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PERSONIFICATION
in the Hellenistic World

Tyche · Kairos · Nemesis

I declare that

this Dissertation

is my own work.



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For Cyril Kershaw.

Contents

Introduction

Introduction

Since one of the acknowledged modern masters of Greek religion takes it as axiomatic that 'the profusion of robed female statues of an allegorical character arouses no more than dusty, aesthetic antiquarian interest'[1], the implied dusty aesthetic antiquarianism of a thesis which attempts a study of such figures demands some degree of defence; and since a noted American scholar in the field of personification asserts that 'one would not get very far trying to characterize an age by the personifications it favoured, or drawing other generalizations from such a heterogeneous assortment of types' because 'no two figures are completely alike in the combination of factors - artistic, literary, religious, historical - that shaped them',and argues that 'each must be studied separately, in accordance with the kinds of evidence available'[2],the approach adopted in the following pages seems to need some justification.

The main arguments to be found in this thesis concern the question of how, in Hellenistic civilization, the use of personification compares with what went before,

and what, if anything, this comparison can tell us about certain wider aspects of Hellenistic culture. More specifically, various received opinions regarding the Hellenistic world will be tested against detailed case-studies of Kairos, Tyche and Nemesis, and if any of these received opinions prove inadequate, they will be replaced by something more convincing. In two important articles central to this subject, T.B.L. Webster has examined personification as a particular type of imagery which conditions much early Greek thought, and has argued that personification was a way in which the early Greeks looked at the world, and which affected their thought on all subjects [3]. Accordingly, if it can be established how, why and to what extent, if at all, the uses of personification in the Hellenistic age differ from those of the preceding eras, it would then seem reasonable to assume that any changes of emphasis which do occur can be interpreted as reflecting some of the changes in the attitude of the people of the Hellenistic era towards their relationship with the world in which they lived. If this attempt to acquire a deeper understanding of the Hellenistic world brings with it the charge of being a dusty antiquarian, it is a charge I readily accept.

Kairos and Tyche have been described as being, in a

sense, the 'patron saints' of the Hellenistic Age [4]. It is my intention to examine this assertion through the study of these two personifications and one other, Nemesis, in an effort to characterize some aspects of the period in question. Despite Shapiro's warning, this is done precisely <u>because</u> they are in some ways dissimilar in the factors that shaped them, and because they afford an insight into those artistic, literary, religious and historical forces which were at work in the period. Furthermore, although for the sake of clarity in the presentation of the evidence, Nemesis, Kairos and Tyche will each be studied under separate chapter headings, no attempt will be made to approach the evidence as though it exists in isolation [5]; rather, the three figures will be related to one another, to other personifications and deities and also to their cultural, religious and social background. This approach will reveal much about the significance of Kairos, Tyche and Nemesis which a more narrow slant would obscure; it will also yield interesting information about certain broader aspects of art, religion and thought in the Hellenistic Age.

(i) Received opinions: decline, decadence, failure of nerve and the secularizing of religion.

The third stage of Gilbert Murray's Four Stages of Greek Religion (1912) covers the Hellenistic period and is described as 'the failure of nerve'; E.A. Gardner, in discussing Greek personification in the Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics ((1917) 794), tells us that the 'anthropomorphic imagination of the Greeks filled every region of earth and sea, rivers and springs, mountains and trees with beings of human form, Nereids or nymphs or river gods. These were not originally personifications; but belief in their existence facilitated the creation of imaginary beings of a similar character to personify . . . various ideas . . . And in later times, as a belief in the actual existence of those supernatural beings waned, it became easier to invent personifications of all sorts, and to give free scope to a poetical or artistic imagination'; in 1936 C.S. Lewis spoke of the 'twilight of the gods' as representing 'the modus vivendi between monotheism and mythology' (6). Monotheism, he argued, should not be regarded as the rival of polytheism, but rather as its maturity:

'where you find polytheism combined with any speculative power and any leisure for speculation, monotheism will sooner or later arise as a natural

development'; Martin P. Nilsson, in his work on Greek Piety (1948), put forward the idea that the widespread belief in Tyche in the Hellenistic period, which was an age characterized by despair of divine intervention and by an exclusive reliance upon human ingenuity or ability, was the 'last stage in the secularizing of Greek Religion' (7); four years later, in an essay on 'Kultische Personifikationen' (8), he described the breakthrough of the cults of personifications in the fourth century B.C. as a sign of the undermining of the old religion, which goes hand in hand with a decreasing faith in the anthropomorphic gods; more recently E.H. Gombrich ((1971) 251f) has argued that 'personifications are drawn into the network of systematic rationalization which characterises the development of the Olympian religion', and that 'this was one of the ways in which Greek rationalism dissolved and sterilised the gods and prepared them for their survival within the Christian tradition'. This doctrine of the decline of religion in the Hellenistic period, in which the cult of Tyche is held to be a major factor, along with syncretism, ruler cult, the promotion of personified ethical concepts like Nemesis, developments relating to temples, priesthoods and rituals, a supposed lack of emotion in religious

belief, and the influence of philosophical scepticism, has been one of the orthodoxies of Hellenistic scholarship. However, some scholars in recent years have come to challenge the validity of the notion of heyday and decline as applied to the events occurring in the Hellenistic age, and to talk instead in terms of re-alignment and reorientation. Accordingly the evidence will be approached with this issue in mind, and should the pro-decline case prove to be deficient in any respects, it will be modified or replaced in the concluding discussion of personification in the Hellenistic world.

Care will be taken as far as possible to avoid judging these issues by modern standards and in terms of modern categories of thought, since these will inevitably produce a misleading, possibly Christianizing, or anti-Christian, picture[9].It has been observed that Christianity has created a great divide between itself and the pagan religions which preceded it, and that that divide is in part responsible for the 'desperately alien' quality of much of ancient Greek religious belief and practice[10], so to judge matters in Christian terms will only exacerbate this alienation. M.I. Finley's warning that 'value judgements based on our own value-systems are

taboo' will be continually kept in mind(11).

(ii) Prima facie evidence for new developments

In order to justify putting the initial question of how the use of personification in the Hellenistic age compares with that of previous periods, it ought perhaps to be explained why there is a prima facie case for thinking that something quantitatively new does indeed occur.

In discussing the extended use made of personifications from nature in the Grand Procession of Ptolemy II Philadelphus, E.E. Rice ((1983)37) suggests that this may be due to 'the increasing popularity and use of personifications in general in the Hellenistic age'; in the first of his Laokoon-Studien(12), H. Blümner describes a transition from the 'mythical' iconography of early Greece to the 'allegorical' iconography of Hellenistic times, and in differentiating figures which are spontaneously created by the popular imagination from those which are consciously created by philosophic reflection, he gives the name of allegory only to the second type. This thesis is picked up by Hinks who asserts that 'it is only in the later period of ancient art, from the Hellenistic age onwards, that the personification of

an abstract concept was deliberately invented, and that its creator had a clear distinction in his mind between the philosophic notion and the human shape in which he chose to attire it' ((1939)17). Immediately prior to this ((1939)16f) he argues that 'it is the mark of allegory that its dramatis personae are abstract concepts: they have no separate existence in legend, such as the characters of myth enjoy; and as a rule they are created ad hoc, to suit a particular situation'. The consensus of scholarly opinion holds that the earliest composition which would fit the requirements of Hinks' definition, and which may be termed 'pure allegory', is the Calumny of Apelles [13]. It has also been argued that even though scenes like the Calumny were not produced before Hellenistic times they were still a natural development of fifth century B.C. experiments in allegorical painting, and of even older poetry, and that in this initial phase, the artists, rather than filling their scenes exclusively with personified abstractions in the manner of Apelles, simply inserted one or more into an already familiar mythical narrative as accessories or supporting figures in order to generalize and so 'almost allegorize' its meaning [14]. It will be necessary to assess the significance of the difference between the 'pure allegory' of the Calumny and the

fifth century scenes which are 'almost allegory', and part of the ensuing discussion will be concerned with the notion of allegory and the tradition in which works like the Calumny lie.

The conscious intention of the artist can be a crucial factor in the creation of allegorical works. Thus, when Callimachus offers an interpretation in dialogue form of an archaic statue of Apollo [15], explaining why the god carries the bow in his left hand and the Charites in his right, in an allegorical exegesis of a work of art which was not originally conceived as such, it seems reasonable to infer that there is a difference in outlook between the Hellenistic Callimachus and the original Archaic artists. Certainly there appears to be no extant example of a strictly allegorical interpretation of a work of religious art which predates this fragment. Rhetorical descriptions of works of art in the form of ecphrases were a favourite exercise of dilettantism in the Hellenistic age [16], and although (or perhaps because) writers were primarily concerned with exhibiting their own experise, with accuracy and relevance as sometimes only minor considerations, they quite commonly unearthed recondite meanings in apparently literal representations. Starting from

the fact that some knowledge of mythology is usually a prerequsite for the correct interpretation of even the simplest scene, writers proceeded to exhibit their erudition in 'far fatched hermeneutic divagations'[17], and even, as we shall see, went to the lengths of inventing incredibly complex imaginary artworks so that they could indulge their passion for elucidating them [18]. Thus there appears to be a good deal of evidence to support a view which sees a quantitative and qualitative difference between the ways in which personifications appear in Hellenistic culture and the ways they appear prior to it, and accordingly two of the principal issues to be confronted in this thesis will be whether personification changes in popularity in the Hellenistic era, and whether it changes in nature.

It has already been observed that M. Robertson described Tyche and Kairos as the patron saints of the new age; elsewhere he describes the statue of the Tyche of Antioch by Eutychides as a 'deeply significant symbol of change, representing Hellenistic art not only in its formal but in its spiritual and social differences from classical art', and speaks of it as being 'the beginning of something new and immensely popular hereafter: the cult of

local and personal Tychai' [19]. He also describes this Tyche as 'a goddess, but a goddess with a difference' [20]. The appearance of tyche in a wide variety of writings has foreshadowings in the Archaic and Classical eras (for example, Pindar addressed his twelfth Olympian ode to her, and in Euripides the question of whether Tyche, who raises up and knocks down, is not the strongest of all the gods is already being asked [21]) yet the extent to which she is invoked and spoken about in the Hellenistic era is quite unprecedented, and the appearance of city Tychai in art and cult after the sculpting of Eutychides' original in circa 300 B.C. is a very striking feature of the period. Robertson is also of the opinion that the Kairos of Lysippus is, in many ways, analogous to the Tyche, and he is not alone in this assessment: L. Petersen [22] describes the Kairos of Lysippus as a clear expression of a new form of deification. Furthermore, at the hands of Lysippus, Kairos is depicted in art for the first time and, as will be seen below, this sculpture was so influential that not only did it dominate the ensuing iconographical tradition but it was also instrumental in occasioning a shift in emphasis in the meaning of the word kairos itself.

It seems, therefore, that there is, at least superficially, some evidence to suggest that quite striking new developments are taking place in the use of certain personifications in the Hellenistic period; but in order to assess these changes in a more accurate perspective, Tyche and Kairos will be examined alongside Nemesis, a figure which proves to be iconographically and, in certain respects, conceptually very similar to Tyche, and one which as well as having a well-established iconographical, mythical and religious tradition at the very beginning of the Hellenistic age, remains a prominent figure within it. In keeping with many of the artistic and social developments of the Hellenistic era, Nemesis undergoes numerous quite subtle modifications to her traditional functions, but by using such a firmly rooted figure as a 'control' we will be better able to see the extent and significance of the changes and innovations embodied in Kairos and Tyche. One aim of the case-studies, therefore, will be to examine the degrees in which Kairos and Tyche show innovation in the ways in which concepts are depicted, though within a line of development of allegorical works, and how Nemesis can be used to place these innovations in context and to show how they stand relative to the tradition.

(iii) Extension and innovation: why Nemesis, Kairos and Tyche, and why in these ways?

If Tyche, Kairos and Nemesis do indeed show, in differing degrees, an extension of, or even innovation in, existing representations of concepts, it is surely reasonable to ask why this should happen to these three concepts in the ways in which it does. Two lines of inquiry will be pursued in an effort to answer these questions and to establish some kind of cultural and historical orientation for this study.

On a more general level, when the personifications are located within the historical and political environment of the Hellenistic era, it becomes apparent that there are particular reasons why they were popular at the time. One aspect of this to be examined is the idea that the conquests made by Alexander resulted in a massive and rapid expansion of the geographical horizons of the Greek world, which consequently exerted a considerable influence on various aspects of religion. Widespread worship of Tyche is often held to be one feature of this, and another is that the wars between the Successors which immediately followed Alexander's death did much to foster a sense of political and social instability, in

which grasping the opportune moment (Kairos) came to be of the utmost importance, and forces such as chance (Tyche), envy of the gods, or the envy of Nemesis, became alternative ways of expressing the reason behind many of the events happening in the world. A further school of thought regards these changes in the world as occasioning a decline in the city-state, and a correlative decline in confidence in the traditional cults. Documents such as the Hymn to Demetrius Poliorcetes are interpreted by many scholars according to this scheme as illustrations of the 'political and spiritual helplessness' [23] of the polis at this time, and the increased emphasis placed on the cult of Tyche is introduced in support of this argument. These facets of the interaction of personifications with their cultural background will be assessed as a means to a deeper understanding of the personifications themselves and of the culture of which they form an important part. Once they have been located in their historical and political context greater sense can be made of their artistic significance.

The second line of inquiry to be followed is narrower. It is centered on the mental climate of the day, and especially on iconography. The particular significance that iconography assumes here has direct

links with an artistic milieu highly receptive to recondite allusion, as exemplified by the phenomenon of the 'scholar poet' and the development of allegorical abstractions. This can be exemplified from allegorical interpretations of art and literature as practised by, amongst others, the Stoics, but at the same time it is important to remain aware that these features of the age only relate to an academic and artistic sphere, and generalizations drawn from these instances should not necessarily be applied to the person-in-the-street: to attribute the standards and values of the intellectual élite to the ordinary public will create a distorted picture of Hellenistic society, but this has frequently been ignored by scholars specializing in this period, often with very misleading results. Nevertheless, whilst the innovative figures of the Tyche of Antioch and the Kairos of Lysippus show the creation of new figures with new attributes for a new kind of 'audience', the old-established figure of Nemesis also shows just how highly the symbolic qualities of an image's attributes were valued in this period, for although one side of her iconography can boast a highly acclaimed and widely known prototype, it is the other, more explicitly allegorical, type which dominates. Thus Nemesis, Tyche and Kairos will be examined as being

particularly suited to a type of expression which was extremely fashionable in the Hellenistic era, and iconography will be examined as a major force in the innovation and development of these concepts.

(iv) The overall plan of the thesis

With the issues outlined above in mind, the chapters examining Tyche, Kairos and Nemesis will assume closely similar formats. Each will comprise a study of precedent, surveying the concept in general and its use in pre-Hellenistic culture, an assessment of the concept in the literature of the Hellenistic era, and a detailed iconographical analysis covering the same period. Specific religious and philosophical issues relating to the concepts will be dealt with as they arise. The aim of this methodology is twofold. Firstly it will enable us to highlight, and thus better analyse, the important and illuminating issue of the difference in emphasis in the deployment of personification in the literary and artistic media. So, for example, in the discussion of Kairos there will be relatively more emphasis placed on art than in those of Tyche and Nemesis; this directly reflects the nature of events in which art, or here, one particular work of art, plays a major

role. This will be seen to afford further insights into personification in Hellenistic times and also into its relation to the religious tradition. The second aim of the methodology is to allow the study of the relationships which Kairos, Nemesis and Tyche have to that earlier religious tradition, and thereby to assess more accurately the degrees of continuity or change that are manifest in them.

One of the attractions of studying the goddess/ personification/concept Tyche in the Hellenistic era is that, although in the broader meaning of the word (as opposed to the specific phenomenon of the city Tyche) it is not an invention of the period, it is frequently described as a highly prominent feature of it, and as such could prove to be a valuable central figure through whom to study the attitudes of the people of the day (and not just those of the intellectual élite). Therefore Tyche will be the subject of the first of the three case-studies. The following chapter will deal with Kairos, concentrating primarily on the now lost masterpiece, the Kairos of Lysippus, and assessing the importance and influence of this sculpture not just on future iconographical representations of the concept, but also on the balance between the different semantic fields which the

noun kairos has. Nemesis will be introduced as a figure who already has two firmly grounded iconographical traditions, one at Rhamnus in Attica, the other at Smyrna, and who plays a significant role in myth prior to the Hellenistic age. However, her prominence in the era and the various alterations and transitions which occur in the established conceptions and representations of her, as well as her ultimate assimilation to Tyche, all suggest she is having to accept modification in order to exist in the new world. Set against these developments in Nemesis the more conspicuous innovations surrounding Tyche and Kairos can assume their real significance, and the concluding chapter attempts to bring together the findings made in the course of these preceding chapters and to add more general evidence to the argument.

The initial chapter, to which we now turn, attempts to establish an overall historical context for the enquiry by examining some of the ways in which pre-Hellenistic thought deployed personification. The study of personification, and of Nemesis, Kairos and Tyche specifically, is a means to an end. That end is to seek a deeper understanding of the religion and art of the Hellenistic era.

NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

1. W. Burkert (1985) 186.

2. H.A. Shapiro (1977) 30.

3. T.B.L. Webster (1953); (1954) 21.

4. M. Robertson (1975) 468.

5. Cf. R. Hinks (1939) 19: 'We shall concentrate upon the relations between them invented by the artist, in the belief that this is the only practicable way of discovering how he and his contemporaries envisaged them.'

6. C.S. Lewis (1936) 57.

7. M.P. Nilsson (1948) 86.

8. Nilsson (1952) 39f.

9. Cf. J. Huizinga (1970) 167: 'involuntarily we judge archaic man's belief in the myths he creates by our own standards of science, philosophy, or religious conviction.'

10. M.I. Finley (1985) xiii.

11. (1985) xiv.

12. Über den Gebrauch der Allegorie in den bildenden Künsten (Freiburg und Tübingen 1881).

13. This is discussed, along with questions of its date and authenticity in my final chapter, pp. 5/18 ff. with Fig. 32.

14. See e.g. Shapiro (1977) 13.

15. Fr. 114 Pf. A full discussion of the fragment is presented in my final chapter at p. 5/25 ff.

16. References given at Hinks (1939) 12 n.1; see also pp. 115 ff.

17. Hinks (1939) 12.

18. See my final chapter pp. 5/84 ff.

19. (1975) 472; 471.

20. (1985) 189.

21. Ion 1512-14; cf. Hec 488-91; Cycl 606f.

22. (1939) 52.

23. F.W. Walbank (1981) 215.

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Pre-Hellenistic Personification

Chapter 1 Pre-Hellenistic Personification

(i) Definitional problems

There are a good many definitional problems which beset any study of personification in Greek culture, and it will be essential to outline where some of the principal difficulties arise, survey the scholarly literature and, where appropriate, offer suggestions on what some possible solutions might be. The ubiquity of personification is frequently said to be one of Greek literature's oldest and most pervasive characteristics [1], and the assigning of conscious or active personality to natural objects and abstract ideas is widely held to be particularly prevalent among the Greeks [2]. However, it must be made clear from the outset precisely what can be meant by the term, especially as fifth century Greek has no word for 'personification'. This suggests that the distinction which we draw between a 'personification' and an 'abstract noun' was not one which we can assume that the Greeks made. The term προσωποποιΐα, the modern Greek word for personification, does not occur before Demetrius of Phalerum [3] in the early Hellenistic period, although even here the meaning, according to L.S.J., is 'dramatization' or 'putting speeches into the mouths of characters' [4]; the Latin term 'fictio personae', 'personarum ficta inductio'

does not appear earlier than Quintilian[5].The Oxford English Dictionary defines 'personify' as a transitive verb meaning 'to figure or represent a thing or abstraction (be this an inanimate thing, a natural phenomenon or an invisible force which affects the human body, such as Sleep, the human mind, such as Love or human life, such as Nemesis) as a person; to attribute a personal nature or personal characteristics to, by way of a metaphor, in thought, or especially in speech or writing; in art to symbolize by a figure in human form', thus 'personification' means 'the attribution of personal form, nature or characteristics; the representation of a thing or abstraction as a person. Also in art, the representation of a thing or abstraction by a human figure.' We shall return to the implications of this definition later, especially to the differences between the literary and artistic media. We can observe some of the discrepancies between modern and ancient personifications from Dr. Johnson, who, in his Dictionary, describes personification, prosopopoeia, as 'the change of things into persons' and then goes on to say that 'Fame tells a tale or Victory hovers over a general or perches on a standard; but Fame and Victory can do no more'; in antiquity, however, they could do far more than perch, hover or tell tales, and the cult of what in modern times would be regarded as 'mere abstractions'

illustrates that the distinction between an abstract noun and a living being, which to us is fundamental, presented itself to Greeks very differently in different contexts; it is often hard for us to judge whether the appearance of an abstraction in personal terms reflects a genuinely personalizing outlook on the world or merely exemplifies a traditional form of linguistic expression [6].The nature of this dilemma will be discussed below, but there is more to say regarding the contemporary interpretations of the word personification before it can be approached.

In a general sense, as the O.E.D. definition suggests, personification is the process of conceiving of inanimate, immaterial or abstract objects as possessing life and soul [7], and in literature personification can arguably come about as soon as the effect of a metaphor consists in describing events or things in terms of life and movement; as such it can be one of the most effective and eloquent devices of poetic language. This problem does not arise to the same extent with personifications in the visual arts, where the choices are more clear-cut, but as far as literature is concerned we need to be aware of the range of evocations which the word personification can include, and of how the adoption of any one of various definitions may affect the analysis.

It is tempting to draw a distinction between personifications which have a place in cult and those which are (or seem to be) merely creations of a poetic or artistic imagination, thereby eliminating all the personifications introduced by the later, Hellenistic, age - the 'purely **poetical, allegorical, conventional** or grammatical' - as artificial since 'they are often simply pictographic devices . . . implying no real belief in a positively existing person' [8]. Yet we do find that many personifications which we would expect to be simply arbitrary creations in the category of personifications with cult: Eleos, Aidos, Pheme and Horme all had cult at Athens, while Gelos and Phobos did at Sparta, and although Cephisodotus' Eirene and Ploutos group may look like a transparent allegory, we must bear in mind that both were deities which had a share in the state worship at Athens [9]. Thus it is often impossible to tell at any given juncture whether we are dealing with an abstraction, a divinity or a daimon, and the question 'what is Nemesis, Kairos or the Tyche of a city?' admits of no easy answer. Indeed, that answer may well need modification according to the historical period of which it is asked.

The fact that modern authors can use the animation of inanimate things and ideas as an intellectual exercise, a device of non-literal language which

produces greater vividness or intensity and other calculated transient effects, should not lead us to prejudge the issue and assume that this also applies to Classical or Hellenistic Greece. It seems, for instance, that Hesiod's characters are not personified to add literary flourish; Nyx's children, for example, are not mere abstractions, lacking in divine status, unworthy of cult; we must be careful about making automatic assumptions about the unreality of allegorical personifications (10). So although, say, Mnemosyne and Hyperion look to us like abstractions personified, we should not presuppose that Hesiod and his audience perceived the difference; the same word may denote a god, a human being, something with partial or temporary human characteristics, an abstract idea or something concrete, and two meanings which may be far apart in this scheme can at times occur in the same sentence. Two examples from Homer illustrate this clearly. At Iliad xiv 200f Hera visits Oceanos who has quarrelled with his wife Tethys and says:

εἶμι γὰρ ὀψομένη πολυφόρβου πείρατα γαίης,
Ὠκεανόν τε, θεῶν γένεσιν, καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν.

Here the physical fluid Oceanos and the anthropomorphic Oceanos are combined in the same sentence; Oceanos is both water and person. At Iliad xxi. 193 ff we are told:

ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι Διὶ Κρονίωνι μάχεσθαι,
τῷ οὐδὲ κρείων Ἀχελώϊος ἰσοφαρίζει,
οὐδὲ βαθυρρείταο μέγα σθένος Ὠκεανοῖο,
ἐξ οὗ περ πάντες ποταμοὶ καὶ πᾶσα θάλασσα
καὶ πᾶσαι κρῆναι καὶ φρείατα μακρὰ νάουσιν·
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὃς δείδοικε Διὸς μεγάλοιο κεραυνὸν
δεινήν τε βροντήν, ὅτ᾽ ἀπ᾽ οὐρανόθεν σμαραγήσῃ.

In this passage Oceanos is both a warrior equated with Zeus and is described in physical terms as the source of all rivers. We will see in discussing Nemesis that this kind of duality came to be exploited by the Alexandrian poets for artistic effect, but there is nothing of that here. It is clear that any given passage must be carefully tested to ascertain whether a particular idea is personified or not.

The problems facing the translator can be further illustrated by looking at the use of nemesis in Pindar. Take, for instance, O. 8. 84 ff:

.... ἑσλὰ δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἐσλοῖς
ἔργα θέλοι δόμεν, ὀξείας δὲ νόστους ἀπαλάλκοι.
εὔχομαι ἀμφὶ καλῶν μοίρᾳ νέμεσιν διχόβουλον μὴ θέμεν·
ἀλλ᾽ ἀπήμαντον ἄγων βίοτον
αὐτούς τ᾽ ἄεξοι καὶ πόλιν.

Should one read the text as nemesis or Nemesis? Context can be the only guide here, and it seems probably that in this example nemesis should be taken as, in our terms, unpersonified. A similar dilemma occurs at P. 10. 42 ff where Pindar says of the Hyperboreans:

νόσοι δ' οὔτε γῆρας οὐλόμενον κέκραται
ἱερᾷ γενεᾷ· πόνων δὲ καὶ μαχᾶν ἄτερ
οἰκέοισι φυγόντες
ὑπέρδικον Νέμεσιν.

Here there is a discrepancy between the text (= 'severely just Nemesis' (LSJ)) and R. Lattimore's translation 'scandal and litigation' which implies that he takes nemesis unpersonified. A problem of the same type relates to Tyche in a line of Aeschylus, Supp. 523, where Pelasgus exits with the words πειθὼ δ' ἕποιτο καὶ τύχη πρακτήριος. The fact that persuasion and fortune can be perceived as divine can be illustrated from a passage of Alcman (11) which describes them as sisters, but one could still argue that Aeschylus may have intended just the 'abstract' concepts specified by πειθὼ and τύχη (12). The dilemma which faces us whether to print upper or lower case letters would be meaningless to Aeschylus: the lack of orthographical distinction between upper and lower case lettering means that a fortiori there was no semantic distinction based on such orthography; the polarity 'Personification/Abstract' is always fluid in antiquity(13). Thus there is no perspicuous division between Tyche and tyche, Nemesis and nemesis, Kairos and kairos, and it will be argued below that the most that can be said is that they may be thought of as standing at two ends of a spectrum.

The foregoing examples illustrate that the borderline between mythical beings which can be represented and abstractions which can be symbolized was very ill-defined in antiquity; gods can fade into personifications of concepts, and abstract ideas can become daimonic powers. Thus there is a 'twilight zone' between the deities of Olympus and the abstractions of language, and the problem of how a personification was seen and experienced by its creator and his or her public remains [14]. Yet modern scholars are by no means the first to pinpoint difficulties of this type, for Carneades criticised Stoic theological doctrines by using the example of the Heap, moving on to apply that problem to show the impossibility of drawing any distinction between that which is supposedly divine and that which is not:

> If gods exist are nymphs also goddesses? If the nymphs are goddesses then the Pans and Satyrs are also gods; but the latter are not gods, therefore the nymphs too are not. But the nymphs have temples vowed and dedicated to them by the state. Are the other gods then not gods who have temples dedicated to them? (15)

Should the opponent decline to accept any link in the chain the sceptic can ask what it is about nymphs which makes them rather than Pans and Satyrs divine, and also what distinguishes nymphs from other deities, given that both sets of things have temples set up in their honour. If we substitute personifications for nymphs, abstract nouns for Pans and Satyrs, and altars

or cult centres (or temples) for temples, we are left with exactly the same problem, although (and possibly significantly) it seems unlikely that the question of the use of these distinctions presented itself to Carneades as a fitting example.

One of the most commonly adopted approaches to the problem of defining personifications is to make use of a 'sliding-scale' or 'spectrum'. This has been employed to good effect by various scholars and, provided an awareness of its limitations is maintained, it can prove to be extremely useful. The scale or spectrum ranges from fully characterized and mythologized divinities to what H. Usener ((1896) 279) termed 'Augenblicksgötter', spontaneous and one-dimensional creations brought to life momentarily to make a point. F. Stössl (1937) has a three-stage scale; W. Pötscher ((1972) 661-62) has four stages, the first marked by 'ausgeprägten Personlichkeitscharakter' which includes Gaia-gaia, Oceanos-oceanos and Ouranos-ouranos, the second whose characterization is 'blasser' and which contains figures such a Nemesis, Eros and Nike, the third with personality 'nur gelegentlich sichtbar' in which Koros, Kratos, Kydoimos, Deimos, Erebos etc. are found, and the fourth with none; Webster ((1954) 13) likewise adopts four categories arranged in a scale of decreasing vividness from deification through strong

personification to weak personification and even technical terms. There are innumerable shades in the spectrum and the various categories merge into one another, and we must notice also that one personification can occupy several different points along the scale - indeed it may occupy more than one point at the same time, as with Oceanos, who can be a legendary character, a distant sea or the father of all. Likewise Eros appears to be capable of operating on at least two levels, since, as a human phenomenon, an individual's own procreative power, which can die even before its owner, it is not immortal, and yet simultaneously Eros pervades the whole world as a primaeval power of universal creation, and is everlasting[16]; likewise Aglaia, Euphrosyne and Thalia are manifestly transitory human phenomena, but together as the Charites they too are immortal[17]. This should pose no problem so long as we recognise that these several experiences, though different, are the responsibility of the same agent (the Charites or Eros in this case).

In certain contexts, however, the metaphor of the scale or spectrum is inadequate. This occurs where a choice is forced upon one, as, in particular, it is forced upon artists or dramatists [18] who are compelled to commit themselves to anthropomorphic representation;

they must personify if they want to represent something immaterial instead of showing its effects on visible things. Thus the issue is quite distinct and the shades in the spectrum become largely indiscernible. Shapiro ((1977) 6) does try to introduce some gradations into the scale on the criterion of more or less specific iconographies, citing the Nemesis of Rhamnus as an example of the former. However, a great many personifications are less explicitly individualized than other divinities or mythological characters, and are consequently harder to identify on the basis of their icongraphy. So if a figure lacks attributes, or those which it has are ambiguous, we are reliant either on an inscribed name, as for example on the François Vase, the Chest of Cypselus or some late fifth century B.C. red figure vases with genre scenes from the life of Athenian women enacted by labelled personifications, or on the appearance of the figure in a known mythological context, as on the Calyx-krater by Euphronius where Sarpedon, Hypnos and Thanatos are recognizable from Homer and also in this case by labels [19]. Using slightly different criteria to Shapiro in placing artistic personifications within the spectrum, Webster ((1954) 14) distinguishes between figures like Himeros and Lyssa, whose attitudes indicate that they are participating in the action, and figures like Hygieia and Eudaimonia on fifth

century B.C. vases, who lend an atmosphere to a scene but who are indistinguishable from each other except by the inscribed names which go with them. This should alert us to the fact that some of the problems confronting any study of personification will vary according to whether it is focussed on literature or on art; the discussions of Nemesis, Kairos and Tyche will attempt to keep these distinctions and issues clearly in mind, and to use them constructively in assessing personification in general.

Despite these reservations the idea of a spectrum can prove helpful in certain cases, and at one of the far extremes comes deification. We have already seen that the presence or absence of a cult is one very rough way of distinguishing between divinities and abstractions, provided one realizes that certain personifications can come under both these categories simultaneously. Furthermore, there are several examples of the establishment of hymns or cults to abstract ideas which seem to have been of great significance at some historical moment: a cult of Pheme was started at Athens after the news of the victory at Eurymedon in 467 B.C. reached Athens amazingly quickly; Eirene was given annual sacrifices and a statue by Cephisodotus of her holding the child Ploutos at a time when, as can be shown from contemporary comedy [20], the need for peace and prosperity was uppermost in the Athenians'

consciousness; Aristotle wrote an epigram for an altar of Philia set up in Plato's honour [21] and also a hymn to Arete to commemorate his dead friend Hermias [22]. Like the other aspects of personification, deification has different degrees of scope and intensity, and its relationship towards the traditional myths can vary; with some exceptions, such as Themis, Nike, Hygieia and Nemesis, personifications of abstracts do not often persist with the same kind of permanent and developing individuality as the Olympian gods, but are deified at moments of great emotion[23], and it is in their adaptation to specific mythological roles that these figures often achieve persistence and individuality [24]. This process also occurs in Homer, when for example, Deimos and Phobos yoke Ares' horses and when Hypnos and Thanatos transport Sarpedon's body. Thus abstractions can be genuinely deified [25], and J. Burckhardt's observation ((1933) 430-1) about personified concepts in Roman religion has great relevance to the figures under scrutiny here:

> Without meaning to, one might arrive at the idea that to the dry, prosaic Romans such things come fairly easily. But the temple of Fear and Pallor (Pavor et Pallor) was consecrated by King Tullus Hostilius amid mortal danger of battle . . . that of Honour and Valour by the great Marcus Marcellus in the midst of the fearful Punic War. So the deification of such beings must have been hedged with a more profound seriousness.

The degree of seriousness and also, in literary works,

the degree of imaginative reality, must be gauged sensitively in each context[26].

Personification can be strong without deification[28], and the boundary between 'strong' and 'weak' is also hard to delineate, since the categories merge into one another. Nevertheless it does seem as if some personifications have achieved and retained a fuller degree of personality than others, and a distinction can perhaps be drawn between personifications in which the human qualities are clearly seen, and those in which a single quality suggests that the abstract idea is conceived personally or is given some sort of independent reality. The first category includes many ethical personifications such as Ate and the Litai in Iliad 9 or Arete and Kakia in Prodicus' Choice of Heracles, and it does appear that some were conceived more vividly than others: Nemesis, Tyche, Aidos, Peitho and Eros certainly appear more 'real' to us than, say, Eleos, Horme or even Philia. Moreover, the fact that the names have a known meaning, that personifications have 'transparent' names, 'weakens' them as against the completely developed personal god with a proper name whose meaning is forgotten[29] Personifications tend to have more closely circumscribed spheres of action (which are described by their transparent names) than the Olympians, who do not represent just single virtues, functions or

states. In fact many personifications are attached to the Olympians as attendants or epithets, as in the case of Athena Hygieia and Artemis Eukleia. In some cases their 'personality is absorbed and they sink into adjectives' [30], but the stronger personifications are able to resist this, and Nike is never lost in Athena, Peitho in Aphrodite or Nemesis in Artemis. In addition to this, if the figure had a well-established cult, if myth had created a fairly distinct character and history for it, if art had given it a determinate iconography, or if literature had helped to give it a fixed and enduring form, the figure would have more chance of retaining its autonomy.

Attempts have been made to distinguish between weaker and stronger personifications in Hesiod on the criterion that the former, in which category come, for example, Nyx's children, are not only virgin born but are also, in many cases, issueless, having no offspring abstract or otherwise [31]. This classification seems unsatisfactory in as much as it includes figures which are not mere abstractions lacking in divine status and unworthy of cult.

Further efforts have been made to distinguish between the figures which participate in the genealogy of Zeus and those which make no contribution to the flow of the myth Hesiod tells, on the grounds that the latter are 'pale abstractions', 'floating

nouns' which 'lack activating power'; the difficulties which this approach creates are symptomatic of the whole problem of how, where and when we can reasonably draw broad distinctions between the different shades of our spectrum. In many cases rigid and broad-ranging categorizations are unhelpful since they obscure the fundamental conceptual differences between modern and ancient categories of thought and thereby prevent us from perceiving the subtle gradations which occur in the ancient uses of what we call personified abstractions.

With the weaker examples of personification we begin to move beyond the scope of this thesis, in as much as we move out of the realms of cult and of artistic representation. So, when Aristotle Metaph. 984a 18 says

προϊόντων δ' οὕτως, αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὡδοποίησεν
αὐτοῖς καὶ συνηνάγκασε ζητεῖν,

the πρᾶγμα , though personified and accorded special status by Aristotle's phrasing, is not a figure to be found in art or cult. Comparable to this is Plato's personification of his argument [32], which may shout encouragement, laugh to scorn, sneak away with covered head, or die and rise again, and the figures of the Just and Unjust arguments, who appear personified in a more concrete form on stage in Aristophanes' Clouds. They too, however, represent a rather different kind of personificatio from Nemesis, Tyche and Kairos which appear both as allegories in art and as objects of cult.

The three personifications dealt with here all come well towards the deification/strong personification end of the scale in as much as, in the Hellenistic era, they all receive cult as theoi while Nemesis has a fully developed mythical personality in addition to her allegorical function. Tyche frequently appears deified or strongly personified in all kinds of literary contexts and, in accordance with significant factors concerned with the Kairos of Lysippus, the majority of the literary references to Kairos in the Hellenistic period are to Kairos the personification (or god) of the Opportune Moment. This is not to say, of course, that the words cannot be used in what we would interpret as 'weaker', less personal ways in various instances and, though it will be endeavoured to assess accurately the usages in any specific instance, it would be a time-consuming and largely futile task to attempt to justify each decision about whether a word is personified or not (in our terms), and, except in particularly important, illuminating or relevant cases, the personification/non-personification distinction will be included indiscriminately in what follows.

(ii) The Historical Context of the Inquiry: How earlier Greek Thought deployed Personification

To study the Hellenistic period in isolation would

preclude the possibility of properly assessing the features which distinguish it from earlier periods. Therefore it is essential to sketch some of the ways in which earlier Greek thought deployed personification, and thereby establish a background against which some of the significant features of Hellenistic personification can stand. This section will concentrate on three main areas, the first examining personification as an aspect of anthropomorphism, the second assessing cult and the third looking briefly at some elements in the development of personification prior to the Hellenistic period. With this picture complete we can proceed to our three case studies of Nemesis, Kairos and Tyche.

(a) Anthropomorphism

One way that divine power can manifest itself is through definite qualities, properties or attributes, and it must be noted that abstractions in themselves encompass neither one nor the other. The Olympian gods are linked to particular areas and functions in which their influence can be acquired or incurred, and this link is guaranteed both by their epithets [33] and by the personified abstractions which can form part of their entourage. Yet the epithets and personifications are by no means separate areas, since it appears that a great many abstract names of gods had

predicative or adjectival power at a very early stage. Abstractions which occur as epithets of 'higher' divinities are particularly interesting; each Olympian deity had numerous powers and attributes which were expressed by epithets, addenda to the name itself [34]. The epithet attached to a god or goddess, describing his or her function, was on occasion so much emphasised that the epithet could assume the primary place, and in many cases actually became detached from the divinity and acquired an independent existence of its own; the epithets were thus able to express a certain characteristic of the deity and later gave way to a particular interest in that characteristic [35]. Thus Eukleia [36] can be regarded as an epithet of Artemis which has taken its own separate way, Peitho as an offshoot from Aphrodite [37], Nike from Athena [38], Praxis from Aphrodite, Nemesis from Aphrodite or Artemis, Hygieia from Athena [39] and so on. Thus many of these figures betray an adjectival nature in their forms, and it seems that many personifications originate in connection with the cult of great deities. Furthermore, the cult of personifications seems only to have become widespread on an independent basis at a later date, and herein lies part of the importance of Nemesis to this study, since as an established representative of this old type of personification she forms a good control against which to measure the full extent of the innovations inherent in the Kairos of

Lysippus and the Tyche of Antioch.

It is as a result of a process dubbed 'Homerization' by Burkert ((1985) 185) that many Archaic Greek personifications acquired this distinctive characteristic of mediating between the individual gods and their spheres of reality [40]; they receive mythical and personal elements from the gods, in return for which they gave the gods part in the conceptual order of things. Some of the vehicles for connecting personifications with one another and with the gods have already been encountered in the form of genealogy, retinues and struggles with adversaries. Thus Themis and Metis become consorts of Zeus [41], and Dike his daughter [42]; Athena carries Nike, a small winged figure, in her hand; Ares is accompanied by Phobos and Deimos, Aphrodite has Eros, Himeros, Peitho, Eudaimonia, Harmonia, Paidia and others with her; Dionysus is the leader of the Horai, but his entourage can also comprise Tragodia, Dithyrambos, Komos, Pompe, Methe and Kraipale. None of these relationships is allegorical in the sense in which it will be used below, but they do express conceptual links between the deities and their spheres of activity.

(b) Development of Personification (Pre-Hellenistic)

Personification is evident in the Greek language as far back as can be traced [43]; there are numerous personifications in Homer, ranging from inanimate things, like the spears which 'yearn to taste flesh' [44], to natural phenomena, like the heavens, the heavenly bodies, the seasons, the winds, the earth and so on, and to forces which affect human beings, like Hypnos, Thanatos, Pheme, Dike, Ate, Litai, Eros, Phobos etc. Although they appear in a poetic context, they belong to the oldest elements of the religious tradition. Personification is thus a method of understanding them, speaking about them and describing their interrelations. A similar process, which Webster ((1954) 18) characterizes as 'persuasive personification', is the use of personification to impress upon people the importance of certain ideas. This occurs, for instance, where Phoinix, in an attempt to make Achilles listen to the Greek envoys, personifies Ate as a strong runner and the Litai as lame, wrinkled, squinting old women who come after her [45]. This is not an allegory in the sense that, say, the Kairos of Lysippus is [46], even though it expresses interactions between ideas in personal terms, and we may note also [47] that a substantial number of Homer's personifications occur in ecphrases;

very few personifications actually get involved in the action: Deimos, Phobos, Eris, Hypnos and Thanatos are the only exceptions. Thus it is clear that Homer did not have the penchant for the facile and spontaneous creation of new personifications which characterizes the Hellenistic era.

A similar range of personifications appears in Hesiod, although he personifies far more ideas of an ethical or political nature, such as Dike, Eunomia and Arete. This may be placed under the rubric 'persuasive personification' but Hesiod also uses personifications to describe the relationships between ideas on a large scale by using, in the Theogony, the genealogy of the gods to link very different things: Chaos is therefore the ultimate ancestor, through Nyx, of Thanatos, Apate and Ate [48], while Gaia is the ultimate ancestor, through Zeus and Themis, of Eunomia, Dike and Eirene who are identified with the Horai [49]. A scholion on Th. 224 ff explains the kinship of Nyx's fatherless children and the family of her last daughter Eris in terms of the alleged connection between the concepts. M.L. West rightly observes that, although the genealogical relationships between the gods of mythology and cult are often well-defined, there are times, particularly in the case of elements of the natural world (like Nyx),

abstractions (like Thanatos, Hypnos, Apate, Philotes and Eris), and pluralities (like the Nymphs, Nereids and Horai), where they have to be invented[50]. Furthermore these inventions are conditioned by the propensity of the Greek language, in poetic contexts, to describe things which are significantly connected as neighbours[51], blood relations, or both [52]. Thus deities of similar natures tend to be grouped together in the genealogies, and these groups then have to be combined with those which the poet receives in a fixed form. This is a crucial point: the genealogical connections between these figures are indicative only of their conceptual interrelationships. The symbolism embodied in these relationships is of a general nature, describing the connections between the concepts only vaguely, and this makes it impossible to describe them as allegorical in the same sense as, say, the explicitly meaningful mother-and-child relationship which expresses the causal relations between wealth and peace which we shall encounter in Cephisodotus' Eirene and Ploutos. The Hesiodic genealogies express connections between concepts; the sculpture by Cephisodotus goes one stage further in describing what that relationship is.

It can be added that the scholia, which descend from an

ancient commentary which combines the results of Alexandrian scholarship with allegorical interpretation deriving from the Stoics, interpret Geras' kinship with Nyx as ὅτι οἱ γερῶντες παραπλήσιοι εἰσι τῷ θανάτῳ, and Lethe's relation with Eris as because πολλάκις γὰρ ἔριδος πρός τινα γινομένης ἐπιλανθανόμεθα καὶ τῶν προσηκόντων. This suggests that there is a difference between the more or less-arbitrary Hellenistic interpretation and Hesiod's original intention. West is again close to the mark when he writes 'in Hesiod's time it was not understood what abstractions were - no more than it was in Plato's. They must be something; they are invisible, imperishable, and have great influence over human affairs; they must be gods' ((1966) 33), and indeed we can see Hesiod himself using this type of reasoning in the case of Pheme:

> ὣδ' ἔρδειν· δεινὴν δὲ βροτῶν ὑπαλεύεο φήμην·
> φήμη γάρ τε κακὴ πέλεται κούφη μὲν ἀεῖραι
> ῥεῖα μάλ', ἀργαλέη δὲ φέρειν, χαλεπὴ δ' ἀποθέσθαι.
> φήμη δ' οὔ τις πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἥντινα πολλοὶ
> λαοὶ φημίξουσι· θεός νύ τίς ἐστι καὶ αὐτή.
> Op. 760-64

These processes are also evident in Pindar, where his use of genealogical links may well have its roots in a conceptual rather than a mythical context, as he uses the relationships between personifications to express conceptual links between them (53). He also uses

personification to express difficult new ideas, as in the opening strophe of I. 5 (54).

> Mother of Helios, Theia the many-named, for your sake men have made the great strength of gold to be a thing prized above other possessions. And ships that strive on the sea and horses under the chariot, by your grace, lady, are made wonderful in the rapid whirl of contests.
> (Tr. Lattimore)

Theia is thus the source of light and the common quality which makes gold and sporting achievement precious; Pindar uses the personification to convey the notion of value. Empedocles used personification in an analogous way: at D-K.B 122 he links the opposite abstract qualities which can be seen in anything physical as pairs of deities who receive the soul at birth:

> There were Chthonie and far-seeing Heliope, bloody Deris and serene Harmonia, Kallisto and Aischre, Thoosa and Denaie, lovely Nemertes and blind Asapheia.

Harmonia, Nemertes and Kallisto are all bona fide mythological figures in quite different contexts, so it is around them that the new personifications are grouped. Again this is not allegory in any but the widest sense, but it does show personification used as a means of putting across a complex novel idea in an accessible way.

A closely related process to these literary examples can be seen in some late fifth century B.C. and early fourth century B.C. vases which depict Dionysus and Aphrodite surrounded not only by old personifications like the Charites and the Horai, but also by new ones such as Eudaimonia, Hygieia, Pompe, Tragodia and Komodia which, as concomitants of ecstasy and love, are in some way connected with Dionysus or Aphrodite and represented as maenads or nymphs. Personifications of this type can be a useful 'shorthand' for artists, and so if they want to say that Chrysippus fell in love with a girl in a procession they can paint him with Aphrodite, Eros and Pompe, as indeed is the case on a squat lekythos of circa 410 B.C. now in New York [55].

Should they wish to indicate the time and venue they could add, say, the figures of Helios, Selene or Nyx, and the nymph of the locality. In fact many local personifications developed from nymphs of springs and mountains, which could easily become locality goddesses and hence representatives of their citizens. Persons may be substituted for some local personifications, as when Herodotus says that Miletus has been sick with stasis for two generations, personifying the city as a person who outlasts any given generation of its citizens [56]; on the other hand, when Aeschylus says that the entire land of Asia

mourns for the Persians who have gone to war, the land of Asia is synonymous with the people who inhabit the land [57]. Likewise Hellas and Salamis figured on the throne of Zeus at Olympia and on a late fourth century B.C. vase in Naples [58]. Asia and Hellas are personifications of people dwelling in the countries rather than the countries themselves, and, although the personifications can be local in character, it is usually the people rather than the place which is typified [59].

The techniques of explanatory and persuasive personification are by no means peculiar to Homer and Hesiod. We have already encountered Dike dragging the ugly Adikia by the neck and beating her on the Chest of Cypselus; a bilingual nicosthenic amphora of circa 530 B.C., now in Vienna, shows Dike attacking the hideous spotted Adikia with a hammer [60]; at ll. 646-51 the chorus of Aeschylus' Choephoroe sing:

Δίκας δ' ἐρείδεται πυθμήν,
προχαλκεύει δ' Αἶσα φασγανουργός·
τέκνον δ' ἐπεισφέρει δόμοις
αἱμάτων παλαιτέρων
τίνειν μύσος χρόνωι κλυτὰ
βυσσόφρων Ἐρινύς.

Mania occurs on a crater by Asteas in Madrid depicting the madness of Heracles [61], Lyssa on an Attic vase by the Lykaon painter [62], Athanasia on a bell crater in New York, a bell crater by the Eupolis painter (now lost), and an Etruscan mirror in the Cabinet des Médailles in Paris [63], Apate on the Darius vase; Plato describes Kakia as a fast runner who catches Socrates' accusers [64] and Hedone and Lype as nailing the soul to the body and rivetting it on [65]; Demosthenes' words show the same process where, in summing up his speech on behalf of Leptines, he says ἐν δὲ τῇ τῶν καθημένων ὑμῶν ἑνὸς ἑκάστου γνώμῃ φιλανθρωπία πρὸς φθόνον καὶ δικαιοσύνη πρὸς κακίαν καὶ πάντα τὰ χρηστὰ πρὸς τὰ πονηρότατα ἀντιτάττεται [66], and also in his first speech against Aristogeiton where he pictures the unjust in Hades along with Arai, Blasphemiai, Phthonos, Stasis and Neikos [67]; the fifth century B.C. Sophist Prodicus describes the meeting of Heracles with the beautiful, modest Arete and the brazen, over made-up Kakia and the choice he made between them [68]. This last example is exceptional in that it is a deliberately written allegory of a didactic nature designed to make a specific point, whereas all the other instances quoted here use personification either to emphasise the significance of the ideas, to express a relationship

between them, or both, but are less explicitly allegorical in form.

Even in the case of personifications which seem to be purely inventions of poetic or artistic imagination we can often find some reference to accepted worship or belief [69], and two examples of this can be drawn from the fifth century B.C. The first of these is the figure of Makaria, who occurs on two late fifth century squat lekythoi, one by the Eretria Painter once in Berlin, and one by the Makaria Painter in Reading [70]. Makaria does not figure as a personification in Greek literature of any period, possibly because a well-known mythical character, the daughter of Heracles, already had this name. Shapiro ((1977) 253) argues that the Makaria who appears on these lekythoi is not the mythical figure but a 'spontaneous creation' whose non-specific associations and wide applicability are demonstrated by her appearance as an attendant standing behind Aphrodite (who is also accompanied by Himeros and Eutychia) on the Reading vase, and as a maenad resting on some rocks after a Dionysiac revel on the Berlin vase. She may be a spontaneous creation on the analogy of, say, Eudaimonia, but her associations with Aphrodite and Dionysus, to both of whom she is merely an accessory, tell against attributing allegorical status to her:

she is purely a supporting figure attached to more important deities.

The second instance occurs in the case of eutychia, for, although the word is common enough in prose and verse [71], the impetus for its personification in vase painting is unclear. Eutychia does not occur in myth and there is no evidence to suggest that she was personified by the poets or received cult in Athens at any time. Shapiro again imputes her presence on vases to the result of 'spontaneous creation' by analogy with Eukleia, Eunomia and particularly Eudaimonia to whom she is closer in meaning ((1977) 232). The semantic kinship between Eutychia and Eudaimonia can be exemplified by a red figure hydria by the Meidias Painter in Florence [72] on which Eudaimonia admires herself in a mirror held by Eutychia, by a red figure hydria in Carlsruhe by the Painter of the Carlsruhe Paris [73] where Eutychia is involved in the judgement of Paris along with Eris, by a red figure squat lekythos by the Makaria Painter in Baltimore [74] where she appears with Eunomia and Paidia , and by the lekythos in Reading mentioned above. The last two examples show how easy it was for Eutychia to be insinuated into the company of personifications associated with Aphrodite, even without literary precedent, but we should be careful to notice that in

all these scenes, like Makaria above, she simply plays a supporting role. Furthermore, since she has no firmly defined iconography, we are dependent on inscriptions for her identification, and, in marked contrast to Nemesis' measuring stick, Kairos' hairstyle or the Tyche of Antioch's mural crown, the necklace, jewellery box and mirror which Eutychia carries have no allegorical significance [75]. This would seem to imply that, even if we admit the possibility of spontaneous creations of personifications in pre-Hellenistic art, we must draw some distinction between these types of figures and those which occur later. Broadly speaking, although the archaic and classical personifications encountered in this preliminary investigation can contribute to the overall meaning of any given scene, they appear to be supporting figures which are frequently connected to the religious or mythical tradition by their association with deities such as Dionysus or Aphrodite, or their involvement in well-known mythical scenes.

The following three chapters will attempt to assess whether Tyche, Kairos and Nemesis can be brought into this scheme of things, and if not, in what ways they represent departures from it. The degree of imaginative life which expressions involving the use of personifications had must be carefully judged

for each occurrence; the variations in the scale from what Dronke calls 'dead metaphor' to 'vibrant imaginative reality' (76) can be enormous, just as there is a vast difference between our commonplace 'necessity is the mother of invention' and Empedocles' or Aeschylus' awesome Ananke. Gardner ((1917) 194) concludes that the later examples of personification in Greece are not entirely dissimilar to those which are found in more recent art and literature, but that the earlier personifications are of a different order and arise from 'the same anthropomorphic tendency that gave so clear and personal a character to the chief Olympian gods'. With these words in mind we shall now enquire whether something quantitatively different can in fact be said to happen in the Hellenistic period. If it can, we shall want to know why and how it happened and what information it can be made to yield regarding both the Hellenistic era and personification in general. With that aim we shall now turn to a figure who is often regarded as embodying much of the essence of Hellenistic culture: Tyche.

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1. See e.g. K.J. Dover (1972) 46.

2. See e.g. G. Foucart (1917) 783; E.A. Gardner (1917) 792.

3. Born circa 350 B.C. See FGrH ii. B. 228.

4. Eloc 265; cf. W. Rhys Roberts (ed) Demetrius on Style, (Cambridge 1902) ad loc.

5. 8.6.44; 9.2.46.

6. Dover (1972) 46.

7. Thus J.B. Carter (1917) 794.

8. Foucart (1917) 785, who does indeed eliminate all Hellenistic personifications. Cf. p. 783 where he argues for a similar rejection of 'all that is comprised today under the vague name 'allegory' . . . as these are late inventions to which a real personality has never been seriously accorded outside rhetoric or poetry.'

9. See Gardner (1917) 793 f. K. Lehman remarks that the moment a 'personification' receives cult she becomes as concrete a divinity as any other (Review of P.G. Hamberg Studies in Roman Imperial Art in A. Bull 29 (1947) 138). His placing of 'personifications' in inverted commas is a neat way of bringing out the artificiality of modern distinctions when applied to figures of this type. Shapiro ((1977) 2) also questions whether an 'intellectual overtone', or indeed any conscious distinction between personified divinities and others was present in the Archaic and Classical eras.

10. Thus M. Warner (1985) 72; A. Fletcher (1964) 32.

11. PMG 64, quoted by Plutarch de fort. Rom. 318a.

12. As R.G.A. Buxton (1982) 30 observes.

13. Buxton loc. cit., see also H. Usener Götternamen (Bonn 1898) 364-75; E. Fraenkel ad A. A. 14; M. Detienne, J-P. Vernant Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society (Hassocks 1978) 92 n.1.

14. See e.g. E.H. Gombrich (1971) 242, 252, 255 and P. Dronke (1980) 16 for discussions of this problem.

15. Cic. N.D. iii. 43.

16. As W. Sale (1965) 677f points out.

17. Hes. Th. 909f.

18. See J.D. Beazley (1947) 7 and my chapter 5, p. 5/97.

19. François Vase: Florence, Museo Archeologico 4209, signed by potter Ergotimus and painter Clitias, circa 570 B.C. The vase features around 270 figures of men and women, animals and hybrid creatures, nearly all of which have their names inscribed beside them.

Chest of Cypselus. A Corinthian work of marquetry depicting Dike, Adikia, Eris, Nyx, Hypnos, Thanatos, Ker, Phobos. It is described by Pausanias 5.17.5 - 5.19.10, who says that most of the figures were identified by inscriptions written in ancient characters. See E. Simon 'Kypselos. Arca di.' in Enciclopedia dell' Arte Antica Classica e Orientale (Rome 1961) iv, 427-32. Dike and Adikia are also depicted on a bilingual neck - amphora, now in Vienna. See Beazley (1956) 320 no. 11; (1963) 11 no. 3.

Genre scenes: Red figure Pyxis, New York 09.221.40, Beazley (1963) 1328, 99, depicting Aphrodite and her retinue, with the inscribed names of Peitho, Eudaimonia, Euklea, Aponia, Paidia, Hygieia, 420-410 B.C.: red figure Pyxis, British Museum E.775, from Eretria, Beazley (1963) 1328, 92, depicting Aphrodite and her retinue, with the inscribed names of Eudaimonia, Himeros, Paidia, Hygieia, Harmonia, Pothos, late fifth century B.C.; red figure Lekanis lid, Naples Stg. 316, Beazley (1963) 1327, 85, depicting Aphrodite and her retinue, with the inscribed names of Eukleia, Eunomia, Harmonia, late fifth century B.C. etc.

Euphronius vase: New York 1972. 11.10, circa 515 B.C. Signed by Euphronius as painter and Euxitheus as potter. See D. von Bothmer 'The Death of Sarpedon'in S.L. Hyatt (ed) The Greek Vase (New York 1981) 63 -80.

20. Theopompus Fr. 7 K, 1 D, e.g.

21. Olymp. in Grg. Pr. 41.9 = R^2 623, R^3 673.

22. Arist. Fr. 5 Diehl, 842 Page.

23. Webster (1953) 13.

24. Shapiro (1977) 1.

25. Nilsson (1952) 31.

26. Dronke (1980) 29.

27. W. Sale (1965) 677f.

28. Webster (1954) 14.

29. See Usener (1896) 364 ff.

30. F.M. Cornford (1907) 232.

31. E.g. M. Warner (1985) 76.

32. La. 194a; R. 503a; Phd. 896; Ly. 212 e.

33. See Burkert (1985) 194.

34. See J.B.Carter De Deorum Romanorum cognominibus quaestiones selectae (Leipzig 1898); 'The Cognomina of the goddess "Fortuna" ' TAPhA xxxi (1900) 60-68; (1917).

35. In certain cases in Roman religion it was realized that an adjectival cognomen was the expression of an abstract idea and thus the cognomen was changed into an abstract noun, personified, and worshipped as an independent deity. See Carter (1917) 795.

36. Eukleia used to have a temple at Athens (Paus. 1.14.5) in Roman times she was united in cult with Eunomia; in Corinth there was a festival of Eukleia; the month Eukleios existed at Byzantium, Corcyra and Tauromenium; she was worshipped as a goddess of marriage by the Boeotians and Locrians, who used to call her Artemis Eukleia; a temple of Artemis Eukleia at Plataea is also mentioned.

37. IGA 32F. Isocrates 15. 249; D.54 proem.

38. SIG 63 = IG I^2 24/25.

39. IG I^2 395. In 420 B.C. Hygieia entered Athens with Asclepius, and it is interesting that Hygieia, being feminine, could not be attached to Ascelepius as an epithet, so the relationship is expressed in terms of a genealogy in which she is his daughter or wife.

40. See K. Reinhardt (1966) passim.

41. Hes. Th. 901.

42. On the Chest of Cypselus, however, Dike is shown hitting Adikia with a stick, illustrating that she could also be credited with a power of her own.

43. See L. Deubner (1902 - 1909) 2069 ff; Petersen (1939); Nilsson (1952).

44. Il. 11. 574.

45. Il. 9, 505 - 12.

46. R. Hinks, however, thinks this is an allegory of the wrongdoer and his repentance.

47. As Shapiro (1977) 35f does.

48. Th. 211 - 32.

49. Th. 886 - 903.

50. (1966) 31 ff.

51. See e.g. Hes. Th. 64; 230; 386; Op. 288 ff; A. A. 1004; 1642 etc.

52. See e.g. A. A. 494 f. See P. Philippson 'Genealogie als mythische Form', SO Suppl. 7. (1936) 3; H. Schwabl 'Zur Theogonie des Hesiod' Gymnasium lxii (1955) 526-42; E. Fraenkel on A. A. 380, 494 f.

53. See Deubner (1902 - 1909) 2098; Nilsson (1952) 32.

54. See also H. Fränkel (1962) 618 f.

55. New York 11. 213.2, possibly by the Meidias Painter. Beazley (1963) 1324. 47. Cf. the oinochoe of circa 350 B.C. depicting Dionysus, Pompe and Eros, New York 25. 190, by the Pompe Painter.

56. v.28.

57. Pers. 548.

58. Naples 3253, The 'Darius Vase'. See Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae I. II. Apate 1; A.D. Trendall, A. Cambitoglou The Red-Figured Vases of Apulia (Oxford 1982) II. 482 ff with pl. 176.1.

59. As e.g. in the case of the Demos of Rhegium on the coins of that city in the fifth century B.C. See P. Gardner Types of Greek Coins (Cambridge 1883) 101.

60. Vienna 3722. Beazley (1956) 320.11; (1963) 11.3 and 1618; (1971) 39; CVA pl.51.

61. See A.D. Trendall Paestan Pottery (Rome 1936) pl. 7 and p. 31 ff.

62. Boston OO.346. Red figure bell crater. Beazley (1963) 1045.7; (1971) 444. circa 440 B.C. This is the only depiction of Lyssa before the fourth century B.C. and the only labelled example in existence.

63. New York 12. 229. 14.; Cab. des Méd.1289. All three works are dealt with by Beazley (1947).

64. Ap. 39b.

65. Phd. 83d cf. Kratos and Bia in A. Pr. 1 ff.

66. D. xx. 165.

67. D. xxv. 52.

68. X. Mem II.i.2.

69. As Gardner (1917) 794 points out.

70. Berlin 2471 now believed lost. Beazley (1963) 1247.1; (1971) 479, cf. Shapiro (1977) 252 ff.

71. Pi. O. 6.81, cf. E. IT 1490; Ar. Ec. 573; Th. 1. 120; 7.77 etc.

72. Florence 81948. Beazley (1963) 1313.1; (1971) 477. Inscribed Eudaimonia, Eutychia, Paidia, Himeros, Hygieia. Circa 420 B.C. CVA pl. 60.1. pl. 61.1 and pl. 62-63.

73. Carlsruhe 259 (B.36). Beazley (1963) 1315.1 and 1690; (1971) 477. Late fifth century B.C. CVA pl. 22, 4-5, pl. 23 and pl. 24. 1-5.

74. Baltimore, Walters Art Gallery 48.205. Beazley (1963) 1330.8. Late fifth century B.C.

75. Contrast the jewellery box carried by Peitho on the Berlin Amphoriskos which does allude to the role of the personification in the scene in which she is involved (Fig. 1).

76. (1980) 19.

2

Tyche

Chapter 2 Tyche

i) Introduction: Tyche in general and in pre-Hellenistic Greek culture

Inuenit tamen inter has utrasque sententias medium sibi ipsa mortalitas numen, quo minus etiam plana de deo coniectatio esset : toto quippe mundo et omnibus locis omnibusque horis, omnium uocibus Fortuna sola inuocatur ac nominatur, una accusatur, rea una agitur, una cogitatur, sola laudatur, sola arguitur et cum conuiciis colitur, uolu<cris uolu>bilisque, a plerisque uero et caeca existimata, uaga, inconstans, incerta, uaria indignorumque fautrix. Huic omnia expensa, huic feruntur accepta, et in tota ratione mortalium sola utramque paginam facit, adeoque obnoxiae sumus sortis, ut ipsa pro deo sit qua deus probatur incertus.

This passage, taken from Pliny HN 2.22, suggests that the idea of the ubiquitous influence of Fortuna on people's lives played an important part in the everyday thought of the Roman world of Pliny's day. The passage itself is reminiscent of many reflections on Tyche which are to be found in the Hellenistic period and may indeed have a Hellenistic source, and, although the concepts of Fortuna and Tyche are not strictly parallel(1), it can reasonably be said that Pliny's words form a fairly accurate description of Tyche in the Hellenistic world. In the first part of this chapter I shall endeavour to trace the development of tyche in literature, on a roughly chronological basis, from Hesiod to the Hellenistic period; the

literature of the Hellenistic era forms the subject of the second part of this chapter, with special thought given to tyche in the philosophers and to what the 'man-and-woman-in-the-agora' thought on the subject; using this as a basis I shall then consider her role and meaning in Hellenistic art and religion and analyse some possible reasons why Tyche became so important, and indeed why Tyche specifically, and not some other concept, was chosen.

If Hellenistic writers attempted to account for an occurrence and found that they had exhausted all the principles which might be classified as 'natural', and also those which can be associated with freedom of will and divine intervention, they would be left with a residuum still standing in need of explanation. It is very hard to ascribe certain types of events to reason or physical impulses; they can happen without any conscious intention and for reasons which remain obscure, and yet it may be felt that they still have a cause. That cause, to many Hellenistic Greeks, is called tyche. Tyche, as we can infer from New Comedy and from certain inconsistencies in Polybius' writings(2), was a word familiar in everyday speech, and the process of personification, which all abstract concepts have the potential to undergo even if not all of them realise this potential, happened at a pretty early stage(3); however, we shall see that tyche was also used as a common noun and never lost its connection with the accompanying verb tynchanein(4). Thus the

word can occupy a number of 'shades' in the 'spectrum' discussed in chapter 1 and, depending on context, it can mean (a) success, fortune, occurrence and so on[5], or (b) what a person attains on his or her own or whatever befalls him or her, whether good or bad. However (a) and (b) are not necessarily distinct; good fortune can be won by skill or divinely bestowed. Tyche frequently means 'luck' in either a neutral or favourable sense, and the incalculability and capriciousness associated with the word 'fortune' can also be implied, though without the tendency of the English word to be used in a good sense; 'chance' fails to convey the comprehensive and personal aspect of tyche; 'Fate' implies something rather too immutable and lawbound; as a vox media tyche can signify both good and bad luck and is accordingly well suited exactly to denote the vicissitudes of fortune. Clearly context is all-important, and, bearing in mind the possibilities and dangers of the use of the word tyche I shall, for the most part, avoid the quicksands of translation and simply use the transliterated forms Tyche or tyche, noting that tyche can accurately be described as the outcome of all causes affecting an individual considered from a standpoint of personal advantages: it may include Nature and Free-will, and can become identical with Destiny and Providence, which would otherwise be distinct ideas. The Tyche of a person is the comprehensive result of natural causes, free-will, outside forces and volitional control. Fortune can,

and indeed has, become synonymous with wealth and success.

Tyche is not mentioned in the Iliad or the Odyssey. Her function is performed by Moira instead:

> Fortunam Homerus nescire maluit et soli deo, quem Moίραν vocat omnia regenda committit; adeo ut hoc vocabulum Τύχη in nulla parte Homerici voluminis nominetur.
>
> Macrobius Sat. 5.16.8.

The common noun occurs first in the Homeric Hymn 11 to Athena, where it means 'fortune', 'success'(6); as far as the personified Tyche is concerned, Pausanias(7) says πρῶτος δὲ ὧν οἶδα ἐποιήσατο ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσιν Ὅμηρος Τύχης μνημην· this happens in the Hymn to Demeter where the daughters of Oceanus are enumerated and where we are told how they played with Demeter's daughter Kore; Tyche is amongst them:

> ἡμεῖς μὲν μάλα πᾶσαι ἀν' ἰμερτὸν λειμῶνα,
> Λευκίππη Φαινώ τε καὶ Ἠλέκτρη καὶ Ἰάνθη
> καὶ Μελίτη Ἰάκη τε Ῥόδειά τε Καλλιρόη τε
> Μηλόβοσίς τε Τύχη τε καὶ Ὠκυρόη καλυκῶπις
>
> h. Cer. 417-20

A more extensive list of the Oceanids appears in Hesiod's Theogony, where at line 360 Tyche occurs again. The significance of Tyche's appearance as a water-nymph and her link with Oceanus is unclear. F. Allègre (1889) suggests that it is as a goddess of fertility and prosperity which comes from the soil that Hesiod groups her with Eudora and the

'déesses champêtres' of the same type(8). Such a connection with the water-nymphs may be because water is a cause of fertility to the countryside(9), and certainly Tyche's agricultural significance is expressed by a large number of monuments, statues, terracottas and bas-reliefs, the most common being of Tyche holding a cornucopia, the horn of Amaltheia(10), presiding over the countryside. The cornucopia is to become a definitive attribute of Tyche in the Hellenistic period, especially in association with city Tychai and the Tychai of the Ptolemaic queens. F.W. Hamdorf(11), however, suggests that it may have been the insecurity of sea travel which first brought home to people the power of the rule of Tyche. This may have links with one of Tyche's other most common attributes, the steering-oar which she uses to direct the 'ship of state'(12). However, our earlier sources contain only vague allusions with which to support this conjecture(13). M.L. West ((1971) ad.1.360) suggests that Hesiod presumably classifies her as an Oceanid because she is a 'desirable patroness of the young' on the grounds that other nymphs in this group have no essential connection with water but are names 'appropriate to fairy godmothers' ((1971) ad.11.337-70). He argues that care of the young is the only function of these nymphs that Hesiod specifies, and for this reason we find included seemingly at random in this list such 'significant but not eminently fontane' goddesses as Peitho, Metis and Tyche. In the light of the remarks we made concerning

the relationships between personifications in Chapter 1, it seems reasonable to suppose there is some conceptual link between these Oceanids, and West is surely right to say that Hesiod is unlikely to have hit upon these names by chance; he must have worked them in deliberately. However, if the significance of Tyche's relationship to Oceanus is now inscrutable, we can at least assert that these instances show Tyche occurring in a deified form in the very earliest Greek literature.

During the Archaic period we encounter Tyche less as a water-nymph and more as a goddess of fortune who presides over human actions in general and assures people of success. As we saw in Chapter 1, Alcman described Tyche, along with Eunomia and Peitho, as the daughter of Promatheia, where her meaning is close to 'success'(14). The power of Tyche was held to be manifested in every sphere of life, and 'lucky chance' was seen to be an essential factor in all kinds of actions, and so, for example, Simplicius in Ph. 331.10 quotes without comment the following fragment to illustrate Empedocles' use of τύχη : τῆιδε μὲν οὖν ἰότητι Τύχης πεφρόνηκεν ἅπαντα , 'there by the will of Tyche all things have thought'(15). In his elegy to Pericles (Fr. 13 West), Archilochus tells him that inevitable shifting fortune makes endurance possible, and also, in Fr. 16 West, that Tyche and Moira affect everything: πάντα Τύχη καὶ Μοῖρα Περίκλεες ἀνδρὶ δίδωσιν (16). This link between Tyche and Moira also appears in Pindar who says that she is

one of the Moirai, mightier than her sisters, as Pausanias vii.26.8 informs us : ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν Πινδάρου τά τε ἄλλα πείθομαι τῇ ᾠδῇ καὶ Μοιρῶν τε εἶναι μίαν τὴν Τύχην καὶ ὑπὲρ τὰς ἀδελφάς τι ἰσχύειν.
At this stage of Tyche's development, despite a definite awareness that the idea of inconsistency is really inseparable from the idea of a goddess of luck or fortune[17], the main emphasis falls on her good aspect, so that the epithet ἀγαθή need not always be added, as in h. Hom. 11 Athena 5 where the words χαῖρε, θεά, δὸς δ' ἄμμι τύχην εὐδαιμονίην τε clearly refer to good fortune, and also in Theognis 129f W , where Cyrnus receives the advice

Μήτ' ἀρετὴν εὔχου, Πολυπαΐδη, ἔξοχος εἶναι
μήτ' ἄφενος· μοῦνον δ' ἀνδρὶ γένοιτο τύχη [18].

The connection that Tyche has with Fate, as suggested by her association with the Moirai, can be further illustrated by an artwork where, if the restoration of her name is correct, she appears with several other forces of Fate. The artwork is the name vase of the Heimarmene Painter, a red-figured pointed amphoriskos from Greece, now in Berlin, which dates from circa 430 B.C. (Fig. 1)[19]. This high-quality work is the oldest and most complete surviving version of the 'persuasion of Helen', and on it Paris and Helen are separated, having not yet seen each other. The pensive Helen sits in the lap of Aphrodite, who puts her arm around her, while Peitho, who holds a jewellery box, stands behind Helen and indicates the nature of the dialogue. This group is balanced by Paris and Himeros. The adolescent Himeros grabs Paris

by the arm and shoulder while staring intensely up at him, instilling erotic longing into him. This vignette is considerably enlivened by the presence of four female figures who frame the group on both sides. On the right, facing one another and apparently unconcerned about the main scene are Heimarmene, who has her back to the action, and an unlabelled woman holding a small bird in her right hand. On the other side of the scene stand Nemesis and, probably, Tyche, who watch the proceedings with interest. Nemesis has her hand on Tyche's shoulder and points what is often interpreted as an accusing finger at the central group (20). Nemesis may carry several levels of significance in this scene, as the mythological tradition which makes her the mother of Helen goes at least as far back as the Cypria (21). Yet, despite the interesting parallel of E. Tr. 766 ff, where Andromache graphically describes Helen's ancestry in terms of Alastor, Phthonos, Phonos, Thanatos and 'all earth - nurtured plagues', Ghali - Kahil ((1955)59) argues that Nemesis' parentage of Helen is insufficient reason for her presence, and seeks to explain it in historical terms as an allusion to the establishment of the Temple of Nemesis at Rhamnus in Attica, which took place around 430 B.C.(22). This seems an unnecessarily complex interpretation, however. Nemesis' gesture is hardly that of an excited mother-in-law-to-be; it is more one of disapproval in keeping with her aspect of righteous indignation, or, as Wilamowitz says ((1929)485), the avenging reprisal for the abduction which is about to take place(23). Furthermore, her iconography bears no discernible resemblance either to the statue by Agoracritus or to the sculpted figure on the base of that statue which was situated in the temple at

Rhamnus. The presence of Heimarmene and Tyche, who are surely also powers of Fate in this scene, would seem to support this conclusion.

The identification of Tyche in this scene is by no means undisputed, for, unlike the other personifications Nemesis, Heimarmene, Peitho and Himeros, she is not inscriptionally secure. Wilamowitz ((1929) 485-6) presents the most convincing restoration of her name when he says that, although only the Y of her name definitely remains, it is in such a position that only one character can stand before it, and, as no person beginning with EY can be thought of, we can confidently complete the word TΫXH . This seems preferable to the solution of Ghali-Kahil ((1955)60) who, while admitting that if the remaining inscription is .Y.E, Τύχη must be the correct restoration, argues that Nemesis' surname (O)υ(πις), who is also a goddess of justice, would fit the context equally well, especially in the light of Heimarmene's presence and indifference. But, as Wilamowitz says, Tyche conveys the idea that the enterprise will succeed, will happen σὺν τύχῃ ((1929)485)(24), and his translation of Tyche in this context as 'Erfolg', 'Success', is surely the correct one(25): Tyche's principal meaning of 'chance' is here opposed to the concept of allotted or predetermined fate(26) , which is represented by Heimarmene on the other side of the scene(27). This is the only extant depiction of the personified Heimarmene in Classical literature. The first literary occurrence of the noun is in Plato's Gorgias 512 E, where τὴν εἱμαρμένην

οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ἐκφύγοι is quoted by Socrates as a maxim current among Athenian women of his day. This, the occurence of the dialect form ἐμβραμένα in Sophron Fr. 119, and the use of the verb μείρομαι by Homer and Hesiod, suggests that the word may have been in common usage for some time, and lends validity to the general rule that personifications in art tend to develop out of literary precedents (28).

Shapiro ((1977)169) describes the scene on this amphoriskos as a 'kind of allegory' which is 'one of the earliest and most sophisticated in Greek art before the fourth century', but there seems to be a considerable difference between the appearance of Tyche and Nemesis here and their later allegorical appearances in Hellenistic art: 'a kind of' is surely the key phrase here, since the scene is so firmly attached to the mythical tradition by the story in which the personifications are only supporting elements who lend detail and atmosphere to the scene. Indeed Shapiro's own interpretation of the scene as a kind of allegory of past, present and future events symbolized by Heimarmene's looking away because her part was played long ago, Nemesis' pointing to the future consequences of the persuasion, and Tyche's involvement as the 'moment-by-moment series of chance events all working towards the fulfilment of a predetermined plan', all of which generalize the scene as a specific mythological event which is 'an exemplum of the workings of forces beyond both mortals and the Olympian gods' ((1977)170f), tells heavily against this being a fully allegorized artwork; even Shapiro's

own allegorical reading of the scene cannot escape from the fact that this is fundamentally a representation of a specific mythological event whose meaning would still be self-evident without the personifications. It is a depiction of the persuasion of Helen, not an allegory of past, present or future Fate(29).

The close connection between Nemesis and Tyche, seen here for the first time in art, will prove to be a prominent feature of the two of them both conceptually and iconographically. Their involvement with, or as, causative powers on the Berlin Amphoriskos underlines their intimate links with Fate(30). However, although Tyche and Nemesis do overlap in some respects and are clearly aspects of a broader group of ideas, they do remain distinct concepts: Nemesis is the personification of divine justice, reproving and punishing all excess, representing the law of order which presides over the government of the world, the law of compensation which is necessary to maintain the equilibrium in nature, as well as in human society and in mortals' dealings with the gods; Tyche is capricious, changing, gives with one hand and takes with the other, distributes favours or disgraces at random, ignores virtue and merit, is unpredictable, represents disorder and incoherence. The formula Nemesis : Order:: Tyche : Disorder will continually recur in our examination of their functions and iconographies, especially in the Hellenistic era.

Tyche's functions as a causative power of fate is

clearly central to her. We have already remarked, on p.2/6f above, on her connection with Moira in Pindar, and further examination of this poet's use of Tyche brings this aspect out more clearly, as well as the pronounced emphasis on her beneficent aspects.

H. Strohm ((1944)46ff) believes that Pindar's conception of Tyche becomes clearer if we can separate out the kindred concept of fate in the Epinician odes, but care should be taken not to enforce too rigorous a system of arrangement on Tyche, Daimon, Potmos, Moira etc., or to overlook the possibility of adaptations or substitutions. A.D. Nock notes that

' θεός, θεοί, δαίμων, Ζεύς,

and words for Fate convey various nuances of meaning but are to some extent interchangeable, and throughout Greek literature we find the use of θεός, θεοί, to denote the incalculable non-human element in phenomena'(31). In O. xii Pindar addresses the Tyche who, under Zeus, rules the city of Himera in her capacity as soteira. This epithet indicates her causative faculty, and its combination with references to ships and armies may well be a deliberate allusion to the recent defeat of Himera's enemies the Carthaginians, as well as to matters of internal politics(32):

Λίσσομαι, παῖ Ζηνὸς Ἐλευθερίου,
Ἰμέραν εὐρυσθενέ' ἀμφιπόλει, σώτειρα Τύχα.
τίν γὰρ ἐν πόντῳ κυβερνῶνται θοαὶ
νᾶες, ἐν χέρσῳ τε λαιψηροὶ πόλεμοι
κάγοραὶ βουλαφόροι. αἴ γε μὲν ἀνδρῶν
πόλλ' ἄνω, τὰ δ' αὖ κάτω ψεύδη μεταμώνια τάμνοι-
σαι κυλίνδοντ' ἐλπίδες·

σύμβολον δ' οὔ πώ τις ἐπιχθονίων
πιστὸν ἀμφὶ πράξιος ἐσσομένας εὗρεν θεόθεν·
τῶν δὲ μελλόντων τετύφλωνται φραδαί.
πολλὰ δ' ἀνθρώποις παρὰ γνώμαν ἔπεσεν,
ἔμπαλιν μὲν τέρψιος, οἱ δ' ἀνιαραῖς
ἀντικύρσαντες ζάλαις ἐσλὸν βαθὺ πήματος ἐν μι-
κρῷ πεδάμειψαν χρόνῳ.

υἱὲ Φιλάνδρος, ἤτοι καὶ τεά κεν
ἐνδομάχας ἄτ' ἀλέκτωρ συγγόνῳ παρ' ἑστίᾳ
ἀκλεὴς τιμὰ κατεφυλλορόησεν ποδῶν,
εἰ μὴ στάσις ἀντιάνειρα Κνωσίας σ' ἄμερσε πάτρας.
νῦν δ' Ὀλυμπίᾳ στεφανωσάμενος
καὶ δὶς ἑκ Πυθῶνος Ἰσθμοῖ τ', Ἐργότελες,
θερμὰ Νυμφᾶν λουτρὰ βαστάζεις ὁμι-
λέων παρ' οἰκείαις ἀρούραις.

This concatenation of Tyche's beneficial aspect with a city's well-being appears again in the form of Tyche who upholds the city, Τύχα φέρεπολις (Fr. 39 Sn-M): Plutarch de fort. Rom. 322C informs us that the kings who succeeded Numa honoured Tyche as φερέπολιν τῆς Ῥώμης ἀληθῶς κατὰ Πίνδαρον , and Pausanias iv.30.6 also tells us that Pindar's poetry contained references to Tyche and that it was he who called her Pherepolis. In the Hellenistic age Tyche came to be the tutelary goddess of a great many cities, but it should be noted that the Hellenistic city Tyche is a deity with one clearly defined function, whereas here one specific aspect of Tyche's wider beneficial nature is applied by the poet to the particular case of this city. The two are similar but not the same: the Tyche of Antioch is specifically, and only, the tutelary goddess of that state; Pindar's Tyche is a wider power, one of whose particular functions is to oversee the internal and external well-being of Himera. It also seems that the genealogy which Pindar gives her is an invention that carries no theological

significance or reference to cult [33]. Whilst dealing with Pindar we might also notice the following verses, where the positive side of Tyche is again emphasised in preference to her negative aspects [34]:

> Τύχα, μερόπων ἀρχὰ
> καὶ τέρμα, τὺ καὶ Σοφίας θακεῖς ἕδρας
> καὶ τιμὰν βροτέοις ἐπέθηκας ἔργοις·
> καὶ τὸ καλὸν πλέον ἢ κακὸν ἐκ σέθεν,
> ἅ τε Χάρις λάμπει περὶ σὰν πτέρυγα χρυσέαν,
> καὶ τὸ τεᾶι πλάστιγγι δοθὲν μακαριστότατον τελέθει·
> τὺ δ' ἀμαχανίας πόρον εἶδες ἐν ἄλγεσι
> καὶ λάμπρον φάος ἄγαγες ἐν σκότεϊ, προσφερεστάτα θεῶν.

Stobaeus 1.6.13 ascribes these lines to Aeschylus, but Bergk's comment 'mihi hi versus ab recentiore scriptore a philosopho potius quam a poeta, conditi videntur' [35] is surely correct; the ascription of these lines to the pre-Hellenistic era seems highly questionable.

From the foregoing examples, however, a distinct pattern can be seen to be emerging. Tyche can be deified and receive hymns, and, as a daughter of Oceanus she does have a mythical background, albeit not a highly developed one. But tyche can also be used as a common noun, often with connotations of success, and these connotations occur in combination with her connections with fate on the Berlin Amphoriskos. As a power of fate she has a causative function, but tyche can also be the result of things which happen to a person [36]. In the latter capacity tyche is one way of forcibly

expressing divine interference in human affairs. Here the etymological root tynchano, in the sense of hit or strike is significant, since tyche can be the striking of the gods, the striking of divine power in human life. It is invoked when it is hoped that by his or her interference a deity will complete the action begun by a human. However, this help is never guaranteed and can only be hoped for, and, although this particular facet of Tyche's entire make up is relatively uncommon at this stage, it will become increasingly important later on. As a causative power Tyche can become the object of hymns; in the instances we have encountered so far she is a generalized force of fate or success, and, though there are definite hints at her ambivalence, the stress remains on her good side. We are still some way from the Tyche described by Pliny in our opening quotation.

The studies of Meuss (1899) and Busch (1937) show that the trend of stressing tyche's beneficent aspects is reversed in tragedy where, because of their subject matter and social function(37), one would expect the plays to confront and explore problems concerning human beings and tyche in rather different ways to the genres which we have examined so far. M.C. Nussbaum ((1986)13) remarks that since tragedy deals with stories through which an entire culture has reflected about the situation of human beings, and also with the experiences of complex characters within those

stories, it is likely to emphasise the mutability of our circumstances and passions and the vulnerability of human life to fortune. Thus Sophocles applies bad and good epithets to tyche on a ratio of five to four, Aeschylus at nineteen to nine, and Euripides at twenty five to five(38), and, although Euripides does mention ἀγαθᾷ μοίρᾳ at Ion 153, he never mentions ἀγαθὴ τύχη which was an important notion in cult(39). Tychai were not infrequently thought to be sent by the gods in their capacity of τύχης ἀρχηγέται (E. El. 890), and so Phaedra's infatuation is called a τύχα Κύπριδος at E. Hipp.371 and Agamemnon is said to be assailed by τῇ τύχῃ τῇ τῶν θεῶν when Artemis held back the winds at Aulis at E. IA 351. It is natural for humans to call on the gods when they incur some bad fortune (see e.g. E. Tr. 470f), and in this sense tyche is the outward sign of the god at work. It is also interesting to note that the personified Tyche occurs very infrequently in tragedy. Remaining true to himself at the brink of an uncertain future, Oedipus voices his defiance of the world and its conventions with these words:

> ἐγὼ δ' ἐμαυτὸν παῖδα τῆς Τύχης νέμων
> τῆς εὖ διδούσης οὐκ ἀτιμασθήσομαι. (40).

Whatever Oedipus' human parentage, he is the 'son of Tyche' who brings forth the months with their varying events. He trusts her, and is willing to follow the route which she seems to indicate. An exchange in Euripides Hec. 785f also illustrates Tyche personified. Here Agamamnon asks Hecabe τίς οὕτω

δυστυχὴς ἔφυ γύνη ; and gets the reply οὐκ ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ τὴν Τύχην αὐτὴν λέγοις.
Clearly Tyche is used here in the negative sense as equivalent to δυστυχία as Hecabe implies that no woman except Misfortune herself can be as unhappy as she(41). A third instance of personified Tyche occurs in E. Ion: Tyche has undoubtedly contributed much to the day's events in which Xuthus meets Ion, having been told that the first person he should meet would be his son, the word of ill-omen is spoken by one of the servants just prior to the drinking of the wine, and the doves arrive at an opportune moment; Ion reflects on this and on the ambivalence of the goddess at ll.1512-15:

> ὦ μεταβαλοῦσα μυρίους ἤδη βροτῶν
> καὶ δυστυχῆσαι καὐθις αὖ πρᾶξαι καλῶς,
> Τύχη, παρ' οἷαν ἤλθομεν στάθμην βίου
> μητέρα φονεῦσαι καὶ παθεῖν ἀνάξια.

In fact it is not universally accepted that this third example refers to the goddess rather than the concept(42), and we might notice that it is not only modern scholars who encounter problems of classification in this area, for the chorus of Euripides' Helen have difficulty in deciding what is god, not god, or between mortal and god:

> ὅ τι θεὸς ἢ μὴ θεὸς ἢ τὸ μέσον,
> τίς φησ' ἐρευνήσας βροτῶν
> μακρότατον πέρας εὑρεῖν
> ὃς τὰ θεῶν ἐσορᾷ
> δεῦρο καὶ αὖθις ἐκεῖσε
> καὶ πάλιν ἀντιλόγοις
> πηδῶντ' ἀνελπίστοις τύχαις; (43).

These examples show the caution which needs to be exercised when making statements about how far Tyche

was deified or personified at this stage; what we would term the abstract noun is widely used, the personification less so. Yet, although Tyche never appears among the dramatis personae of tragedy, we can witness some of the tendencies which Pliny spoke of becoming more evident: we have already seen how Ion comments on her fickleness(44), and we also encounter the notions that you cannot fight tyche(45), you must submit to it(46), it is connected with lot(47) and with the wind(48), we hear it abused(49), it is connected with the intellect(50) and it appears in reflections of a moral nature(51). In all these instances much that will be said about the goddess in the Hellenistic era is already prefigured, but one of the principal differences between the two periods is that tyche's appearance, particularly in personified form, is far more frequent than it is in Classical literature or art.

According to Xenophon Mem. i.1. it was the view of Socrates that human events are governed partly by gnome and partly by the agency of gods or daimons, and that gnome should be exercised to the utmost and only when it failed ought we to resort to divination to determine actions of which the future results could not be foreseen, to discover the intentions of the gods or to daimonion; the Sophists sought to better people's lives by means of the technai of life(52); the Hippocratics viewed medicine as the conqueror of tyche, and an epitaph of Hippocrates says that he won his reputation οὐ τύχᾳ, ἀλλὰ τέχνᾳ (53) ; we have

already witnessed Euripides' linking of tyche with xynesis in Hipp. 1105f(54), but he also uses the tyche/techne polarity as though it were au courrant(55), whilst Agathon's Fr.6N^2 τέχνη τύχην ἔστερξε καὶ τύχη τέχνην suggests that the use of these words as polar opposites was familiar; we also find that Thucydides very often prefers to speak of tyche instead of 'the divine' and that he frequently contrasts tyche on the one hand with techne or gnome or the other, so much so that F.M. Cornford says that 'in Thucydides, γνώμη, man's foresight and decision, and Τύχη share the world between them'(56), A. Parry that 'the central problem of history is, How, and when, can man impose his gnome on things outside himself?'(57), and L. Edmunds ((1975)4) that 'Thucydides clearly regarded gnome, techne and tyche as historical forces and saw events in these terms among others'(58). We might add that the formula techne : tyche :: gnome : tyche :: order : disorder is prevalent throughout Thucydides' writing and that this connection which tyche has with disorder is a fundamental aspect of the concept.

In Thucydides tyche often signifies the incalculable, that which cannot be ascribed to manifest natural causes, freedom of will and so on, and, as in Euripides, it remains partly the abstract idea of chance and partly the action of providence. Speakers in the History frequently comment on the contrast between a person's gnome, over which he or she has total control, and tyche over which he or she has

none, so at iv.64.1 Hermocrates says that he is not foolish enough to imagine that because he is master of his own will (τῆς ...οἰκείας γνώμης ... αὐτοκράτωρ) he can control tyche. Pericles, on the other hand, trivializes tyche, though still admitting its existence. He does not think of tyche as an objective force which is impervious to human reason, but rather reduces it to the same status as human error: human designs, and issues of events, frequently go in directions that are hard to predict, and that is why people commonly view tyche as responsible for whatever falls out contrary to calculation:

> ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὰς ξυμφορὰς τῶν πραγμάτων οὐχ ἧσσον ἀμαθῶς χωρῆσαι ἢ καὶ τὰς διανοίας τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· δι' ὅπερ καὶ τὴν τύχην, ὅσα ἂν παρὰ λόγον ξυμβῇ, εἰώθαμεν αἰτιᾶσθαι.
>
> Th.i.140.1(59)

In concluding this speech at i.144.4 Pericles makes gnome the tradition of the democracy when he states that the ancestors defeated the Persians and made Athens great more by gnome than by tyche. For him tyche is mere randomness and is defined in negative terms as that which is contrary to calculation, but as Edmunds ((1975)81) remarks, this was not a widely held view: Solon said that the vicissitudes of life were an expression of Moira and the gods' purpose, which mortals can neither understand nor prevent; in popular belief the link between tyche and the gods persisted in Athens and was in fact official, since θεοί and the phrase ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ frequently appear

coupled in the headings of Attic inscriptions; we have already seen how tyche and the divine are commonly associated in Pindar and tragedy; Aristotle later reported that 'there are some who believe that tyche is a cause, but obscure to human reason as being something from the gods and rather daimonic'(60). Moreover, the Spartan ambassadors warn the Athenians at Th. iv.18. 3-5 against believing that tyche will always be on their side, a warning ultimately vindicated by the Spartan victory at Mantinea, after which, Thucydides tells us, the Greek world considered that Pylos was a matter of tyche and that the Spartans were still the same in gnome, were still brave fighters(61). As far as the Spartans are concerned, gnome is the courage which resisted Tyche(62). Rather than, for instance, Archilochus, who sings πάντα τύχη καὶ μοῖρα ... ἀνδρὶ δίδωσι (63), Thucydides, described by Edmunds ((1975)80) as 'an historian whose method is devoted to distinguishing the reasonable from the casual', seems to hold a view which sees tyche in human terms as that which is contrary to calculation, and which includes anything unforeseen and unforeseeable. However, as it is used by some characters in the History, tyche can mean more than just the operation of unknown natural causes, the working of ordinary causal law in the universe, and can be extended to extraordinary sudden interventions of non-human agencies occurring especially at critical moments in warfare or manifest periodically in the convulsions of nature. Such interruptions defeat the purpose of human gnome, and together with gnome are

the sole determining factors in a series of human events. Thus, when the future is spoken of as uncertain, this implies both that it is unknown and undetermined, and that human design cannot control human events completely, because unknown or incalculable agencies may intervene at any juncture. There is a natural temptation to emphasise the element of the incalculable and make tyche largely or totally responsible, and many succumbed to this temptation: we have already seen how Tyche was more powerful than Moira in Pindar, and Jocasta echoes this type of view at S. OT 977f when she says τὰ τῆς τύχης κρατεῖ, πρόνοια δ' ἐστὶν οὐδενὸς σαφής [64]. In all these cases forces of order are placed into antithesis with tyche who is clearly a force of disorder and disruption, the power which upsets peoples's calculations and destroys their lives, regardless of the steps they take to avert this, regardless of their skill and foresight.

The connection of tyche with disorder is clearly important, but the use of tyche in Thucydides raises a further point which is fundamental to this study, that of tyche's connection with an alleged decline in the traditional religion. The greater importance tyche assumes, the more traditional religion is held to decline. This process is widely believed to reach its apogee in the Hellenistic era, but it has been imputed to the fifth century also. Thus Allègre ((1889)63ff) believes that the Sicilian disaster is a possible reason why he can observe, at Athens, a loss of

confidence in the traditional gods and goddesses, and a correlative rise in the importance of Tyche. We must, however, exercise the utmost caution on this issue, for in none of the Thucydidean passages we have looked at can it be safely argued that Tyche is deified or even personified, and, although the concept of tyche is clearly of importance to many speakers in the History, the deified Tyche did not have far-reaching contemporary significance for them, widespread cult was lacking, and artistic representations of her were comparatively infrequent, especially by Olympian standards. A theory of the decline of Olympian religion in the fifth century B.C. on the basis of Thucydides' use of tyche seems to demand far greater justification than Allègre is able to offer.

The subject of tyche and the undermining of belief in the gods is one which is sometimes raised in connection with the influence of the Ionian philosophers. Whoever, as they did, feels unable to trust the Olympian deities and is unable to adopt a rationalistic philosophy of life without losing his or her moral support, may arrive at the pessimistic conclusion that everything happens by chance. If this actually does occur, that person's mental outlook is likely to centre round the notion of tyche, the element of uncertainity, accident, Fortune, distributing her gifts and taking them back irrespective of individual merit. This leads Buricks ((1948)125) to argue that the belief in tyche as

factum, as the result of things that happen to a person, is a symptom of the 'diminished energy and unhinged morals by the side of a decreasing political power, a phenomenon of disintegration'. Arguments of this sort are frequently applied to Hellenistic culture also, and in both cases a large-scale moral decline is presupposed. There is scant evidence for this, for, although it is easy to point to sceptics in any historical period, one must look beyond the isolated sayings of a few enlightened thinkers and attempt the more difficult task of assessing the attitude of the ordinary people. In this case, as the level of its significance in cult shows, the importance of tyche in relation to the Olympians is nothing like so great as Allègre or Buricks insist, even if we grant that an increase in tyche's popularity necessitates a corresponding decrease in the Olympians'. Furthermore, comments which may, arguably, be applicable to Athens in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War should not necessarily be applied to Greek culture in general.

The fourth century orators, who frequently mention the power of tyche, often place daimon or daimonion close to the benevolence or malevolence of the gods, as does Demosthenes in the De Corona 303 when he asks:

> εἰ δ' ἢ δαίμονός τινος ἢ τύχης ἰσχὺς ἢ στρατηγῶν φαυλότης, ἢ τῶν προδιδόντων τὰς πόλεις ὑμῶν κακία, ἢ πάντα ταῦτ' ἐλυμαίνετο τοῖς ὅλοις, ἕως ἀνέτρεψεν, τί Δημοσθένης ἀδικεῖ;

M.P. Nilsson ((1967)II 201) sees this continual

calling on tyche as a sign of the 'Entgöttlichung' of the world, but, for all the supposed profanity and decadence of this time, temples continued to be built, festivals celebrated, new cults founded and old ones maintained: it is hard to reconcile Nilsson's opinions with the facts of the day-to-day functioning of religious life throughout the Greek world.

Nevertheless it is worth noting that when Demosthenes is forced to introduce elements which mankind cannot control he, like Thucydides, prefers to use tyche to the Olympians, as he does, for example in the second Olynthiac:

> μεγάλη γὰρ ῥοπὴ μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ ὅλον ἡ τύχη παρὰ πάντ' ἐστὶ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράγματα.

A further development from this time was the growth of the idea of the general fortune of humanity, the fortune of cities and the fortune of individuals. Demosthenes highlights the difference between the two when he defines tyche at De Corona 252 - 255. Here he distinguishes his own personal fortune (ἰδίαν τύχην) from the great and good fortune of Athens and of mankind. The idea that the fate of an individual is determined at birth is found as far back as Homer, and we have already encountered tyche's strong connections with words for fate. The orators of the fourth century display a definite willingness to conceive of Tyche as companion of an individual throughout her or his life(65): Aeschines warns τὸν δαίμονα καὶ τὴν τύχην τὴν συμπαρακολουθοῦσαν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ φυλαξάσθαι (66), and Demosthenes asks ἀγαθῇ γ'

οὐκ ὁρᾷς; τύχη συμβεβιωκὼς τῆς ἐμῆς ὡς φαύλης κατηγορεῖς;[67].

In these instances tyche is not just a ruling power but also personal Fate which clings to people. Such conceptions are possible when one can contemplate Tyche from two viewpoints, one in which she appears in isolated instances which affect everyone, the other in which a person finds him or herself under an active power which may be interpreted in the form of a female ruler of his or her fate. In both instances fate can be seen from the standpoint of the individual: everyone has their own Tyche which holds sway over their life. Thus one can speak of the Tyche of a person which accompanies him or her throughout his or her life and also use the word Tyche to express the ancient idea that Fate is allotted to people at birth. This tyche is undoubtedly a divine force capable of exerting a powerful influence on individuals or on inter-state politics. The value of using evidence from the orators here is that they are addressing an audience of laymen whom they are attempting to win over to their side, and so they speak in terms which would be familiar from everyday life. Through them we can move a little closer to the views of the common people.

The picture of tyche which we summarized earlier on page 2/14f is now a good deal clearer. Tragedy has added a negative aspect of tyche which, though certainly evident in other genres, was not as prominent: henceforth tyche can be good, bad or ambivalent according to context. The study of tragedy

also pinpointed some of the difficulties of definition that beset any modern interpretation of tyche, as well as indicating some of the range of activities which the concept can have and the variety of attitudes which can be held towards it. The order/disorder antithesis, relating to tyche's use alongside concepts such as techne, gnome and synesis is another significant addition to the overall perspective; once it is realised that tyche is a force of disorder which opposes human skill and intelligence it becomes easier to see why philosophers, dramatists and historians should be concerned to explain or explore it. The broad spectrum of opinions we find on the subject is greatly illuminating and indicates the wide range of the concept: it can concern an individual or a state, can be causative or a result of circumstances, can be the name for undiscovered causes behind events, or closely connected with fate. It is also considered by some modern scholars to be, even in the fifth century B.C., a symptom of the 'decline' of traditional religion and of the profaning of the world. These features and issues, which take us somewhat closer to Pliny's description of Fortuna, will be treated in greater depth when we come to consider Tyche in the Hellenistic age, but before we can do that we must turn to Aristotle, who is important to this study for a number of reasons. Chronologically he stands on the threshold of the Hellenistic world, but more importantly his works represent a recapitulation of much that had been significantly said about Tyche before him, and he gives a definition which, with its

implications, contains many of the views which will subsequently come to be entertained on the subject right through to the Roman period and beyond.

Nussbaum (1986) has shown that Aristotle develops a conception of a person's proper relation towards tyche which returns to and further articulates many of the insights of tragedy. We have already encountered the aspiration of human reason to subdue and master tyche by means of techne, and we might add that Plato took it to be the task of philosophy to become the life-saving techne through which to achieve this goal. The pressing and delicate questions of how far eudaimonia is vulnerable, of what kind of external events can disrupt or distract it, and of how, and to what extent, it should attempt to make itself safe, became important areas for Aristotle. In an extended discussion of tyche at EE 1247a 37 - 1248b 8 he confronts the issue of whether people are fortunate by nature (physis), and concludes that tyche and physis are opposites, the latter being the cause of things which always or generally happen in the same way,

ἡ δὲ τύχη τοὐναντίον

(EE 1247a 33). He adds that even though not everyone who appears to be fortunate actually succeeds because of tyche (They do so rather because of nature, διὰ φύσιν), this does not prove that there is no such thing as tyche or that it is not a cause of anything, but only that tyche is not the cause of everything it seems to be. The opposition between physis and tyche is another manifestation of the

order/disorder dichotomy, which also appears in Aristotle's discussion in the pairing of tyche with nous and phronesis. Tyche itself which, Aristotle tells us, is defined by people as a cause incalculable to human reasoning (ἄλογον ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ, EE 1247b 8-9), is felt to be an ambiguous term: it is conceived as a more or less enduring personal trait of an individual which is independent of reason and nature, and may even be transformed into a providential interference or guidance by the divinity. This is very close to the concept of a personal Tyche and has nothing to do with inner impulses, is not natural to human beings, comes from outside, and is disconnected from nature and is distinguished from the type of tyche that is a personal instinct which leads people to desired success at opportune moments under favourable circumstances, makes faulty reasoning turn out right, is independent of nous and phronesis, and shows a natural disposition for the satisfaction of certain types of desires. Both are irrational, says Aristotle, but the difference between them is that the former is more continuous good fortune, the latter not continuous (EE 1248b 3-7).

A very similar discussion of tyche occurs at MM 1206b 30 - 1208a 4 where tyche's relationship to physis is again explored. Here tyche's connection with disorder is made even more explicit: its results are said to be produced without order, ἀτάκτως (1207a 1), and the concept is placed in opposition to nous and logos, whose domain exhibits the order and

invariability, τὸ τεταγμένον καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως, which tyche lacks, so that where there is most nous and logos there is least tyche (1207a 3 - 6). This passage also distinguishes two types of luck, firstly luck per se, which is more valuable in its relation to eudaimonia: the power to arouse and satisfy ambition resides within the individual him or herself (and external goods are here presented as a sine qua non of eudaimonia at 1207b 17ff). Secondly there is external, or accidental luck, which, independent of any impulse, enables one to attain goods that have not been considered as desired and helps one to avoid evil. Eutychia thus appears to consist of the enjoyment of some good which logos would not expect, or the avoidance of some ill that it would not anticipate, but good luck is more clearly recognized in the good we receive than in the evil we escape, which is only lucky incidentally (1207a 31 - 35).

In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle discusses the relationship of tyche to eudaimonia, and in doing so he examines two extreme points of view. The first of these is that eutychia and eudaimonia are the same thing (EN 1153b 21-22. Cf. 1099b 7 - 8). This raises the question of whether eudaimonia is given either by divine dispensation or by tyche, or whether it is something which can be learnt, acquired by training, or cultivated in some other way (EN 1099b 9ff), but the 'luck theorist' makes tyche the single decisive causal factor in attaining a given kind of life, and 'turns the greatest and noblest of all things over to

tyche' (EN 1099b 24). The second extreme case is that tyche has no power at all to influence eudaimonia and that even uncontrolled external events such as torture can neither enhance nor diminish eudaimonia to any significant degree.

The 'eudaimonia-equals-eutychia' thesis is less extensively treated. At EN 1099b 18-25 Aristotle speaks of the pervasive attitude that eudaimonia can be attained by study or effort rather than by pure luck, since, although the luck view is not disproved by empirical facts, it would be λίαν πλημελές , at odds with our other beliefs, to think otherwise. Nevertheless Aristotle sees the value of understanding both the force and the serious contribution of the luck thesis, and also wants to examine and in some way preserve the idea that tyche can have a powerful influence on eudaimonia, especially as the latter's vulnerability is evident when it is afflicted by castastrophe: πολλαὶ γὰρ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται καῖ παντοῖαι τύχαι κατὰ τὸν βίον (EN 1100a 5-6).

The 'tyche-has-no-power-whatsover' thesis holds that eudaimonia is invulnerable to tyche because it consists purely in having a good ethical state which persists even under the worst possible circumstances. Aristotle has two counter arguments, firstly eudaimonia needs actual activity in order to function, and secondly that good human activity can be hindered or even prevented by some types of luck:

> No activity is complete if it is impeded; but eudaimonia is something

complete. So the *eudaimon* person needs the goods of the body and external goods and goods of luck, in addition, so that his activities should not be impeded. Those who claim that the person who is being tortured on the wheel, or the person who has encountered great reversals of fortune, is *eudaimon*, so long as he is good, are talking rubbish - whether that is their intention or not.

(*EN* 1153b 16-21 Tr. Nussbaum)

Aristotle feels that thoughts and emotions are vulnerable to circumstance, and like the activities of the physical world they can remain incomplete and imperfect; torture can maim them. As Nussbaum ((1986)327) says, Aristotle argues that uncontrolled events can interfere with excellent activity by depriving it of some instrument, means or resource which may either be essential for that activity, so that its absence totally precludes the activity, or whose absence seriously curtails it. He also argues that circumstances may constrain an activity by removing its object or recipient temporarily or permanently, as, for instance, the death of a friend permanently prevents friendship:

> Nonetheless, *eudaimonia* evidently needs the external goods as well, as we said. For many things are done through *philoi* and wealth and political capability, as through tools. And deprivation of some things defiles the condition of being *makarion*; for example good birth, good children, good looks. For nobody will be entirely *eudaimonikos* if he is entirely disgusting to look at, or basely born, or both solitary and childless; still less, perhaps, if he has terribly bad children or *philoi*, or has good ones who die. As we said, then, it seems to require this sort of fortunate climate in addition. This is why some have identified *eudaimonia*

> with good fortune, and others with excellence.
>
> (EN 1099a 33-b8. Tr. Nussbaum)

At this point Aristotle introduces a test case, that of Priam, who had, one imagines, achieved a consistently virtuous character throughout his life and performed virtuous actions, yet had still been deprived of his family, children, friends, power, resources and freedom, and thus of his capacity to exercise many of the virtues for which he was renowned (EN 1099a 5-10). In assessing this case Aristotle tries to do justice to each extreme view by insisting both on tyche's real importance and exploring the belief that one can indeed be dislodged from eudaimonia, and also by arguing that, given a view of good living which values stable excellence of character and the actions that accord with them, drastic upsets like Priam's will be highly infrequent. While claiming that eudaimonia can be damaged by certain types of tyche(68) he still holds that it is not entirely at the mercy of tyche; external goods are not constituents of good living, and a person who is living or acting well will continue to do so throughout their lifetime:

> The happy man therefore will possess the element of stability in question, and will remain happy all his life; since he will be always, or at least often, employed in doing or contemplating the things that are in conformity with virtue. And he will bear changes in fortune most nobly, and with perfect propriety in every way, being as he is 'good in very truth' and 'four-square without reproach'.
>
> (EN 1100b 18 - 22.Tr. Nussbaum)

Aristotle adds that small changes in fortune will not

precipitate a ῥοπὴν τῆς ζωῆς (1100b 22 - 25), a major turning point in life, but that large or frequent changes can have an impact since they crush and injure (θλίβει καὶ λυμαίνεται (1100b 28)) because they bring pain and impede many activities. Once lost, eudaimonia can be recovered, but this requires time and equally large measures of good fortune to offset the balance (1101a 8 - 14).

Thus the position adopted by Aristotle here is that eudaimonia is prepared for the contingencies of the world and is not easily impaired by them, but that no amount of practical excellence can offset the loss of eudaimonia in a really catastrophic case. On the one hand, he argues, it is necessary for the good condition to fulfil its potential in good activity, but the very nature of this activity exposes the agent to the world, thereby making him or her vulnerable to reversals. The vulnerability is limited, but nevertheless real.

In Aristotle's discussions there is no suggestion that we are dealing with random or uncaused events: to say that an event happens by tyche is not only incompatible with, but even requires, concomitant causal explanation: we are dealing with events which influence a person's life in a way that is not amenable to his or her control. This view appears strongly in much Hellenistic philosophy and also in New Comedy, where the type of tyche examined in the

Physics takes a prominent role in many plays. At Physics ii. 4-6 Aristotle tells us that the agency of tyche or automaton has been recognised in popular and philosophical thought and that events are spoken of as occurring spontaneously 'of themselves' (ἀπὸ ταύτομάτου 195b 30 - 35). He adds that some people question the existence of chance on the grounds that lucky events always have some definite cause, others call some events lucky, others not, and that those philosophers who allow chance into their systems ought to have given some account of it(69). Others again regard tyche as an inscrutable divine cause. The whole question therefore needs examination(70).

Aristotle says that there are things which always happen in the same way, things which happen for the most part, and things which form exceptions to the habitual rule of nature. Yet not every exceptional or accidental event is a chance event, since chance events produce desirable results that might naturally be ends either for the conscious action of human agents or for the unconscious striving of nature. To illustrate a chance event Aristotle uses the example of a man going to the agora to do his shopping meeting a man who owes him money but whom he had not expected to meet there, and collecting his debt(71). This comes under the rubric 'tyche' because, although the recovery of the debt was not the intended object of his visit to the agora, it might have been if he had known it would ensue: δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι ἡ τύχη αἰτία κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τῶν ἕνεκά του (72).

Thus, he concludes, things which may become causes of a chance result are quite indeterminate; no rule can be posited to limit them, and popular opinion is justified in regarding tyche as something indeterminate and obscure. He adds that there is also sense in the view that nothing happens by chance(73), on the grounds that chance is not an operative cause but only a name for a particular kind of causation between events. Tyche is also distinct from automaton here: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης πᾶν ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου τοῦτο δ' οὐ πᾶν ἀπὸ τύχης (74), so when any causal agency incidentally produces a significant result outside its aim, it is attributed to automaton, but when such a result arises from deliberate action (though not aimed at it) on the part of a being capable of choice, we may say it comes by tyche(75). Thus neither inanimate things nor animals nor children can accomplish anything by tyche because they exercise no deliberate choice(76). This again brings home the point that tyche is essentially a human phenomenon which can be connected either with individuals or groups.

The tyche of the Physics has been described as 'simply a name for the unforeseen meeting of two chains of rigorous causation'(77), so, when two people go to the agora for valid reasons, each one can regard the other's being there (though not their own) as a chance event, since it arises from causes of which they know nothing. As we shall see when we turn to the Hellenistic era, this definition admirably suits the

way tyche controls the coincidences of Menander's drama. Aristotle's views are helpful to this study because he is really the first writer we have encountered who enshrines a reasoned analysis of the nature and workings of tyche. Perhaps predictably, he does not personify the concept, which remains purely a technical term. For him tyche deals with goods of the body, goods of the soul, and external goods, a combination which covers practically all aspects of life.

We have now reached a stage where the overall picture of tyche which we have attempted to draw is practically complete: the Hellenistic age will add very little that is new, and the value of this survey of pre-Hellenistic literature is that it allows us to confront the Hellenistic period, which is neither a period of brilliant originality nor an isolated unit with few or no ties with the preceding centuries, with a firm grasp of precedent. In many respects the general concept of tyche and its sphere of influence are a natural culmination of the developments of the fourth century: Alexander's career and the turmoil following his death were the impetus which started a process for which the ingredients were already present.

Let us briefly summarize the principal findings and issues of this section. Tyche appears in Greek literature as far back as we can trace. Her connection with fate is an extremely important one,

although she is recognised as distinct from other figures and concepts such as Moira, Nemesis, Heimarmene and automaton. Tyche can be regarded either as the result of things that happen to a person or as a causative power, and we have also encountered a common view that tyche is just a name for undiscovered causes of events. Philosophy shows part of the range of opinions that can be held about tyche, and also that tyche can be conceived of as an abstraction and that there is no need to personify in order to grasp the concept. Furthermore it is essential to establish the extent to which she was personified and deified; compared to many other concepts Tyche undergoes this process relatively infrequently, although we must remain conscious that in literature, as opposed to art, it is hard to be definite. The use of tyche is also used in evidence for a theory of a decline in traditional religion at various historical periods, but our initial examination of such a hypothesis suggests that this is not necessarily the case and that there need not be an inversely proportional relationship between tyche and the Olympian religion. Tyche is essentially a human phenomenon, and in this aspect she begins to appear as an 'individual' deity, as the tyche of a particular person. Tyche can be good, bad or indifferent depending on context, but we have established that, whatever the connotations of the word, it has a strong connection with disorder, as its opposition to techne, gnome and the other orderly concepts shows.

Definition and translation of Tyche are often

problematical, but despite the fact that she has only appeared fairly infrequently in art there have been some foreshadowings of the iconographical attributes of the steering oar and the cornucopia which are to become extremely common in Hellenistic art. With this picture in mind we can now approach the Hellenistic period with a clearer picture of the range of meanings tyche could have for the people of the time.

ii) Tyche in Hellenistic literature

From a religious point of view the first century of the Hellenistic period was, in many respects, a natural continuation of what went before. But the career of Alexander the Great had the effect of creating possibilities never before perceived; it broadened horizons and created a new world for the Greeks. Enormous possibilities presented themselves to the enterprising and the lucky; everyone, no matter how humble their origin or position, was the maker of their own fortune. The power struggles following the death of Alexander showed great and sudden alterations in the lives of individuals and states; a person could very quickly climb to the height of fortune and just as quickly fall again; city states which once fiercely defended their independence now united into federal leagues; bulwarks of social conservatism like Sparta were swept by social revolution; previously inconsequential areas now acquired political significance, as did Aetolia; men like Perseus rose to exalted position and yet ended up in degrading captivity; countries like Epirus were seen to prosper

in one century only to be obliterated by the Romans in the next. Conditions which to some were doubtless exciting and challenging were, as much Hellenistic philosophy shows, a source of insecurity to others; the age has been described as having an 'obsession with fortune'(78).

The universal popularity which Tyche enjoyed in the Hellenistic period has been related by some scholars to a supposed 'secularizing' of life(79), in which, in default of any positive object, the sentiment of dependence became linked with the purely negative idea of the unexplained and the unpredictable, which was Tyche. This school of thought holds that, broadly speaking, the age was drifting away from a 'real' trust in the Olympians and that Tyche was born out of the shortcomings of 'real' religion(80). Ruler cult is also held to be a significant element in this scheme of things, so in our assessment of Tyche in general and of the Tyche of Hellenistic rulers, these questions will be given special emphasis.

An extremely valuable corpus of evidence for what a great many people living in the formative years of the Hellenistic period thought about Tyche is provided by New Comedy, especially in the plays and fragments of Menander. The historical background to Menander's life is of some relevance to this study, since Athens was, at this time, a minor power, struggling for survival in an enlarged world dominated by the power struggles of the kings and larger states that appeared

after Alexander's death(81). During these struggles Cassander took over Athens in 317 B.C., and this led to the installation of Demetrius of Phalerum as epimeletes, 'Supervisor of the City', a post which he retained for a decade, until Demetrius Poliorcetes was welcomed as liberator in 307 B.C.. From 322 B.C. Theophrastus, the Peripatetic, was head of the Academy; Menander was a pupil of his, and often expressed Peripatetic ideas in a popular way in his dramas:

> οὕτως ἀσυλλόγιστον ἡ Τύχη ποιεῖ,
> τὸ συμφέρον τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου βίῳ·
> καθ' οὓς κρινεῖ τὰ πράγματ' οὐ χρῆται νόμοις,
> οὐδ' ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ζῶντα ' ταῦτ' οὐ πείσομαι '.
>
> Men.Fr.295 Kö.

These lines read like a motto for Hellenistic society.

In Antiquity Menander was admired as being an extremely realistic dramatist(82). His plays are peopled with characters from everyday life, and, as A.W. Gomme stated, 'we are in a world of reasonable men and women, with human feelings and emotions; and these men and women are most subtly observed'(83). The characters, who are usually common human types, certainly convey an air of realism and are presented in a way designed to encourage the audience's interest: 'figures that have the appearance of real life'(84)are presented to the figures of real life that they imitate. However, if the types of characters which Menander portrayed seemed 'real' in their time, the same can hardly be said for the plots of the

plays, which explore relationships between men and women that affect their own happiness, since the extraordinary coincidences which occur in them are unlikely to have been in the common experience of the spectators. It has been suggested that it was in the depiction of the power which seemed to create and resolve human problems, Tyche, that Menander seemed realistic(85), and certainly the frequency with which Menandrean characters express the view that Tyche, either as pure chance or as an inscrutable fate, as opposed to orderly forces like human will and reason, dictates the course of people's lives leaves us with a strong impression if not of Menander's own view at least of a common view of the people of his time, even when we take into account the fact that much of the evidence is fragmentary and lacking in context.

Tyche is only included in the dramatis personae of one of Menander's extant plays, the Aspis, in which she delivers the prologue. Many Menandrean dramas have prologues spoken by divine personages, although in general the prologues of New Comedy are presented by minor rather than major divinities. Thus Pan appears in Dyscolus, the Hero in Heros, Arcturus in Plautus' Rudens which is derived from Diphilus, and personified abstractions such as Tyche, Agnoia and Elenchos appear in Aspis, Periciromene and an unknown play (Fr.717 Kö) respectively. The main function of the prologue figure is to put the audience in possession of the basic facts of the drama, and so, when, as frequently happened, none of the human characters understood the

situation in its entirety, a non-human prologue speaker was needed(86). Thus the audience was given the advantage of knowing the truth of which the characters are ignorant and of being able to appreciate the importance or irrelevance of their actions. The prologue spoken by Tyche is 'postponed'; such postponed prologues are also a feature of Heros, Periciromene and Synaristosai, and in all these dramas human action is followed by a divine prologue. Tyche fulfils the normal function of a divine prologue speaker, using her knowledge of past and future events to supply the audience with information inaccessible to the characters in the play, thus relieving 'the apprehension any member of the audience ill enough acquainted with the genre to be afraid the plot may turn out badly for the sympathetic characters'(87) might feel. Davus has no control over the switching of the shields which causes him falsely to report Cleostratus' death, so the incident may be seen as a 'misfortune'; Tyche is therefore a natural choice to explain the situation in the prologue. We may compare the Periciromene, where Agnoia not only explains the cause of the obstacle but is also the cause of its removal. This is in marked contrast to Boetheia of the Synaristosai and Elenchos of Fr.717 Kö who get their names only from the process of removing the obstacles, and, since the prologue figures usually impart optimistic information, it is interesting that Menander should choose an essentially negative force like Agnoia or an ambivalent one like Tyche in this capacity. It has also been suggested that

personifications like Agnoia and Elenchos are products of Menander's poetic imagination rather than divinities in whom 'true belief' is expected(88), but we should exercise extreme caution here, since Tyche had been receiving cult at Athens since 335/4 B.C., and although in Fr.adesp.154 Kock the poet, via the character, admits that he is deliberately personifying and deifying an abstraction in the words

> ἀμορφότατος τὴν ὄψιν εἰμί γὰρ Φόβος,
> πάντων ἐλάχιστον τοῦ καλοῦ μετέχων θεός

so that the need to explain the process is indicative of its novelty(89), we should still remain aware that Phobos had long been receiving cult at Sparta and Selinus(90). The 'belief value' of many of these figures remains highly problematical.

The use of tyche as one of the mainsprings of the dramatic action has been described as a 'ressort de qualité grossière'(91), but despite this assessment the choice of Tyche as a prologue speaker seems a judicious one in the Aspis, for 'dieses Stück ist ein Tyche-Drama par excellence'(92). As R. J. Konet ((1976) 90 - 92) points out, Tyche is recalled repeatedly throughout the play by Menander's use of tyche and its compounds, with the result that Aspis becomes a play of 'fortune' rather than one of deep character study(93). Even before Tyche reveals her identity the audience have been furnished with clues: at line 18f Smicrines' first words are τῆς ἀνελπίστου τύχης, ὦ Δᾶε (94); at line 25 Davus, talking about the initial successes against the Barbarians, uses the verb διευτυχοῦντες, and two lines

later reflects ἦν δ' ὥς ἔοικε καὶ
τὸ μὴ πάντ' εὐτυχεῖν χρήσιμον ;
at lines 58f he tells us how he was ambushed and how
εὐτυχῶς δέ τι λοφίδιον ἦν ἐνταῦθ' ὀχυρόν ;
finally in the last speech prior to the entrance of Tyche herself, Smicrines uses the verb ἐντυχεῖν in the sense of 'converse with'. So the appearance of the goddess has at least been strongly hinted at, and she enters at a most opportune moment. The supposed death of Cleostratus, the escape of Davus and others, for instance, appear as the work of Tyche, and later in the play there is some heavy irony in the feigned death of Chaerestratus when Davus quotes from tragedies by Chaeremon and Carcinus to prove the impermanence of human luck and the power of Tyche at lines 411 and 417f. Ultimately Tyche manifests her work in the timely return of Cleostratus, although everything turns out contrary to the characters' expectations. In this context it is interesting to observe how Tyche not only helps people to extricate themselves from a predicament, but also causes that predicament in the first place. Thus the exchange of the shield, the error of the slave Davus, and his homecoming with the bad news on the day of the planned wedding, are all the work of Tyche in her 'fateful' aspect.

The fact that Tyche witholds her name until the very last word of the prologue has received adverse criticism. C.H. Moore ((1916)2) claims that Tyche 'appends her name as a mere tag to the expository

prologue .... without bringing herself into any real relation to the comedy, even to the extent done by' Agnoia in Periciromene 20ff, and goes on to argue that the speaker's identity lost its significance once the prologue was severed from the main body of the play, although divine prologue speakers could still be used to dramatic advantage by securing the interest and attention of the audience ((1916)10). However, it is hard to accept that the dramatic interest is lost if the divinity is not named early, or that the reason for the existence of Tyche is gone, firstly since the repeated use of tyche and its compounds in Aspis testify strongly for the goddess' importance, and secondly since the delaying of her self-revelation seems like a deliberate device to keep the audience in suspense, possibly looking at Tyche's mask and costume. Given the iconographical elements in this study it would be of supreme interest to ascertain exactly what Tyche's mask and costume consisted of and how this would relate to other artistic representations of her, but there seems no way of finding this out. However, when Tyche does reveal herself she also gives a virtual promise that she will play a determining part in the events which are to follow, clarifies the dramatic action, and outlines what can be expected:

λοιπὸν τοὔνομα
τοὐμὸν φράσαι· τίς εἰμι, πάντων κυρία
τούτων βραβεῦσαι καὶ διοικῆσαι; Τύχη.

(Aspis 146-48)(95)

Nevertheless, despite Tyche's promises we are not left with an impression that the characters are simply ignorant and powerless playthings of fate, for Tyche, like other Menandrean prologue deities, is not really the executrix of a higher order who metes out justice to humans in the play, because the character of those humans is the crucial factor. This is why we are informed of Chaerestratus' good intentions and of Smicrines' greed: in the end good and bad fortune are distributed according to the deserts of the characters. Thus the actions of Tyche, which can at times seem cruel to the point of inhumanity, are not in fact random and unthinking(96), for there is a definite link between human personality and character and the events ordained by fate in the plots of New Comedy: it is a convention of the genre that poetic justice is invariably done, and that it is done with the aid of the gods(97). Furthermore, the gods of New Comedy tend not to act by miraculous interference with the course of nature, but through nature, and especially through the minds of human beings(98). The Aspis is no exception to this rule: Tyche and to automaton play a large role in Menander, but neither means simply 'chance' here; as in Aristotle the latter refers to things which happen by themselves without deliberate human intervention(99). In some Hellenistic writers Tyche did come to mean blind chance, but in the classical period, as we have seen, it usually meant 'whatever happens', and we have seen numerous examples where the irrational element in human affairs was attributed not to blind chance but

to causes which were incomprehensible; in this sense Menander's usage is classical(100). The good are rewarded, the bad are punished; the young lovers marry with a secure income, the greedy old man is ridiculed. It is a measure of Menander's artistic skill that he can achieve this harmony between a person's inner character and their outer fate in a natural manner: the fact that Smicrines leaves empty-handed is actually a consequence of his avaricious scheming, which must make him unlucky even when he is successful: the bad person is <u>atyches qua</u> bad.

It seems inadmissible for a New Comedy to have an unhappy ending, and so insofar as Tyche directs the events of the plot she appears to be beneficial rather than malicious(101); as Aristotle says at <u>Rh</u>. 1391b 1, 'the fortunate have one admirable characteristic; they love the gods and are devout, trusting in the gods because of the blessings given them by <u>tyche</u>'. We have seen how Tyche promises to manage the affairs and act as umpire at <u>Aspis</u> 148(102), and her workings fulfil this promise as she sees to it that the base are foiled and rebuffed while the good are properly rewarded: an ending where this is not the case would be inadmissible, and so Tyche properly distributes good and bad fortune according to the deserts of the characters.

Throughout the <u>Aspis</u> we are continually being reminded of the role and power of the prologue figure: at line 213 Davus invokes her with the words ὦ Τύχη (103);

at the end of the first act he says νοῦν ἔχετε· τὸ τῆς τύχης ἄδηλον· εὐφραίνεσθ' ὃν ἔξεστιν χρόνον (248f) (104), by which time tyche is firmly established within the scheme of the play.

In the second act Chaerea's monologue comes after line 266 where Chaerestratus urges Smicrines τὴν δὲ παιδίσκην τυχεῖν καθ' ἡλικίαν ἔασον αὐτὴν νυμφίου. In the monologue itself Chaerea laments his bad luck in the words οὐδὲ εἷς τούτων γὰρ οὕτως ἠτύχηκεν ὡς ἐγώ (286f). Towards the end of this act Davus bids Chaerestratus ἀπόθνῃσκ' ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ (381) : Agathe Tyche is frequently joined to imperatives(105), and Van Leeuwen ad loc. suggests that the phrase ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ is used to neutralise the unpropitious command to die, but this may be taking the context over seriously since, by associating courteous words with a seemingly hostile imperative, Davus is surely joking(106).

The scene of the feigned death of Chaerestratus in act three contains some quotations from tragedy by Davus, among which two in particular stand out as being extremely pertinent to a play of fortune. The first, τύχη τἀ θνητῶν πράγματ' οὐκ εὐβουλία, comes from Chaeremon's Achilleus Thersitoktonos, Fr.2N and was made famous by Theophrastus in his Callisthenes(107). We may notice here just how carefully Smicrines lays his plans but how tyche

prevails. The second quotation, ἐν μιᾷ γὰρ ἡμέρᾳ τὸν εὐτυχῆ τίθησι δυστυχῆ θεός (417f), comes from Carcinus and the irony of this is evident; like other Menandrean plays the action here takes place in one day, during which Smicrines, to whom the remarks are addressed, falls from good fortune to bad.

The obstacles placed in the way of the characters as they search for happiness can be overcome in numerous ways, but a considerable amount of tyche is often necessary to help them. In this respect T.B.L. Webster ((1974)21) cannot see any difference between Tyche, Agnoia and Pan, and, in as much as they all perform specific functions, directing the action for the benefit of the good characters, he is certainly correct, but the choice of whether a personification like Agnoia, or a personification with cult such as Tyche, or a god such as Pan should deliver the prologue is not arbitrary. It depends partly on the story and partly on its setting. So, for example, in Dyscolus Cnemo lives in Phyle, where there was a famous cave of Pan and the Nymphs. Furthermore, because the obstacles have to be surmounted, the prologue speakers invariably have a beneficent function even if, like Agnoia and Tyche, they are more usually associated with negative or ambivalent results. It would therefore be unwise to attempt to reconstruct Menander's own comic tradition from his use of prologue figures, and equally unwise to make sweeping assertions regarding the amount of 'true belief' relating to the prologue

figures, for although Elenchos and Agnoia seem to us like 'mere abstractions' they do fulfil the same type of function as Tyche and Pan who are deities with established cults.

The notion that success depends on luck as well as good judgement, as we saw in Aristotle, is one that is frequently reiterated thoughout Greek literature and is one which is fundamental to Menander.At Fr. 417 Kö the speaker elaborates on what was in his time a platitude, and does so with comic seriousness:

> παύσασθε νοῦν ἔχοντες· οὐδὲν γὰρ πλέον
> ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὁ τῆς τύχης
> - εἴτ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο πνεῦμα θεῖον, εἴτε νοῦς -
> τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ κυβερνῶν (ἅπαντα) καὶ στρέφον
> καὶ σῴζον, ἡ πρόνοια δ' ἡ θνητὴ κἀπνὸς
> καὶ φλήναφος. πείσθητε, κοὐ μέμψεσθέ με·
> πάνθ' ὅσα νοοῦμεν ἢ λέγομεν ἢ πράττομεν,
> τύχη 'στίν, ἡμεῖς δ' ἐσμὲν ἐπιγεγραμμένοι.

Thus although Aristotle's 'truly good and sensible man' bears decorously all that fortune sends him and follows the most honourable course that is open to his resources, we still get characters who deny reason and give <u>tyche</u> complete control or regard <u>tyche</u> as an excuse for themselves made by weak characters:

> ἀδύνατον ὡς ἔστιν τι σῶμα τῆς Τύχης·
> ὁ μὴ φέρων δὲ κατὰ φύσιν τὰ πράγματα
> τύχην προσηγόρευσε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τρόπον.
>
> (Fr.468 Kö)(108)

This again brings the order: disorder polarity into prominence as <u>tyche</u> is conceived as the opposite to orderly forces such as <u>nous</u>, <u>pronoia</u> and <u>techne</u>. In the chapter on Kairos we shall examine the interrelationships of Tyche, Kairos and Techne as

applied to navigation: chance brings the opportune moment which the helmsman must use his skill to exploit, and in many respects the action of New Comedy functions in much the same way. The forces of chance may well be in evidence, but Menander invariably makes the skills of the characters exploit the fall of chance so that the characters' own efforts and talents can forward the plot and bring happiness to themselves and their friends. This is one reason why the plays are of artistic interest.

As a general rule tyche only intervenes in the plays to extricate characters from situations which are sometimes desperate after those characters have continually displayed real energy and intelligence. Although the solutions of the dramas often owe much to chance they are usually brought about through human intelligence and skill(109). Usually the unexpected events of the scenes only serve to bring success nearer, and even if they do contribute to that success, it is commonly because a shrewd mind is aware how to profit by it at the right moment. In the νέα the interference of chance is generally limited to starting and terminating the action. Again this emphasises the polarity between tyche and human attributes like gnome and techne, since the latter two offer a means of ordering one's life whilst the former is a power which, although it requires techne as a means of exploiting the opportunities in life which tyche provides, can overturn all the effects of techne in a moment. The maxims κοινὸν τύχη, γνώμη δὲ τῶν

κεκτημένων (110) and τύχη τέχνην ὤρθωσεν, οὐ τέχνη τύχην (111) make this explicit.

In discussing Aristotle's examination of tyche in the Physics we remarked on Ross' summary of Aristotle's view as the 'name for the unforeseen meeting of two chains of rigorous causation'(112). This definition can justifiably be applied to many of Menander's plays, as for instance, in Epitrepontes Syriscus has perfectly valid reasons to bring the baby with its trinkets to Chaerestratus' house, and Onesimus has a valid reason to be there at that moment. It is in this sense that Tyche declares herself as πάντων κυρία τούτων βραβεῦσαι καὶ διοικῆσαι at Aspis 147f, and the happy boy at Coneazomenae 13ff proclaims, possibly in conscious contradiction of Demetrius of Phalerum, who stated quite categorically that the innovations of tyche bear no relation to human deductions(113):

> λελοιδόρημ' ἄρ' οὐ δικαίως τῇ Τύχῃ·
> ὡς γὰρ τυφλὴν αὐτὴν κακῶς εἴρηκά που,
> νῦν δ' ἐξέσωσέ μ' ὡς ἔοιχ' ὁρῶσά τι.

We are left with the problem of explaining the apparent tension between Tyche as a prologue figure and the way tyche works as an ordering force in the plots of the plays, and the copious statements by the characters who see Tyche as a force of disorder. This tension appears to stem from the possibility that the requirements of the genre may have been at odds with Menander's own artistic aims; if the hero is to be successful and the villain thwarted the natural

result, as Webster ((1974)200) notices, is that New Comedy's 'official slogans' must be 'Fortune favours the brave', 'God cares for the virtuous' and so on. Yet, while Menander is prepared to use such slogans in the course of his dramas, it is clear that his acute interest in human nature would not allow him to submit to such simplistic and untrue generalizations: they may suffice as rules of the genre, but the words in the mouths of the characters surely present a more authentic image, if not of what the playwright himself thought, at least of what various sections of his audience were likely to think. We may refer back to Fr.295 Kö and also to Fr.630 Kö which describes how the just man can be involved in misfortunes:

> ὦ μεταβολαῖς χαίρουσα παντοίαις Τύχη,
> σόν ἐστ' ὄνειδος τοῦθ', ὅταν οὗτος ὢν ἀνὴρ
> δίκαιος ἀδίκοις περιπέσῃ συμπτώμασιν.

This may compel him to abandon his standards(114), and a person's natural talents may be negated by events(115). Again this is close to Peripatetic theory, for Aristotle said that the happy man requires a modicum of health and the gifts of fortune at EN 1153b 17, and Theophrastus was criticized by Cicero for holding the same position(116). Thus it would surely be wrong to see Tyche in Menander as a force of order or divine justice, for the weight of the evidence contained in the plays and fragments is amply sufficient to establish her position firmly on the side of disorder.

Menander is thus an extremely rich source for

information concerning Tyche in the early Hellenistic age. The wide range of sentiments expressed make it difficult to discern what Menander's own views were on the subject, since Tyche appears in so many different lights: all we can say is that this is probably a reasonably accurate reflection of the broad variety of views current at the time. In the plots of the plays we have seen Tyche acting as a beneficent deity or power, ordering the action for the benefit of the good characters and giving the bad ones their just deserts also; she can be the impetus which sets off the action as well as the force which brings it to a close; yet she can be strange and unpredictable(117); she gives three bad things for every good one(118); she is ill-mannered, untrustworthy, unjust, crazy, foolish and changes from day to day; she brings rich people to poverty; she is blind and accursed; foresight and good advice are of no use against her; she comes close to being a godlike power at Fr.417 Kö, a fragment which fits in with the philosophical precept that the wise person bears the blows of <u>tyche</u> bravely(119); <u>techne</u> and <u>gnome</u> may be of some use, indeed are essential for seizing the opportune moment in the plot, but a person's character is of no avail:

ἄνοια θνητοῖς δυστύχημ' αὐθαίρετον·
τί σαυτὸν ἀδικῶν τὴν τύχην καταιτιᾷ; (120)

There is also a strong influence felt from contemporary philosophical thought, and all this serves to illustrate not only the many variations and contradictions there were in the day-to-day conceptions of <u>tyche</u>, but also to show just how ready the people of the early Hellenistic period were to

interpret events as due to chance. This has led to Menander's plays being cited as proof of the supposed Hellenistic religious loss of nerve, with Menander himself being described as a reliable witness to feelings of disenchantment, leaning towards melancholy, which many people at his time felt regarding the gods, and his ethics as resignation to the rule of capricious fortune(121), but even Cary, who is also a proponent of the decline of Hellenistic religion, rejects this view on the grounds that, when Menander wrote, the main philosophical systems were being formulated and the Greeks were still being carried on the wave of Alexander's conquests and were 'not yet within sight of national decadence' ((1951)354-5). We might add that although Tyche had received cult at Athens from 335/4 B.C. this had no discernible effects on the cults of other deities and is more indicative of the flexibility or 'selective continuity' which characterizes Greek polytheism than of declining religious confidence. The historical background is also important here, for it would seem that the interest in Tyche is reflective of wider trends which are to some extent conditioned by historical circumstances in which the considerable changes occasioned by the conquests of Alexander and the unstable political and military climate of the time may well have contributed to the feeling that there was a power at work greater than human volition. The workings of chance should be, and usually are, blind, but human inconsistency finds it hard to avoid the idea that the force which brings good or bad luck

can be influenced and propitiated: the cult of Tyche at Athens suggests that this is in fact the case(122). Again we may refer back to Pliny HN 2.2, which, from the evidence of New Comedy, now reads much more like a description of Tyche in the formative years in the Hellenistic age(123).

It is often argued that a great many people in the Hellenistic age had lost the comfort and support which a truly 'living faith' can give against the blows of fortune, and that philosophy offered a means of replacing the rudder, so to speak, and steering people though the unwelcome events occasioned by Tyche. It is further argued that philosophy had the potential to give deliverance from destiny if the individual had the power and ability to allow it to do so; philosophy would replace that missing comfort and support(124). Furthermore, it is said, in any philosophical religion (and, it is argued, all the Hellenistic philosophical schools were 'religious' in some sense) the gods can only really be accessories. Euhemerism and the allegorical interpretation of myth by the Stoics are frequently used as evidence for the alleged decline of religion in the Hellenistic period, and these factors, along with pre-Hellenistic philosophical scepticism, will be examined in the final chapter, but here we shall examine the relations between Hellenistic philosophy and Tyche in order to gain insights both into Tyche's place in Hellenistic thought of a different level to that encountered in New Comedy and into Tyche's relation to the 'decline' of Hellenistic

culture.

Plutarch's Περὶ Τύχης (Mor. 97C - 100A) has such a strong flavour of Old Stoicism that we can gain some idea of the arguments used by the Old Stoics against the Peripatetics on this subject (125). Starting with Chaeremon's verse τύχη τἀ θνητῶν πράγματ', οὐκ εὐβουλία (126) Plutarch attacks the doctrine of tyche in Theophrastus' Callisthenes of which this verse is the leitmotiv. He starts by asking whether it was as a result of isotes, sophrosyne or kosmiotes or whether it was ἐκ τύχης μὲν καὶ διὰ τύχην that various historical characters were virtuous or not (97C), and then proceeds to demand whether man's superiority over the animals is due to tyche or Prometheus, the power to think and reason, before assessing to what heights man's intelligence raises him, above what it places him and how he is master of all things and in every way (98B). Throughout the discussion tyche is represented as a negative and disorderly power against which are ranged the positive and ordering human qualities of dikaiosyne, logos, andreia, phronesis, euboulia, eunomia, mneme, empeiria, sophia, pronoia, epimeleia and techne. The tyche:techne polarity is strongly stated at 99A ff, where Plutarch discusses the role of chance in works of art. He admits that chance may occasionally contribute slightly to the success of πράγματα θνητῶν but argues that the technai bring the most and greatest of artworks to perfection through themselves, for τὴν γὰρ Ἐργάνην καὶ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν αἱ τέχναι πάρεδρον οὐ τὴν Τύχην ἔχουσι (99B).

He cites the only recorded instance of a technical achievement due to tyche, that of the painter who hurled his sponge at his picture in frustration and thereby achieved the effect of the foam of a horse frothing at the mouth(127), and then proceeds to argue that even the most mundane things are done by epistasis and prosoche rather than by tyche: nobody wets clay with water and leaves it, assuming that ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ αὐτομάτως there will be bricks, and no-one provides themself with wool and leather and then sits down τῇ τύχῃ προσευχόμενος in the hope that the materials will turn into a cloak or a pair of shoes (99D). His conclusion, at 99F f, is that phronesis enables a person to control their life and counterbalance the whims of tyche and that without phronesis a great many apparent benefits such as wealth, health and happiness are unserviceable, fruitless or even harmful in that they burden and disgrace their possessor: undeserved good fortune becomes a source of misery for the unthinking.

The Stoics believed that everything which happens is followed by something else which necessarily depends on it as a cause, and also that everything which happens has something preceding it to which it is connected as a cause. Therefore nothing exists or happens in the universe without a cause because everything is connected to everything else(128). Given this immanent and necessary causality it was impossible to separate tyche from fate: as far as the

Stoics were concerned, all that tyche could be was a subjective moment, a defective or incomplete understanding of the fated causal concatenation, and, as the slightest element of contingency would shake their absolute confidence in the divine purpose, they could not consider tyche as an arbitrary whim. Thus they defined tyche in the familiar terms of 'a cause unclear to human perception'(129), thereby incorporating it into the regular pattern of causes and making up for its mysteriousness by making it divine and so unable to do harm(130). Possibility, then, only exists to the extent that people are ignorant of the causal connection between events, and a possible event is defined as that which is prevented by nothing from happening, even it if does not happen(131). However, there is something which prevents all non-events from happening, namely the causes of those events which do occur: only human ignorance of causes makes people assert the absence of any impediment to the happening of non-events. The Stoics regarded Heimarmene as a far more important concept than tyche(132), but their concern to explain the latter away clearly indicates that they felt the need to come to terms with what, as we have seen from Menander, was popularly regarded as a powerful and ubiquitous force.

Epicurus also addresses himself to the problem of tyche and praises the person who believes that things happen partly κατ' ἀνάγκην, partly κατὰ τύχην and partly παρ'

ἡμᾶς [133] on the grounds that necessity destroys responsibility and that tyche is inconstant, whereas our own actions are free. Neither does this praiseworthy person believe tyche to be divine, as the majority of people do, since in the acts of a deity there is no disorder[134], nor does he or she think tyche is a cause, though an uncertain one: rather he or she believes that tyche dispenses neither good nor evil, although it orchestrates the beginnings of many good and bad things, and that the misfortune of the wise is preferable to the prosperity of the fool[135]. In sum, it is preferable that the successful outcome of a well judged action should not depend on chance; once the arbitrary element has secured the guarantee of free will for humans the element of contingency is denied any further influence, and phronesis or logismos enable people to bear almost anything which tyche brings:

> Βραχέα σοφῷ τύχη παρεμπίπτει, τὰ δὲ μέγιστα καὶ κυριώτατα ὁ λογισμὸς διῴκηκε καὶ κατὰ τὸν συνεχῆ χρόνον τοῦ βίου διοικεῖ καὶ διοικήσει. (136).

Thus tyche again appears ranged against the ordering forces of life, and we can infer from this discussion that the problem of tyche's disruptive influence on life was as significant to Epicurus as it was to the Stoics. We should also be aware of the continuity of the debate: the issues are not new, as our examinations of Aristotle, Thucydides and others have shown, but they do illustrate a more far-ranging preoccupation with them. It is not so much the

novelty of the problem of tyche which is of interest as its ubiquity.

One man of practical experience whom the revolutionary events of the Hellenistic age brought to prominence pondered deeply over these ideas which concentrated heavily on the movements of events. This was Demetrius of Phalerum, born in circa 350 B.C., who as strategos escaped death as a pro-Macedonian in 318 B.C., and was made absolute governor at Athens by Cassander. He held power there until Demetrius Poliorcetes took the city in 307 B.C., after which he escaped, later becoming librarian at Alexandria before dying in disgrace under Ptolemy Philadelphus. Inspired by the sudden change in fate which he had undergone he wrote a treatise on Tyche. His Peripatetic inclinations led him to collect and consider the material which experience gave him, and there are reminiscences of Theophrastus' Callisthenes in his writing. The Callisthenes is a bitter work which approves the maxim that tyche, not euboulia rules people's lives, and examines the case of Aristotle's pupil Callisthenes who was put to death by Alexander on a charge of conspiracy. Theophrastus, lamenting the death of his friend, is outraged at the prosperity of Alexander and argues that the world is ruled by a fickle goddess who capriciously overthrows what has been painfully built up and puts power into the hands of unworthy people. He shows how tyche killed Callisthenes, notwithstanding his euboulia, but gave Alexander power which he was unfit to wield(137). Demetrius' treatise also

emphasises the capricious nature of tyche(138). He asks whether fifty years ago anyone would have thought that the then obscure Macedonians would seize and destroy the mighty Persian empire, and depicts Tyche quite pointedly as a force who has no consideration for our existence, who invariably defeats our reckoning by some novel stroke and who manifests her power by foiling our expectations. He concludes by saying that the Macedonians themselves have these blessings on loan; Polybius comments on the prophetic nature of his words(139). Demetrius regarded Tyche as being as blind as Ploutos(140), and the moral of his story was 'be humble at the height of prosperity'. However, many missed the point and concentrated on his pessimistic doctrine which regarded the whole of human history as subject to the arbitrary rule of tyche, and certain scholars have been quick to interpret this as an indication of a despondent spiritual atmosphere at Athens after Alexander's conquests. Certainly the prevalent interest in tyche in philosophical contexts is noteworthy, and in Demetrius' case is tied in with historical and personal conditions, but there is scant evidence to suggest that the traditional cults, festivals, temples etc. came to be neglected in order to accommodate tyche, and, even if we were to grant that Athens may have been despondent at this time, we should not necessarily impute that attitude to the entire Hellenistic world: the tension seen between Demetrius' moral and that which others drew from his work shows the danger of extracting isolated

sentiments from an author and then applying them to an entire culture. The distinction between the views of an educated élite and those of the broad base of the population should always be kept in mind.

Our principal source for the views of Demetrius of Phalerum is the work of Polybius, who is also one of the most valuable sources for Hellenistic conceptions of tyche which we have. He is influenced by Stoic thinking but also by the popular thought of his day, and this leads to his reflecting many commonplace ideas about tyche while at the same time arguing that Tyche is not the cause of Roman success. Most especially, the inconsistencies and self-contradictions that are evident in the way in which he handles tyche reveal a most illuminating picture of what Tyche represented for an educated person and of what it represented for the masses(141). For Polybius Tyche can simply and objectively signify the course of events, and even with the emphasis he places on the causal connection of historical facts, he cannot be rid of the popular conception whose expressions he uses. Tyche can occasion great changes, plays with adults as though they were little children, is deceitful, incalculable, delights in disrupting human affairs, and yet, despite this frequent appearance of Tyche in the historical narrative, she is seldom, if at all, described as divine or godlike. In many ways what Polybius has to say about Tyche corresponds closely to the examples we surveyed in New Comedy, but his perception of it is coloured by philosophy and by

the deeper insight of politics which he achieved from his stay in Rome. Thus he is able to show what views were current among the common people side by side with his desire to replace Tyche by rational causes.

The main thesis of Polybius' History is that the Roman conquest of the world is not due to tyche but to Roman character and institutions. He is dismissive of the view that Tyche causes anything, and yet he commonly lapses into rhetoric and speaks of Tyche as reducing all things to a unity and of his work as intended to bring out this design of Tyche and the consequent lesson for world history(142). In the first book he states a poblem which is difficult to explain as natural by the recurrence of natural phenomena, so, rather than assume that the growth of Roman domination is a result of natural law, he uses a word which, as we have seen, has been familiar to his Greek audience since the time of Alexander, and ascribes the startling phenomena which he is to survey to tyche. However, as W.W. Fowler (1903) points out, the fundamental idea underlying both these points is much the same, and in fact it is not far removed from the Stoic idea of Heimarmene. We have also seen that, apart from the vulgar meaning of mere chance and accident, tyche has been used at least since the time of Aristotle to express that which happens in the natural order of things without ascribing any notion of wantonness or caprice to it, and so the use of tyche here need not be so startling as one might first imagine. Yet Polybius can still say, in the same

book(143), that it was not by tyche or automatos, as some Greeks think, that the Romans acquired their universal hegemony, thereby contrasting his own view with the ascription of events to tyche in the narrower sense of chance or accident, which would probably have been the ordinary, unphilosophical, contemporary Greek usage. Evidently he is unconcerned by the inconsistency of saying on one page that it was not by chance and on another of declaring how tyche has manifested its power, and so it would be unreasonable to expect to be able to pin down Polybius' popular language to philosophical consistency, since he himself clearly feels no inconsistency(144).

Polybius is ready to dramatize Tyche as a purposive power, and to moralize the lessons her vicisstudes teach in the rise and fall of empires as he does at xxiii.10 in the case of Philip of Macedon, who experiences terrible misfortune as if Tyche had meant to punish him for all the wicked and criminal acts he had committed earlier in his life(145). The same process is made explicit in the case of the Spartan Ephors who had been bribed to make Lycurgus king, but who were subsequently murdered by Chilon, τῆς τύχης τὴν ἁρμόζουσαν αὐτοῖς ἐπιθείσης δίκην (iv. 81. 5.).

The Tyche which we encounter in the case of Philip of Macedon bears some resemblances to Nemesis, and the cliché that moderation is needed at times of success is regularly repeated: Antiochus bursts into tears at

the downfall of Achaeus because, Polybius supposes, he saw how hard to guard against and contrary to expectations are events due to tyche(146); Aemilius Paullus moralizes over the vanquished Perseus on the theme of never being overbearing and merciless, and of not placing any reliance on present prosperity(147); Scipio Aemilianus uses Hasdrubal as an example of how Tyche treats inconsiderate people(148). However, it seems clear that Polybius did not hold that arrogance alone brought divine vengeance with it, for in many cases it is prosperity which invites the jealousy of tyche, who in the epilogue to the History is described as ἀγαθὴ φθονῆσαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις (149). The episode involving Regulus is a good example of this(150), for here Regulus' error in demanding excessively severe terms for the Carthaginian surrender, and also the timely arrival of Xanthippus, are only part of the reason for his failure; the other part is the jealousy of Tyche(151). Interestingly Diodorus' account of the same incident makes the same point as Polybius but in slightly different terms, for he tells us that Regulus' pride was such ὥστε τὸ μὲν δαιμόνιον νεμεσῆσαι (152). The closeness between Tyche and Nemesis in these passages, which is also reflected in their iconographies, will be discussed in connection with the latter figure, but we may observe that the vagueness inherent in Polybius' use of Tyche suggests that the concept was in common usage with many Hellenistic authors. Walbank (1945) exemplifies this by examining the account of Agathocles' drastic changes of fortune

given by Diodorus xx.70, which is derived from one of the Hellenistic historians Douris or Timaeus. Agathocles lost a major part of his army in a defeat in Sicily, but capricious tyche enabled him to defeat his conquerors with a minimal force in Africa; subsequently he murdered his φίλος and ξένος Ophellas, but on the exact anniversary of this he lost his army and his two sons, with tyche exacting retribution through Ophellas' friends who seized Agathocles' sons. Walbank ((1945)7) reasonably interprets this appearance of Polybius' just avenging force in a non-Polybian passage as 'clear proof that it was common form in the third and second centuries'. This unusual mixture of Tyche with human rational faculties(153) is intended to be a lesson to others, and is typical of the so-called 'tragic' school of Hellenistic historians which included Callisthenes, Douris, Phylarchus and Agatharcides who all stressed παράδοξα , sensations, unexpected reversals in fortune and the prominent part played by Tyche in human affairs(154). Thus the historical method of the Regulus incident accords with a concept of Tyche which sees the course of events as a balanced pattern in which good fortune is requited with bad, and vice versa, and we might again observe that although this is by no means a new view of tyche, the extent to which it permeates the writings and thought of Hellenistic historians is suggestive of an increased awareness of, and significance in, the concept of tyche at this time.

Tyche in Polybius need not be jealous and retributive, however. At i.4. 4-5 we are told of the providential action of tyche who is continually producing something new (καινοποιοῦσα) and always playing a part in people's lives, and has never yet achieved such an accomplishment as the events which Polybius is about to describe: the use of κάλλιστον and ὠφελιμώτατον to describe the ἐπιτήδευμα of the rise of Rome to world domination clearly convey the beneficial and providential side of tyche here(155).

However, when an explanation by traceable causes is available, Polybius, like Thucydides, dismisses the facile resort to chance or supernatural intervention; only people who have a misinformed view of kairous, aitias and diatheseis attribute εἰς θεοὺς καὶ τύχας what is in fact due to orderly human forces of anchinoia, logismos and pronoia(156). Again the commonplace that tyche is merely a name for our ignorance and that nothing happens without a cause is often stated(157). Thus at ii.38.5-9 he idealistically suggests that the success of the Achaean League is not due to tyche but to equality, free speech, humanity and genuine democracy. His emotions and sympathies are clearly engaged in this passage which reflects the patriotic bias of an Achaean statesman who attributes the whole of his country's success to its own merits, and this partiality can also be observed in his descriptions of the rise of Rome, Roman success in battle, Flamininus' campaign in Greece, the achievements of Scipio

Africanus and the career of the younger Scipio which, though sometimes allowing some influence to automaton, emphasise the link between success and innate good qualities(158). Polybius does not deny tyche's existence in any of these examples, but he does clearly delimit the area in which tyche can be used as an account for historical events. K. Ziegler (159)observes that some other references to Tyche are qualified by words like ὥσπερ or ὡσανεί, and Walbank ((1957)25) takes this as indicating a 'real and prolonged doubt about the existence of an objectively active Tyche' This is strongly supported by Polybius' own words at xxxvi.17 where, in a detailed exposition of tyche and heimarmene, he defines the former as a convenient label by which to distinguish acts of God and the irrational or fortuitous interventions of man.

Tyche, then, appears to be the area which lies outside human control, and the word is frequently used in the Aristotelian sense of those events whose causes are difficult to discern or for which there are apparently no rational causes at all. But Polybius' view is not a clear-cut or consistent one, for he attributes Roman success to both calculation and rational causes and also to the overriding power of a providential Tyche. Furthermore he falls into popular usage and speaks of tyche as a capricious power and recognises the fact of accident and spontaneity(160). Leaders of the stature of Epaminondas and Philopoemen are said to attain success through their own talents but are defeated

though no fault of their own,
τῆς τύχης ἥττων (161), and those who find fault with fortune are said to be justified(162) in such cases. The fickleness and capriciousness of tyche are evident in the case of Sparta, whose condition deteriorates so that after being the best she becomes the worst(163), and also in the case of Athens and Thebes who in turn decline ὥσπερ ἐκ προσπαίου τινὸς τύχης (164). It is interesting that Polybius shows no feeling of awkwardness that his Tyche can simultaneously be capricious and retributive: the tyche which influences the careers of Philip and Antiochus at xv.20.5-6 is both just and capricious, for the same tyche can function in occasions of change and sensational incident as well as in those where the concept is closer to providential design. Walbank ((1957)23) rightly observes that it is a feature of the capricious power of Demetrius of Phalerum's Tyche that she is constantly kainopoiousa, but that this is also a work of the providential Tyche which orchestrates Rome's rise(165) and is not inconsistent with the rational nexus of causation(166). Thus Polybius' conceptions of Tyche constantly shade into each other according to how his sympathies in any given situation lie. Walbank goes on to argue that 'the personality with which Polybius invests Tyche is a matter of verbal elaboration, helped by current Hellenistic usage, which habitually spoke of Tyche as a goddess' and that he probably fell victim to the words he used and to his constant personification of what began as a

mere hiatus in knowledge ((1957)25). There is constant tension between the type of everyday usage which we encountered in Menander and the rather different usages which were evident in our discussion of Hellenistic philosophy: when Polybius adopted the word Tyche it covered, as H. Erkell remarks(167), all the shades in a spectrum from a sharply defined philosophical concept to a hazy outworn cliché. This illustrates how even a person who had thought long and hard about the course of history still fell prey to the ordinary usage of everyday life; this usage shows just how great a power the conception of and belief in Tyche exercised over people of all intellectual backgrounds in the Hellenistic age.

The value of Polybius' use of Tyche to this study lies in its lack of straightforwardness. It is clear that his use of tyche is not innovative to any great degree but owes much to Thucydides, Aristotle and others. He uses rational explanations and preserves a remarkably ethical attitude, but as a man of his times he also pays tribute to the power of Tyche, thereby combining what to us seem like two mutually exclusive elements. Yet this served his pedogogic aims of imparting factual information and also of showing how different individuals stood up to the blows of fate. This accounts for the difference between the philosophical conceptions of tyche, which relate to the natural order and development of human affairs where events cannot be explained scientifically, and the more commonplace conception, which relates to the constant

changes or chances of mortal life where it is hopeless or even needless to search out the causes; the choice of the shade of meaning is greatly influenced by Polybius' personal standpoint. All this shows the pervasive power that Tyche has acquired by the second century B.C.: the combined evidence of Hellenistic comedy, philosophy and historiography illustrates clearly not that tyche was conceived of in ways which were fundamentally different from those of the Classical era, but rather the extent to which writers and thinkers of different intellectual backgrounds and outlooks were concerned with the same problem. Pliny's remarks sound more pertinent the more Hellenistic literature one reads, and any description of the Hellenistic era which notes a preoccupation, or even, at times, an obsession with Tyche will not be far away from the truth. Before we progress to examining whether similar observations can be made regarding Hellenistic art let us summarize briefly some of the main points that have arisen in this section.

The emphasis falls heavily on the non-mythical aspect of Tyche, even though her cult is in existence: there is little or no trace of the Hesiodic water-nymph in any of the genres we have assessed here. The interest centres rather on the concept of chance as a force of disorder, and does so especially because of historical and personal circumstances; the lives and times of Menander, Demetrius of Phalerum and Polybius were all seen to be significantly affected by tyche, if the emphasis given to this concept in their writings is an

accurate indication, and, although tyche has been evident and of interest to many writers, thinkers and ordinary people since Archaic times, it has never previously received so much attention across such a broad field. This rise of tyche's importance was a gradual process hastened by historical events, but to see this trend as reflecting a religious or cultural decline would be, we have argued, to misinterpret a process which is better interpreted as a shift in emphasis. Furthermore, we have also seen that there is a considerable range of opinions to take into account at any one time, for the views of dramatists, philosophers, historians and people-in-the-street differ widely both amongst themselves and according to their own artistic and personal aims and biases. Therefore the greatest care should be exercised when generalizing on the nature and significance of 'the Hellenistic conception of tyche'.

iii) Tyche in Hellenistic Art

It has been argued that from the beginning of the fourth century B.C. the religious feeling for the majesty and splendour of the Olympian deities declined, and that as a result, on an approximately inversely proportional scale, artists began to use the representations of divinities solely as showcases for their own virtuosity(168). Certainly this artistic virtuosity reached its apogee in the Hellenistic period, when metaphors and attributes tended to become embellishments whose judicious choice

was part of an artist's taste, and fitting symbols tended to be applauded, in learned circles at any rate, as much for their erudition, wit and virtuosity as for their religious import(169). Throughout the fourth century B.C. also, the artistic representations of personifications became more frequent, as the statues of Peitho and Paregoros by Praxiteles in the temple of Aphrodite Praxis at Megara, and the group of Eros, Himeros and Pothos by Scopas show(170). But, although personifications proliferate, the Olympians continue to receive temples, statues and cult right through the Hellenistic era, and we should note that the beliefs and aims of artist and client need not coincide, any more than artists' expertise should preclude the religious significance of their work. It is, therefore, my intention to examine these and other issues relevant to Hellenistic culture through a virtuoso rendition of a personification whose fame stemmed partly from the fact that it served as a convenient symbol of a city, and partly because it seems to have enshrined many of the feelings about the nature of life in the Hellenistic age which we encountered in our study of Tyche in Hellenistic literature. The monument in question is the Tyche of Antioch, but before we can examine it in detail we must survey the artistic representations of Tyche which preceded it.

Pausanias iv.30.3f informs us that the famous Chian sculptor and temple-architect Boupalus, who with his brother caricatured the poet Hipponax, is said to have

made a statue of Tyche at Smyrna, representing her with the polos on her head(171) and carrying the horn of Amaltheia : οὗτος μὲν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο ἐδήλωσε τῆς θεοῦ τὰ ἔργα. He is also said to have produced a gilt group of draped Charites which, either then or later, were placed above the images of the goddesses in the temple of the Nemeseis at Smyrna. The accepted dating of Boupalus' Tyche to 536 B.C. has been challenged by R. Heidenreich, who distinguishes between the Boupalus of the Archaic period, whose works are described by Pliny HN 36.11-13, and a later, Hellenistic, sculptor of the same name who carved the Tyche for Smyrna and also the Charites for Smyrna and a group of Charites at Pergamum about the beginning of the second century B.C. (172). Heidenreich's point that our knowledge of Pergamene statuary and ancient portraiture generally, especially the ways of representing Tyche, connect what Pausanias tells us with the Hellenistic period rather than with the Archaic ((1935) 670f, 676-89, 691-96, 697-99) is initially attractive, but, while his argument that Hipponax himself never calls Boupalus a sculptor or mentions his brother, and that caricatures were unknown in plastic art as early as the sixth century B.C. is, on his own admission, unanswerable, there are serious objections to this theory: firstly his inference that, since the Temple of the Nemeseis at Smyrna was not erected until the early third century B.C., it is unlikely that statues were made for it in the sixth ((1935) 672) is rejected by C.J. Cadoux ((1938)89) on the grounds that a very

ancient Temple of Nemesis probably existed in the village period, and in any case Pausanias does not say that Boupalus sculpted the Charites for this temple in particular; secondly, Heidenreich's argument ((1935) 673f, 690) that Pausanias does not give Boupalus' date or mention his brother, which implies he is dependent on late and inexact informants, merely compounds the problem rather than solving it; thirdly the suggestion that the sixth century B.C. is much earlier than any traces of a cult of Tyche in the Hellenic world ((1935) 672f) appears dubious in the light of the existence of ancient xoana on the acropolis at Sicyon(173), at Titane, where there were agalmata of Tyche, Aphrodite, the mother of the gods, Dionysus, Hecate and others(174), and at Elis where there was a shrine of Tyche and Sosipolis(175). The possibility of the existence of archaic representations of Tyche is also demonstrated by the existence of a temple at Argos which, as Pausanias ii.20.3 says, must be a very old one if it is the one where Palamedes dedicated the dice which he had invented, and also by the Tychaion in Syracuse which Cicero describes as 'Fortunae fanum antiquum'(176). Finally Heidenreich seeks to support his late dating by asserting that the horn of Amaltheia, the cornucopia, could not have been depicted as early as the sixth century B.C. ((1935) 674f)(177), and, while the earliest definite representations of it date only from the first half of the fifth century B.C. (178), the cornucopia does appear in literature as early as Anacreon and Phocylides(179) and may even be older

than its connection with Amaltheia, since the magical object out of which its possessor can get anything he or she likes, or an unlimited supply of any one thing, is a widespread folk-motif(180). Thus Heidenreich's case for making Boupalus' Tyche of Smyrna a Hellenistic rather than an Archaic work appears to be inconclusive.

The statue which we have been discussing is by no means an isolated representation of Tyche before the Hellenistic period; we have already encountered her on the Berlin Amphoriskos and mentioned her xoana at Sicyon, Titane and Elis. Pausanias also informs us that the people of Pherae had a temple of Tyche and ἄγαλμα ἀρχαῖον (181). From the fourth century B.C. we hear of a temple of Tyche at Megara which had a statue of her by Praxiteles(182), copies of which are believed by Imhoof-Blumer and Gardner ((1885) 56f) to appear on coins of the Antonine period which depict her with a mural crown(183) and holding a patera and cornucopia, a temple and statue of Tyche at Megalopolis(184), a statue of Agathe Tyche by Praxiteles in Athens(185), and a sanctuary of Tyche at Thebes. The cult statue for this shrine was carved by Xenophon, who did the hands and face, and Callistonicus, who did the rest, and depicted Ploutos in the arms of Tyche, so as to suggest that she was his mother or nurse(186). Personifications allegorised in terms of family relationships became a common feature of Hellenistic art, and indeed Pausanias attributes to Xenophon and Callistonicus the

same motives as those of Cephisodotus in his Eirene and Ploutos, which, as we shall see in the concluding chapter, is an important work because, although the personifications of Ploutos and Eirene had for a long time possessed substantiality as divine beings, the innovative mother-and-child allegorical relationship implies a new acknowledgement of their abstract essence(187). Further fourth century B.C. works depicting Tyche include the Stele of Phylarchus from Tegea, dated by F. Hiller von Gaertringen to 361 B.C., which depicts Tyche with a steering oar adorning a trophy(188), a relief now in Copenhagen showing Zeus Epiteleios Philios, Philia and Agathe Tyche(189) (Fig. 30), and possibly a seated Tyche by Apelles(190). Thus before the creation of the Tyche of Antioch by Eutychides in the early Hellenistic era there have been examples of Tyche represented in various media and with various attributes; but, as we shall now see, the seated figure as the specific city - Tyche type, and the very widespread diffusion of it, is a striking innovation which implies much about Hellenistic art and culture.

In 300 B.C. Seleucus I Nicator founded his capital at the mouth of the river Orontes; he named it Antiocheia after his son Antiochus. In honour of this foundation the sculptor Eutychides, a Sicyonian who was possibly a pupil of Lysippus, made a statue representing the Tyche of the city which was probably of colossal scale and which stood in the open air. The original no longer survives, but the large number of replicas in

bronze, marble and glass and representations on coins and gems facilitate its reconstruction. Tyche sits on a rock, which represents Mount Silpius on which Antioch stood, with her legs crossed. Her left hand is at her side and her right arm rests with its elbow on her right knee. Her right hand holds a bunch of wheat or a palm branch. These details are all illustrated in various replicas in bronze in which she wears a mural crown on her head, a new innovation which symbolizes the walls of the city(191). In other copies her right foot rests in the shoulder of a swimmer who is emerging from the waters of the river Orontes which he personifies (Figs 2 - 4)(192). The composition of the group is complex: Orontes' head is turned to the right, Tyche's to the left, while the movement of the body and drapery of the female figure intermingle and oppose each other, for the folds are so arranged as to follow the diagonal direction of the left arm from left to right in the upper part of the composition, while in the lower part the folds are practically vertical, although they curve around the legs and meet in zigzags above Orontes' head. The fact that this clarifies and emphasises the movement, which in Tyche goes from her right to left while the river god swims in the opposite direction, created difficulties in representing this dynamic three-dimensional figure in two-dimensional media such as coins and gems. On tetradrachms of Antioch from the reign of Tigranes the Great, Tyche appears in profile to the right, seated on a rock and holding a palm branch in her right hand. The Orontes is at her

feet, and, though his face is frontal, his body is in an oblique position so as to accord with the axis of Tyche as he swims to the right(193). On a red jasper in Cambridge(194) Tyche appears in frontal view with her head in three-quarter view, with Orontes at her feet, crowned by a cuirassed figure who may well be Seleucus Nicator(195), and accompanied by Fortuna. The highly distinctive nature of Tyche's headdress can be seen from coins which depict solely her head in profile. Dohrn remarks that the earliest free representations of the head of Tyche appear on coins from the city of Aradus in 260 B.C.(196), but strictly speaking accurate represention of her head in the form of copies of the original statue begin on coins of the same city in 133/2 B.C. (Fig. 5), and later on tetradrachms of Seleuceia in circa 100 B.C.(197). Thus the group is iconographically and stylistically non-traditional: the composition is highly three dimensional, with the movements of parts of the group and parts of the figures going in different directions to create a sense of energy which challenges the spectator to walk around it and study it from many different angles.

In artistic, conceptual and religious terms Eutychides' Tyche of Antioch was innovative, influential and distinctive of the Hellenistic age. Although we have seen vague anticipations in pre-Hellenistic art and thought, the degree to which the cult of local and personal Tychai permeated Hellenistic culture was quite unprecedented. The fact

that the cult of the Tyche of Antioch is distinct from that of Tyche in general is further attested by the coinage of Demetrius I Soter and his elder son Demetrius 11 Nicator, which featured a seated enthroned Tyche holding a short sceptre and a cornucopia. This type is peculiar to both rulers and, although it was struck at Antioch, does not depict the Tyche of that city (198) (Figs. 6 and 7). Thus the Tyche of a city or of an individual is a particular aspect of the wide range which the concept of Tyche can cover; the specific should not be confused with the generic. The choice of Tyche to serve as guardian deity of the new city, in preference to one of the Olympians, is also interesting and informative, but ought not to be interpreted in terms of 'Olympian decline': Antioch had no religious tradition, and so rather than making use of a traditional deity, hero or mythical ancestor, Tyche was chosen. Greeks outside the homeland tended to view the old gods as common to all Greeks rather than as peculiar to their own state, and so Tyche, which could be linked to individuals or states, was a felicitous choice. The emphasis laid on the beneficent aspect of Tyche in this context further accentuates the difference between the city Tyche and the more usually disorderly general Tyche.

Eutychides' group is also innovative in the type of allegory it represents. The rock, swimmer, walled headdress and fruits of the earth indicate the geographical site, fortifications, and economic importance of the city. Unlike some cult statues of Tyche, which are often connected with other deities,

there is no mythical sense embodied in Eutychides' work, and unlike the scene on the Berlin Amphoriskos, where Tyche only adds vividness to an already meaningful scene, the Tyche of Antioch would be meaningless without the significant spatial relationship between Tyche, the Orontes, and the rock. Thus Eutychides has achieved innovation out of continuity, and the significant aspects for this study are the new type of Tyche and the new type of allegory.

The influence of the Tyche of Antioch type can be observed in the four seated statuettes in the British Museum from the Equiline treasure which, despite dating from circa 400 A.D., probably reproduce Hellenistic originals (199). Rome (Fig. 8) and Constantinople (Fig. 9) both wear girded tunics, mantles and crested helmets. Rome holds a spear and shield, Constantinople a cornucopia and patera, Alexandria (Fig. 10) wears a mural crown and holds fruit and ears of corn in her lap and sits with her left foot on the prow of a ship. All three of these figures are facing straight ahead and have a jejune and conventional appearance; the fourth figure in the group is of the Tyche of Antioch type and has been discussed above (Fig. 4).

The figure of Tyche sitting, standing or occasionally reclining, modius on her head, cornucopia in her hand and steering paddle by her side is extremely common in statuary, bronzes, coins and other media from the

beginning of the Hellenistic era. However the Tyche of Antioch has neither the cornucopia nor the steering oar. This leads Hinks ((1939) 77) to suggest that there was another type dating from early Hellenistic times which is now lost. He argues that the frequent combination of Tyche's attributes with those of Isis imply that this type was created at Alexandria in the third century. The Tychaion at Alexandria was certainly a famous shrine(200), and the common appearance of Tyche on coins shows how familiar her cult must have been to the Alexandrians. As examples of this lost original Hinks cites a figure in the Boboli Gardens, Florence, which is a third century original which has no polos but which does have a cornucopia(201), a pastiche from the Roman period in the Braccio Nuovo of the Vatican, where a steering paddle and globe are added to a fourth century type(202), and, the standing type of the goddess of Massilia in the British Museum(203) who holds a gilt patera in her right hand and pours a libation onto a small altar in front of her. In her left hand she holds a gilt cornucopia which emerges from gilt leaves and is surmounted by busts of Apollo and Artemis. She is winged, wears a long chiton and a himation, and her hair, parted and arranged in elaborate curls, is topped by a mural crown. On the edge of her wings are busts of the Dioscuri, below each of which is a small globe, and the wings themselves support a crescent shaped cross-piece to which are attached seven busts representing the days of the week or their corresponding deities, below each of which is a small

globe (Fig. 11). However, in view of the appearance of the cornucopia and the steering oar on pre-Hellenistic works such as Boupalus' Tyche and the Stele of Phylarchus, and the diversity of variations on what is admittedly a fairly limited theme, it seems unnecessary to postulate a second definitive Hellenistic original. The iconography and pose of the Tyche of Antioch are highly distinctive, so an artist wishing to depict the Tyche of some other city would have to exercise considerable care in the choice of iconographical details in order to avoid confusion. Moreover the representation in art of Tyche as a city goddess, as the embodiment and representation of the city, is modified to suit the different places she represents in respect of their character, situation and inhabitants.

If a city or country can have its Tyche, so can its ruler. Tyche as a universal goddess could be applied also to an individual, especially if there was a particular reason for showing respect to that individual, and some striking examples of the appearance of Tyche in connection with the ruler cult occur in relation to the queens of Egypt. A number of faience oinochoai, which seem to have cult significance, feature representations of Arsinoe wife of Philadelphus, Berenice or Arsinoe II holding a cornucopia or <u>dikeras</u> in one hand and making a libation near a horned altar, close to which is a tall column decked with garlands[204] (Fig. 12). These are inscribed either on the shoulder of the vase with the words

ἀγαθῆς τύχης Ἀρσινόης Φιλαδέλφου or Βασιλίσσης Βερενίκης ἀγαθῆς τυχῆς (205), or on the altar of Arsinoe ἀγαθῆς τύχης Ἀρσινόης Φιλαδέλφου Ἴσιος(206) or on Berenice's, θεῶν εὐεργετῶν (207). The interpretation of these inscriptions is problematical. The oinochoai appear to be cult objects but the identity of the cult, and the function of the vases within it, remain obscure. P.M. Fraser ((1972) I.241 f) observes that the Temple Inventories of the Second Athenian period at Delos, which itemize the contents of the Temple of Agathe Tyche, amongst which was a statue of Agathe Tyche carrying a gilded cornucopia, show that she was a fully personified deity from 166 B.C. and that her portrayal bore some general resemblance to that of the queens on the oinochoai(208). Furthermore, the Philadelpheion at Delos, which was built to honour Arsinoe at around this time, was probably renamed, or absorbed in, the temple of Agathe Tyche(209), and if this is the case it clearly points to an Alexandrian cult of personified Agathe Tyche. The cult centre was possibly the circular Tychaion which included statues of Alexander and Soter(210) and which Palladas wrote about(211). So historically it is reasonable to regard the queens on the oinochoai as identified with Agathe Tyche, but this still leaves the problem of whether Agathe Tyche refers to the personal Tyche of Arsinoe and Berenice, to a separate personified deity with which the queens are identified or assimilated, or to a fusion or confusion of these. F. Taeger ((1957)I.300) and Thompson (1973) adopt the first

explanation, but the interpretation of Fraser ((1972)I.241), who observes that, although Agathe Tyche was indeed a fully personified divinity at this time and was portrayed in the same manner as the queens, and although the nature of Tyche as a concept does allow the transfer from the universal to the individual and the goddess had the full apparatus of cult, the ambiguous wording of ἀγαθῆς τύχης Ἀρσινόης Φιλαδέλφου may well reflect a corresponding ambiguity in relation to the actual distinction between the universal and particular aspects of Agathe Tyche. So it is reasonable to assume that despite the existence of a fully developed cult of Agathe Tyche at Alexandria which was closely associated with Arsinoe and Berenice II and in which the oinochoai were cult vessels, the inscriptions were so phrased as to refer to the personal Tyche of Berenice and Arsinoe. The iconography of the vessels underlines this, as Arsinoe, whose features are individually characterized, wears a royal diadem and has bare feet, as is appropriate to a human being acting as a deity. Similar ambiguities will be encountered when we come to examine the ways in which Hellenistic poets deliberately conflate the images of nymphs and the geographical areas which they personify for artistic effect.

Arsinoe also carries a special symbol, the dikeras, or double horn. It has been implied from Ath. 497 b - c that the dikeras was invented by Ptolemy II to describe the queen's bounty, but E.E. Rice ((1983) 202

- 208) has shown that this attribute, which appears on coins struck in her honour after her death(212), may have existed before its association with her. He traces the route by which the dikeras came to be associated with the posthumous commemoration of the joint rule of Arsinoe and Philadelphus through a series of stages. This begins with the 'marriage' of Isis and Sarapis and their increasing joint importance in a cult initiated and propagated by the royal family, moves, via the marriage of Arsinoe and Philadelphus, to the connection of Isis, Agathe Tyche/Tyche and Arsinoe, then to the deification of the royal couple as Theoi Adelphoi and finally to the death of Arsinoe ((1983)207). Thus Isis and Sarapis were the original owners of this attribute which was initially transferred to Arsinoe II after her death to commemorate her co-regency, symbolizing, in effect, her and Philadelphus as Isis and Sarapis on earth, and finally came to be used as the standard symbol of the joint rule in successive reigns. This assimilation and identification of queens with deities reflects two important religious trends of the Hellenistic age, syncretism and the deification of individual rulers with their consorts and other members of the family, independently of the central dynastic cult. These trends are often interpreted as indexes of the decline of religion in the Hellenistic period and will be discussed in that context once our remaining case-studies are complete, but we might observe at this stage that it has been suggested that, rather than indicating decline, this process of assimilation

gave a more genuine feeling to the effective divinity of the queens and the ruling house as a whole than the direct worship of individuals(213).

Another important aspect of the religious side of Tyche was her connection or fusion with Agathos Daimon. Very frequently, and certainly early, Tyche appears with the epithet ἀγαθή, most especially at Athens, and the formula Ἀγαθὴ Τύχη appears on inscriptions and decrees from the end of the fifth century B.C. onwards(214). Agathe Tyche herself is represented on a relief from the Asclepeum at Athens(215) on which she wears a chiton and himation, stands just off front view turning to the left, and holds a large cornucopia. She also appears with Agathos Daimon on a relief from the Acropolis(216), while on a funerary relief now in Copenhagen she appears in place of the deceased along with Zeus Philios(217) (Fig. 30). Cult of Agathe Tyche and Agathos Daimon is attested on the Acropolis(218). Thus, like abstractions such as Eirene, Dikaiosyne and Demokratia, Agathe Tyche was gradually emerging as a daimon in the late fifth and early fourth centuries B.C. We have also seen how conceptions of tyche varied from the philosophers to the public at large, the latter tending to see her as a powerful daimon often connected with Fate, with the epithet ἀγαθή often used to avert any evil implications(219). This popular view may have been influenced by Oriental conceptions which made Tyche personal, as a kind of guardian spirit which watched

over kings, cities (like the Tyche of Antioch) and individuals(220) and which is mentioned either with the definite article, as in an Attic inscription of 378/7 B.C.(221), or without it, as on several Attic inscriptions which refer to the Agathe Tyche of the Athenians(222), an inscription from Samothrace dated 288 - 291 B.C. which mentions the Agathe Tyche of Lysimachus(223), and one from Paros, circa 207/6 B.C., which talks of the Agathe Tyche of that city(224). Another inscription, from Halicarnassus, speaks of the Agathe Tyche of Ptolemy I Soter, from whose reign it dates(225), and finally one from Telmessus from the third quarter of the third century B.C. addresses the Agathe Tyche of King Ptolemy and Queen Arsinoe(226). Although none of these examples, even those which refer to Ptolemy, come from Egypt, it would be reasonable to suppose that the idea was familiar there too(227). On the inscriptions where the definite article is omitted the relation of the Tyche to the cities or people is so close as to imply that it is also personal; on the last two examples the detached form of the phrase is the commonest usage employed as the heading to inscriptions as an apotropaic acclamation down to Roman times; on the inscriptions from Samothrace and Halicarnassus the Agathe Tyche is regarded as a good daimon who is invoked for one's own benefit. These examples thus show that although Agathe Tyche and Agathos Daimon are different in origin and nature, they have, even by the fourth century B.C., become merged and assimilated(228).

One particularly interesting parallel between Agathos Daimon and Tyche is that Agathos Daimon is found in association with the early history and foundation of Alexandria, where the cult of Agathos Daimon was probably early established both as a domestic cult and in a wider context(229). For the latter the famous 'Potters Oracle' is good evidence (230), for it prophesies that the Agathos Daimon will leave the city now being built (Alexandria), for Memphis, 'the Mother of the God'. Thus Agathos Daimon is already regarded as symbolic of the city, its tutelary deity(231), and the Oracle of the Potter attests the early association between Agathos Daimon and the fate of the city, and hence with Tyche. In the fourth century the two deities had become so closely linked that they were also identified(232): the inscription

'Αγαθοῦ Δαίμονος 'Αγαθῆς Τύχης often appears on altars, dedicatory stelai and other monuments, and in such cases it is impossible to distinguish between the two. This fusion was extended to other than purely domestic contexts, and we can see how, like Tyche, Agathos Daimon came to personify the Fortune of cities: when the hostile Egyptian predicted the departure of the tutelary deity from Alexandria by implication he prophesied the fall of the city.

The mergers and identifications which Tyche undergoes, not only with Agathos Daimon, but also with Pan(233), the Horae(234), Ploutos(235), Isis and Nemesis, and the wider process of syncretism in general do not indicate a ubiquitous decay of religion in the

Hellenistic period. The evidence of the formulae from the Ptolemaic oinochoai reveals that the boundaries between deities, or between individuals and deities, could be quite fluid. In Egypt, especially in Alexandria, much of this process is centred around the Egyptian deities, and if we study the assimilations of the queens to deities we discover the central significance of Isis, who absorbs, and is absorbed in, mortal queens, Greek and foreign deities, and personifications such as Tyche and Nemesis, whilst never ceasing to be a recognisable deity herself. These identifications and the later aretalogies(236) reveal the rapid development of Isis as the great creative power of the universe and the founder of all ordered society. However, this process ought not to be seen in terms of religious decline or decay, but rather as a shift in emphasis in religious consciousness according to the needs of particular people in particular cirucmstances(237).

Tyche, then, appears to be an extremely valuable figure through which to investigate certain aspects of Hellenistic culture. We have seen that she is by no means an invention of the Hellenistic age but is a distinctive feature of it, and that, although Alexander's career did not create Tyche, it seems likely that it did have a great influence on her development. With the exception of the Tyche of Antioch it is not so much Tyche's newness which ought to be emphasised, but the extent to which she occurs. Her range of functions makes her a difficult figure to

classify: the stress on her capriciousness and negative aspects is notable in popular thought, and yet she received widespread cult as a beneficent deity; in philosophy tyche could be the name for the undiscovered cause whose disorderly actions can be overcome by orderly forces such as phronesis, and yet at other times we find her closely connected with Fate. In the writings of Polybius we can see a constant tension between a philosophical outlook which seeks to exclude Tyche from history, and concessions to popular terminology. Thus, if we apply our notion of the 'sliding scale' to Tyche, we can see that she can occupy various points along it ranging from deification through strong personification to her use as a technical term, unpersonified. She can be a mythical figure, an Oceanid, or a non-mythical figure, as she was when representing the Tyche of Antioch or the Tyche of individuals, and this non-mythical aspect seems to be a crucial element in her new-found significance and attractiveness to the people of the new era; unencumbered by centuries of literary re-handling and innovation she arrived practically complete and relatively unspoiled, ready for use by the people of the new world. The significance of Tyche in herself, and in her connection with ruler cult, syncretism and monotheism, and sceptism raises issues of the decline of religion and an alleged turning away from the Olympian deities which will be more fully discussed when the studies of Kairos and Nemesis are complete, but, on the evidence we have examined so far it seems that the received views which

uphold the pro-decline standpoint may be regarding shifts in emphasis as decadence and thus misinterpreting the evidence. But however the evidence is approached, it seems that in many respects Tyche was a very fitting symbol for the Hellenistic age and that Pliny's description of her significance is highly accurate.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1. See below n.123.

2. Discussed below at pp.2/40ff and pp.2/64ff.

3. See p.2/4f below.

4. See e.g. L. Edmunds (1975) 189ff.

5. We may cf. the (mis-)use of 'fortuitous' in English to mean 'fortunate'.

6. H. Hom. 11 Athena 1.5. cf. Archil. Fr.16 West; Alcm. PMG 64.

7. Paus. 4.30.4.

8. Cf. A. Fick, F. Bechtel, Die griechischen Personnamen^2 (Göttingen 1894) 463 who regard the combination of Εὐδώρη τε Τύχη τε as tantamount to Εὐδώρη τε Εὐτύχη τε.

9. For a later example in which Bonus Eventus bears some similarities to Tyche, see Varro R.R. 1.1.6:

> Necnon etiam precor Lympham ac Bonum Eventum, quoniam sine acqua omnis arida ac misera agricultura, sine successu ac Bono Eventu frustratio est, non cultura.

10. Whether the cornucopia is the horn of Amaltheia or the horn which Heracles broke off the brow of the river god Acheloos, the fertility symbolism is still the same. For the goat Amaltheia which suckled Zeus see Call Jov. 47f; D.S. 5.70.3; Hyg. Astr. ii.13; Manil. I.366-69; Lactantius Placidus on Statius Theb. iv.15. Artistic representations listed at Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae s.v. Amaltheia. The Ovidian version, told at Fasti V.115-128 distinguishes Amaltheia, the nymph, from the goat. Cf. Musaeus quoted by Hyginus loc. cit; Eratosth. Cat. 13. See also Schol. Arat. 161; D.S. 4.35.4.

11. ((1964) 37f).

12. Note also, for example, the connection she has with the sea in Pi. O. xii.

13. See also G. Herzog - Hauser (1948) 1647.

14. PMG 64 = Plu. de fort. Rom. 318a. cf. A. Supp 523 also discussed above in ch.1. See Buxton (1982) 41. This group's peculiar nature forms a parallel to the Horai at Hes. Th. 902f, where Eunomia, Eirene and Dike appear as daughters of Themis.

15. Empedocles Fr.103 D-K. Cf. Archil. Fr. 103 West and Arist. Ph. 196a 12-24. The latter complains that Empedocles uses tyche without identifying it with Philia or Neikos and without giving an explanation of it.

16. Tyche, the Moirai and the Mother of the Gods were combined in cult, according to an inscription from Amorgos of uncertain date: IG xii.7.432. An inscription from the Roman period from Caria joins Tyche, Moirai, Zeus Capitolinus, the Muses, Charites and Mnemosyne: G. Deschamps, G. Cousin 'Inscriptions du temple de Zeus Panamaros' BCH 12 (1888) 272.

17. Cf. Sol. Fr 13.63-64 West; Thgn. 161-64, 149, 593; A.A. 330-33; S. Ant. 1182; OT 254; 441; OC 1024. See also Plu. de fort. Rom. 317E - 318D.

18. For the prayer for arete and aphenos cf. Call. Jov. 90ff and also h. Hom. 11, 15, 20. This is further discussed in the context of the Grand Procession of Ptolemy II Philadelphus in my final chapter.

19. Berlin inv. 30036. Beazley (1963) 1173; (1971) 459.

20. L.B. Ghali-Kahil (1955) 59; H.A. Shapiro (1977) 169. Wilamowitz (1929) confuses the two figures here, since the inscriptions clearly indicate by their position that Nemesis rather than Tyche is the one who is pointing. See Buxton (1982) 46 n. 63.

21. See Athen. 8.334B. This aspect of Nemesis will be discussed at length in the chapter on Nemesis.

22. See D.S. Robertson Greek and Roman Architecture^2 (Cambridge 1969) 328 with refs. Cf. also the base of Agoracritus' Nemesis, which shows Nemesis and Helen. At Call. Dian. 232 Helen is called 'Rhamnousis'.

23. Cf. L. Petersen (1939) 40-41 who interprets Tyche, Nemesis and Heimarmene as 'Erfolg, Strafe und Schicksalsbestimmung'.

24. That, as Buxton (1982) 46 and n. 63 points out, is why Peitho is present.

25. Cf. Petersen in n.23 above.

26. Wilamowitz also conjectures that the unnamed woman may be Ananke. Cf. Petersen (1939)40. This must remain speculative, however. For more definite appearances of Ananke in art see Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae s.v.

27. See also Shapiro (1977) 170.

28. This type of process is postulated by, for example, Burkert ((1985) 185), who says 'personifications appear first in poetry, move into the visual arts and finally find their way into the realm of cult'.

29. Shapiro's interpretation also ignores the possible function of the fourth unnamed figure. Furthermore, Nemesis seems to be pointing at the particular events of the present, and drawing Tyche's attention to them, rather than pointing into the future.

30. Fortune or fate is one of the prime causes of tragic entanglement and catastrophe. Tyche, though rarely deified, occurs in this role most especially in tragedy. See H. Meuss (1899); G. Busch (1937); S. Ant. 1158; OT 1080; E. IA 1163; Cyc. 606; cf. Pl. Lg. 709 B. Emphatic depiction of the fateful workings of Tyche appears in Menander: see below pp. 2/40 ff.

31. 'A Diis Electa: A Chapter in the Religious History of the Third Century' in Essays on Religion in the Ancient World I (Oxford 1972) 260. See also H.S. Versnel (1980). For more recent examples of the linking of Tyche and Moira see K. Kritos - Davis 'The Moires and Tyche in Modern Greek Folklore: a critical bibliography' Μανατοφορος 16 (1980) 47-53.

32. See C.M. Bowra Pindar (Oxford 1964) 123-24.

33. See L.R. Farnell ad loc.

34. PMG 1019 Frag. Adesp. 101.

35. Ad fr. 139.

36. A.A. Buricks (1948) makes much of the notions of factum and agens as applied to Tyche.

37. See e.g. W. Burkert 'Greek tragedy and sacrificial ritual' GRBS 7 (1966) 87-121.

38. Detailed studies in Meuss (1899) and Busch (1937).

39. A.A. 755 is the first and only appearance of agathe tyche in tragedy, although the conception may well be earlier, as Sappho, for example, has τύχαι σὺν ἔσλαι (Fr.31.4.D)
See Busch (1937) 16; 61. A.A. 1230 seems to presuppose a common use of ἀγαθὴ τύχη.
The earliest instance of the formula ἀγαθῆι τυχῆι Ἀθηναίων on Attic inscriptions is in the decree about the Chalcidians of 446/5 B.C. (IG I^2 39).

40. S. OT 1080f. Cf. AP 9.74.4 = FGE Anon xlviii, an anonymous epigram on a field which passes through many hands which ends with the words εἰμὶ δ' ὅλως οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ Τύχης,
and also Hor.Sat. 2.6.49 where Fortunae filius is said in a very different tone.

41. Cf. a fragment of the comic poet Trabea, quoted by Cic. Tusc. iv.31: Fortunam ipsam anteibo fortunis meis, although Fortuna is here good fortune.

42. Arguments pro- or contra- goddess are assessed by Meuss (1899) 3f, 16.

43. E. Hel. 1137ff. Cf. Busch (1957) 39 n.102: 'Zwischen den Göttern und Nichtgöttern stehen die Dämonen'; Wilamowitz (1931) I.361 sees τὸ μέσον as a 'Mittelklasse der Dämonen und Heroen'.
We may of cf. Pl. Smp. 202 d-e where Eros is called δαίμων μέγας ... καὶ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον μεταξύ ἐστι θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ,
and also Alexis Fr. 240K where Hypnos is described as οὐ θνητὸς οὐδ' ἀθάνατος ἀλλ' ἔχων τινὰ σύγκρασιν κτλ..
In cult, however, this distinction falls away as personified abstractions are worshipped as theoi.
With l.1142 cf. Palladas AP 10.62:

> Ignorant of all logic and all law
> Fortune follows her own blind course,
> kind to the criminal, trampling on the just,
> flaunting her irrational, brute force.
> (Tr. A. Harrison)

44. E. Ion 1512. Also HF 480.

45. S. Fr. 197; Fr. trag. adesp. 312.

46. E. Or. 1024; HF 1321-57; Andr. 1052; Tr. 1204; IT 489; Hel. 267. Cf A.A. 1042 (Ἀνάγκη τύχης); Th. 506 (χρεία τύχης).

47. E. Fr. inc. 989; Heracl. 547; Tr. 643; Supp. 1078; Ion 609; A.A. 333; S. Aj. 1058f.

48. E. Fr. 153.3f; HF 216; A.Pers. 602; A. 187.

49. E. Alc. 1070; Or.4; Or.80.

50. E. Hipp. 1105f; A. Fr. 389 N^3 : κοινὸν τύχη, γνώμη δε τῶν κεκτημένων.

51. E. Fr. 376; 153; 375; Heracl. 863ff; Fr. inc. 1040; 1077; 1073; Fr. 535; Tr. 349, 1008f.

52. See F. Heinemann 'Eine vorplatonische Theorie der τέχνη' MH 18 (1961) 108. Cf. Democritus Fr. 197B where tyche is contrasted with sophie.

53. AP 7.135.

54. See p.2/18 and n. 50 above.

55. Alc. 785f; IT 89.

56. From Religion to Philosophy (London 1912) 120.

57. 'Thucydides Use of Abstract Language' Yale French Studies 45 (1970) 20.

58. Extensive references to gnome and tyche in Thucydides and in general are given at Edmunds (1975) 5 n.10.

59. Democritus Fr. 119B shows a similar disdain for tyche, similar human, subjective orientation, and the same opposition of planning to tyche:
ἄνθρωποι τύχης εἴδωλον ἐπλάσαντο πρόφασιν ἰδίης ἀβουλίης. βαιὰ γὰρ φρονήσει τύχη μάχεται, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα ἐν βίῳ εὐξύνετος ὀξυδερκείη κατιθύνει.

60. Ph. 196b 5-7.

61. V.75.3.

62. For the differences in outlook towards gnome in the Spartans and in Pericles, see Edmunds (1975) 89-142.

63. Fr. 5D. Cf. Thgn. 129-30, Hdt. 1.32.4 who both make chance primary and human competence subordinate to it.

64. Cf. Pl. Lg. 709b: τύχας δ' εἶναι σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα ; D. ii. 22 : μεγάλη γὰρ ῥοπή, μᾶλλον δ' ὅλον ἡ τύχη παρὰ πάντ' ἐστὶ τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράγματα ;
Chaeremon Fr.2N^2, quoted by Davus at Men.Aspis 411 and given currency by Theophrastus in his Callisthenes to the extent that it was found 'in libris et scholis omnium philosophorum'. See Cic. Tusc. V.25.

65. See Meuss (1899) 201 n.2a; 467f; 473f.

66. Aeschin. iii.157.

67. D. xviii.266.

68. See EN 1153b 19-21 and the passages of EE and MM discussed above.

69. 195b 35 - 196b 5.

70. 196b 5 - 9. See D. Ross Aristotle (London 1923).

71. 196b 30ff.

72. 197a 5 - 6.

73. Cf. his discussion in the EN which we examined above.

74. 197a 36 - b1.

75. 197b 18 -22.

76. 197b 6 - 8.

77. D. Ross op.cit. p.75 - 78.

78. J.J. Pollitt Art in the Hellenistic Age (Cambridge 1986) 1ff.

79. Nilsson (1967). Pollitt's confident assertion ((1986) preface) that 'the time has long passed when any serious, informed student of Hellenistic art would refer to it as decadent' cannot be applied to other areas of Hellenistic culture.

80. We might note that, although the classical Greek religion is habitually called Olympian, it did not only recognize Olympian deities, and that the term 'Greek religion' is misleading in as much as every city had its own individual array of gods and heroes. See R. L. Gordon (1972) who convincingly argues the case that the changes in Hellenistic society and religion are not a symptom of decadence, but of 'selective continuity', and who is careful to judge Hellenistic religion in terms of the context of which social group one has in mind at the time.

81. See e.g. W.S. Ferguson Hellenistic Athens (London 1911).

82. Menander's reputation as a realist was established shortly after his death with the well known saying of Aristophanes of Byzantium 'O Menander, O life, which of you imitated the other?' (ed. Nauck p.249).See also Quint. X.i. 69 - 70.

83. Quoted by F.H. Sandbach in A.W. Gomme, F.H. Sandbach (1973) 24.

84. Gomme, Sandbach (1973) 25.

85. Pollitt (1986) 6.

86. The only human prologue figure we know of is Moschio in Samia.

87. H. Lloyd-Jones (1971b) 179.

88. Gomme, Sandbach (1973) 21.

89. See further L. Petersen (1939) 56.

90. See Hamdorf (1964) 66; 120.

91. P.-E. Legrand (1910) 392.

92. K. Gaiser (1973) 122.

93. Konet (1976) 90.

94. Cf. E. Hel. 412: ἀνελπίστῳ τύχῃ ; E.Hel.1143: ἀνελπίστοις τύχαις.

95. Cf., Philyll. Fr. 8 K. Cf. Aeschin. ii.131: τὴν τύχην, ἣ πάντων ἐστὶ κυρία.

96. See Gaiser (1973).

97. See W. Ludwig 'Die Cistellaria und das Verhältnis von Gott und Handlung bei Menander' in Fondation Hardt Entretiens xvi (1969) 71f.

98. See H. Lloyd-Jones (1971b) passim.

99. Arist. Ph. 197a 36f; cf. Plu. de Fato 517E.

100. Euripides often plays with the notion of tyche as an independent and capricious power (see Busch (1937)), but even here the operations of tyche are, at least on the conceptual level, set down by the will of the gods, a will which may be inscrutable to mortals. See H. Lloyd-Jones (1971b) 144f.

101. Cf. the role of automaton: Frs. 420; 241; 249 Kö; Epitr. 735. Role of physis Fr. 337 Kö.

102. Cf. Pk 164ff. Βραβεῦσαι strictly means 'to give a decision as umpire', but came to mean 'control' or 'direct'. Cf. Plu. Pel.13: πρᾶξιν ... βραβευθεῖσαν ... ὑπὸ τῆς Τύχης ; Alciphron ii.4.2: τὸ ζῆν ... ὑπὸ τῇ Τύχῃ βραβεύεται.

103. Cf. Ter. Hec. 406: O Fortuna!

104. Cf. E. Alc. 785ff: τὸ τῆς τύχης γὰρ ἀφανὲς ... εὔφραινε σαυτόν, πῖνε, τὸν καθ' ἡμέραν βίον λογίζου σόν ; Heliod. 4.8.8: τὸ γὰρ ἄδηλον τῆς τύχης ἀνθρώποις ἄγνωστον.

105. See e.g. D. iii.18: ταῦτα ποιεῖτ' ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ. Cf. Thphr. Char.14.7.

106. Cf. Sam. 297.

107. This will be discussed more fully in relation to Hellenistic philosophy. Cf. Cic.Tusc.5.9.25; Nicostratus Fr.19.4 - 5; D. ii.22; Alciphr. iii.8.3; Pl.Lg. 709b.

108. Cf. Hecuba in E. Tro. 988 who regards Aphrodite as an excuse made by Helen to account for her inability to withstand the charms of Paris. Cf. also Democritus Fr.119B.

109. Exceptions to this are Plautus' Rudens and Menaechmi where the characters are, in Legrand's words, 'les jouets d'un espiègle fortune' ((1910) 395).

110. Men. mon. 679 ed. Meineke.

111. Men. mon. 740 ed. S. Jaekel.

112. See p.2/36 above.

113. F.Gr.Hist. 228.29 = Plb.29.21.

114. Fr.631.Kö.

115. Fr.296.Kö.

116. Cic. Acad. i.9.; Fin. V.5.

117. Frs.348, 463 Kö and cf. Fr. 630 Kö.

118. Diphilus Fr. 107 Kock.

119. Cf. Fr. 632 Kö: πειρῶ Τύχης ἄνοιαν ἀνδρείως φέρειν. Cf. Fr.181 Kö and Mon. 280 ed. Jaekel.

120. Fr. 486 Kö; cf. Fr. 468 Kö.

121. Festugière (1955) 11.

122. IG ii^2 333c.

123. It should be noted that care is needed in applying Latin treatments and adaptations to Greek concepts: Tyche and Fortuna are not the same. In the Roman period Fortuna is usually distinguished from blind chance, for which the usual term is temeritas:

> Sunt autem alii philosophi qui contra Fortunam negant esse ullam sed temeritate res regi omnes autumant

(Pacuvius apud Auct. ad Her. ii.23,43f.) Fortuna is a deity or numen, controlling people's fortunes rather than one who represents good or bad luck. Evidence for this is provided by the oracles at Praeneste and Antium, for oracles were never associated with the idea of blind chance - they were supposed to be the voice of some power in the secrets of a destiny inscrutable by human device. Fors was the uncertain, unknown element in life; Fortuna, as the deity connected with Fors, was capable of foretelling the future. The notion of mere chance as a capricious and irresistible power controlling human actions certainly seems to be at odds with the Roman Republican concept of virtus: 'est unus quisque faber ipse fortunae suae' (Appius Claudius Caecus apud Epistula ad Caesarem de Republica i.1.2 (circa 300 BC)). With the Pacuvius passage cf. p. 4/88, n.78.

124. We might observe that the use of such terms as 'comfort', 'support', 'deliverance' and 'living faith' impose an implicitly Christian perspective on an area where such a perspective is likely to produce a distorted picture.

125. See Buricks (1950).

126. TGF p.782 N^2. 6f. Cic. Tusc. V.9.

127. Pliny says this was Nealces (HN 35.36); Dio Chrysostom says it was Apelles (Or 63.4).

128. See e.g. SVF II 944, 945.

129. SVF II 965, 966, 967, etc.

130. SVF II 965.

131. SVF II 959.

132. See e.g. SVF II 913-926.

133. D.L. X.133.

134. οὐθὲν γὰρ ἀτάκτως θεῷ πράττεται (D.L. X.134).

135. D.L. X.135.

136. D.L. X.144.

137. See Cic. Tusc. iii.21; V.24ff. Cicero is heavily critical of Theophrastus here: Note also how in Plutarch and Maximus of Tyre Ἀλεξάνδρου τύχη ἢ ἀρετή has become a regular theme in semi-philosophical and rhetorical exercises.

138. FGrH 228, see Plb. xxix.21; D.S. xxxi.10.

139. xxix.21. 7 - 9.

140. D.L. V.82.

141. These inconsistencies are examined by C. Öto 'Historical thought of Polybius and Ssu-ma Ch'ien' JCS xxxi (1983) 54 - 65. See also A. Roveri (1982); Walbank (1981) 156f; (1957) 16 - 26 and ad. ii.38.5; (1945) 5ff and 10 - 11; P. Shorey (1921); W.W. Fowler (1903).

142. i.4.1; i.4.5. His starting point is not an arbitrary one. Tyche has decreed that at the time when war broke out in the western Mediterranean, war also began in the East, but the point of this is to emphasise that the history of Rome has become καθολικὴ καὶ κοινὴ ἱστορία rather than to stress the role of Tyche. See Täubler (1926) 83,89.

143. i.63.9.

144. See R. Hercod La conception d'histoire dans Polybe (Diss. Lausanne 1902) 113; Shorey (1921).

145. Cf. xv.20. See F. W. Walbank 'ΦΙΛΙΠΠΟΣ ΤΡΑΓΩΙΔΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ' JHS lviii (1938) 55 - 68.

146. viii.20.10.

147. xxix.20.

148. xxxviii.20. 1 - 3.

149. xxxix. 8.2. Cf. D.S. xxvii. 6.2 which is derived from Polybius, where he says there is νέμεσίς τις θεοῦ which watches over the life of man and swiftly reminds those whose presumption passes mortal limits of their own weakness.

150. i.30 - 35.

151. i.35.2.

152. D.S.xxiii. 15.2.

153. See K. Lorenz Untersuchungen zum Geschichtswerke des Polybius (Stuttgart 1931) 43ff; Täubler (1926) 89.

154. A good example of this style occurs in D.S.iii.40. 7 - 8 which reproduces Agatharcides faithfully and heavily emphasises the role of Tyche. See Fraser (1972) i.546f.

155. Cf. xi.24.8.

156. x.5.8. Cf. x.2.5f; x.3.7; x.7.3; x.9.2f etc.

157. See e.g. ii.7.1ff.

158. Rise of Rome: i.63.9; success in battle: xviii 28.5; Flamininus: xviii 23.2; Scipio Africanus: x.5.8; younger Scipio: xxxi 30.1 - 3.

159. s.v. Polybios in RE XXI.2 (1952) 1538f.

160. x.33.4; x.37.4; x.40.6; x.40.9; xi.2.10; xi.4.4; xi.4.7; xi.19.6; xi.24a.3; xv.16.6; xv.33.1; xviii.12.2. etc.

161. ix.8.13 (Epaminondas); xxiii.12.3 (Philopoemen).

162. E.g. xv.20.5.5 - 8; xvi.32.5; xxxii.4.3.

163. iv.81.12.

164. vi.43.3 - 5.

165. xxix.21.5, cf.i.4.5.

166. i.63.9.

167. Augustus, Felicitas, Fortuna: lateinische Wortstudien (Göteborg 1952) 146.

168. Nilsson (1967) II.811.

169. See E. Wind 'Studies in Allegorical Portraiture I' JWI i (1937) 138 - 162.

170. Paus. i.43.6.

171. The kalathos or modius was often worn on the heads of fertility daimones, as, for example, the votive statuettes from Sicily found in the sanctuaries of Demeter and Kore, especially at Gela and Agrigento, where a goddess of the Athana Lindia type is seated on a throne, wearing a polos, a simple garment, a pectoral hung with pendants as symbols of fertility. She is a goddess of abundance. See G. Zuntz Persephone (Oxford 1971) 114-41 and plates 14 - 16. In Egypt the normal Egyptian modius was worn by divinities of plenty such as Serapis, Nile, Agathos Daimon, Agathe Tyche and Isis. For the history and nature of the polos see V. Müller Der Polos, die griechische Götterkrone (Berlin 1915).

172. Heidenreich (1935).

173. Paus. ii.7.5. See F. Imhoof - Blumer, P. Gardner (1885).

174. Paus. ii.11.8.

175. Paus. vi.25.4. See J.E. Harrison (1911) 241.

176. Cic. Verr. ii.4.58. K. Ziegler (1948) 1689f.

177. Arguments against this are voiced by A. Rumpf (1936) 674 and K. Schauenberg (1953).

178. E.g. on two red figure Amphorae by the Oinokles Painter, circa 475-450 B.C., both from Nola, one now in the Louvre (Beazley (1963) 648 no.25), the other in Naples (Beazley (1963) 647 no.21), and also on a fragment of a cup from Naucratis, now in Oxford (G544), dated circa 470-460 B.C. (CVA Great Britain 3 Oxford 1 Pl. 49.14). See Schauenberg (1953).

179. Anacreon Fr. 16 Page; Phocylides Fr.7.Bgk.

180. See Stith Thompson Motif-Index of Folk-Literature (Copenhagen 1956) D.1470.2.3.

181. Paus.iv.30.3. See Rumpf (1936) 60f.

182. Paus.i.43.6.

183. The mural crown, as Imhoof-Blumer and Gardner suggest ((1885) 56), may well be a mere later addition.

184. Paus. viii.30.7.ff. Megalopolis was founded in 371 B.C.

185. Ael. VH ix.39. Pliny HN 36.23.

186. Paus. ix.16.2.

187. See Chapter 5 p.6ff and fig. 29.

188. IG V.2.1. F. Hiller von Gaertringen 'Die Phylarchosinschrift von Tegea' MDAI(A) 36 (1911) 349 - 360.

189. See Nilsson (1967) 809, pl. 28.2 and my chapter 5 p.8 and fig. 30.

190. Stobaeus Floril. 105.60. See T. Dohrn (1960) 41.

191. Examples in a private collection in Cologne: J.C. Balty (1981) 843 no. 7; in the Hungarian Historical Museum, Budapest, Inv. 4/1933.8. See Dohrn (1960) 14 no. 3 and pl. 14; Balty (1981) 843 no. 5; in the Metropolitan Museum, New York, 13.227.8: Dohrn (1960) 16 no. 7 and pl. 22; Balty (1981) 843 no. 10; in Paris Bibliothèque Nationale, Cabinet des Médailles 607: Dohrn (1960) 16 no. 8; Balty (1981) 843 no. 11; in the Museo Archeologico in Turin, Inv. 1106: Dohrn (1960) 18 no. 11 and pl. 23, 26; Balty (1981) 843 no. 13; in Florence, Museo Archeologico, Galleria 427, Br. Inv. 2341: Dohrn (1960) 15 no. 5 and pl. 20.

192. Fig. 2: Bronze replica in Paris, Louvre Br.4433: Balty (1981) 843 no. 2. Fig. 3: Marble replica from Rome of early Trajanic date. Vatican, Galleria dei Candelabri IV 49 (184). It is important, from an iconographical point of view, that the head and right forearm of this figure have been restored, and, although the restoration appears to be correct, the fact that the right arm is raised leads Balty (1981) 844 to reject it as a true depiction of the Tyche of Antioch. In its remaining details however, including the foot placed on the swimmer's shoulder, it does appear to be accurate. Fig. 4: Fourth Century A.D. Silver figure from the Esquiline treasure, London, British Museum 66, 12 - 29.22. Dohrn (1960) 19 no. 12 and pl. 3. Balty (1981) 183 no. 18.

193. Tetradrachm from Tigranes' reign over Syria (83 - 69 B.C.): Balty (1981) 845 no. 33, cf. Dohrn (1960) 26 and pl. 30.1.

194. Cambridge, Corpus Christi College B110. 2nd Century A.D. Balty (1981) 848 no. 105.

195. This can be surmised from Malalas p.276, 3-9 and from a parallel from Doura. See M. Rostovtseff 'le Gad de Doura et Séleucus Nicator', in Mélanges syriens offerts à R. Dussaud (Paris 1939) 281-295.

196. (1960) 29. See BMC Coins Phoenicia 13f, pl. 3.2.

197. Fig. 5: Coin of Aradus 96/5 B.C. London, British Museum. See Dohrn (1961) 29 and pl. 33.3. Coins of Seleuceia: Dohrn pl. 33.2.

198. See E.T. Newell The Seleucid Mint of Antioch (New York 1968) 34 - 37; N. Davis, C.M. Kraay The Hellenistic Kingdoms, Portrait Coins and History (London 1973) figs. 88, 94. Fig. 6: Tetradrachm of Demetrius I (162 - 150 B.C.) Fig. 7: Tetradrachm of Demetrius II (first reign 146 - 140 B.C.).

199. BMC Early Christian Antiquities nos. 332-335 pl. xx. See also M. - O. Jentel 'Alexandria' in Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae.

200. See P. Stengel 'Alexandria' in RE i (1894) 1383.

201. W. Amelung Führer durch die Antiken in Florenz (München 1897) 145.

202. W. Amelung Die Sculpturen des Vaticanischen Museums (Berlin 1903 - 1908) I.101f.pl.13 no. 86.

203. BMC Silver Plate 33. Second Century A.D. Cf. also the 'genius of a city' BMC Silver Plate 34 pl.v., who holds a patera and a cornucopia in her right and left hands respectively and wears a mural crown.

204. See Pollitt (1986) 255, 271ff and fig. 274; D.B. Thompson (1973). Fig. 12: British Museum 73.8 - 20.389.

205. Thompson (1973) 125 no. 1, 134 no. 29, 149 no. 75 etc.

206. Thompson (1973) 171 no. 142, 172 no. 144, 173 no. 146.

207. Thompson (1973) 134 no. 29, 149 no. 75, 174ff nos. 150-154.

208. See Fraser (1972) II 392 nn. 414-15.

209. Fraser (1972) II 392 n. 416.

210. Fraser (1972) II 392 n. 417.

211. AP 9.180.

212. Thompson (1973) lxxiii b and c.

213. Fraser (1972) I.245f. Syncretism and ruler cult are discussed more fully in chapter 5 pp.5/59ff.

214. Cult at Athens: IG ii/iii^2. 1035, ii.1496 (333/2 B.C.); IG ii.162 (335/4 B.C.), IG ii.471 (334/3 B.C.); IG i^2.366 (334/3 B.C.) etc. Agathe Tyche on inscriptions and decrees: IG i^2.44 (378 B.C.), IG I^2.116 (361/0 B.C.), IG i^2.105 (368/7 B.C.), IG i^2.112 (362/1 B.C.) etc. Cf. Aeschines iii.154, Andocides i.20, D.iii.18.

215. Athens Nat. Mus. 1343.

216. Athens Nat. Mus. 4069.

217. See chapter 5 p. 5/12.

218. See IG ii/iii^2.1035, IG ii.162 (335/4 B.C.), IG ii.471 (335/4 B.C.).

219. O. Waser (1916-1924) 1328-31; Nilsson (1967) 208.

220. B.C. Dietrich Death, Fate and the Gods. The development of a religious idea in Greek popular belief and in Homer (London 1965) 5.; O. Waser (1916-1924) 1332-34; Nilsson (1967) 201, 209.

221. SIG i.147.7ff.

222. SIG i.181.17 (362/1 B.C.); i.196.8 (356/5 B.C.); i.262.9f (337/6 B.C.).

223. SIG i.372.20 ff.

224. SIG ii.562.31f.

225. OGI 16.1-5.

226. OGI 55.

227. See Herodas vii.93 (Though he too is probably not Alexandrian. See Fraser (1972) ii.876 n. 30.)

228. See however SIG iii.1044, where Posidonius sets up perpetual worship for his family in the cemetery at Halicarnassus: here the Agathe Tyche of the deceased parents and the Agathos Daimon of the founder and his wife are clearly differentiated.

229. See O. Jackobsson Daimon och Agathos Daimon (Lund 1925); A.B. Cook (1925) II.1125-9; W.W. Tarn 'The Hellenistic Ruler-Cult and the Daemon' JHS 48 (1928) 208-219; Fraser (1972) i.209f, ii.357 n. 165. Phylarchus FGrH 81.F.27.

230. POxy 2332.51ff: κατά τε ὁ αγαθὸς δαίμων καταλείψει τὴν κτιζομένη πόλειν καὶ ἀπελεύσεται εἰς τὴν θεοτόκον Μέμφειν καὶ ἐξερημώσηται.

231. This civic role seems unknown in the earlier Greek world, although in fifth century B.C. Athens he received libations poured at the end of meals as a minor or household god.

232. See also Pl. Smp. iii.7; Paus. vi.20.5; vi.25.4; viii.36.5; ix.39. 4-5; Pliny HN 36.5.

233. Paus.v.15.6.

234. CIG 6191, 6754.

235. Paus.ix.16.2.

236. See W. Peek Der Isishymnus und Verwandte Texte (Berlin 1930).

237. See Chapter 5 pp.5/59-5/63.

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

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Kairos

Chapter 3 Kairos

In discussing Tyche I argued that two particularly influential factors in the development of the personified Tyche in the Hellenistic age were the social and historical conditions of the time and the artistic consequence of one particular sculpture. This chapter will continue this theme with an examination of Kairos. Section (i) will survey kairos in pre-Hellenistic culture, and against this background section (ii) will examine Kairos in Hellenistic literature and art. In the second section there will be relatively more emphasis placed on art than in the chapter on Tyche, and this, it will be argued, is a direct reflection of circumstances in which art - indeed one particular work of art - plays a major role. This itself sheds fresh light on the nature of personification in Hellenistic times and its relation to the religious tradition. It will again be argued that two influential factors on the development of personification in the Hellenistic age are the social and historical climate in which it takes place, and the special significance of one particular work of art. In the wake of the career of Alexander the Great, and indeed during the course of it, since it seems probable that the Kairos of Lysippus was sculpted in his reign[1], there was need as shown by historical events for rulers and individuals to seize whatever

opportunities came their way in the volatile world of despotic power-struggles. Life and death issues affecting the future of dynasties and nations were very much influenced by the way in which people took or missed their chances : in the upper echelons of Hellenistic politics kairos was an important concept, and one which can be shown to have been prominent in the minds of the people involved and of observers. The second factor, which is partly influenced by the social milieu, is the sheer artistic brilliance of the Lysippan statue, given the environment of Hellenistic artistic taste in general. It is clear that the Hellenistic Age shows an especial liking for allegorical figures and representations, and it will be argued that in the Kairos we have an allegorical figure par excellence, very much like Eutychides' Tyche[2]. Here is an example of an artistic masterpiece exerting such a strong hold over its viewing public that it is able to dominate the meaning of the concept which forms the subject of its art. I intend to show that the origin of the personified Kairos lies in an artistic conceit far more than in a religious tradition, that Kairos personified in the temporal sense is probably a creation of the Hellenistic age, that given the right cultural background a personification need not be mythical but can be created at whim, and that we are dealing with an environment which is able to countenance the creation of new gods out of nothing, since there is no

clear precedent for an artistic representation of Kairos, the opportune moment, prior to Lysippus. In order to do this, however, we must first embark on a survey of the meanings of kairos in various pre-Hellenistic authors and contexts, and thereby establish the literary and historical perspective against which we can draw our conclusions.

i) Kairos in pre-Hellenistic Greece

As the word does not appear in Homer, we must look to Hesiod and Theognis to find the first uses of kairos in Greek literature. The usage which we find in these authors is concerned with 'due measure', 'proportion', 'fitness' and so on, and is a usage that became proverbial. Hesiod Op. 694, says, regarding loading a wagon, that kairos is the best on every occasion[3]:

μέτρα φυλάσσεσθαι· καιρός δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄριστος.

It is a sentiment echoed by Theognis, 401f:

Μηδὲν ἄγαν σπεύδειν· καιρός δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄριστος
ἔργμασιν ἀνθρώπων...

and we may compare Bacchylides 14.16-18:

ἀλλ' ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ
καιρὸς ἀνδρῶν ἔργματι κάλ-
λιστος·

This passage shows either that one of Bacchylides and Theognis imitated the other, or, more likely, that they both adapted an existing proverb. B.A. Van Groningen ((1966) ad loc.) speculates that the meaning of kairos as the right, propitious or decisive moment probably derives from a more ancient meaning of 'juste milieu' or 'convenence'. Certainly in our

example from Theognis the term is a positive value and is opposed to the defect expressed by ἄγαν σπεύδειν, but it is not always clear which kairos we are dealing with since the two principal meanings, or semantic fields[4], of kairos are closely related. Van Groningen argues that kairos, 'the propitious moment', corresponds to ἄγαν σπεύδειν in the sense of 'make haste excessively', while kairos, 'moderation, juste milieu', corresponds to ἄγαν σπεύδειν in the sense of 'make exaggerated efforts'. I remain sceptical of the former half of his assertion, but he is surely right to observe that our choice depends heavily on the context in which the word is situated.

Praise of kairos in the sense of moderation is common throughout Greek literature, and with the foregoing examples we may compare Critias 87 B 7 = D-K I p. 61 l. 13 10(73a)

μηδέν ἄγαν· καιρῷ πάντα πρόσεστι καλά.[5]

A similar sentiment is expressed by Pindar in P. ix 78f where, cutting himself short, he says that kairos is all important:

ὁ δὲ καιρὸς ὁμοίως
παντὸς ἔχει κορυφάν.

It is not always kairos to enlarge on a multifarious theme, and whilst in this ode a list of Telesicrates' previous victories is justifiable, Pindar tells us that he will only mention the most important of them; as far as he is concerned, despite the temptation to

praise great deeds at great length, true art dictates that moderation is the best policy. Kairos, the rules of accurate choice and prudent restraint, the sense of what suits the circumstances, tact, discretion and so on, alone produces maturity in any field[6]. Here and in similar contexts the word signifies the right mark or limit between too much and too little, and not the opportune moment of time; it is a spatial concept rather than a temporal one.

An awareness of this meaning of kairos as limit is apparent in Pindar's first Pythian Ode where he is making the point 'do not over-praise, because the hearer is soon sickened by someone else's praises'. He expresses this in the words καιρὸν εἰ φθέγξαιο, 'if you limit your utterance', and makes his conception of the word explicit when he adds the phrase πολλῶν πείρατα συντανύσαις ἐν βραχεῖ , 'pulling the boundary ropes together in a brief space', πεῖραρ being a boundary word. This insistence on the proper limit of praise recurs in P. x 4 where the author breaks off his grandiose opening and returns to the matter in hand with the question τί κομπέω παρὰ καιρόν ; 'Why do I boast beyond the proper limit, immoderately?' In Olympian xiii 47-48 the poet seems to restrain himself as he breaks off his victory - list by means of another variant of the now familiar proverb:

ἔπεται δ' ἐν ἑκάστῳ
μέτρον· νοῆσαι δὲ καιρὸς ἄριστος

'In each thing there is a measure which suits, and the right mark is the best thing to know', the translation of R.W.B. Burton ((1962) 46), is surely correct here, and not 'the fitting occasion is the best thing to be able to discern' as L.R. Farnell would render the passage[7]. At N. i 18, Pindar moves from the numerous themes suggested by the thought of Sicily to his personal interest in the victor by means of the words πολλῶν ἐπέβαν καιρὸν οὐ ψεύδει βαλών, 'I have lighted upon many themes, hitting the right mark without falsehood', and this passage prompts Burton to observe that a prominent feature of all these passages except P. x 4 is that kairos appears more or less closely associated with words of quantity such as πολλά , implying that, although there is a mass of material available to the poet, it is his task to know when and where to draw the line ((1962) 47).

In this sense, then, kairos is closely associated with limit and boundary words, most especially with metron and horos, and we can further exemplify this with some instances from Democritus who, in insisting on the proper limits, uses kairos, metron and horos in various forms : fr. 71 D-K: ἡδοναὶ ἄκαιροι τίκτουσιν ἀηδίας; fr. 70 D-K: παιδὸς οὐκ ἀνδρὸς τὸ ἀμέτρως ἐπιθυμεῖν; fr. 219 D-K: χρημάτων ὄρεξις, ἣν μὴ ὁρίζηται κόρῳ, πενίης ἐσχάτης πολλὸν χαλεπωτέρη , and we may also discover a similar variation in the apophthegmata of the Seven Sages, since μέτρον ἄριστον is attributed to

Cleoboulus, μηδὲν ἄγαν to Solon, μέτρῳ χρῶ to Thales, and καιρὸν γνῶθι to Pittacus. This close association of kairos, metron and horos is also evident in another Pre-Socratic, Anaxarchus, fr. 1 D-K: πολυμαθίη κάρτα μὲν ὠφελεῖ, κάρτα βλάπτει τὸν ἔχοντα· ὠφελεῖ μὲν τὸν δεξιὸν ἄνδρα, βλάπτει δε τὸν ῥηϊδίως φωνεῦντα πᾶν ἔπος κήν παντὶ δήμῳ. χρὴ δε καιροῦ μέτρα εἰδέναι σοφίης γὰρ οὗτος ὅρος. οἳ δὲ ἔχω καιροῦ ῥῆσιν ἀείδουσιν, κῆν πεπνυμένην ἀείδουσιν, οὐ τιθέμενοι ἐν σοφίῃ γνώμην αἰτίην ἔχουσι μωρίης. As a final example we may also cite the choral exchanges towards the end of the Supplices of Aeschylus, where the words surely cannot mean 'profit' or 'advantage', as L.S.J., but rather must, as T.G. Tucker[8] observes, mean 'the exact point which marks the limit of measure' : again we see the association of kairos with boundaries:

> μέτριόν νῦν ἔπος εὔχου
> τίνα καιρόν με διδάσκεις; (9)
> τὰ θεῶν μηδὲν ἀγάζειν.
>
> (A. Supp. 1059f)

Even though we have established that an important constituent of kairos' semantic field is closely related to boundary marks, limits and dividing lines, it is by no means a black and white issue as to where we are to draw those lines. A fascinating expression of just how fundamental a problem this poses comes in Euripides' Hippolytus 385ff where Phaedra, reflecting at length on the quality aidos, which she regards as her own great failing[10], says that there are two

kinds; one is a virtue which prevents people from self-assertion in the face of others, the other is the same thing turned into diffidence or indecisiveness and is a vice which prevents them from taking a positive line at all : the problem is where to draw the line between them:

> δισσαὶ δ' εἰσίν, ἡ μὲν οὐ κακή,
> ἡ δ' ἄχθος οἴκων· εἰ δ' ὁ καιρὸς ἦν σαφὴς
> οὐκ ἂν δύ' ἦστην ταὔτ' ἔχοντε γράμματα.

Barrett ((1964) ad loc.) rightly notes that the distinction between the two types of aidos is one of kairos : the positive aspect of aidos is κατὰ καιρόν , appropriate, in place; the negative aspect is παρὰ καιρόν, inappropriate, out of place. It would make life easier for Phaedra if we could be sure of the kairos or certain when aidos is in or out of place, for then we could make a sharp distinction and call it by one name or the other as circumstances dictated; unfortunately for her, and interestingly for this study, we cannot be certain : the distinction is blurred, so the two types of aidos shade into one another and we have to use the same name for both. 'If the dividing line were plain, there would not be two having the same name' is Palmer's translation ((1950) 155). In the fifth century part of the range of meaning of kairos can be reduced to 'what is proper, appropriate or just right'. Barrett ((1964) loc.cit.) suggests that this may well have developed from something more specific (he suggests perhaps a spatial

'right place'), but if there is a development it must have begun early and the evidence for tracing it is inadequate. As we have seen, the noun first appears in proverbial expressions. To return to the Euripidean passage, I favour the translation 'dividing line' as proposed by Wilamowitz ((1880) 506ff) and Palmer ((1950) 155), despite the objection of Barrett who can find 'no evidence that a Greek ever thought of the καιρός as dividing anything from anything'. Neither do I find convincing Barrett's remark that contexts of the type exceeding the kairos do not necessitate our supposing 'limit' rather than 'right degree'. We have already examined the connection of the word with boundary words, and boundaries clearly do divide one thing from another; the iconographical attribute of the razor, although admittedly applied to the temporal kairos, also strengthens our case here, since the purpose it serves is to divide the right moment from one that is too soon or too late. Unfortunately etymology is unhelpful[11] : the suggestion of a derivation from keiro by Wilamowitz ((1880) 506ff) presents phonetic difficulties, as do other suggested derivations such as kerannymi, krino, and kyro.

One further example of kairos as a boundary word also ties in with the problems of choice facing Phaedra. It occurs in the words of the chorus in A. Pr. 507ff :

> μή νυν βροτοὺς μὲν ὠφέλει καιροῦ πέρα,
> σαυτοῦ δ' ἀκήδει δυστυχοῦντος· ὡς ἐγὼ
> εὔελπίς εἰμι τωνδέ σ' ἐκ δεσμῶν ἔτι
> λυθέντα μηδὲν μεῖον ἰσχύειν Διός.

Here Prometheus has benefitted mankind beyond what is appropriate in the eyes of Zeus and beyond what is profitable to himself, yet it is not necessarily clear that mankind would agree that they have benefitted too much : kairos can be a relative term; it depends who is drawing the lines.

Kairos however, need not always be linear. It can be punctual, in the sense of 'mark, target, point of aim'. It is this point which a singer of praises must hit in order to succeed, and the chorus at A. A.782-7 find themselves faced with much the same problems as Pindar had to come to terms with: how do we hit the right mark in praising a great person?

ἄγε δή, βασιλεῦ, Τροίας πτολίπορθ',
Ἀτρέως γένεθλον,
πῶς σε προσείπω; πῶς σε σεβίζω,
μήθ' ὑπεράρας μήθ' ὑποκάμψας
καιρὸν χάριτος;

The kairos here is the mark, target or exactly defined point which the chorus must neither overpass nor fall short of(12). In fact an explicit connection between kairos and shooting at targets had already been expressed by Aeschylus earlier in the play, at ll. 365 ff:

μήτε πρὸ καιροῦ μήθ' ὕπερ ἄστρων
βέλος ἡλίθιον σκήψειεν.

Here kairos must surely bear its local sense 'short of the mark', as E. Fraenkel ((1950) ad loc.) asserts, rather than L.S.J.'s temporal 'prematurely'. With this expression πρὸ καιροῦ = 'short of the mark' we may

compare E. Supp. 744 ὦ καιροῦ πέρα τὸ τόξον ἐντείνοντες, shooting beyond the mark. The shooting metaphor as applied to speech is given its distinctive statement however in A. Supp. 446, καὶ γλῶσσα τοξεύσασα μὴ τὰ καίρια ...[13], 'a tongue that has shot arrows beside the mark' (tr. H.W. Smyth, Loeb).

Considerable scholarly attention has been applied to an especially interesting passage of Euripides - the lines spoken by the Nurse at Med. 125-30 - and an examination of the passage, and the opinions passed on it, will yield further interesting points for my own investigation of kairos. In D.L. Page's text (1938) the lines run as follows:

τῶν γὰρ μετρίων πρῶτα μὲν εἰπεῖν
τοὔνομα νικᾷ, χρῆσθαί τε μακρῷ
λῷστα βροτοῖσιν· τὰ δ' ὑπερβάλλοντ'
οὐδένα καιρὸν δύναται θνητοῖς·
μείζους δ' ἄτας, ὅταν ὀργισθῇ
δαίμων οἴκοις, ἀπέδωκεν

It is the interpretation of the words τὰ δ'ὑπερβάλλοντ' οὐδένα καιρὸν δύναται θνητοῖς that has caused problems. A.E. Housman ((1890)8-11) argues that line 128 is not Euripides at all, but contains a duplicate of the scholion on the previous line, the end result being a combination of two glosses, one of which, καιρόν, supplements ὑπερβάλλοντα , and so correctly informs us that ὑπερβάλλειν means ὑπερβάλλειν καιρόν, 'to overshoot the mark'. As parallels he cites Democritus fr.235 D-K: ὅσοι ἀπὸ γαστρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς ποιεῦνται ὑπερβεβληκότες τὸν καιρὸν, and Plu. Ages. 8:

καὶ γὰρ εἰ Λύσανδρος ἦν φορτικός, ὥσπερ ἦν,
ὑπερβάλλων τῇ φιλοτιμίᾳ τὸν καιρόν, οὐκ ἠγνόει
δήπουθεν Ἀγησίλαος ἑτέραν ἀμεμπτοτέραν ἐπανόρθωσιν
οὖσαν ἀνδρὸς ἐνδόξου καὶ φιλοτίμου πλημμελοῦντος. (14)

Thus, though Housman rewrites the passage in a form which excludes kairos altogether, he interprets the word here in its spatial sense.

D.L. Page ((1938) ad loc.) has a somewhat different solution. He writes that kairos can only refer to a point of time, not a period, and his interpretation of the phrase is 'excess does not mean profit', i.e. 'excess has no power for profit'. The temporal meaning 'opportunity' or 'right time', which I shall discuss below, easily passes over into 'profit' or 'advantage': just as a missed opportunity can cause regret, so an opportunity that is taken often results in a definite concrete advantage. We may compare, in this context, a lyric passage from E. Andr. 130ff, τί σοί καιρὸς ἀτυζομένᾳ δέμας αἰκέλον καταλείβειν δεσποτῶν ἀνάγκαις ; which the scholiast explains ἀντὶ τοῦ ὠφέλεια and P.T. Stevens ((1971) ad loc.) translates 'In what respect is it the moment to waste away...' i.e. 'What avails it..?' Further, a similar transference of meaning is apparent in S. Ph. 151:

μέλον πάλαι μέλημά μοι λέγεις, ἄναξ,
φρουρεῖν ὅμμ' ἐπὶ σῷ μάλιστα καιρῷ·

Here R.C. Jebb's interpretation ((1890) ad loc.) that the literal meaning 'for thine occasion' becomes by extension 'for the moment at which a thing can be done

for thine advantage' is surely correct, and just how naturally ὁ σὸς καιρός might approximate to the sense of τὸ σὸν κέρδος can be seen from such passages as Hdt. i. 206. 1 οὐ γὰρ ἂν εἰδείης εἰ τοι ἐς καιρὸν ἔσται ταῦτα τελεόμενα , which Jebb translates 'seasonably for thee', i.e. 'for thine advantage', and D. 23.182, ἣν ὃν ἔχει τόπον ὅστις οἶδεν ὑμῶν, οὐδ' ἐκεῖν' ἀγνοεῖ, τίνος ἕνεκα καιροῦ περιπεποίηται καὶ διεσπούδασται μὴ λαβεῖν ὑμᾶς, which J.H. Vince (Loeb ed.) renders 'those of you who know (the strategic significance of Cardia in the Chersonese) cannot be unaware of the advantage for the sake of which he has acquired it for himself, and has taken great pains to keep it out of our hands'. Thus, confronted as we are by two differing critical opinions on the problem, we can usefully turn to the comments of Wilamowitz (1880) whose treatment of kairos still remains the definitive one.

Wilamowitz warns of the dangers of not disengaging oneself from the understanding of kairos in the temporal sense, which has been the dominant meaning right from the time of Lysippus' allegory up till modern Greek. He observes the proverbial uses[15] and goes on to say that kairos is often the edge, the sharply defined dividing line, which separates right from wrong, enough from too much or too little, the 'fines quos ultra citraque nequit consistere rectum' ((1880)507). Kairos, he says, is usually conceived of

as a line rather than a point, though this should be qualified by observing that this is more true of the spatial meaning than the temporal, when kairos is a point of time rather than a period. He closes by pointing out that the two semantic fields, which he designates 'momentum' and 'discrimen' ((1880)508) are not always distinct. One cannot help remembering Phaedra's words...

At this juncture I would like to mention an interesting parallel to the way kairos can carry both spatial and temporal senses, namely akme, which exhibits analogous properties. Strictly it only means 'edge', 'knife-edge', 'cutting edge', but it can also carry a temporal sense, like kairos, meaning 'the best, most fitting time' or 'the crucial moment'. The parallel between the two words is nicely illustrated in the words of the Paidagogos at S. El. 22, who says that there is no time for longer pause, now they must act:

ἴν οὐκέτ' ὀκνεῖν καιρός, ἀλλ' ἔργων ἀκμή.

Nor is this an isolated example, since Carion in Ar. Pl. 255f expresses similar sentiments in similar terms:

ἴτ', ἐγκονεῖτε, σπεύδεθ', ὡς ὁ καιρὸς οὐχὶ μέλλειν,
ἀλλ' ἔστ' ἐπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀκμῆς, ἢ δεῖ παρόντ' ἀμύνειν. (16)

Furthermore, in connection with these words we can mention one further example; that is rhope which commonly means 'the turn of the scale', 'the fall of

the scale pan', or metaphorically, 'the casting weight' which tips the balance, but which, in later Greek, can also mean 'the decisive moment' or 'moment' generally[17], as in Palladas AP 11 289:

Ὦ τῆς ταχίστης ἁρπαγῆς τῆς τοῦ βίου·
ἀνὴρ δανειστὴς τῶν χρόνων γλύφων τόκους,
τέθνηκεν εὐθὺς ἐν βοπῆς καιρῷ βραχεῖ,
ἐν δακτύλοισι τοὺς τόκους σφίγγων ἔτι.

The contrast here is quite explicit; the author is setting the instantaneous, momentary words, rhope and kairos against the more continual chronos. However, what I find more interesting in this context is the fact that we have drawn attention to three words which all designate some kind of boundary, edge, turning point or limit in space, but which can also carry identical temporal meanings indicating one specific moment in time.

It is not always kairos to dilate on a manifold theme, however, and, having digressed somewhat from the passage in Medea with which this discussion started we must return to that problematical sentence. We may conclude that, as we shall see, the meaning of kairos as the decisive moment is a very important aspect of it, but it is only one aspect; kairos also provides a means of distinction between evil doers and honest people, just things and unjust things. One further Euripidean example will serve to underline this and bring us back to the Medea problem; this is the words of Polynices at Ph.469ff:

ἁπλοῦς ὁ μῦθος τῆς ἀληθείας ἔφυ,
κοὐ ποικίλων δεῖ τἀνδιχ' ἑρμηνευμάτων·
ἔχει γὰρ αὐτὰ καιρόν·

The scholia paraphrase the last sentence ἐπίτευξιν ἔχει, which is instructive, since that word is used of hitting the mark also, as by (Plato) Def.413c, where eukairia is defined as χρόνου ἐπίτευξις, ἐν ᾧ χρὴ παθεῖν τι ἢ ποιῆσαι. Thus just things have clearly drawn boundaries, so when Medea's Nurse says τὰ δ' ὑπερβάλλοντ' οὐδένα καιρὸν δύναται θνητοῖς,she is most probably speaking of exceeding the proper boundaries, with the sphere in which these boundaries are exceeded indicated by the locative θνητοῖς.

The purpose behind this examination of the spatial side of kairos' meaning has been primarily to show how widespread this usage of the word is in the centuries preceding the Hellenistic period. The temporal meaning is, then, just one meaning amongst several, and therein lies the importance of the statue by Lysippus: not only was he able to create the personified Kairos more or less out of nothing, but he was also able to choose the sense of the word in which he personified it. This is vital to any assessment of extension or innovation in conceptions of kairos since it will reinforce our comments regarding the artistic side of the concept : the personified Kairos is a creation of the Hellenistic age, but the shift in meaning from the

spatial to the temporal as the principal meaning goes hand in hand with it.

Let us now turn our attention to the temporal semantic field of kairos, in which the word bears the meaning 'exact or critical time, season, opportunity'[18]. Whereas in space the mark which is kairos can be linear or punctual, in time it is definitely punctual. We are dealing with the brief or decisive moment which marks a turning point in the life of human beings or in the development of the universe, the favourable moment, the brief moment of opportunity in affairs, 'Occasionem rerum brevem'[19]. It describes one propitious moment in a lapse of time; if time is conceived as a continuum it can be regarded as constituted from numerous kairoi, single indivisible units of time. This contrast between kairos as a specific instant of time with chronos, the continuum of which that kairos is but a part, is well illustrated by Demosthenes 19.258, where the present juncture is juxtaposed with the previous period of time, the former designated by τοιοῦτον καιρόν, the latter by τὸν ἔμπροσθεν χρόνον. Furthermore the 'here and now' sense of kairos is further emphasised by ἐπὶ καιροῦ in the words which follow:

> Again, thanks to his continual evasions, he has at last been brought to trial at the very moment (εἰς τοιοῦτον ... καιρόν) when, for the sake of the future if for no other reason, you cannot possibly ... allow a man so steeped in corruption to go scot-free; for, while it is always your duty, men of Athens, to abhor and to chastise traitors and bribe-mongers,

> at this moment (ἐπὶ καιροῦ τοῦτου) it is especially opportune and valuable to the whole of mankind.
>
> (Tr. adapted from J.H. Vince, Loeb ed.)

The link between the two words is further emphasised in D. 3.16 where he asks τίνα γὰρ χρόνον ἢ τίνα καιρόν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦ παρόντος βελτίω ζητεῖτε; The words are probably not synonymous here, but depict a kind of sharpening of focus from the less specific chronos to the more clearly defined kairos(20).

If we return now to Pindar we are once again faced with a passage which has caused much dispute amongst scholars. It appears in the 4th Pythian at ll. 286-7:

> ὁ γὰρ καιρὸς πρὸς ἀνθρώπων βραχὺ μέτρον ἔχει.
> εὖ νιν ἔγνωκεν· θεράπων δέ οἱ, οὐ δράστας ὀπαδεῖ.

In his discussion of the use of kairos in P. 9, Burton ((1962)46) comments that the usage there and in similar contexts signifies the right mark or limit between too much and too little and not the opportune moment, as indeed we have seen above; but he then proceeds to remark that this is 'probably its normal usage in earlier Greek and perhaps its only one in Pindar'. However, despite the connection of kairos with metron here, which, as we have observed already, is a common feature of the spatial sense of kairos, Bowra's interpretation of the words seem preferable ((1964)246). The passage occurs where Pindar has been

praising Damophilus to Arcesilas, stressing the need for action at the right moment and the importance to individuals of catching the kairos before it eludes them. Damophilus does indeed know how to catch the kairos, but Pindar inverts this; it is the kairos which clings to him, not vice versa. If we are here dealing with the temporal meaning 'opportune moment', as seems likely, Pindar's point that a gifted person has some degree of control over his or her own destiny is subtly expressed. Indeed Bowra's translation calls to mind some of the iconographical features of the personified Kairos[21], where those who catch him are rewarded, those whom he eludes followed by regret :

'Very swift is the moment for a man. He has seen it : Time is his servant now, not running away'[22].

In its temporal sense, then, kairos can be the right time or appropriate moment to do something, as it is in Aristophanes Ec. 576, where the Chorus , eager to hear Praxagora's detailed proposals for the running of the gynaikokratia, urge her to show precisely what she can do: ' δηλοῦν δ' ὅ τί περ δύνασαι καιρός ', in other words, it is the right time, the opportune moment, for showing. We have already quoted Carion's words in the Plutus 255f in connection with the link between kairos and akme, where he insists that there should be no delay since the time for action is at hand (p. 3/14

above), and analogous to this are the Chorus' words in Th. 660f : χρὴ μὴ βραδύνειν, ὡς ὁ καιρός ἐστι μὴ μέλλειν ἔτι [23]. There can be no doubt that here we are dealing with a single opportune moment of time. Herodotus is equally explicit in his use of kairos in this sense in viii.144.5, where the Athenians, speaking to the Spartan envoys, tell them that it is now the right moment for them to send a force to meet Xerxes in Boeotia : πρὶν ὧν παρεῖναι ἐκεῖνον ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν, ὑμέας καιρός ἐστι προβοηθῆσαι ἐς τῆν Βοιωτίην [24]. A further parallel may be adduced from Aeschylus Pr. 523ff where Prometheus responds to the questioning of the Chorus by urging them to change the subject since it is not the right moment, appropriate time, to speak of such things:

> ἄλλου λόγου μέμνησθε, τόνδε δ' οὐδαμῶς
> καιρὸς γεγωνεῖν, ἀλλὰ συγκαλυπτέος
> ὅσον μάλιστα·

One last example can be seen in Sophocles' particularly striking use of the temporal meaning of kairos where the Paidagogos tells Orestes and Electra that Clytemnestra is now on her own and that there is no male inside the house. As J.H. Kells[25] observes, here is the inevitable kairos : we now have two young men with military training versus one woman who is the mother of one of them. It is a singularly powerful dramatic moment:

> σφῶν δ' ἐννέπω γε τοῖν παρεστώτοιν ὅτι
> νῦν καιρὸς ἔρδειν· νῦν Κλυταιμνήστρα μόνη·

νῦν οὔτις ἀνδρῶν ἔνδον·

(S.El.1367ff).

This fairly random survey of instances of kairos in its familiar meaning of 'opportune moment' serves to show that its use in the pre-Hellenistic period is widespread, since it occurs in a large variety of author and contexts. As far as this study is concerned, however, the interest lies in the fact that this usage, in which kairos became personified later, is really only one amongst several. By no means is it the dominant one.

If you are to recognise when it is the right moment to do something, if you are to see the chance to seize your opportunity, you have to look for it, and, not surprisingly, the notion of looking or watching for an opportunity is a prominent one. For instance, Aristotle remarks in Rhetoric 1382b 11 that those who have been wronged, or think they have, are always on the lookout for an opportunity, kairos, of avenging the wrong they have received:

καὶ οἱ ἠδικημένοι ἢ νομίζοντες ἀδικεῖσθαι·
ἀεὶ γὰρ τηροῦσι καιρόν. (26).

If you look diligently for your opportunities you will indeed find them, and there is no shortage of passages in Greek literature where people do find the opportunity they are looking for, as is the case in Lysias 13.6, where kairos is used with lambano:

ἐν δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ οἱ βουλόμενοι νεώτερα
πράγματα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίγνεσθαι ἐπεβούλευον,
νομίζοντες κάλλιστον καιρὸν εἰληφέναι καὶ μάλιστ'
ἂν ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ τὰ πράγματα, ὡς αὐτοὶ
ἐβούλευοντο, καταστήσασθαι (27).

We may also note that kairos and chronos are practically synonymous in this passage : usually the two are distinct, but chronos is able to carry the sense of 'a definite time', and hence can be narrowed down to one definite moment(28).

It is, however, the notion of seizing the right opportunity which is the most pertinent one for this study, at least as far as the iconography is concerned, especially in regard to the allegorical significance of the forelock of Kairos. Taking time by the forelock is an idiom that has found its way into English, as, for example, in Shakespeare's All's Well V.3.38-9 :

'Not one word more of the consumed time.
Let's take the instant by the foreward top;'

and we may compare Much Ado I.2.13 'take the present time by the top'(29). In 4.27.4 Thucydides speaks of losing the opportunity by dallying, διαμέλλειν καιρὸν παριέντας (30), while Aeschines, 3.66, speaks of premature action, in this case the convening of the assembly, depriving the state of its chance of alliance with other Greek states, τοὺς καιροὺς τῆς πόλεως ὑφαιρούμενος. Once again we may comment on just how precise the instant defined by kairos is : to act too quickly is just as bad as to act too slowly - you must

be in exactly the right place at exactly the right time.

Being in the right place at the right time is only half the battle, however, since it is still necessary for people to possess the sufficient degree of skill in order to exploit the opportunities which chance throws their way. Kairos, tyche and techne are thus naturally associated with one another, most especially in the realms of war and navigation. As a complementary pair kairos and tyche are important to navigation and its specific type of human action: the ambivalence of kairos matches that of tyche, and whilst Kairos is not a sea divinity, as Tyche to an extent is, equipped with her steering oar, he does have some connections with that realm[31]. Fifth century B.C. epigraphic evidence from Elea reveals two sea divinities, Zeus Ourios and Pompaios, who are associated with 'Olympian Kairos'[32]. Zeus Ourios presides over favourable winds[33], and whilst literally 'ouros' means 'following', metaphorically it can refer to the moment of departure, the moment of putting out to sea [34], and so the link between Zeus Ourios and Kairos is made stronger. The right moment plays a

crucial role in navigation[35], and, though Zeus Ourios may blow favourably, the navigator must foresee it and expect it in order to profit from it. So Kairos, associated with Zeus Ourios, representing the opportunity itself, means the propitious moment which the good steersman must grasp, having already foreseen the chance that will present itself for him to exercise his techne[36]. This is explicitly stated in Plato Lg. 708E-709C, where the Athenian stranger argues initially that no person ever makes laws, but chances and accidents of all sorts (τύχαι δὲ καὶ ξυμφοραὶ παντοῖαι) make all our laws for us, since wars, poverty and diseases upset polities and change laws, so that one might say that human affairs are nearly all matters of pure chance (τύχας δ'εἶναι σχεδὸν ἅπαντα τὰ ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα). However, he then asserts that although this appears to be correct à propos of seafaring, medicine and generalship, we can also say that everything is not chance but theos, which has two auxiliaries, tyche and kairos, by which all human affairs are managed, and that with these there is a third factor of a gentler nature, namely techne. He concludes that it is a great advantage that navigational techne should co-operate with the ripening of the kairos in a storm : καιρῷ γὰρ χειμῶνος ξυλλαβέσθαι κυβερνητικὴν ἢ μὴ μέγα πλεονέκτημα ἔγωγ' ἂν θείην [37]. Techne here, then, represents mankind's share in the work of the universe; we have no control over tyche and kairos, but our techne is

something that we do control : the conjunction of tyche, kairos and techne serves to emphasise one essential aspect of navigation, the essential complicity between the helmsman and the elements which he confronts.

In view of this close association between kairos and tyche, the idiom καιροῦ τυχεῖν , meaning 'to make the best use of an opportunity' is noteworthy. In Lg. 687A Plato uses it in a military context in asking how exactly could the men who were marshalling the army have made the best use they could out of a certain situation:

> πρῶτον δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ νῦν λεγομένου, πως, εἰ κατὰ τρόπον ἡπιστήθησαν τάξαι τὸ στρατόπεδον οἱ τότε διακοσμοῦντες, τοῦ καιροῦ πως ἂν ἔτυχον;

Τοῦ καιροῦ τυχεῖν is also used in the sense of 'to make the best use of an opportunity' in Pl. Alc. 2.148 a 6. A rather more problematic juncture of kairos and tychein occurs in E. Hec. 592ff, where Hecuba, in the course of a philosophical disquisition on the value of education compares mankind and its nature in these terms:

> οὔκουν δεινόν, εἰ γῆ μὲν κακὴ
> τυχοῦσα καιροῦ θεόθεν εὖ στάχυν φέρει,
> χρηστὴ δ' ἁμαρτοῦσ' ὧν χρεὼν αὐτὴν τυχεῖν
> κακὸν δίδωσι καρπόν...

The kairos here is clearly favourable weather for growing crops, but quite how this ought to be rendered

into English remains highly problematical. We might close this paragraph with a proverbial sentiment from Men. Mon. 394:

καιροῦ τυχὼν καὶ πτωχὸς ἰσχύει μέγα.

We have once more returned to the benefits of making the most of one's opportunities in life.

I would like to conclude this survey of the temporal semantic field of kairos with a brief look at some of the plural usages of the word. This will bring us back to the contrast between kairos and chronos with which we began this section : I argued that if time, chronos, is a continuum in which you exist, it can be said to be made up of numerous kairoi, individual points of time, and this is supported by the fact that the bulk of the plural usages of kairos refer to continual stretches of time rather than instantaneous points : one kairos may be one moment, but several kairoi put together form a period. Thus in the plural kairos can mean seasons of the year, as it does in IG xiv 1018, or critical times or periodic states, as in Arist. Pol. 1335a 41, or a period of time in general, as is the case in Arist. Ath.23.2, or the chronological sequence of events, as shown by Plb. 5.33.5. and so on(38). The point remains that throughout Greek literature kairos is frequently used in the plural in a continual temporal sense, whereas

its singular practically solely refers to one single instant.

Having thus surveyed the literary evidence, drawing our examples principally from the pre-Hellenistic era, we can see that the meaning of kairos as 'the opportune moment', 'one propitious moment in a lapse of time' is only one amongst several and only covers one half of its whole semantic field. Furthermore, concrete evidence for the deification of Kairos in its temporal sense appears to be lacking. According to Himerius it was Lysippus who ἐγγράφει τοῖς θεοῖς τὸν Καιρόν [39], and there seems no precedent for the statue nor for the widespread use of the personified Kairos. Cult of Kairos is only definitely attested at Olympia where, as Pausanias tells us, there were two altars close to the entrance of the stadium, one of Hermes Enagonios and one of Kairos[40]. Pausanias also says that Ion of Chios composed a hymn to Kairos which called him the youngest son of Zeus; this may have been connected with the establishment of the cult of Kairos at Olympia[41], but the genealogy reads more like a poetical expression used by the fifth century B.C. poet for the late origin of the god than evidence that Kairos had a significant role to play in mythology. Neither Himerius' statement, nor the words of Palladas AP 10. 52 can be pressed to imply practical cult:

Εὖγε λέγων, τὸν Καιρὸν ἔφης θεόν, εὖγε, Μένανδρε,

ὡς ἀνὴρ Μουσῶν καὶ Χαρίτων τρόφιμος·
πολλάκι γὰρ τοῦ σφόδρα μεριμνηθέντος ἄμεινον
προσπεσὸν εὐκαίρως εὗρέ τι ταὐτόματον.

The implication of this epigram is that the idea of Kairos being called a god is uncommon, thereby making Menander's usage striking[42]. Thus it seems that when Lysippus fashioned his statue of Kairos in the early Hellenistic period the notion of personified Kairos, although having precedents, was by no means in widespread use, and there appears to be no indication of any artistic representations of the figure prior to Lysippus. The problem remains, however, of why the Hellenistic Greeks should take so readily to a deified Kairos who personifies the temporal sense of the word[43], and we must move to a discussion of this problem now.

ii) Kairos in Hellenistic Literature and Art

This study of Kairos in Hellenistic literature and art is particularly concerned with why Kairos shows the innovations it undergoes in the ways it does, and concentrates on two main areas. The first of these is literary and is connected with historical circumstances, the other is iconographical and is linked to the scholarly mentality which characterizes so much of Hellenistic art. The historical analysis concerns itself with the importance of grasping opportunities in an unstable world, and thus ties in closely with much that was said about Tyche in Chapter 2; the iconographical analysis is centred on the

famous, though no longer extant, sculpture of Kairos by Lysippus, and reinforces the comments already made concerning the particular importance of attributes and their relations in Hellenistic art. Interest here focuses on the temporal meaning of Kairos as the 'opportune moment' which, as a result of both the historical factors and the artistic influence of Lysippus' Kairos, assumes a special significance within the semantic range of the word. The overall aim of this section will be not only to establish whether, and in what respects, Kairos, like Tyche, can rightly be termed one of the 'patron saints' of the Hellenistic age, but also what light this sheds on certain wider aspects of Hellenistic culture.

The frequent appearance of kairos in the temporal sense of 'opportune moment', or of one specific moment in time, is especially noticeable in various types of Hellenistic literature, and especially in contexts where it is essential for individuals to take the chances which come their way. One such context is that of personal relationships of an erotic nature, and in AP 12. 31 Phanias addresses an appeal to Pamphilus on the common theme of being more forthcoming as his attractiveness has only a short time to last. This ends with the words Καιρὸς Ἔρωτι φίλος, suggesting that lovers must seize their opportunities: for Pamphilus it will soon be too late. Later we shall see that Himerius describes the Kairos of Lysippus as

being, presumably like Pamphilus here, at the akme of his youth. We might also notice how the emphasis between kairos' semantic fields can change, for in AP 12. 197 Strato uses the saying καιρὸν γνῶθι , which was originally used in a moral sense by Pittacus, in a temporal sense applied to the 'ripening' of a person's physical charms : all things he says, are more lovable when in their prime (ἀκμάζοντι).

The temporal sense of kairos also occurs in an epigram by Callimachus for Theaetetus, who, after failing in a dramatic or Dionysiac competition, has taken to some other form of literature(44). However, Callimachus tells us, although the herald might call the names of others for a short time, possibly just the time it takes to make the judges' verdict known, Hellas will proclaim Theaetetus' wisdom for ever. Here one specific instant (βραχὺν ... καιρόν) is contrasted with eternity (ἀεί).

However, in view of the unstable social and historical circumstances of the period, it is interesting to see that the Hellenistic historian Polybius puts forward an opinion which, in view of his statements on Tyche, is especially significant. At 27.20. 1-2 he makes a general sententious observation which, although it could be applied to practically any context, here refers to war : he says that people should regulate

all their activities by kairos because kairos is more powerful than anything else, and that this is especially true in war where the rhopai can shift abruptly from one side to another : not to avail oneself of this is a serious mistake:

> Ἴσως μὲν οὖν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ἀνθρωπείοις τῷ καιρῷ δεῖ μετρεῖν ἕκαστα τῶν ἐνεργουμένων· μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς· ὀξύτατα γὰρ περὶ τούτων εἰς ἑκάτερα τὰ μέρη γίγνονται ῥοπαί. τὸ δ' ἀστοχεῖν τούτων μέγιστόν ἐστι τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων.

That this is an important notion to Polybius can be seen from 9.15.1. where, again in the context of warfare, he says that it is kairos which governs all human actions:

> κρατεῖ δ' ἐπὶ πάντων μὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἔργων ὁ καιρός, μάλιστα δὲ τῶν πολεμικῶν.

Furthermore, while discussing the art of a commander at 9.12.2-3 he tells us that, in military operations, less is achieved openly and by force than by stratagem and the use of kairos, and also that, in actions dependent on selecting the kairos, failure is more frequent than success. Kairos and Tyche are closely linked here, and at 6.43.3 he says that after a sudden 'effulgence' which was the work of tyche and kairos, Athens and Thebes suffered an absolute reversal of fortune whilst still ostensibly prosperous and with good prospects of successful times ahead. Again, at 11.24a.3, he informs his reader that although the Carthaginians had been making war on the Romans, tyche now afforded the Romans the kairos of making war on the Carthaginians. His words at 10.43.2 sum up the

historical influence on the importance of kairos in the unstable and changing world of Hellenistic politics extremely pertinently:

> ὅτι μὲν οὖν ὁ καιρὸς ἐν πᾶσι μεγάλην ἔχει μερίδα πρὸς τὰς ἐπιβολάς, μεγίστην δ' ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς, παντὶ δῆλον·

The influence of this temporal usage on the interpretation of kairos even permeates modern scholarship : Walbank ((1967)ad. loc.) compares Polybius' words at 9.15.1. with Hesiod's καιρὸς δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄριστος (Op. 694), but the comparison is surely a false one since, as we argued above, Hesiod's words concern the right measure when loading a wagon, whereas Polybius is speaking in purely temporal terms of the right moment for enterprising actions.

Thus tyche and kairos are both conceived by a Hellenistic historian as important factors in the historical events of the day, and show the correlation between the political volatility of the age and the importance of the concepts of chance and opportunity. The necessity of grasping opportunities in an unstable world is surely one reason for the importance of kairos' temporal meaning in Hellenistic times.

The temporal meaning of Kairos appears in a Hellenistic epigram by Posidippus, AP 16. 275 = HE 3145ff., dating from circa 275 B.C., and leads us onto the iconographical aspect of why and how Kairos was

important. This fascinating poem in the form of a dialogue between a statue of Kairos and the spectator describes the figure and his attributes, and explains their significance(45).

α. Τίς πόθεν ὁ πλάστης; β. Σικυώνιος. α. Οὔνομα δὴ τίς;
β. Λύσιππος. α. Σὺ δὲ τίς; β. Καιρὸς ὁ πανδαμάτωρ.
α. Τίπτε δ' ἐπ' ἄκρα βέβηκας; β. Ἀεὶ τροχάω. α. Τί δὲ ταρσοὺς
ποσσὶν ἔχεις διφυεῖς; β. Ἵπταμ' ὑπηνέμιος.
α. Χειρὶ δὲ δεξιτερῇ τί φέρεις ξυρόν; β. Ἀνδράσι δεῖγμα,
ὡς ἀκμῆς πάσης ὀξύτερος τελέθω.
α. Ἡ δὲ κόμη, τί κατ' ὄψιν; β. Ὑπαντιάσαντι λαβέσθαι.
α. Νὴ Δία, τἀξόπιθεν δ' εἰς τί φαλακρὰ πέλει;
β. Τὸν γὰρ ἅπαξ πτηνοῖσι παραθρέξαντά με ποσαὶν
οὔτις ἔθ' ἱμείρων δράξεται ἐξόπιθεν.
α. Τοὔνεχ' ὁ τεχνίτης σε διέπλασεν; β. Εἵνεκεν ὑμέων,
ξεῖνε· καὶ ἐν προθύροις θῆκε διδασκαλίην.

The original statue no longer survives, and chronologically this is the nearest description to the Kairos of Lysippus that we have. It also provides a convenient starting point for our study of the iconography by introducing certain distinctive attributes which appear in most of the descriptions and copies which come after it : we are told that Lysippus was the sculptor, that it stood on tiptoe, had winged feet, carried a razor, had long hair at the front but was bald at the back, and that the statue had a moral purpose. The allegorical purpose of this statue, which is based solely on the interaction between the personification and the attributes it carries, is also striking, and sets it apart from figures like Tyche and Nemesis on the Berlin amphoriskos, who are supporting figures in a

mythological scene and who carry no distinctive attributes, or the various Hesiodic personifications who are closely tied to a mythical or religious tradition. There is much of this which is typically Hellenistic : the allegorical nature of the statue, the obvious pleasure which Posidippus takes in interpreting its attributes, and the creation of a virtually new personification from nothing, all of which accord well with the scholarly aspects of Hellenistic art. The choice of meaning of kairos as 'opportune moment' rather than 'right measure' also suggests that, given the historical and cultural environment in which Lysippus and Posidippus lived, this aspect of the word has assumed a greater degree of significance than it possessed in earlier times when its moral implications had particular importance. In all these respects, then, the Kairos of Lysippus represents an extension of, and innovation in, the existing usages of kairos, and also suggests that something radically new and influential is taking place in the Hellenistic age.

Since the original is no longer extant the precise appearance of the Kairos, its location and even the ascription to Lysippus remain highly problematical, and, if we are fully to understand the nature and significance of this statue, we must assess a variety of literary and artistic evidence which will allow us to construct a more extensive corpus of evidence with

which we can examine the significance of Kairos in the Hellenistic age. One such piece of information is provided by the fourth century A.D. writer Callistratus in his Descriptiones Statuarum vi.1-4 :

> I wish to describe to you the work of Lysippos, the fairest of statues, which the artist made and offered to the view of Sikyonians. Kairos it was, modelled into an image out of bronze with art that rivalled nature. Kairos was a boy just becoming a man, blooming from head to foot with the flower of youth. He was fair to behold, shaking his fledgeling beard and leaving his hair loose for the breeze to wave wherever it wished ; and his flesh was blooming, showing its bloom in the luster of his body. For the most part he was like to Dionysos; his forehead shone with loveliness and his cheeks, reddened into youthful bloom, were fair, casting a gentle glow upon his eyes; and he stood on tiptoe on a sort of sphere, and his feet were winged. His hair had not grown in the usual way; but the long hair, falling down over the eyebrows, waved its curl against the cheeks, while the back part of Kairos's head was void of tresses, showing only the newborn sprouts of the hair.... and though standing still it showed that it had the possibility of starting off, and deceived one's eye, conveying the impression that it possessed the power of motion forward and had received from the artist the ability to cut the air with its wings, if it should wish. So great was our wonder; but one of those that are learned in matters of art and know how, with more artistic feeling, to trace out the marvels of the artists, acclaimed also the design of the statue, explaining how the power of Kairos was retained in the work of art : that the wings on the feet conveyed a hint of swiftness; and as causing the revolutions of ages he is represented as riding on the seasons; and as for the bloom of youth, that is because all that is timely is beautiful and Kairos is the only creator of beauty, while everything that is faded is outside the nature of Kairos; and as for the long hair in front, that is because he can easily be seized when he is coming on,

> but when he has passed the moment for action has gone with him and it is not possible to catch Kairos when he has been disregarded.
>
> (Tr. F.P. Johnson).

Here the attributes of the forelock, the tiptoe stance and the winged feet of Posidippus' epigram are all endorsed, though the bald patch now appears as a drastic haircut. Certain new details are also added: the statue stood in Sicyon and was worked in bronze. The youth and beauty of the figure are also heavily stressed, and the bloom of youth is interpreted as an allegorical attribute ὅτι πᾶν εὔκαιρον τὸ ὡραῖον καὶ μόνος κάλλους δημιουργὸς ὁ καιρός . The forelock is again for seizing and the wings signify swiftness, and, although the razor is omitted from this description, a new attribute, the sphere, is added, which, although its significance here remains unexplained by Callistratus, generally signifies power over the world. This may link it with the remark that Kairos was 'riding on the seasons'. The discrepancies between Callistratus' account and Posidippus' indicate that they were not describing the same statue, and we may reasonably assume that the later author was not describing the Lysippan original but a later copy which was equipped with additional allegorical accessories[46].

The technical and mental ingenuity of Lysippus which are remarked upon by Callistratus are also commended by another fourth century A.D. writer, Himerius of

Prusias, who tells us that Lysippus 'enrolled Kairos among the gods (ἐγγράφει τοῖς θεοῖς τὸν Καιρόν) and made a statue of him, expounding his nature through the image... he represents a youth, extremely handsome in appearance, an ephebos, with long hair from the temples to the forehead, but bare from the forehead back; armed with a knife (σιδήρῳ) in his right hand, and holding a balance in his left; and winged on his ankles, not in order that he may move more lightly through the air above the earth, but so that, though seeming to touch the ground, he may successfully conceal the fact that his weight does not rest on the earth' (Ecl. xiv.i. tr. F.P. Johnson). The hairstyle, winged feet, razor or knife, and youthful beauty of the first two descriptions are again evident, but Kairos is here spoken of as a god. This is a vital point; for an artist to be able to 'create' a new god in this fashion would surely have been inconceivable in Archaic or Classical times. However, if the social and cultural milieu was conducive to this type of process, as this example suggests was the case in the early Hellenistic period, a deified personified abstraction can be created outside of the mythical and religious tradition. This is clearly something new and something peculiar to Hellenistic culture; like the Tyche of Antioch the Kairos of Lysippus is a significant innovation.

In Himerius' ecphrasis there is a further interesting addition to Kairos' iconography; he holds a set of scales in his left hand which, like the razor, tonsure, winged feet etc. is one of his standard identifying features. The addition of the scales also highlights the problems facing this study, since it seems that the more literary evidence that is adduced which purports to describe Lysippus' original, the more confusing the overall picture becomes. This confusion is compounded by the evidence of Phaedrus (floruit 40 A.D.) who at Fabulae V.8. says the following:

> Cursor volucri pendens in novacula,
> Calvus comosa fronte, nudo occipitio
> (Quem si occuparis teneas; elapsum semel
> Non ipse possit Iuppiter reprehendere),
> Occasionem rerum significat brevem;
> Effectus impediret ne segnis mora,
> Finxere antiqui talem effigiem Temporis.

Phaedrus claims to be describing an image of Tempus rather than Occasio, which is the usual Latin translation of kairos, although occasio also occurs in the description. The phrase 'volucri pendens in novacula' is also difficult to interpret : J.E. Matzke ((1893) 315) translates 'standing on a razor', A.B. Cook ((1925) ii.862) points out that 'pendens' could mean 'treading' or 'weighing', and F.P. Johnson ((1927) 284) prefers 'hovering above a winged knife'(47). There may be some connection with the proverbial expression ἐπὶ ξυροῦ ἵσταται ἀκμῆς which goes back at least as far as Homer(48). The figurative

meaning of this expression is taken even further by Creon's use of the phrase ἐπὶ ξυροῦ τύχης βεβηκέναι at S. Ant. 996[49] which also highlights the difference between metaphorical and iconographical attributes, since the razor is not an iconographical attribute of Tyche as it is of Kairos. It is possible that some imitation of the Lysippan original showed Kairos with the razor under his feet, rather than in his right hand, and that Phaedrus had some such figure before him. Comparable to this description is an engraved carnelian of the Imperial period in the Berlin collection which depicts Kairos, with a pair of scales in his right hand, treading gingerly on a steering oar[50]. The remainder of Phaedrus' description includes the now familiar details of the forelock for seizing, the bald back of the head for vainly groping at, and the stress on the statue's moral purpose: 'in order that slow delay might not hinder achievements'. Phaedrus is also vague about the sculptor's identity; Tempus is ascribed to 'antiqui'.

Another relevant passage is Epigram xxxiii of the fourth century A.D. writer Ausonius, 'In simulacrum Occasionis et Poenitentiae':

Cuius opus? Phidiae: qui signum Pallados, eius
  quique Iovem fecit; tertia palma ego sum.
sum dea quae rara et paucis Occasio nota.
  Quid rotulae insistis? Stare loco nequeo.
Quid talaria habes? Volucris sum. Mercurius quae
  fortunare solet, trado ego, cum volui.
Crine tegis faciem. Cognosci nolo. Sed heus tu
  occipiti calvo es? Ne tenear fugiens.
Quae tibi iuncta comes? Dicat tibi. Dic rogo, quae sis.
  Sum dea, cui nomen nec Cicero ipse dedit.

sum dea, quae factique et non facti exigo poenas,
  nempe ut paeniteat: sic Metanoea vocor.
Tu modo dic, quid agat tecum. Quandoque volavi,
  haec manet: hanc retinet quos ego praeterii.
tu quoque dum rogitas, dum percontando moraris,
  elapsam dices me tibi de manibus.

There is a striking resemblance in this passage to the dialogue style of Posidippus' epigram, but it is the differences between them which generate the most interest here. In the first place we are told that Phidias, not Lysippus, was the artist. Matzke's explanation of this discrepancy seems convincing ((1893) 318): Ausonius probably had some version of the figure in front of him which he knew was not by Lysippus, whose statue and name he may have known from elsewhere, but whose creator he did not know. So 'Phidias' may simply be a synonym for 'the Greek sculptor par-excellence', in the same way as the herdsman Comatas calls his bowl ἔργον Πραξιτέλευς at Theoc. Id. V.105, to which K.J. Dover[51] remarks 'it was no doubt a widespread habit to attribute heirlooms to famous artists of the past'. A second point of divergence between Ausonius and Posidippus is that the figure in question is called Occasio, not Kairos. The translation from Greek to Latin therefore necessitates a gender change for the concept, since Kairos is masculine, Occasio feminine. Thus the god Kairos becomes the goddess Occasio. This illustrates how the gender of personifications in Greek is inextricably linked to the gender of the abstract noun which they personify[52]. Finally another significant divergence

between the Latin and the Greek epigrams is that Ausonius' Occasio has a companion, 'a goddess who exacts penalties for what is done and what undone, to cause repentance'; she is Metanoia. The association of Kairos with Metanoia is a late, but understandable addition to his iconography : Lost Opportunity invariably brings Regret with it[53]. We might also note the retention by Ausonius of the Greek term Metanoia, which counterbalances his translation of Kairos by Occasio. It is thus highly improbable that Ausonius was describing the same work as Posidppus.

The extensive works of the Byzantine Tzetzes (circa 1100 A.D.) include five references to the sculpture by Lysippus, one of which suggests that regret was the reason why Alexander commissioned the work in the first place:

> Ὁ Μακεδὼν Ἀλέξανδρος, ὁ βασιλεὺς ὁ μέγας,
> Ἥσχαλλε χρόνον ἑκδραμών ποτε τῶν προσηκόντων.
> Τότε τελῶν δ' ὁ Λύσιππος ἀνδριαντοεργάτης
> Τὸν χρόνον ἠγαλμάτωσε σοφῇ τῇ διανοίᾳ,
> Κωφόν, ὀπισθοφάλακρον, πτερόπουν ἐπὶ σφαίρας,
> Πρὸς τὸ κατόπιν μάχαιράν τινι διδόντα πλάσας,
> Πάντας ἐντεῦθεν νουθετῶν, χρόνον μὴ παρατρεχέιν. (54)

The usual attributes of the bald patch, the winged feet and the sphere are all present, but the figure is also described as being deaf or dumb, and an interesting confusion has arisen in which the razor is changed into a knife, with which the figure threatens anyone who tries to grasp him from behind once he has

passed by. Also worthy of note is that the figure is called Chronos[55]. Matzke ((1893) 326) points out that this confusion was rare but not unknown in Hellenistic times, and certainly Cicero was aware of the closeness of the concepts when he write 'occasio est pars temporis, habens in se alicuius rei idoneam faciendi aut non faciendi opportunitatem, quare cum tempore hoc differt; nam genere quidem utrumque idem esse intellegitur' (Inv. i.27). In the course of time kairos came to lose its meaning of 'opportune moment' and become used with the same meaning as chronos, as, for example, in the expression ἐν δυσχρήστοις καιροῖς on two inscriptions of Imperial date from Apamea[56]. Furthermore, some replicas of the Kairos of Lysippus depict Kairos as a young man but bearded (Figs. 13 and 14), which may also stem from the verbal misuse of Kairos for Chronos, and this confusion is further added to since Chronos and Kronos were constantly interchanged, a process which A.B. Cook ((1925) ii. 374) says 'queered the course of Greek theology' from the fifth century B.C. onwards. Thus Kronos can appear rather like Kairos, as a bald god hurrying along with a sickle-knife, as he does on a coin of Tarsus struck by Valerian (253-260 A.D.)[57]; thus Kairos, who Ion of Chios described as the youngest son of Zeus, is transformed into a figure resembling his own grandfather, Kronos. E.A. Gardner ((1896) 411) raises the interesting question of whether the scythe of Time is the ultimate development of Kairos' razor and his

hour-glass of the balance; A.B. Cook ((1925) ii.867f), however, thinks that the scythe of Time is derived from the scythe of Death, who is often conceived of as a mower or reaper, and the hour-glass from the hour-glass of Death in the Danse Macabre. These problems admit no easy solution, but they do serve to illustrate just how complex the iconographical interrelations between certain personifications can become, particularly when the concepts in question are as closely linked as Kairos and Chronos.

Our final piece of literary evidence for the Kairos of Lysippus comes from another Byzantine, Cedrenus (circa 1100 A.D.) who, in his Historiarum Compendium 322 B-C, tell us that in the Lauseum at Constantinople there was a statue representing Chronos, bald behind, long-haired in front, which was a work of Lysippus. It seems improbable, however, that the Lysippan original was moved to the Lauseum and stood there until it was subsequently destroyed; more likely Cedrenus was describing a copy in the popular manner as 'the work of Lysippus', as the identification of the figure as Chronos rather than Kairos would seem to suggest.

The Kairos thus seems to have attracted considerable interest among rhetoricians and epigrammatists. However, no artistic reproduction which can definitely be regarded as a faithfuly copy of the original survives, although certain gems and reliefs show its

influence, or the influence of the rhetorical descriptions(58) and we must now analyse these in order to further our understanding of Kairos' iconography.

An engraved gem of the early Roman period depicts Kairos as a youth with wings on his back and ankles, his left foot placed on a wheel, holding a whip in his left hand and a small round object in his right(59), but, although the identification of this figure as a Kairos seems reasonably secure, there is some discrepancy between it and a more common type which also occurs on several gems of the graeco-roman period. One example of this type appears on a convex carnelian in the collection of C. Newton-Robinson in London(60). It shows Kairos as a bearded man with wings on his shoulders and ankles, standing on tiptoe. A butterfly appears in place of the razor, while Kairos tests the adjustment of a pair of scales in front of him. A convex onyx from the Blacas collection, now in the British Museum, shows a similarly winged, bearded figure balancing a pair of scales on a razor's edge and standing on tiptoes with his right foot on a sphere (Fig. 13)(61). Another gem from the Blacas collection, also in the British Museum, shows the same design as the carnelian in the Robinson collection but reversed (Fig. 14)(62). A similar type to the Kairos on the gems also appears in relief sculpture. A fragment in Athens comprises the

remains of Kairos' left leg and a winged foot[63], and a more extensive fragment in Trogir (Traù), ancient Tragurium in Dalmatia, dated by Schwarz ((1975) 257) to the first century B.C., allows us to see the pose and distinctive hairstyle of the figure more clearly[64]. However, the most complete representation of this type is now in Turin[65]. It is a marble relief of the Trajanic/Hadrianic era and depicts the youth Kairos with wings on his shoulders and ankles, with his hair brushed forward over his forehead and shaved close on the back and top, balancing some scales on a razor with his left hand and testing their adjustment with his right (Fig. 15). One final later example deviates considerably from this type but brings to mind Ausonius' description[66]. It is the fragmentary relief of circa 1100 A.D. let into the pavement under the steps of the ambo of the Cathedral at Torcello near Venice, which depicts a young man with a shaved head; he is beardless, wears a short tunic, and runs with his feet on winged wheels. In his left hand he holds a balance; in his right he brandishes a stick. Behind the flying figure an aged bearded man has tried unsuccessfully to seize him and makes a gesture of despair; behind the old man is a weeping woman. In front of the youth stands another man who grasps him by the head to stop him; behind this man is another woman who brings him a crown and a palm. A.B. Cook ((1925) ii. 865f and n.2) and P. Perdrizet ((1912) 265) connect this plaque with an

epigram by Manuel Philes[67] and interpret the youth as Bios, with Perdrizet suggesting the stick in his hand is the measuring-rod of Nemesis, but, in the light of the evidence we have suveyed so far, the scene appears more like an allegory of taken and missed opportunity; Kairos, whose wings, scales, wheels and bald pate (his forelock is invisible, presumably being held by the successful man) all accord with the evidence of the various artworks and descriptions we have just surveyed, must surely be the central figure flanked by Metanoia, who accompanies the unsuccessful man, and Nike[68], who rewards the man who has grasped the opportunity.

This survey of the literary and monumental evidence relating to the Kairos of Lysippus raises numerous problems concerning both the sculpture itself and its place in Hellenistic culture generally, and we must now turn to these issues. Firstly, it is extremely hard to maintain any degree of confidence in the evidence, since we have as many different pictures as there are accounts and copies. This in turn raises the long-standing question of to what degree, if at all, the extant ancient writings on art are credible, and certainly it is not easy to assess whether the authors and artists whose work we have encountered knew the statue in the original, through a copy of that original, or just by hearsay. The problem is magnified by the numerous discrepancies in detail between the

literary and the monumental evidence, but certain valid conclusions can still be drawn regarding the title of the statue, its sculptor, its location, its purpose and, more broadly, the light this throws on particular aspects of Hellenistic culture.

In the first instance it seems certain from the various iconographical attributes that the statue portrayed Kairos and not some other closely related concept such as Chronos, despite the confusion between them which occurs in some of our sources. A comparison with the other evidence strongly suggests that a Kairos by Phidias, as attested by Ausonius, whose statement seems to rest on a lack of understanding of Lysippus' statue on the part of himself, his source, or both, never existed. The attempt by Benndorf (1885), who is followed by W. Drexler (1890-1894), to prove that the Kairos can be attributed to Polyclitus is also unconvincing. He links the find at Olympia of a colossal astragalos which served as a statue base[69], with Pliny's statement at HN 34.55 that Polyclitus created a 'nudum talo incessentem', and then reads 'nudo talo incessens' and infers that the surprise of the highest throw in dice forms the most palpable epiphany of Kairos. However Kairos is less concerned with games of dice and the fall of chance than with grasping the opportune moment, which introduces an element of skill, and further objections to Benndorf's theory have been legion and

convincing[70]: it seems highly unlikely that Lysippus' Kairos had a Polyclitic precursor. However, this still leaves the question of whether the Kairos of Lysippus stood on the astragalos base. The positioning of the feet can still be determined, and it transpires that the left leg, unlike the Turin relief and the Robinson gem, was advanced, not the right. This would allow a mirror image but not the original[71]. Furthermore the omission in all the surviving evidence of any allusion to what would have been a striking iconographical element, by artists and authors who show a particular interest in such features as the forelock, bald patch, razor and wings of Kairos, seems to be a fundamental objection to this theory : if Lysippus' Kairos did have such a distinctive feature as the astragalos, it would surely have appeared in the copies and descriptions.

Various stylistic features of the original which are noted in the descriptions seem to fit Lysippus extremely well, especially Callistratus' remark that 'though standing still it showed that it had the possibility of starting off, and deceived one's eye, conveying the impression that it possessed the power of movement forward....leaving the hair for the breeze to wave wherever it wished' (Stat. vi 1-3); such dynamic qualities characterize much of Lysippus' work. Yet it still remains doubtful whether Callistratus, or any of our other sources, had the original in front of

them. Lamer ((1919) 1515) argues that even Posidippus had not seen the original, but of all the evidence we have his seems the least inaccurate. If Posidippus did not know the original the type must have altered very rapidly after it was sculpted, but in view of the highly distinctive nature of the statue this seems unlikely: the presence of attributes handled as externals would make it easy for any copyist to produce a convincing replica of the original but would also make it more difficult to fabricate independently. Still, a convincing reconstruction of the exact details of Lysippus' Kairos is practically impossible; the main difficulty is to assess what our sources may have added or omitted, and, although it seems unlikely that it carried the abundance of attributes which the later copies and descriptions attest, it seems hard to believe that Lysippus' original had no distinguishing features, especially since the god Kairos, whose cult is only attested in one place, was not especially significant in the religious consciousness of Lysippus' immediate predecessors. Given the environment of the early Hellenistic period where, as the Tyche of Antioch also shows, a new kind of public, which included learned scholars, showed an especial interest in attributes and their relations, the iconography of Kairos is surely one particular reason for the importance of Kairos in the temporal sense in the Hellenistic age.

It now remains to assess whether the Kairos was allegorical in intention, or whether it was a mythical figure which was later interpreted allegorically, or whether it was allegorical at all. A.B. Cook ((1925) ii. 859f) suggests that the statue was not strictly allegorical at all but that Lysippus, who, as Pliny HN 34.65 says, was famous for rendering male forms and especially the hair, wished to portray the Age of Puberty, and so created a youthful runner with winged feet, holding a razor to shave his head for the 'well known puberty rite'. This figure, Cook argues, took popular fancy, and moralists, starting with Posidippus, later discovered a significance in the hair not intended by the sculptor. He also argues for the etymological connection of kairos with keiro[72]. However, whilst Kairos does indeed seem to stand on the boundary between youth and age (though Διονύσῳ κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον ἐμφερής (Callistr. Stat. vi.2) it was bald at the back (AP 16.275.8 = HE 3161)[73]), Cook's ingenious theory is based on the weakest of evidence and has found scant support amongst modern scholars. The more usual view is that put forward by F.P. Johnson ((1927) 163-5) and A.W. Lawrence[74] who both regard Kairos as an allegory of the proverb 'the turn of events is often balanced on an edge as fine as a razor'. This appears to be a more plausible thesis, especially in the light of the significance of kairos in the historical writings of Polybius and particularly in view of the figure's iconography. Thus

forelock, bald patch and wings correlate with the transience and swiftness which must be predicated of both the concept and its personification; the tiptoe stance suggests that Kairos is both continually running and always on the verge of flight, an equivocality which stresses the elusiveness of kairos as a concept and the need for precision timing for an individual in capturing it; the razor and scales bring the numerous attributes into a composite whole, indicating the restricted leeway which kairos permits. C. Picard[75] sees a further topical reference which ties Lysippus' Kairos to 'l'instantanéité même et l'instabilité de la vie fugitive du siècle' which we have seen to be important to the rise in Tyche's importance. G. Schwarz ((1975) 264-65) picks up Tzetzes' two references to the connection between Alexander the Great and Kairos at H. viii. 428ff and x. 264ff, and interprets the Kairos as an allusion to Alexander's lightning powers of decision. In all these cases the Kairos is regarded as being a deliberate allegory of the opportune moment rather than as a mythical figure which later became interpreted allegorically. This opinion is surely correct; we have already seen that Kairos has no great mythical significance, and such a strange assortment of attributes does not tend to accrue to 'normal' mythological figures. Furthermore, dating as it does from the early Hellenistic period, the original belongs to a time when the use of visual allegory was

becoming increasingly popular. One product of the scholarly propensities of this period was a trend away from the use of statues as icons or images of gods and heroes, and towards the need for form to be 'read' in an iconographical sense, with gesture, attribute, situation etc. providing the means of decipherment. The need to convey specific meanings stimulated the use of these devices, as is evidenced by the large number of allegorical works appearing in the Hellenistic era, of which the highly intellectual Kairos, whose meanings are scrupulously worked out and discriminatingly expressed, is a prime example(76). This tells against Hinks' view ((1939) 119) that a single figure cannot perform an unmistakably allegorical function because an allegory is a situation, a continua metaphora. The Kairos is not an embodiment of an idea or a refined study in personification like Scopas' Pothos, but a 'transparent' allegory which depends on accessories as opposed to gesture or facial expressions; these accessories collaborate with the figure to create the allegory. This is clearly a strikingly new development which gives the Kairos of Lysippus a very different aspect to the personifications which we examined in chapter 1, since here the personification has practically no links with the religious tradition and has been created from nothing by means of Lysippus' artistic genius. J.J. Pollitt ((1986) 53) remarks that an increasing predilection for allegory and

personification was one of the new directions in which Lysippus helped steer Hellenistic art, and that this is represented by the Kairos; undoubtedly this type of process is a characteristic feature of Hellenistic culture, and thus in this respect Kairos can indeed justifiably be termed a 'patron saint' of the new age.

One final theoretical issue remains concerning the meaning of the Kairos. J. Dörig ((1967) 447) interprets it as an embodiment of Lysippus' creative credo, personifying the precise moment which the artist must capture before it flies past unused. Thus, Dörig argues, the Kairos is to Lysippus what the Canon was to Polyclitus, although the former seems not to have concerned himself with the timely existence of gods and humans but with catching the momentary flash of the eternal in the temporal. This thesis is developed further by Stewart, who argues that the Kairos is not purely rhetorical but is 'a personal manifesto in bronze' ((1978) 164), personifying Lysippus' own achievements, a polemical statement of his own ideas on the role of kairos in sculpture. Thus, Stewart argues, the Kairos was not a commissioned work but was made by the artist for himself as a didaskalia on display to the public in front of his own house in Sicyon[77]. If this is the case, it seems that a contrast between Lysippus' attention to kairos in his handling of symmetria and that of his predecessors was deliberately

intended[78], with kairos meaning the ideal canon, exactly the right choice among the various symmetriai and harmoniai available. Reservations about this theory have recently been expressed by Pollitt ((1986) 307 n. 18), but the fact that the Kairos was, as Callistratus says (Stat. vi.3), perfectly caught in mid-movement and yet perfectly balanced for that moment, still accords with the instantaneous nature of the statue; indeed there seems no good reason why the Kairos should not have had one particular personal allegorical meaning for Lysippus relating to his own art, and a less specific one relating to life in general.

We have come a long way from the proverbial uses of kairos meaning 'the right measure' with which this chapter began, but I feel that the examination of the various meanings of the word has been especially valuable for our overall view of Kairos, and indeed of personification in general, in the Hellenistic period. As far as assessing continuity and change is concerned, the evidence is highly instructive : the Hellenistic era has created something that is new and peculiar to itself, but in order to do so it has had to rely to some extent on its past. Kairos has always been available; it is just the choice of sense of the word and the way it is used that is new. The Kairos of Lysippus illustrates the invention of a truly allegorical figure which, whatever modern theories may

say, the ancient sources interpreted as allegorical. The emphasis on art in this chapter is dictated by the fact that one particular work of art plays a significant role which yields much information about Hellenistic culture and the relation of personification to the religious tradition, which is not nearly so close as our analysis of early personification showed was the case in Archaic and Classical times; it also highlights that personification in art presents problems of a different nature to personification in literature. Iconography, in the context of the new kind of milieu which has the learned scholar as one of its key figures and which showed an ever increasing predilection for the use of visual allegory, is one reason why Kairos becomes so important; the unstable nature of Hellenistic politics is another. Yet despite the social and historical background of the Hellenistic era and its significance for the rise in popularity of Kairos, we must bear in mind that the word had been used commonly in previous times in a good many contexts; it has always been important, whether in war, sport, love or any other aspect of life, to take your chances.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

1. Possibly at his personal behest : see Tzetzes H. X. 266-72

2. Cf. Pollitt (1986) 53 : 'one of the new directions in which Lysippus helped steer Hellenistic art is the increasing fondness for allegory, symbolism and personification, and is represented by the Kairos.'

3. See W. Headlam, A.D. Knox Herodas Mimes and Fragments (Cambridge 1922) ad iii.20.

4. See L.R. Palmer (1950).

5. For later examples cf. Men. Mon. 9 : ἅπαντα καιρῷ χάριν ἔχει τρυγώμενα ; Mon. 382 : καιρὸς γάρ ἐστι τῶν νόμων κρείττων πολύ ; Mon. 400 : καιρῷ σκόπει τὰ πράγματα, ἄνπερ νοῦν ἔχῃς.

6. Thus H. Fränkel (1962) 509f. At 510 n. 15 he rightly points out that the sense of the sequence ἀρεταὶ πολύμυθοι - βαιὰ ἐν μακροῖσι - ὁ καιρὸς παντὸς ἔχει κορυφάν (P. ix 76-79), is unmistakable if we look at parallels from other Pindaric passages immediately preceeding or following a list of victories. E.g. O. xiii 45-48: πλήθει καλῶν - ἐν ἑκαστῷ μέτρον - καιρὸς ἄριστος ; P. i 81f : καιρὸν εἰ φθέγξαιο, πολλῶν πείρατα συντανύσαις ἐν βραχεῖ ; O. xiii 98 : παυρῷ ἔπει θήσω φανέρ' αθρόα ; I. vi 56-59 : μακρὸν πάσας ἀναγήσασθ' ἀρετάς - εἰρήσεται πόλλ' ἐν βραχίστοις.

7. The Works of Pindar. Critical Commentary (London 1932) ad loc.

8. ΑΙΣΧΥΛΟΥ ΙΚΕΤΙΔΕΣ The 'Supplices' of Aeschylus (London and New York 1889) ad. loc.

9. For further discussion of this passage see U. von Wilamowitz - Moellendorff (1880) 507-10; H. Fränkel (1962) 567-68, 604 n. 11; W.S. Barrett (1964) ad ll. 386-7; H.F. Johansen, E.W. Whittle Aeschylus The Suppliants (Copenhagen 1980) iii ad loc.

10. In a different way it is Hippolytus' own great failing too.

11. For a survey of critical opinion on the etymology of kairos see P. Chantraine (1968-80) s.v.

12. There does, however, seem to be no reason why a linear meaning would not be appropriate in this case: again the problem of choosing the right English equivalent has no simple solution.

13. The notion is also common in Sophocles. See e.g. Tr. 59; Ph. 862, 1279; El. 29f. It is also worth noting that the adjective καίριος is used especially of blows and missiles hitting their mark and that kairos bears this meaning also in E. Andr. 1120.

14. B. Perrin's translation of ὑπερβάλλων τῇ φιλοτιμίᾳ τὸν καιρόν as 'gratifying his ambition unseasonably' (Loeb) would surely be better rendered 'gratifying his ambition beyond the mark'.

15. He also adds Men. Fr.568 Kö which comes from Plutarch's περὶ ἔρωτος apud Stob. ecl iv.20,34, and later in this fragment, as Plutarch expands on the truth of the words καιρός ἐστιν ἡ νόσος ψυχῆς· ὁ πληγεὶς δ' εἴσεθ' ἡ τιτρώσκεται in the last line and a half of the Menandrean fragment, he declares that love requires a suitable cause to be bought to bear at the right moment on a heart ready to be influenced : "καιρός ἐστιν ἡ νόσος ψυχῆς."...τοῦτο δ' εὐστοχίας ἐστὶ καιροῦ τῷ παθεῖν ἑτοίμῳ συνάπτοντος ἐν ἀκμῇ τὸ ποιεῖν πεφυκός.

16. Cf. A.A. 1352 f: κἀγὼ τοιούτου γνώματοι κοινωνὸς ὢν ψηφίζομαι τι δρᾶν· το μὴ μέλλειν δ' ἀκμή.
We may cf. A. Pers 407 : κοὐκέτ' ἦν μέλλειν ἀκμή ; E. El. 684 : στείχειν δ' ἀκμή : S. Aj. 811 : οὐκ ἔδρας ἀκμή ; S. Ph. 12 : ἀκμὴ οὐ μακρῶν λόγων ; Th. 2.42.4 : καὶ δι' ἐλαχίστου καιροῦ τύχης ἅμα ἀκμῇ τῆς δόξης μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ δέους ἀπαλλάγησαν
etc. For similar instances involving kairos see e.g. A. Ch. 710f : ἀλλ' ἔσθ' ὁ καιρὸς ἡμερεύοντας ξένους μακρᾶς κελεύθου τυγχάνειν τὰ πρόσφορα ; S.OT 1050: σημήνατ', ὡς ὁ καιρὸς ηὑρῆσθαι τάδε.

17. See LSJ s.v. for fuller references.

18. See LSJ s.v. 3.i.a.

19. The phrase comes from Phaedrus Fabulae V.8.

20. Cf. also D.i.24. and i.20

21. I do not wish to argue that kairos is personified in this passage, despite Wilamowitz's suggestion ((1880) 509) that the word is practically personified here.

22. For further discussion of the use of kairos in Pindar see U. von. Wilamowitz - Moellendorff Pindaros (Berlin 1922) 264; G. Coppola Introduzione a Pindaro (Rome 1931) 222ff; H. Gundert Pindar und seine Dichterberuf (Frankfurt - am - Main 1935) 63; M. Untersteiner La

formazione poetica di Pindaro (Messina - Florence 1951) 65-102.

23. Cf. Hdt. 4.139.3; 6.90.1

24. Cf. S. OT 1050 and A. Ch. 710ff quoted in n.16 above.

25. Sophocles Electra (Cambridge 1973) ad loc.

26. Similarly in Plutarch the Hellenistic ruler Demetrius anticipated the right moment to make himself King of Macedon (Pyrrh. 7) : καιρῷ δε χρησάμενος καὶ φθάσας ἀποκτίννυσιν ὁ Δημήτριος τὸ μειράκιον, καὶ βασιλεὺς ἀνηγορεύθη Μακεδονίας.

27. Cf. Lucian Tim. 13 where Zeus, speaking to the personified Ploutos, says 'that was why you presented yourself to us pallid and full of worries, with your fingers deformed from the habit of counting on them, and threatened that if you found a chance (εἰ καιροῦ λάβοιο) you would run away'.

28. An interesting instance of temporal chronos with spatial kairos occurs in S. El. 1292 : χρόνου γὰρ ἂν σοι καιρὸν ἐξείργοι λόγος, i.e. your speech might overstep the duration which is πρὸς καιρὸν, might transgress the boundary of what is appropriate in time.

29. Perhaps the most vigorous notion of seizing the right moment occurs in an incident from Hellenistic history related by Plutarch Phil. 15: τεταραγμένης δὲ τῆς Σπάρτης ὁ Φιλοποίμην ἁρπάσας τὸν καιρὸν ἐπιπίπτει μετὰ δυνάμεως, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀκόντων, τοὺς δὲ συμπείσας, προσηγάγετο καὶ μετεκόμισεν εἰς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς τὴν πόλιν. The converse situation, losing the opportunity, is also important, especially in view of the iconographical association of Kairos with Metanoia which we find in later descriptions and works of art : see Ausonius Epigr. xxxiii; Tz. H. x. 266-72; the Torcello relief (see above p. 3/45f) etc.

30. Cf. Pl. R. 374C.

31. See M. Detienne 'The Sea Crow' in Myth, Religion and Society, structuralist essays by M. Detienne, L. Gernet, J.-P. Vernant and P. Vidal - Naquet, ed. R. Gordon (Cambridge 1981) 16-42.

32. See M. Guarducci 'Divinità fauste nell' antica Velia' PP 21(1966) 279-94; 'Da Olympios Kairos al Principe degli Apostoli' Arch Class 23 (1971) 124-41, Against this see G. Pugliese - Caratelli

· Ὀλύμπιος Καιρός · PP 25 (1970) 248-49; 'Fraintendimente ed errore : a proposito di Olympios Kairos e di San Pietro' PP 26(1971) 347-53.

33. See A.B. Cook (1925) iii. 140-55.

34. See h. Bacch. 26 ; A. Ch. 812-14; Supp. 592-94; S. Ph. 837-38, 855, 862-63.

35. See Arist. EE 1274a 5-7; EN 1112b 4-7; Alcaeus Fr. 249 L-P.

36. See also Pi. N.7. 17-18.

37. For a survey of the complex textual and interpretative problems of this passage see E.B. England The Laws of Plato (Manchester 1921) ad loc.

38. A fuller list of references is given in LSJ s.v. καιρός 3.ii/iii/iv.

39. Ecl. xiv. 1.

40. Paus. V.14.9. cf. Hamdorf (1964) 40.

41. See, O. Benndorf (1885) 11.

42. This presumably refers to Menander the comedian, but there is no instance of him calling Kairos a god in his extant writings.

43. We might observe that the examples such as Ion of Chios' hymn may have been addressed to Kairos in the sense of 'right measure' rather than 'right time'; there is no way of knowing.

44. AP 9. 565 = HE 3165ff.

45. See G. Schwarz (1975) 244-50.

46. Cf. Schwarz (1975) 250-51.

47. See Schwarz (1975) 253f also.

48. Il. 10. 173.

49. See Nussbaum (1986) 80f.

50. See E. Curtius (1875) 4, pl. 2.2; A. Fürtwangler Beschreibung der geschnittenen Steine in Antiquarium (Berlin 1896) 273 no. 7358 pl. 55, E.; A.B. Cook (1925) ii. 862 fig. 800.

51. Theocritus Select Poems (Basingstoke and London 1971) ad loc.

52. See I. Fodor 'The origin of grammatical gender' Lingua viii (1959) 1-41, 186-214. In mediaeval and renaissance art the nude female practically superseded the male Kairos and is constantly found where emblematic art wished to illustrate the concept of occasio; see E. Panofsky (1939) 72 n. 5.

53. In connection with Ausonius' epigram we may cf. a drawing copied from Vasari for the Mascherata della Genealogia degl' Idei de' Gentili', a parade of ancient gods in honour of Francesco I de' Medici and Joan of Austria in 1565 A.D., now in the Uffizzi, Florence. It is an almost exact illustration of Ausonius' poem : L'Occasione stands on a wheel, wears winged sandals, has her face covered by hair, is bald at the back of her head and is accompanied by Metanoia , of whom L'Occasione says 'when I have flown away, she remains; she is retained by those I have passed'. See R. Wittkower (1937) 172-75 and pl. 22c. In a somewhat different way lost chance is represented in a ivory group in the Victoria and Albert Museum by D. Le Marchand (1674 - 1726 A.D.). Time carries off Chance who simultaneously kills herself and seizes herself by her own forelock. At the feet of Time is a woman with a lion, the latter being an attribute of Penitence. Both the woman and the lion look up at the dying Chance with an expression of sadness and grief, thereby embodying the feelings of the penitent. See R. Wittkower 'Chance, Time and Virtue' JWI i (1937) 313-321 and pl. 49 b. Cf. also the Torcello relief described below p.3/45f.

54. Tz. H. x. 266-72. cf. H. viii 428ff; x.289f; Ep. 70; Ep. 95.

55. Cf. the description by Nikephoros Blemmydes (1197/8 - 1272 A.D.) Oratio qualem opporteat esse regem 10, which is practically identical with this. See Schwarz (1975) 253.

56. G. Doublet, V. Bérard 'Inscriptions de Dinair' BCH xvii (1893) 302 no. 2, 313 no. 8.

57. See M. Mayer s.v. 'Kronos' in Roscher Myth. Lex. II.i (1890-1894) 1557 and fig. 8.

58. As an illustration of the distortions that can occur because of an amalgamation of sources we may cite a painting by Girolamo da Carpi in the Dresden gallery whose sources we know were Posidippus, Ausonius and Callistratus. The figure is male, stands on tiptoe, has winged feet, holds a razor in his right hand, stands on a sphere, has a bloomy complexion and is accompanied by Penitence. Thus Posidippus' Kairos is combined with Ausonius' Metanoia and has the androgynous

features of Callistratus' Occasio. See R. Wittkower (1937) 173-75 and pl. 22b.

59. A. Furtwängler (1900) i.pl. 30 no. 38, ii. 149.

60. Furtwängler (1900) i. pl. 43 no. 49, ii. 207; A.B. Cook (1925) ii. 860 fig. 796; A.F. Stewart (1978) 165 ill. 1.

61. BMC Gems 143 no. 1200. cf. A. Furtwängler (1900) i. pl. 43 no. 50, ii 207f; A.B. Cook (1925) ii.860 fig. 798; Stewart (1978) 165 ill. 1.

62. BMC Gems 143 no. 1199. Furtwängler (1900) i. pl. 43 no. 51, ii.208; A.B. Cook (1925) ii.860 fig. 797; Stewart (1978) 165 ill. 1.

63. Athens Acrop. Mus. 2799. Curtius (1875) pl. ii.4; O. Walter Beschreibung der Reliefs in kleinem Akropolismuseum zu Athen (Vienna 1923) 74 fig. 125; M. Abramic (1930) fig. 3.

64. M. Abramic (1930) 1-8, figs. 2,4 and pl. 1; Schwarz (1975) 256f.

65. Turin Mus. 317. E. Curtius (1875) pl. 1.1.; Schwarz (1975) 255f.

66. Curtius (1875) 6f, pl. 1.2; A.B. Cook (1925) ii. 865f and n. 2, fig 802.

67. Carmen lxvii ed. E. Miller (Paris 1855) vol. I. p.32.

68. The crown and palm branch surely define this figure as Nike/Victoria rather than Fortuna as Schwarz (1975) 258 and n.70 suggests.

69. It was found near the location of the altar of Kairos noted at Paus. 5.14.9. Cf. Treu (1897) iii pl. lv.4.5, text 212.

70. Lamer (1919) 1510; Treu (1897) loc. cit.; Stewart (1978) 163 n. 2, who dismisses Pliny's statement as 'a red herring'. Cf. also Guarducci (1971) 124-30.

71. See Lamer (1919) 1510; Johnson (1927) 164f; Stewart (1978) 163 n. 2.

72. For further possible etymological connections of kairos see R.B. Onians The Origins of European thought about the body, the mind, the soul, the world, time and fate (Cambridge 1954) 303-469; M. Kerkhoff (1973) 258ff; P. Chantraine (1968-1980) s.v.

73. As Stewart (1978) 168 comments, Posidippus seems more reliable than Callistratus here. The latter

gives Kairos a striking haircut. This detail, along with the sphere on which the statue stands, seems like invention or the description of a version conflating kairos with chronos. Likewise the epithet ὁ πανδαμάτωρ which Posidippus gives him is really proper to chronos, who, as we have seen, is increasingly confused with kairos. The power of kairos is also stressed by Protagoras D-K. II. 254 and Gorgias D-K. II.302.

74. Later Greek Sculpture and its influence on East and West (London 1927)

75. Manuel d' Archeologie Grècque : La Sculpture IV.2 (Paris 1963) 556.

76. Subtlety was considered one of Lysippus' strong points, and his gnome is celebrated throughout the sources, twice in relation to the Kairos : Him. Ecl. xiv.1.2; Tz. H. 269.

77. See Posidipp. AP. 16.275.12 = HE 3165; Callistr. Stat. vi.i. Other locations that have been suggested are Olympia, on the astragalos base, which we have already rejected, and Pella (see Schwarz (1975) 264ff who calls the Sicyon connection 'eine völlig unantike Vorstellung' (247)) where the statue may have been connected with Alexander. Stewart (1978) 163 n. 2 suggests this may have been a 'double' of the original.

Curtius (1875) wishes to link Kairos with Hermes. We have already seen the concept of kairos connected with the palaestra at Olympia, where an altar of Kairos stood near the stadium entrance opposite an altar of Hermes Enagonios. The fact that Lysippus' Kairos is said by Posidippus to have stood ἐν προθύροις may be a reference to the door and gate-god Hermes, and Hermes' winged feet may have influenced Lysippus' depiction of Kairos, but this must remain conjectural. However, we may notice the later association of Fortuna with Mercury in which the two are often found together or Fortuna is found with the symbols of Mercury.

78. See F. Pfister 'Kairos und Symmetrie' Würzburger Studien zur Altertumswissenschaft xiii (Würzburg 1938) 131-50; D. Schulz 'Zum Kanon Polyklets' Hermes 83 (1955) 206-8; Stewart (1978). cf Plu. Mor. 45c.

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4

Nemesis

Chapter 4 Nemesis

This chapter will fall into three sections examining firstly Nemesis as a personification in pre-Hellenistic literature, secondly Nemesis' iconography, and finally Nemesis in Hellenistic literature. We will encounter rather different issues and problems here because Nemesis already has a well-developed iconography by the time she arrives in the Hellenistic period : this sets her apart form Kairos and Tyche who, as we have argued, show a great deal of innovation. So, by examining the extensions and shifts of emphasis embodied in Nemesis, and by setting these against the changes and innovations in Kairos and Tyche, we can construct a more accurate picture in which the significance of these developments becomes clearer. We will then again be able to view various aspects of Hellenistic culture through the 'eyepiece' of these three personifications.

i) Nemesis in pre-Hellenistic literature.

The Hellenistic scholar Aristarchus of Samothrace, in a scholion on Hesiod Th. 223, tells us, with reference to Nemesis, that she was not a personal figure in Homer: Ὅμηρος τὸ μὲν πρᾶγμα οἶδε, τὴν δὲ θεὸν οὔ. However, in Hesiod she is a personal figure, and at Th. 223ff she is included in the genealogy of the gods

as a daughter of Nyx, a figure of the same type as Apate, Philotes, Geras and Eris :

> τίκτε δὲ καὶ Νέμεσιν πῆμα θνητοῖσι βροτοῖσι
> Νὺξ ὀλοή· μετὰ τὴν δ' Ἀπάτην τέκε καὶ Φιλότητα
> Γῆράς τ' οὐλόμενον, καὶ Ἔριν τέκε καρτερόθυμον.

At Op. 197ff, on the other hand, we are brought into contact with another facet of Nemesis' personality. Here it is prophesied that, along with Aidos, Nemesis will leave the earth and the depraved human race:

> καὶ τότε δὴ πρὸς Ὄλυμπον ἀπὸ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης
> λευκοῖσιν φάρεσσι καλυψαμένω χρόα καλὸν
> ἀθανάτων μετὰ φῦλον ἴτον προλιπόντ' ἀνθρώπους
> Αἰδὼς καὶ Νέμεσις· τὰ δὲ λείψεται ἄλγεα λυγρὰ
> θνητοῖς ἀνθρώποισι·κακοῦ δ' οὐκ ἔσσεται ἀλκή.

It is clear that Hesiod's approach to the social and moral phenomenon of Nemesis is different in these two passages, and F. Solmsen[1] is surely right to comment that in the Theogony Hesiod seems to be thinking of the harm an individual can suffer when exposed to the nemesis, the 'blame' or 'righteous indignation', of his or her neighbours and fellow citizens, where Nemesis is a human rather than a divine consequence of unrighteous actions[2], whereas in the Works and Days he has in mind the restraining influence which she might exercise over a culture devoted to crime and wickedness[3]. It is conceivable that Hesiod knew the line at Hom. Il 13.122 where aidos and nemesis are linked, and that he was familiar with a cult goddess Nemesis from Rhamnus and Smyrna[4]. Certainly L.R. Farnell's comment ((1896) 489 and note b.) that since

Hesiod is fond of giving cosmic origins (like Nemesis' relationship to Nyx) to the abstractions which he makes divinities, Nemesis in Hesiod is a personal figure but 'probably only a mere personification' like Aidos, is not supported by the evidence of the Cypria, whose account of the birth of Helen implies a definite pre-existing belief in a goddess Nemesis, or by the distinct possibility that, as Farnell himself admits ((1896) 495f), the goddess of Rhamnus was called Nemesis before the time of Homer. Thus the two Hesiodic passages illustrate clearly that Nemesis appears in the very earliest Greek literature in personified, deified form, and can have connections either with human feelings, as she does in Th. 223ff, or with divine influence on human behaviour, as she does in Op. 197ff(5).

In the lines from Hes. Op. both Nemesis and Aidos are connected with a sense of shame and a feeling of respect for the gods and for the opinion of others. They come into operation when there is no restraining influence, and are thus both forces which inhibit. Aidos implies that, in the course of a person's everyday feelings of desire, ambition, anger and so on, there are times and places when he or she will draw the line and stop. There are unseen boundaries which a person who possesses the right degree of aidos will not want to cross(6), and Nemesis is closely integrated with this scheme, as we will see

particularly when we come to examine her iconographical attributes of the measuring rod and the bridle. To exemplify this further we can say that if someone takes something of yours, you will usually apply to the judges to make him or her give it back, perhaps with reasonable 'damages' also : that is what is always done and that is what you have a right to expect. However, if the judge is corrupt and refuses to grant you an impartial hearing, you will be aggrieved; that is not dike; the judge is lacking in aidos; you and the third parties, the people and the gods, will feel nemesis, 'righteous indignation'. Thus the type of actions which cause feelings of nemesis can assume various forms and occur in various contexts, but they follow a similar pattern : Nemesis follows the exceeding of some boundary or other, whether it is in respect of behaviour towards the gods, towards humans, or towards the dead. As such it can encompass cowardly actions, lying, perjury, false-swearing, gloating over someone else's bad luck, boasting or arrogance, impudence, irreverence, excessive hopes, cruelty towards the helpless, claiming to be superior to a deity in some respect or trying to cross the boundary between gods and humans, and the tragic example of heroes at odds with society who are willing to sacrifice everything to preserve their own arete but who go to some extreme of individualism in persuit of it. Persons or things can appear as objects before which similar feelings are

felt, as in the case of Hector standing before the Trojan men and women as Achilles bears down on him in Hom. Il.22.105. The Trojan populace can be seen as a physical embodiment of the order at the head of which Hector stands, and as such they represent both the unviolated world order which makes him a hero and also the watchful revenge for the violation of that order[7]. Put more simplistically, they represent both the nemesis of the people and the nemesis of the gods.

Many of the actions which cause feelings of nemesis can be brought under the rubric of hybris, and there is a clear connection between the two concepts, but the 'moral content' of instances in which Nemesis is incurred need not be so transparent. This raises the issue of the close links between Nemesis and Tyche. H.S. Versnel (1980) has convincingly argued for the close connection of nemesis and tyche in the sphere of human fate, and the case of Aemilius Paullus, who had to pay the extremely high price, both for his own success and the fortune of Rome as embodied in his triumph, of losing both his sons, is a prime example[8]. In Plutarch's version of the speech he made to the Roman people Aemilius admits that he had always feared that a daimonion, or tyche, or nemesis would destroy him or the state at the peak of their prosperity, but he goes on to say that, now his own

household had been afflicted, enough had been sacrificed to nemesis:

> νῦν οὖν ἀκινδυνός εἰμι τὰ μέγιστα καὶ θαρρῶ καὶ νομίζω τὴν τύχην ὑμῖν παραμενεῖν ἀβλαβῆ καὶ βέβαιον (9).

Thus Aemilius is an example of a morally unimpeachable individual who is waylaid by nemesis while at the zenith of his luck and prosperity; nemesis is, in this case, a mechanical, non-moral principle of equilibrium whose disturbance, as, for instance, by an excess of tyche, must be restored by compensatory acts. A further example of Nemesis as a power of fate, which has similar implications, occurs at Herodotus i.34.1:

> Μετὰ δὲ Σόλωνα οἰχόμενον ἔλαβε ἐκ θεοῦ νέμεσις μεγάλη Κροῖσον, ὡς εἰκάσαι, ὅτι ἐνόμισε ἑωυτὸν εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἁπάντων ὀλβιώτατον.

We may also mention the story of Polycrates, told at Hdt.iii.40-43, where the metaphysical idea of nemesis is prominent. Polycrates' great wealth incites the envy of the gods, and so, to divest himself of some of that wealth, he discards his ring. But the reappearance of the ring makes it impossible for him to reject what he has accepted he must reject, and, since 'only utter ruin can expiate obdurate prosperity'(11), he must be destroyed. Thus the statement of W.W. How and J. Wells(12) that the gradual purification and moralization of the idea caused not the prosperity, but the pride bred of it to

become the object of divine displeasure, is seen to be misleading: hybris can be the point at issue, but in this case it is the prosperity. This process appears to contradict the notion that the gods guarantee morally just and fair compensation, restoring equitable conditions where someone is powerless against injustice beyond his or her control, but there is an essential similarity between them in that in both cases, regardless of notions of guilt or intent, some boundary has been exceeded that should not have been, and so, via nemesis, the order must be restored. This is absolutely fundamental to Nemesis in both the conceptual and iconographical spheres, for, in many cases where Nemesis appears in relation to some other figure, it is as an embodiment of order and the right measure as opposed to disorder. Nemesis is thus, in one aspect, indignation over disturbances in the correct order of things, be they caused by extraordinary good luck or by the arrogance that is often, though not always, associated with it. Nemesis does not rest until the right proportion on which the world order depends is re-established.

Alongside the goddess Nemesis, the nemesis of the gods, and the nemesis of humankind, we also encounter the nemesis of the dead, Νέμεσις θανόντων [13]. This connection of Nemesis with the dead is due not so much to her chthonic aspects, which are attested by the appearance of the snake alongside her on certain

reliefs, and the funerary character of those and other reliefs, but rather to her function as an avenger: the νέμεσις θανόντων is not only the resentment but also the vengeance of the dead, and it is in this capacity that Electra summons the allegedly dead Orestes against Clytemnestra with the words ἄκουε Νέμεσι τοῦ θανόντος ἀρτίως at S. El. 792.

Nemesis had a special cult as goddess of the dead which seems to be confined to Attica: a festival of the dead, known as Nemeseia (or Nemesia) was held in her honour at Athens, as we know from Demosthenes 41.11. Harpocration, s.v. Νεμέσεια, tentatively explains the festival in these terms: Δημοσθένης ἐν τῷ κατὰ Σπουδίου. μήποτε ἑορτή τις ἦν Νεμέσεως, καθ' ἣν τοῖς κατοιχομένοις ἐπετέλουν τὰ νομιζόμενα. The Suda, s.v. Νεμεσία makes the same suggestion but adds Νεμεσία οὖν ἡ ἐπὶ τοῖς νεκροῖς γινομένη πανηγύρις, ἐπεὶ ἡ Νέμεσις ἐπὶ τῶν νεκρῶν τέτακται . The use of μήποτε, 'perhaps', indicates that Harpocration thought that the Nemeseia may have been a festival of the dead, but it is clear that he, and the author of the Suda, knew little else about it. All we can safely add is that the context of Demosthenes' remarks suggests that it may have been a rite performed by a daughter in honour of her dead father(14).

Although nothing definite has been transmitted about the character and purpose of the Nemeseia, the first

century A.D. work περὶ ψυχᾶς κόσμου, which goes under the name of Timaeus of Locri, gives a statement which, when put into the context of Nemesis' functions, may provide a clue. The doctrine of the immortality of the soul is a well-known one, and the above-mentioned work casts Nemesis in the role of judge of the dead (104E and 105) : ἅπαντα δὲ ταῦτα ἐν δευτέρᾳ περιόδῳ ἁ Νέμεσις συνδιέκρινε σὺν δαίμοσι παλαμναίοις χθονίοις τε, τοῖς ἐπόπταις τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων [15]. This can be connected with a highly imaginative and symbolic treatment of a funerary theme on the late third or early second century B.C. funerary relief of the Rhodian schoolmaster Hieronymus, sculpted by Demetrius[16], now in the Pergamon museum, Berlin. If we accept the conjectural supposition of F. Hiller von Gaertringen and C. Robert[17] that the scene is the Meadows of the Departed, with the judgement described by Plato in the Myth of Er, then the female figure with butterfly wings, wearing a chiton and holding a staff in her right hand, ought to be interpreted as a judge of the Underworld, perhaps Nemesis, who is condemning the figure on the extreme right to punishment (Fig.16). Thus this aspect adds a further detail to the overall picture of how the goddess was seen; she is capable of extending her influence beyond the grave and enforcing the punishment of <u>hybris</u> even in the Underworld. Her connection with the dead and her function of judge of the dead are thus further factors to take into account

when assessing her importance in Hellenistic and Classical religion and thought.

So Nemesis can emanate from the gods, from man - and womankind, and from the dead. The Nemeseia also illustrates that Nemesis, as a deity with cult, is an integral part of the religious tradition in the pre-Hellenistic era, and as such has a very different background to the figures of Kairos and Tyche.

Nemesis also differs considerably from Kairos and Tyche in that she is a fully-developed mythical character: 'of no personified moral abstraction in the Greek langauge is so personal a story told '(Farnell (1896)460). She appears in the myth of the birth of Helen in the Cypria, whose author has a propensity for personifications such as Momos, Themis and Eris, but who gives Nemesis an especially prominent, although slightly different, role. The story tells that Zeus pursued Nemesis over land and sea whilst she metamorphosed into a variety of land and sea creatures to escape him:

τοὺς δὲ μέτα τριτάτην Ἑλένην τέκε θαῦμα βροτοῖσι...
τήν ποτε καλλίκομος Νέμεσις φιλότητι μιγεῖσα
Ζηνὶ θεῶν βασιλῆϊ τέκε κρατερῆς ὑπ' ἀνάγκης·
φεῦγε γάρ, οὐδ' ἔθελεν μιχθήμεναι ἐν φιλότητι
πατρὶ Διὶ Κρονίωνι· ἐτείρετο γὰρ φρένας αἰδοῖ
καὶ νεμέσει· κατὰ γῆν δὲ καὶ ἀτρύγετον μέλαν ὕδωρ
φεῦγε, Ζεὺς δ' ἐδίωκε· λαβεῖν δ' ἐλιλαίετο θυμῷ·
ἄλλοτε μὲν κατὰ κῦμα πολυφλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης
ἰχθύϊ εἰδομένη πόντον πολὺν ἐξορόθυνεν,
ἄλλοτ' ἀν' ὠκεανὸν ποταμὸν καὶ πείρατα γαίης,
ἄλλοτ' ἀν' ἤπειρον πολυβώλακα· γίγνετο δ' αἰεὶ

θηρί', ὅσ' ἤπειρος αἰνὰ τρέφει, ὄφρα φύγοι νιν.

(Fr. VII = Ath. 334B)

Inevitably she had to acquiesce, and, having been raped by Zeus in the form of a swan, she laid an egg which she hid in a swamp. Although the later tradition holds that Castor and Polydeuces were born from the egg as well as Helen[18], the Cypria version makes Helen the only offspring, with the Dioscuri present at the egg's discovery[19]. Herter ((1935) 2344) ascribes a special significance to Helen's lineage, interpreting her kinship with Nemesis as a symbolic indication of the retribution which Paris' violation of the guest-host relationship incurred, and argues that when Zeus decreed the Trojan War he wanted to rectify both the overpopulation of the world and also the wickedness of humankind. Herter thus finds it particularly important that Nemesis should be Helen's mother, since, in the hands of Aphrodite, Helen became an instrument in Zeus' scheme[20]. But such an interpretation of this relationship seems unjustified; although kinship relations between mythical figures can be employed to express certain conceptual links between them, there is no indication that Nemesis' motherhood of Helen was conceived by the author of the Cypria as anything other than a mythical family tie in the same way as Leda's parenthood of Helen was. Herter's ingenious interpretation sounds too much like a Hellenistic allegorical exegesis of the myth to be convincing.

As far as this study is concerned, despite the fact that the version of the birth of Helen which makes her the child of Zeus and Leda subsequently became the dominant one, we still have sufficient evidence for the early appearance of Nemesis in myth; this connects her even more firmly to the religious and mythical tradition. Furthermore, the fifth century B.C. Attic comic poet Cratinus followed this tradition in his comedy Nemesis[21]. He sets the story in Rhamnus, where there was a well-established cult and temple of the goddess[22], and in it Pericles, who is called Zeus, and Aspasia, who is called Nemesis, are satirized[23], with one of the larger fragments, Fr 109K, referring to Zeus metamorphosed into a swan[24]. If, as seems likely, the Nemesis-Zeus myth was well enough known at Athens to provide a suitable vehicle for policital satire, this again shows how deeply rooted in the literary and mythological tradition Nemesis was, and therefore how different she is in this respect from Tyche and Kairos.

The purpose of this survey of Nemesis in pre-Hellenistic literature has been to prepare the ground for the sections dealing with her iconography and her place in the Hellenistic world. We have seen that Nemesis can carry several nuances of meaning ranging from 'blame' or 'righteous indignation' to, by a kind of extension of these ideas, 'vengeance'. In the latter aspect she can act purely as a principle of

balance, without any obvious moral overtones, or as a guarantor of morally just and fair retribution, but regardless of the moral implications of her actions the process is the same in that she comes into action to restore order when boundaries have been exceeded, whether by deliberate wrongdoing (hybris), or, as in the case of Polycrates and Aemilius Paullus, simply by an excess of favourable tyche or success. Nemesis need not be a divine consequence of a person's actions, however, and in addition to the νέμεσις θεῶν we encounter the νέμεσις ἀνθρώπων, the human consequences of unrighteous actions, and also the νέμεσις θανόντων , which is specifically taken into account in an Athenian festival. The fact that Nemesis receives cult, appears in deified and personified forms in a variety of literature, and takes a fully developed role in the myth recounted by the Cypria, sets her apart from Kairos and Tyche who exhibit these features to a far lesser extent, if at all. Therefore it seems reasonable to expect that her development in the Hellenistic period will be of a different nature to that of our 'patron saints', and that this in itself will be informative in relation to personification in the Hellenistic period. So with this in mind let us now turn to Nemesis' iconography.

ii) The iconography of Nemesis

We have already touched upon Nemesis in art by virtue of the Berlin Amphoriskos and the relief of

Hieronymus, but for the most part the iconography of Nemesis follows two main lines connected with the representations at her two principal cult centres, Rhamnus and Smyrna. The aim of this section is to examine the nature and relative significance of the two iconographies, particularly the relationship of Nemesis' attributes to her functions as outlined in section (i). As was the case with Kairos there is some degree of difficulty regarding the available evidence, since that relating directly to our originals is lacking, and in the case of the Smyrnaean types an approximate reconstruction on the basis of later representations is all that is admissible. However, since the main emphasis here is to establish the iconography in terms of attributes which relate to Nemesis' functions and in terms of its relationship to other figures, rather than a detailed stylistic reconstruction of the original artworks, that problem is not a serious one. Within the overall scheme of this section we will concentrate on Nemesis' two different iconographical strands and her relation to Tyche and <u>hybris</u> with the aim of being able to connect the iconographical features to the literary developments in section (iii).

a) <u>The Nemesis of Rhamnus</u>

We have already remarked on the function which Nemesis has as an ethical power who punishes arrogance. This is reflected in one version of the origin of the cult

statue of Nemesis at Rhamnus. Pausanias describes this goddess as ἀνθρώποις ὑβρισταῖς... ἀπαραίτητος, and relates how it is thought that her wrath fell upon the Persians who landed at Marathon; the invaders brought with them a block of marble to make a trophy for their expected victory, but ultimately Phidias made a statue of Nemesis from it(25). There is, however, a variant story of the origin of the statue at Rhamnus which concerns Agoracritus, the pupil and beloved of Phidias(26), and which regards the work as Agoracritus' chef d'oeuvre : Pliny describes a contest between Agoracritus and Alcamenes, who each sculpted a statue of Aphrodite, in which the Athenians supported their fellow kinsman Alcamenes. Consequently Agoracritus called his statue Nemesis and sold it on condition that it should not remain in Athens: it was set up at Rhamnus and 'Marcus Varro preferred it to any other statue'(27). Pliny's mention of Phidias' love-gifts to Agoracritus is embellished by Zenobius and the Suda(28) who say that the master carved the statue but attached a small label with Agoracritus' signature to the applebranch in Nemesis' hand. However there seems little doubt that this is merely a local tradition which ascribed the work to the more famous artist(29).

Although the statue itself is no longer in existence except in a few small fragments, Pausanias' description at i.33.3ff allows us to reconstruct

several of its main features. He says that she wore a crown with deer and small images of Nike, and held an applebranch in her left hand and a phiale in her right, on which Aethiopians were rendered. The statue did not have wings (and, he adds, nor did any other ancient statues of Nemesis, not even τὰ ἁγιώτατα ξόανα of the Smyrnaeans), although he says that later artists, in the belief that the goddess manifests herself primarily as a goddess of love, did give her wings as they did to Eros. Regarding the phiale, an example from the early Hellenistic gold treasure of Panagurishte, decorated with three concentric rings of full face repoussé negro heads, may be closely analogous to that of the statue by Agoracritus. Pausanias dismisses the suggestion that the Aethiopians appear on the phiale because they live near the river Oceanus, who is also the father of Nemesis, but is unable to offer an explanation himself. However, in view of the deep rooted tradition which regards the Aethiopians as a just and blameless people, they would seem to be an eminently suitable subject to appear associated with Nemesis[30].

Apart from Pausanias' description, some fragments of the original, consisting of pieces of drapery, scraps of the right foot, left arm, neck, chin, and a fragment from the right side of the head (Fig. 17) [31] still survive. Despinis (1971)[32] has shown convincingly that the remains correspond to details of a statue known through several Roman copies of just over life size[33], and hence that Nemesis wore a chiton and a heavy himation around her hips and over her left shoulder, and stood frontal, with her weight

on her left leg. Thus the description in Pausanias and the theoretical reconstruction from the surviving fragments and copies suggest that the Nemesis of Rhamnus, while being a sculpture of the highest calibre with a distinct iconography, had no traits that might strictly be termed allegorical, for the applebranch and the stags in the headdress are equally appropriate to Artemis, branches occur in representations of mortal women as well as goddesses, and it is conceivable that the stags could be just as much decorative as symbolic. However, the existence of this statue, and the cult at Rhamnus of which it was an integral part, once again illustrate Nemesis' existence in the art and in the religious consciousness of pre-Hellenistic Greek culture.

We have already witnessed Nemesis' mythical role in literature as the mother of Helen, and the version of the myth in which Helen was born by Nemesis but suckled and nursed by Leda was shown in plastic form on the base of the Nemesis of Rhamnus. Pausanias describes this scene in which Helen is being led to Nemesis by Leda. Tyndareus and his children stand by, as does a man, Hippeus, with a horse. Agamemnon, Menelaus and Achilles' son Pyrrhus are also present, along with Epochus and another youth, who are the brothers of Oenoë, the eponymous nymph of the district in which Rhamnus is situated (i.33. 7-8)[34]. Some fragments of this relief, dating from before the

Peloponnesian War, which caused an interruption in the building work on the temple, still survive(35). These remains present us with a scene in which each figure was completely separate from the others and stood almost frontal in a scheme reflected in a partial copy from the Roman Imperial period now in Stockholm(36). This features four figures: on the left stands an old man, probably Tyndareus; next to him is a young man, most likely Castor or Polydeuces; next to him is a girl, whose attitude of revealing herself suggests she is Helen; next to her is a woman whose gesture towards the girl with her right arm (wrongly restored with a scroll) implies that she is Leda and seems to confirm the identification of Helen. Although the copy ends here, Nemesis would surely have been the third member of the central female trio, and a surving horse's head in profile illustrates that Hippeus stood on the spectator's right. The original head of Helen survives in a very worn state, as does a particularly fine head with a cloak over her hair, like Leda's on the Stockholm relief but turned in the opposite direction, and therefore probably that of Nemesis(37). Robertson ((1975) 352) suggests that the introduction of Helen to her mother Nemesis, whose direct instrument she was to become, is a closely related idea to the miraculous birth or creation of the femmes fatales Pandora and Aphrodite on the bases of the Athena Parthenos and Zeus at Olympia of Agoracritus' mentor Phidias, and that there must have been a conscious connection here. However, this

again seems to be forcing an allegorical meaning onto a scene which is essentially mythical; the Nemesis who appears in the myth of the birth of Helen, and on this statue base, is certainly related to Nemesis the personified abstraction by virtue of the aidos and nemesis which she feels at her rape by Zeus(38), but there appears to be no sound evidence that the Nemesis here is anything other than Helen's mother; to interpret her presence as a recondite allusion to the future events of the Trojan war is surely unjustified. But whatever the validity of Robertson's assertion, the scene on the base of the statue adds an artistic parallel to the literary evidence which emphasises the difference between Nemesis, who is at this period a fully fledged mythical personage, and Kairos and Tyche, who were not(39).

b) The Nemeseis of Smyrna

The second principal strand of Nemesis' iconography relates to her cult at Smyrna. Pausanias tells us that the 'modern' city was founded by Alexander the Great in accordance with a vision he had after hunting on Mt. Pagus. Having come to the sanctuary of the Nemeseis he found a spring and a plane tree in front of the sanctuary, and, as he slept under the tree, the Nemeseis appeared to him and instructed him to found a city there and remove into it the Smyrnaeans from the old city. This he did, and henceforth the people of Smyrna believed in two Nemeseis rather than one,

saying that their mother is Nyx[40]. Herodotus states that the original city of Smyrna was destroyed by the Lydians in the reign of Alyattes, and that after this the people lived scattered in villages[41]. The date of this destruction is usually placed circa 600 B.C.[42], and H. Vos[43] holds that the destruction was the occasion for the founding of the cult, suggesting that, as Nemesis is the avenging deity who punishes hybris, the Smyrnaeans, convinced that their city had fallen as a result of hybris, tried to propitiate Nemesis with a cult. This notion of the destruction of the city being due to hybris also appears in Theognis 1103, Ὕβρις καὶ Μάγνητας ἀπώλεσε καὶ Κολοφῶνα καὶ Σμύρνην , but this may be a rationalization, a false aition for a cult which already existed in some form. At least the importance of the cult in the Hellenistic city founded by Alexander suggests that the original cult was an important one which is unlikely to have arisen in one of the villages after the diaspora.

The cult statues of the Nemeseis at Smyrna are the oldest known, and their great antiquity is attested by Pausanias, who describes them as 'ancient' (ἀρχαίων) and as 'most holy wooden images' (ἁγιώτατα ξόανα)[44]. Also of interest is that he remarks that the figures were not winged, although we do possess a large corpus of monumental evidence which does attest winged Nemeseis. This continual variation in the attributes

of the figures in reproductions and descriptions presents a major obstacle to any attempt to reconstruct the iconography of the originals, since in addition to appearing winged or unwinged, Nemesis sometimes appears with a cubit measure, a bridle, a griffin or a wheel, sometimes without. However, there is a certain amount of agreement throughout the copies on the principal motifs, and in this respect we may group together the coins which show the two Nemeseis alone (Figs. 18 and 19)[45], or on a chariot pulled by griffins(Fig. 20)[46], or appearing to Alexander as he sleeps under the plane tree with his weapons scattered around him (Fig. 21)[47], or where they appear with the Artemis of Ephesus (Fig. 22)[48]. On the basis of the similarities between these reproductions we may reconstruct the iconographical scheme of the figures as two youngish women wearing long-sleeved chitons, the hem of which they raise to shoulder height with the right hand. The overgarment hangs vertically down from the shoulders, runs free of the upper body at the front, and is wrapped around the lower body and the lowered left arm in a heavy fold. The left hand figure of the two stands erect with her weight equally on both feet; the right hand figure tends to lean back slightly. Both have their hair bound at the front by a small stephane or fillet, while at the back the hair sits on the nape of the neck in a knot with a single ringlet. The cubit rule is generally the attribute of the right hand figure; she carries this in her left

hand, holding it to her left shoulder. The left hand figure is less well proportioned, partly because in her left hand she carries a bridle which dangles by her side (Figs. 19 and 21). A coin from Alexandria (Fig. 23)[49] also shows the two Nemeseis on either side of Apollo, with the right hand one holding a bridle, but the authenticity of this attribute in relation to the original figures must remain questionable; Rossbach ((1897-1902) 145) points out that, since it only occurs on coins and not in other media which show traces of the original figures, it may well not have been an attribute of the original cult-statues.

It is the hypothesis of Furtwängler[50] that one figure, which occurs on the reverse side of a coin minted under Claudius, forms an especially reliable example of a copy of one of the two Nemeseis (Fig. 24)[51]. This is a standing figure whose undergarments cover her feet and over whose head is drawn a mantle which she touches with her right hand in the usual manner of Nemesis; in her left hand she holds a branch. The figure is characterized by an archaic rigidity, but although any reconstruction of the Smyrnaean statues must necessarily be along the lines of Ionian korai of the early sixth century B.C. and what was possible for sculptors of schools like Samos, Mytilene etc., this stylistic feature looks more like lack of technique on the part of the die cutter than

authentic representation of an archaic work of art[52]. Furthermore, the gesture of holding the dress alone does not constitute sufficient proof that the figure is Nemesis, and, while the attribute of the branch is attested in numerous representations of Nemesis[53], it is more relevant to the Nemesis of Rhamnus than the Nemeseis of Smyrna. Thus the limitations of the numismatic evidence are clear; we cannot necessarily draw on coins as being the best representations of the original cult statues, and an approximate reconstruction is all that we can achieve. In most small copies the archaic style in which the originals must have been rendered, since they were of roughly the same era as Boupalos who sculpted the Tyche of Smyrna, is not in evidence: on only two coins[54] are any traces of an archaic original in evidence, namely the zigzag falling of the overgarment in Nemesis' left hand.

Numerous hypotheses have been made to explain the duality of the Nemeseis at Smyrna. Tournier ((1863) 102) thinks it arises from a conflation of the Nemesis of Smyrna with the Nemesis of Rhamnus, suggesting that Smyrna was first inhabited by Aetolians (in whose territory there was a cult centre of Adrasteia) and later colonised by Attica, where Rhamnus is situated. Farnell ((1896) 494) picks up Pausanias' implication that the Smyrnaeans created two Nemeseis because they had moved from their ancient home, and argues that

their duality is due to Smyrna's change in site, supposing that the older city had its Nemesis who, like Tyche, performed a tutelary function and who was retained when a new one was created for the new settlement. Several scholars prefer to explain the duality in view of the general tendency of daimones to multiply, but in Greek culture they tend to do so in numbers of three or more as in the case of Eros and the Erotes, the Moirai, the Charites, the Elpides etc.[55]. Schweitzer ((1931) 203)[56], on the other hand, explains the phenomenon as due to the influence of cults of dual divinities which exist in Asia Minor as far back as the second millenium B.C. Certainly the preponderance of artistic evidence from Eastern cities lends plausibility to assertions linking Nemesis with Anatolian or Near Eastern culture, but in view of the lack of concrete evidence the issue of Nemesis' duality must remain purely a matter of conjecture.

Also obscure is the iconographical significance of the graceful gesture with which Nemesis raises the border of her undergarment to shoulder level. The gesture is not unique to Nemesis, since it appears on female marble figures from the pre-Persian acropolis at Athens, is typical of Hera, who often makes a similar gesture towards the cloak on her head, appears on representations of brides, who, however, usually do it with the left hand, and is closely related to the elegant way in which figures of Elpis hold out a

flower(57). The pose is sometimes construed as an expression of modesty, chastity or shamefacedness, which would be appropriate to a young woman with close connections with aidos, but it still need not have any specific relevance to Nemesis' functions. The suggestion(58) that the gesture is connected with the custom of spitting into one's bosom to avert the evil eye can be rejected on the basis of the artistic evidence(59), and the lines of Mesomedes' Hymn to Nemesis, νεύεις δ' ὑπὸ κόλπον ὀφρὺν ἀεὶ ζυγὸν μετὰ χεῖρα κρατοῦσα (1. 12f.), make no mention of spitting, despite Posnansky's inferences to the contrary ((1890) 104f); his suggestion that spitting was a vulgar superstition not practised before the Hellenistic period is implausible since it is likely to be a very old custom(60). This illustrates another aspect of the common, but not necessarily accurate, view of Hellenistic culture as decadent which he and other scholars continually express.

The meanings of the cubit rule, which sometimes appears in the plural but more often as one fairly broad stick which is occasionally calibrated, and the bridle pose fewer problems, however. They are symbols of restraint and of the correct measure, the ruler being to determine where the boundaries are that people should not cross, the bridle to restrain them from doing so. This is the significance accorded to

them by two anonymous epigrams of unknown date in the Planudean Appendix of the Palatine Anthology:

'Η Νέμεσις προλέγει τῷ πήχεϊ, τῷ τε χαλινῷ,
μητ' ἄμετρόν τι ποιεῖν, μήτ' ἀχάλινα λέγειν.

(AP 16.223)

'Η Νέμεσις πῆχυν κατέχω· Τίνος οὕνεκα; λέξεις.
πᾶσι παραγγέλλω· Μηδὲν ὑπὲρ τὸ μέτρον.

(AP 16.224)[61]

Thus these two attributes express Nemesis' function as the goddess who punishes those who transgress the limits of the natural order, and reinforce the fundamental connection which we saw from literature that Nemesis has with order as opposed to disorder, both in herself and through her relationships with other concepts.

The remaining attributes are less closely related to the original statues. Occasionally the wheel and the griffin are installed near to Nemesis. The wheel, which is also a symbol of order, particularly the restoration of order, is rather more frequent in its occurrence and accompanies Nemesis when she is equipped with the measuring stick. However, it is still frequently omitted from her iconography, and still more infrequent is the griffin, which represents sharp-sighted watchfulness, has close connections with swift revenge, and which occurs on coins of Smyrna as the draught animal of the Nemeseis' wagon (Fig. 20)[62]. Thus it seems that the griffin and the wheel,

and also the wings[63], evidence for which dates from a period when descriptions and representations had a tendency to overload deities with symbolic attributes, were probably not features of the original statues, but are more likely to be arbitrary additions of individual artists[64]. However, the surviving works of art which represent Nemesis are, on the whole, influenced by the statues at Smyrna rather than the one at Rhamnus[65]. This is the case, for example, with the Nemesis who appears with Eros and Elpis on the Chigi Crater[66] and also on a Pompeian wall painting, now in the Ashmolean Museum, Oxford which depicts a similar theme in a rather more realistic fashion (Fig. 28)[67]. Here Psyche, depicted as a young woman with butterfly's wings, is seated, and, while one Eros ties her hands behind her back and another burns her breasts with a torch, a third pours water on her from an amphora. Behind Psyche stands Nemesis in a long-sleeved chiton; her hair is unbound and her drapery, which she grasps with her right hand in the standard manner of the Nemeseis of Smyrna, is diaphanous. Where Elpis was present on the Chigi Crater we now have a smaller figure who hides her face behind a fan or large leaf[68]. This is not the only instance of Nemesis on wall paintings: Pliny, HN 35.143, mentions and artist called Simus, probably identical with the sculptor Simus of Salamis in Cyprus, known from inscriptions of the third century B.C.[69], who painted a 'Nemesim egregiam'. The reason

for the iconographical predominance of types deriving from the Smyrnaean statues appears to be that, despite the undoubted high quality and fame of Agoracritus' statue at Rhamnus, the relationship between the attributes of the Smyrnaean types to Nemesis' functions makes them easier to 'read' iconographically and thus better suited to express the concept of Nemesis in art. Also, the later the representations of Nemesis become, the more attributes she tends to acquire. This can be understood as due partly to the smallness of many of the representations themselves, linked with the limitation to only one Nemesis figure, who therefore has to carry more attributes, partly to the fusion of Nemesis with other deities and concepts such as Tyche, with whom she ultimately comes to be identified, and partly to late antiquity's predilection for allegorical figures carrying large numbers of attributes(70). Certainly, given the importance of attributes in the Hellenistic tradition that we have witnessed in the figures of Tyche and Kairos, this must be held to be an especially influential factor in determining the ascendancy of the Smyrnaean type. The greater number of representations of Nemesis deal with her as a personification rather than as a mythical character, and the evidence of the coins of Smyrna shows that, iconographically speaking, the abstract ideas of right and retribution entered into the representations of the Smyrnaean Nemeseis, which hold the measure and

bridle as symbols of order and control, far more than the one from Rhamnus.

c) Nemesis and Tyche

In the monumental and literary evidence we have surveyed thus far we have encountered various associations and fusions of Nemesis with other deities. These are essential to any understanding of the goddess, and as far as this study is concerned her connection with Tyche is particularly important. In antiquity, as Pausanias, who is sceptical of the association, informs us, it was widely believed that Nemesis and Tyche shared the same origin as Oceanids[71]. However, Nemesis' parentage, authentic or not, is not the only link she has with Tyche : the Berlin amphoriskos illustrates that they could both function as deities of Fate, and we have also seen that they could both have a tutelary function as goddesses of certain cities. Furthermore, their attributes become confused, and so, for example, Nemesis often appears with the cornucopia and/or the steering oar[72]. A striking instance of the complete identification of the two figures occurs on a carnelian of Imperial date, now in Vienna, which shows a female figure crowned by Nike. She would appear to be Tyche, since she carries the steering oar and cornucopia, but despite displaying none of the attributes exclusively associated with Nemesis, she is

accompanied by the inscription κυρία Νέμεσι ἐλέησον [73]. The most interesting of all the attributes shared by Nemesis and Tyche, however, is the wheel. We often speak of the 'Wheel of Fortune', which appears to be an appropriate metaphor for the divinity's inconsistency[74], but the wheel is originally associated with Nemesis to a greater degree than with Tyche, who possibly acquires this attribute as a result of her fusions with Nemesis. In fact Tyche rarely has this attribute unless the two deities are identified with each other, as they are on a coin of Tios in Bithynia, dating from the third or second century B.C.[75]. Here Nemesis - Tyche is represented standing to the right with a cornucopia resting on her left arm; her right arm leans on a wheel which in turn stands on an altar. It is thus interesting to see, in this Hellenistic example, that the wheel occurs as an attribute of a goddess of order, Nemesis, and also of a goddess of disorder, Tyche; Nemesis' wheel expresses bringing circumstances back to their rightful equilibrium, Tyche's the disruption of that equilibrium. The fact that Isis was also represented with the wheel leads Cook ((1925) I.271) to suppose that she borrowed her wheel from Nemesis who in turn borrowed it from Fortuna, and that the borrowings were facilitated by the general resemblance subsisting between the deities in question. However the connection between these deities and their attributes is surely conceptual rather than chronological and

arises out of the similarities in their functions rather than from any clear-cut temporal factors(76). It is also interesting to note that although the wheel was used as an instrument of punishment involving flogging, burning or even beheading, and was regarded by the Romans as a typically Greek institution(77), and would therefore prove to be an especially appropriate attribute for a figure such as Nemesis, there is no evidence to suggest that Nemesis' wheel was ever conceived as a wheel of punishment; it is the rotary action of bringing things back to their rightful order that is significant(78).

Allègre ((1889) 154f) argues that, in order to become assimilated to Tyche, Nemesis had to lose her function of punishing those who violated the laws of the moral order or those who attempted to avoid the laws of the physical world. In his view it is as a benevolent and just divinity that Nemesis was associated with Tyche. However, although it is true that both goddesses can be conceived as just, the differing significance of the wheel in their respective iconographies illustrates that their connection is grounded as much in their standing as polar opposites, as representatives of order and disorder, as in their similarities. The coin from Tios mentioned above shows that the two came to be identified in the Hellenistic period, and, although they had been associated on the Berlin amphoriskos, they had never previously been

completely assimilated as they are on the coin. The extent to which they became conjoined can be illustrated also by a passage from Dio Chrysostom's discourse On Tyche which may well have its origins in Stoic thought of the Hellenistic era, in which we are told that Tyche has been given many names: her impartiality has been called Nemesis, her obscurity Elpis, her inevitability Moira and her righteousness Themis, ' πολυώνυμος τις ὡς ἀληθῶς θεὸς καὶ πολύτροπος' (79). These similarities are surely grounded in their functions as goddesses of Fate, as the inclusion of Moira in the list suggests, and in the tendency they both show to strike people at the pinnacle of their success and prosperity. Here too they can differ, since the righteous compensating and punishing power of Nemesis often operates more violently, as the motif of trampling hybris in her iconography shows. However, although many of the iconographical fusions we have witnessed here are of post-Hellenistic date, both these and the conceptual similarities between Nemesis and Tyche can be shown to have their origins in the Hellenistic era, and, as we shall see in section (iii), are a significant feature of both personifications in Hellenistic times.

d) Nemesis and Hybris

Throughout this chapter we have commented on various aspects of the association of Nemesis with Hybris, and before proceeding to an analysis of this facet of

Nemesis as it appears in Hellenistic literature we must assess briefly the iconographical motif of Nemesis trampling Hybris underfoot. This subject appears on a fragmentary white marble relief from the amphitheatre at Gortyna, which dates from the second century of the Roman Imperial era and is now in the British Museum[80]. This depicts the lower part of a draped female figure who stands on a prostrate boy. On the right is a griffin and on the left a large snake. She holds a cubit measure, traces of which are still visible along the length of her left arm; her right arm does not extend the full length of her body and so may have been bent at the elbow to raise the hand in Nemesis' usual gesture. The recurrence of these motifs in other works of art allows us to attempt a reconstruction of the remaining portions of the relief roughly along the lines of the figures in the right hand niche of the Thasos relief[81]. The snake is also depicted on the Piraeus relief[82], as is the trampled figure who may, in this case, represent some personal enemy, but is more likely to represent the generic hybristes, the mortal who through crime, ignorance, arrogance or some such fault, transgresses the right measure and thus receives due punishment[83]. The trampling motif also appears on Trajanic bronze coins from Alexandria which depict a winged Nemesis of the 'Erinys' type, running to the right, wearing a short tunic and laced ankle boots, holding a wheel in her left hand and treading on a prone man with her right

foot[84]. These coins carry similar details to the second century A.D. statuettes, one from the Dattari collection, the other in the Cairo museum, which both depict a winged Nemesis clad in a long chiton and high boots, her right hand touching the tunic in the usual manner, her left arm hanging down and holding a wheel vertically, standing with her right foot on the head of a trampled victim[85]. One other example of Nemesis treading down Hybris comes from a limestone relief from Thebes, now in Cairo, whose meaning and dating has proved highly problematical[86]. On it a winged goddess, wearing a cuirass, a short tunic and a military cloak, holding an indistinct object in her right hand, treads on a prostrate woman with her left foot. Alongside the downtrodden woman kneels a weeping woman, and in the field of the relief, on the left, is a balance, and on the right is an eight-spoked wheel. J. Stryzgowski[87] believed it to be a representation of Kairos, Pronoia and Metanoia; A. Muñoz[88] thought that the principal figure was Bios. However, the iconography of the Torcello relief which we examined in the chapter on Kairos tells against the former interpretation, for although the scales and the wheel can occur as attributes of Kairos, it is surely significant that the figure is female and has a normal coiffure. The interpretation of the trampled figure as Pronoia is also curious, for there seems to be little reason why Kairos should be portrayed treading her into the ground, whilst the identification of the

principal figure as Bios has little to commend it in view of the iconographical attributes and the interaction of the figures. The appearance of the wheel, wings and trampling motif strongly suggest that this figure is Nemesis, that the figure beneath her feet is Hybris (since she is female, rather than the generic male hybristes who we have encountered previously), and that the kneeling woman is indeed Metanoia, weeping at the overwhelming of Hybris. If this interpretation of the relief is correct we have a further expression in art of one of Nemesis' basic functions which, as we shall see in the next section, assumes a particular significance in Hellenistic literature.

Our study of Nemesis' iconography has shown that, in addition to being a fully developed mythological figure, the personified Nemesis appears in a clearly defined form in literature and art from the pre-Hellenistic era onwards. In analysing Nemesis by means of the attributes she carries and her relations to other divinities and concepts, it is particularly interesting to observe the tension which exists between the original representations from Rhamnus and Smyrna (so far as we can reconstruct them) and the later, more explicitly allegorical representations which, though influenced by the original works of art, particularly those from Smyrna, contain many iconographical variants or omissions. The relationship

of Nemesis to Tyche and Kairos is also important, particularly in those spheres of life where the concepts of chance and fate are foremost in people's minds, such as sport, war, or anywhere that one person's success threatens to disrupt the natural order of things; the measuring stick, bridle, wheel, and the motif of trampling Hybris between them express the notions of the right measure, Nemesis' restraining influence, the restoration of order, and the consequences of incurring her wrath. By reason of her connection with other deities and concepts Nemesis undergoes modifications in her iconography to suit the needs of different people at different times, and the final section of this chapter will assess some correlative changes in the overall conception of her, linked to social and artistic factors, assessing the significance of those changes both for Nemesis herself and for Hellenistic culture generally.

iii) Nemesis in Hellenistic Literature

The aim of this section is to provide an analysis of Nemesis as she appears in the literature of the Hellenistic age. When placed in context with sections (i) and (ii) the material here will enable us to draw conclusions regarding the degree of newness of the concept of Nemesis in the Hellenistic period, and also to make some observations on the relation between the way Nemesis is handled in literary situations and the way she is handled in iconography, with particular

attention being paid to the differences in emphasis which occur in these two media. Another aim of this section is to ascertain how, why and in what degree the concept of Nemesis in the Hellenistic era differs from that of earlier times. I will argue that certain specifically Hellenistic developments, which are symptomatic of the era and which arise out of the cultural climate of the times, are the appearance of Nemesis in erotic situations, which is reflected in her iconography, and the attribution to her of jealousy as a personality trait, which has no iconographical corollary. A further Hellenistic development, I will argue, is that of Nemesis of the agon. Closely tied to the iconography are the sections dealing with Nemesis and the right measure, Nemesis and hybris, and Nemesis and Tyche; these will attempt to underline the links between the literature and the iconography, and to support the assertions and comments made about Nemesis in sections (i) and (ii).

a) Nemesis and the right measure

Given that Nemesis is the guardian of the right measure, it is understandable that she is widely feared in situations where luck comes someone's way[90], but she is also seen by etymologers and theologians as a righteous and impartial avenger[91]. The tension which exists between these views is well illustrated by a fascinating fragment of the Cynic Cercidas of Megalopolis[92] which belongs to his

meliamboi and is a political piece very much on the lines of Solon's social poems; in this instance we are dealing with a social crisis dating from around the time of the destruction of Megalopolis by Cleomenes III:

> (Why does not God) choose out Xenon, that greedy cormorant of the well-lined purse, the child of licentiousness, and make him the child of poverty, giving to us who deserve it the silver that now runs to waste? What could prevent it (ask God that question, since it is easy for him to bring about whatever his mind resolves) that the man who ruins wealth by pouring out what he has or the filthy-dross-stained usurer, should be drained of their swine-befouled wealth, and the money now wasted given to him that has but his daily bread and dips his cup at the common bowl? Has Dike then the sight of a mole, does Phaethon squint with a single pupil, is the vision dimmed of Themis the bright? How can one hold them for gods that lack eyes to see and ears to hear? Yet men say that the dread king, lord of the lightning, sits in mid-olympus holding the scales of justice, and never nods. So says Homer in the Iliad. 'He doth decline the scale to the mighty of valour, when the day of fate is at hand.' Why then does the impartial balancer never incline to me? 'But the Brygians, dregs of humanity (yet I dread to say it), see how far they swing down in their favour the scales of Zeus! What lords, then, what sons of Ouranos shall a man find, that he may have justice? For Zeus, father of us all, verily is a father to some, to others a step-father. Best leave the problem to astrologers; I think for them it will be a light task to solve. But for us, let us have a care for Paean, and for Metados - she is indeed a goddess - and Nemesis that walketh the earth. While the godhead blows a favourable wind astern, hold her in honour; but though mortals fare well, yet shall a sudden wind blow vaunted wealth and proud fortune away. Who then shall vomit them back to you from the deep?'
>
> (Fr.4 Powell. Tr. D.R. Dudley (1937) 79)

In this passage, which indisputably denounces the inequalities of wealth, W.W. Tarn ((1928) 755) sees a warning to the governing classes to be charitable while they had time, otherwise revolution would be upon them and their wealth taken away. On this interpretation Nemesis would seem to be invoked in her capacity of restoring equilibrium, acting to diminish wealth differentials. This would date the piece to the period when Cleomenes' reforms were arousing the oppressed classes throughout the Peloponnese. Rostovtzeff ((1941) I.206-7) shares this opinion[(93)], although he feels that Cercidas was not a revolutionary but a member of the well-to-do class who was warning the wealthy of the coming revolution which would force them to 'disgorge' (νείοθεν ἐξεμέσαι, l. 55) the wealth which they had appropriated; again this reading would see Nemesis as acting to restore order and establish some degree of right measure amongst people's wealth.

Dudley ((1937) 78-81) on the other hand, suggests that the poem is connected with the social distress which arose in Megalopolis around the time of its rebuilding after Cleomenes had destroyed it. This reading offers an alternative view of the specific role of Nemesis in the passage, for Cercidas' radical politics would then date from after the war with Cleomenes, from a time when the desperate situation of the Megalopolitan poor

would demand decisive action from the previously safe conservatives who had opposed the militant slogans of the Spartan Revolution until they were confronted by a situation needing drastic reforms. On this interpretation the poem is not a warning to the ruling class to change its outlook while there is still the opportunity, but an appeal to the reformers not to wait for divine vengeance, but to act themselves under the inspiration of a new triad of divinities, namely Paean, Metados and Nemesis. This dating has been rejected on the grounds that Cercidas is putting his case by speaking <u>in persona</u> rather than in person(94). Certainly the πατρικὸς ξένος of Aratus is unlikely to have been poor, and Aratus is unlikely to have supported a man who advocated the same revolutionary politics against which he had recalled the Macedonians into the Peloponnese. Furthermore this creates difficulties regarding the significance of Nemesis, emphasising as it does the vengeance aspect of the deity which does not seem to relate so well to the other two divinities, who are clearly beneficial figures. Nemesis is surely being employed here in relation to her role of preserving the right measure, and the arguments which favour the dating of the poem to before the destruction of Megalopolis add a good deal of weight to this case. The social context of the fragment is important in that it shows that the workings of Tyche, who could well be the missing figure at the very start of the fragment(95), and

Nemesis are not solely confined to literary or artistic fields: in the area of politics a great imbalance of wealth between rich and poor constitutes one further type of distortion of the natural order of things, and whether the upshot of the distortion is divine retribution or social revolution, the necessary ingredients are the same. The complaint against the workings of Tyche is commonplace at this period, as we have seen in chapter 2, as is the notion of the sudden reversal of fate at the end of the poem: Nemesis is just as powerful a force in politics as in any other sphere.

The political aspect of this meliamb is not the only feature which is relevant to this study, for the poem raises some issues which concern personification in general as well as Nemesis in particular. Cercidas questions not only the inequalities of wealth but also the very existence of Zeus, 'who is a real father to some but only a stepfather to others'. Certainly, given the Hellenistic liking for echoing early epic, he may well have Hesiod's Dike and Themis on his mind when he mentions them here: 'how are they still gods, who have neither sight nor hearing?' he demands, in a tone that is reminiscent of the song sung by the Athenians to welcome Demetrius Poliorcetes in 291 B.C.[96]. The entire reference to Zeus as the powerless Olympian King who, despite holding the scales, merely rubber-stamps the decrees of Fate, may

well imply criticism of Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus[97], and the father/stepfather jibe could be intended to ridicule Zeus' amorous liaisons[98]. So, unable to reconcile the facts of life with the view that the gods are at one and the same time just and all-powerful, Cercidas sets up a remarkable trio of alternative divinities[99]. The use of personification is a salient feature of Cercidas' style[100], and his reader may well be expected to recall the Nemesis and Aidos of Hes. Op. 197, but a crucial factor is that the three forces are in people's own hands to use, rather than being daughters of Zeus, as in Hesiod, or stars in the sky set there by Zeus as a constant, though unobtainable, warning and inspiration to mortals, as Aratus, whose work continually asserts Zeus' benevolence, said of Dike[101]. This highlights some interesting questions about personification in general.

Metados, which only occurs once in extant Greek literature, may be formed on the analogy of Aidos[102], but given the Hellenistic penchant for the old poets, and for Hesiod in particular, the suggestion that Cercidas probably knew the words of Hes. Op. 356 Δὼς ἀγαθή, Ἅρπαξ δὲ κακή, θανάτοιο δότειρα, may well be valid[103]. He may indeed be exploiting both possibilities. Metados seems to be an ad hoc creation of the author, and as such can be compared with the Kairos of Lysippus, since we are dealing with

a deified concept which owes its origin more to artistic conceit than to a religious tradition: in fact Cercidas feels the need to point this out - the θεὸς γὰρ αὗτα of line 48 is clear indication that he feels his coinage of Metados is unusual and demands some explanation(104). The parallel between Metados as a new creation in a literary context and Kairos in an artistic one, both dating from the early Hellenistic period, suggests that there is little difference between literature and iconography when it comes to the invention of new personifications at this time, but also that there is considerable difference between this period and the preceding ones, where rather than being products of artists' imaginations personifications form part of a far-reaching religious tradition against which Metados is a deliberate reaction.

Nemesis in this passage has also been the object of much scholarly discussion: Hunt ((1911) 21) believes that Nemesis is the figure under which Cercidas commends the practical duties of aiding the needy and punishing evil doers; Dudley ((1937) 81) believes that Nemesis is not named as a threat to the wealthy, but perhaps 'as a reminder to the party of reform that they have to fulfil on earth the functions assigned to Zeus in heaven'; Paquet ((1975) 136 n 39) views Metados and Nemesis as counterparts, Nemesis being 'déesse vengeresse'. Webster ((1964) 223), however,

feels that Nemesis is 'not retribution but distribution'. None of these solutions seems wholly satisfactory, however, and I prefer to see Nemesis here as upholding the right measure in respect of wealth. The three figures would then fit neatly together, with Nemesis in this capacity, Metados as sharing, and Paean, who is originally the doctor of Olympus(105), as healing in the metaphorical sense of healing those in distress: thus the cure for human ills is in human hands, and the trio of personifications is used as an artistic device to make the point.

b) Nemesis and Hybris

In addition to her function of guarding the right measure we have also seen that Nemesis can act as an avenger, both in a very general sense and as the punisher of hybris specifically, and it is to this latter aspect that we now turn(106). We have already observed that the type of hybris which can incur nemesis can manifest itself in varying forms, but that whilst the contexts may be different, as may the 'moral content', the pattern remains the same: Nemesis follows the transgression of boundaries. In the Hellenistic period Nemesis undergoes numerous developments but still remains identifiable by means of many of the traits which the old Nemesis had in her original form, and so, in Callimachus' Hymn 6 Demeter we encounter one of Nemesis' fundamental aspects,

namely the punishment of words and deeds characterised by hybris.

Within a ritual frame this hymn expounds a cautionary tale which explicitly warns against going too far[107], and although the story is told in moral terms and the myth relates to the ritual action of the hymn's setting, Callimachus concentrates more on the secular and social elements of the story. Thus the religious formulation is only important on the surface[108], and, although it does have serious concerns, the emphasis of the hymn is more literary, and its preoccupations centre on the unusual and the entertaining, on 'beauty and the bizarre', as it aims to create 'a new kind of literary realism out of old forms'[109]. So, although the inset deals with Erysichthon's transgression and its consequences, it is interesting that at lines 72-114 we see the secular and social effects of his actions: the hymn's dramatic setting is in Greece's distant past, the characters are mythical, and we witness an act of hybris and its repercussions. But then the emphasis shifts; Hellenistic bourgeois values are imposed on the archaic setting so that 'scandal is more powerful than religion'[110]. The narrative enclosed within the ritual context of the frame carries a morally edifying message, warning that hybris against Demeter brings disaster with it. Thus overstepping the mark is a very important aspect of the story. It is introduced from

the outset, and the notion is reinforced as Callimachus quotes the last line of Hesiod's Works and Days εὐδαίμων... ὃς τάδε... ἐργάζηται... ὄρνιθας κρίνων καὶ ὑπερβασίας ἀλεείνων (111).

The narrative section of the hymn describes how a bad idea got hold of Erysichthon when the δεξιὸς δαίμων of the Triopidae became angry with them (ll. 31-2). The notion of ὁ δεξιὸς δαίμων is especially interesting, since it may be modelled on ἀγαθὸς δαίμων, whose cult, as we saw in our discussion of Tyche, was popular at Alexandria at this time(112); Hopkinson ((1984) ad. l. 32) observes that in all periods of Greek literature the daimon is often virtually synonymous with 'luck' good or bad, but that here ἄχθετο suggests something more active which turns against the Triopidae and puts the disastrous idea in the mind of one member of their family. This is an instance of ate, and the way in which this operates can be illustrated by Trag. Adesp. 296 N², preserved by Lycurgus, In Leocritem 92, in 330 B.C.:

> ὅταν γὰρ ὀργὴ δαιμόνων βλάπτῃ τινά,
> τοῦτ' αὐτὸ πρῶτον, ἐξαφαιρεῖται φρενῶν
> τὸν νοῦν τὸν ἐσθλόν· εἰς δὲ τὴν χείρω τρέπει
> γνώμην, ἵν' εἰδῇ μηδὲν ὧν ἁμαρτάνει.

Callimachus makes no explicit mention of why the daimon suddenly became hostile, but we have already seen examples of the dangers of excess wealth, and

Erysichthon and his family do live in a βαθὺν οἶκον (1.113).

Excessive wealth may be one reason for the downfall of the Triopidae, but it is the hybris of Erysichthon which brings about his fate. The motif of aidos is prominent here(113). Erysichthon and his henchmen are lacking in it: they ran shamelessly (ἀναιδέες, 1.36) into the sacred grove; Erysichthon's shamelessness is stressed in the introduction to Nicippe's speech at line 45 where he is called ἀναιδέα φῶτα ; his savage glare, disregard for the priestess and the violence he threatens all work against the inhibiting force which aidos exerts. His parents by contrast are shown as being excessively aidomenoi (1.73), although here the emphasis is different - as representatives of Hellenistic bourgeois society with all its values their ultimate disgrace is to have their son's embarrassing condition publicly exposed, and their shame is such that they cannot bring themselves to send him to the banquets which he wants(114). Erysichthon has been described as 'a juvenile delinquent, the wild scion of good stock; no unnatural monster, but a boy who has got an insane idea into his head'(115), but there seems to be a hint of the monstrous present, and of the hybris implicit in that monstrosity, since, if line 34 is not spurious(116), the word androgigantas, which denotes the gigantic size of Erysichthon's servants, can also carry

overtones of hybris due to its association with gigas: the gigantomachy scenes on the Great Altar of Zeus at Pergamum are a classic statement of the giants' role as representatives of hybris and disorder in Hellenistic art.

Erysichthon's hybris, then, is responsible for his violent entry into the sacred grove of Demeter. The first thing he assaults is an enormous poplar which stands in the centre of the grove. On being struck it cries out to the others. Demeter hears the cry and, disguised as her priestess Nicippe, has words with Erysichthon(117), asking him to stop and warning him not to incur the goddess' anger. His hybris is again made implicit in his reaction; with a look whose ferocity is compared to a lioness he orders her to 'get lost or I'll stick my great axe in your skin' and proceeds to make clear his motives for action: ταῦτα δ' ἐμὸν θησεῖ στεγανὸν δόμον, ᾧ ἔνι δαίτας αἰὲν ἐμοῖς ἑτάροισιν ἄδαν θυμαρέας ἀξῶ (ll. 54-55). This is the last straw: he has now exceeded all due measure and Nemesis moves into action. She writes down his κακὰν ... φωνάν and thereby seals his fate(118).

Nemesis does not appear in person as the executrix of the punishment. Rather she plays the role of a goddess of fate who enters the wrongful actions of people in a book, as a result of which some punishment catches up with them at a later juncture. It is important to

notice that Nemesis very seldom does her own 'dirty work': it is only in art that Nemesis herself is depicted as the agent of the punishment, in which context we have seen the motif of Nemesis trampling Hybris[119]. Another striking aspect of the Erysichthon story is the way that the punishment fits the crime: he wanted to build a banqueting hall, and accordingly Demeter inflicts on him the paradoxical punishment of eating himself to starvation; the more he eats the more he wastes away; his excess is punished by further excess. In fact he practically suggests his own punishment, since ᾧ ἔνι δαῖτας (l.54) is exactly echoed in the first sentence of Demeter's judgement at line 63. This brand of poetic justice is a fundamental feature of the way in which Nemesis works in the Hellenistic period, and we may compare the first century B.C. inscription from Smyrna, the home of the Nemeseis, which curses anyone who harms the sacred fish with the fate of being eaten by fish[120]. This is surely based not on the Greek fear of death at sea and an unmarked grave[121], but on the idea that the punishment should fit the crime. In Erysichthon's case, moreover, the poetic justice is particularly apt, for, as a shameless individual he is an especially appropriate subject for Ravening Hunger, for both stomach and hunger promote shamelessness in Greek literature from the time of Homer onwards[122].

Thus Callimachus' Hymn to Demeter illustrates very clearly several significant aspects of the way in which Nemesis works in the literature of the Hellenistic age. Hybris is definitely present, as is the notion of the right measure and the transgression thereof, and the whole action takes place in the sphere of 'Nemesis and the gods', since the hybris and transgression are directed against Demeter. The importance of the way in which the punishment fits the crime should not be overlooked, since this is a particularly prominent aspect of Nemesis' workings in the Hellenistic era, and one which we shall see again when we examine how she operates in erotic contexts. Finally we may comment on a marked difference in emphasis between literature and iconography related to the role of Nemesis as a punisher of hybris: in literature Nemesis can be shown as a force of Fate who instigates, but does not personally execute, the punishments which she decrees; in art this 'second-hand' operation of the goddess is found far less frequently, and Nemesis assumes the function of punisher. This may well be due to the difference between the two media, principally with regard to the difficulties faced by artists in depicting Nemesis acting via some other agency: thus Nemesis performs the act of vengeance herself and personally tramples Hybris underfoot.

Hymn 6 Demeter is not only valuable for the light which it sheds on Nemesis, but also for the problems which it raises about the notion of personification in general. An ambiguity in line 102, probably intentional on Callimachus' part, has stimulated a considerable amount of critical comment. The line itself occurs in Triopas' appeal to Poseidon, where he regrets that Apollo had not struck Erysichthon down; that was not the case, however, and, as a result of Demeter's punishment, νῦν δὲ κακὰ βούβρωστις ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσι κάθηται [123]. Βούβρωστις (= 'an ox's ravening appetite', 'an appetite fit to eat an ox') has aroused much discussion[124], but it is the effect of ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσι κάθηται which is of interest here, since it can mean either (a) 'but now accursed Hunger sits in his eyes', (b) 'but now accursed Hunger sits before my eyes', or, in my opinion, both[125].

a) The metaphor of personified passions or emotions sitting in the eyes or in other parts of the body is a common one in Greek poetry[126], and, although there is no exact parallel for hunger situated in the eyes, the image evoked is that of the 'crazed look of yearning which follows gastro-enteric and mesenteric diseases'[127] or in the cases of acute starvation made so familiar by televised news reports. Futhermore, if ἐν ... κάθηται (l.102) is regarded as a tmesis of ἐγκάθηται (= 'lie in ambush',

'lurk')[128] then this adds a menacing overtone of lurking to the ordinary usage.

b) The words can also be construed to read 'but now accursed Hunger sits before my eyes', for ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσι often occurs in the same metrical sedes as an epic formula for 'before one's eyes'[129], although in the majority of instances some indication is given of whose eyes by ἐμοῖς, ἴδωμαι etc. Not so here, however, and the equivocality is reinforced by the grammar of ἦέ νιν αὐτός βόσκε λαβών (Ī.103f), since νιν can refer to αὐτὸν (Erysichthon) or αὐτήν (the disease): by an artistic conceit Erysichthon has now become Ravening Hunger personified[130]. This association has in fact already been foreshadowed in the collection of adjectives in lines 66-67 when Demeter inflicts her punishment, since λιμὸν αἴθωνα is a literary allusion to Erysichthon's 'nickname'. This is mentioned by Lycophron in his typically recondite way in Alexandra 1388-96:

> Οἱ δ' αὖ τέταρτοι τῆς Δυμαντείου σποράς,
> Λακμώνιοί τε καὶ Κυτιναῖοι Κόδροι,
> οἳ θίγρον οἰκήσουσι Σάτνιόν τ' ὄρος,
> καὶ χερσόνησον τοῦ πάλαι λῃτηρίαν
> θεᾷ Κυρίτᾳ πάμπαν ἐστυγημένου,
> τῆς παντομόρφου βασσάρας λαμπούριδος
> τοκῆος, ἥτ' ἀλφαῖσι ταῖς καθ' ἡμέραν
> βούπειναν ἀλθαίνεσκεν ἀκμαίαν πατρός,
> ὀθνεῖα γατομοῦντος Αἴθωνος πτερά. (131).

The pun in the last line of this quotation is explained by the scholia as follows: ὁ δ' Ἐρυσίχθων Αἴθων ἐκαλεῖτο, ὥς φησιν Ἡσίοδος διὰ τὸν λιμόν (132).

Furthermore, Limos was personified in Hes. Th. 227 and was represented in female form in the temple of Apollo at Sparta(133), and there was a statue of Limos as a male(134), along with a complementary one of Euthenia, at Byzantium(135). The logic of Callimachus' thought runs along the lines that Erysichthon is called Aithon because limos is called Aithon, Ravening Hunger, personfied. We may also observe that the relationship between aithon and limos is purely metaphorical and that they have no link apart from in this phrase. So we can see Callimachus playing with the confusion made possible by the conflation of two images in the figure Erysichthon - Aithon, the personification of Ravening Hunger; the goddess' punishment is a terrible disease (μεγάλα δ' ἐστρεύγετο νούσῳ , 1.67), and we are presented with a picture of a man assailed by hunger and disease which ultimately absorb him completely, so that he sits before his father's eyes as personified Hunger(136).

This deliberate blurring of the boundaries between the concrete and the abstract, between the personifications and the things they personify, is a strong feature of Callimachus' writing and says much about the way in which personification was exploited as an artistic device to create specific literary, emotional or intellectual effects, to 'score points', in an artistic environment which demanded such virtuosity from exponents of all art forms(137). Once

again we have an instance of an artist handling personification in a way which is far removed from that which we see, for example, in Hesiod: the figures of Erysichthon - Aithon and Boubrostis are purely creations of the poetic imagination; they have no basis in any religious tradition.

The foregoing argument can be reinforced with another example also drawn from the Hymn to Demeter, where a similar blurring of boundaries occurs at ll.37-39:

> ἧς δέ τις αἴγειρος, μέγα δένδρεον αἰθέρι κῦρον,
> τῷ ἔπι ταὶ νύμφαι ποτὶ τῶνδιον ἐψιόωντο·
> ἃ πράτα πλαγεῖσα κακὸν μέλος ἴαχεν ἄλλαις.

There is a duality between the poplar and the nymph, which again seems quite intentional on the author's part. Ἦν δέ τις is a Homeric formula for introducing a particular person(138), but here it is applied to a tree. Furthermore, the complicated structure of the lines is surely deliberate: l.39 brings both the poplar and the nymph into the action by using ἄλλαις(139), since, despite our natural inclination to supply 'trees' as the missing noun, νύμφαις provides the only strict grammatical agreement given what Callimachus has already said. So νύμφαι, which may well be a reference to the Hamadryads, who were coeval with their trees, makes the exact relationship between nymph and tree difficult to pin down, since sometimes the nymph is the personification of the tree and at other times she has a separate

existence and lives in the vicinity[140]. If, then, the poplar is a metamorphosed nymph, it is reasonable that she should cry out to her companions. This is an artistic ploy which invites comparison with the merging of Athena with her xoanon at the beginning of Callimachus' Hymn 5 Bath of Pallas, and especially with the conceit in Hymn 4 Delos. In this case cities, rivers, mountains etc. have their own divinities who run off as soon as Leto appears in any particular place. However, the upshot of this is a general exodus of localities, so that ultimately there is nowhere left for Apollo to be born. Further in 11.46ff we are informed that Delos, when a wandering island called Asterie, 'swam to the wave-washed maston of the island Parthenie'. Now since mastos can = 'breast' or 'hill', a double image is here made possible through the conceit that the island is a giant nymph lying on her back in the sea with her breasts sticking out of the water. This type of equation of nymph with locality occurs in A.R. Arg. 4.475 in the case of the nymphs of Pelion, and also in the paintings of the Odyssey from the Esquiline, which are copies of second century B.C. originals, where the personifications of pastures, mountains, winds and coasts are shown as small figures on or within the elements they personify[141]: hence wind gods are in the winds and the mountain god lies on his mountain, just as in similar fashion the Orontes swims in its own river on Eutychides' Tyche of Antioch and the cubits of the Nile flood crawl all

over the personification of the Nile[142]. In these cases the landscape dominates the figures, which goes against the Classical solution to the problem whereby the personification is a substitute for landscape, as, for example, when Oenoë's brothers localise the scene on the base of the Nemesis of Rhamnus.

We have now come rather a long way from the specific instance of hybris with which this discussion of Callimachus' Erysichthon story began. That story provides a good vehicle for examining Hellenistic culture, both for us and for Callimachus. He treats the tale with a neo-classicist's slant, using traditional material as a set of conventions, and his refusal to deal with that material as meaningful in its own terms allows him to express the sophisticated (in the full sense of the word) modernism characteristic of Hellenistic poetry. But the moral of the story is clear: hybris incurs the displeasure of Nemesis in her faculty as punisher of excess. The notion of the right measure, transgressed as a result of a deficiency, or excess, of aidos, is familiar from pre-Hellenistic literature; what is new is the consequences of the transgression, which are social rather than religious. This suggests that the workings of Nemesis are seen in a slightly different light, and the way in which the punishment fits the crime reinforces that suggestion.

Another facet of 'Nemesis of the gods' arises out of disregard or disrespect of divine gifts:

pace tua fari hic liceat, Ramnusia virgo[143],
namque ego non ullo vera timore tegam,
nec si me infestis discerpent sidera dictis,
condita quin veri pectoris evolvam

(Catullus 66.71-4)

These lines are derived from Callimachus' Lock of Berenice, where the lock speaks under the correction of Nemesis, whose displeasure she is inviting by her indifference to her new beatitude, because Nemesis punishes excessive praise, especially of mortal things as opposed to divine or immortal ones. If, as seems probable given Callimachus' learning, he knew the myth which made the Telchines the sons of Nemesis, there could be a specific meaning in this mock-heroic invocation of the goddess, the implication being 'with all due respect to the goddess who punishes proud words, and who is the ultimate cause of my being severed from the head of my sovereign, I would still rather be there again than raised to the dignity of a star'.

The sentiment that, when you vaunt yourself over someone else's bad luck, you must expect that Nemesis will bring the same on you, is expressed by Meleager AP 12.33 = HE 4480ff. in an epigram typical of his ingenious blending of the erotic and dedicatory types:

Heraclitus' good looks are on the decline, but this is no reason to gloat:

> Ἦν καλὸς Ἡράκλειτος ὅτ' ἦν ποτέ· νῦν δὲ παρ' ἤβην
> κηρύσσει πόλεμον δέρρις ὀπισθοβάταις.
> ἀλλά Πολυξεινίδη, τάδ' ὁρῶν μὴ γαῦρα φρυάσσου·
> ἔστι καὶ ἐν γλουτοῖς φυομένη Νέμεσις.

We are once again in the sphere of Nemesis of humankind, and the theme of the epigram is quite explicit: overweening behaviour towards humans is just as culpable as misbehaving against the gods, and incurs the punishment of Nemesis. Words as well as actions can be regarded as symptomatic of <u>hybris</u>, and you must be careful in what you say as much as in what you do, and outrageous statements which might challenge or defy Nemesis or her counterpart Adrasteia are frequently toned down by an appeal to one or both of these goddesses. We have already seen this in Callimachus' <u>Lock of Berenice</u>, and we might add the fragment of Menander's <u>Methe</u> where both deities are mentioned in the same breath: Ἀδράστεια καὶ θεὰ σκυθρωπὲ Νέμεσι συγγινώσκετε [144], and the notion of the unpleasantness of Nemesis implied in the use of σκυθρωπὲ is also present in an anonymous Hellenistic epigram <u>AP</u> 12.120 = HE 3776ff. This ends by mentioning both Nemesis and Adrasteia in a context where the author, despite having endured the pangs of love on previous occasions, and despite his confidence in being able to put up with these, summons the vengeance of both deities on an unresponsive <u>eromenos</u>:

καὶ σὺ μὲν, Ἀδρήστεια, κακῆς ἀντάξια βουλῆς
τῖσαι καὶ μακάρων πικροτάτη Νέμεσις.

One further example of an awareness of possible excess on the part of the speaker resulting in an attempt to propitiate Adrasteia comes from Herodas 6.34f. where Coritto, who shows an awareness of the proverbial injunction μὴ μέγα λέγε [145], violation of which was regarded as offensive to Nemesis and/or Adrasteia, covers herself with the words μέζον μὲν ἡ δίκη γρύζω, λάθοιμι δ' Ἀδρήστεια. A rather more direct method of averting the wrath of Nemesis is the apotropaic custom of spitting three times into one's bosom. Thus the Cyclops in Theoc. Id. 6.39 spits three times into his breast to turn away evil after he has admired his own reflection in the sea, and Theophrastus' superstitious man shudders and spits εἰς κόλπον whenever he sees a madman or epileptic[146]. An anonymous Hellenistic epigram, sometimes attributed to Meleager, AP 16.251, also shows Eros punished through Nemesis, spitting into his bosom:

Πτανῷ πτανὸν Ἔρωτα τίς ἀντίον ἔπλασ' Ἔρωτι;
ἃ Νέμεσις, τόξῳ τόξον ἀμυνομένα,
ὥς νε πάθῃ τά γ' ἔρεξεν· ὁ δὲ θρασύς, ὁ πρὶν ἀταρβής,
δακρύει, πικρῶν γευσάμενος βελέων.
ἐς δὲ βαθὺν τρὶς κόλπον ἀπέπτυσεν. ἃ μέγα θαῦμα·
φλέξει τις πυρὶ πῦρ· ἥψατ' Ἔρωτος Ἔρως.

So as a deity closely connected with the idea of the right measure in the moral sphere, Nemesis is brought into operation by violations of those limits which define what is within the bounds of right and what is

not. Whether Nemesis acts against excessive words or excessive deeds, and whether those words and deeds are directed against the gods or one's fellow mortals, makes no difference to the way the process works: Nemesis punishes excess, and try as one might to propitiate her with apotropaic words or actions she is still ever watchful, ever ready to record one's misdeeds in writing. The evidence we have surveyed suggests that these apotropaic practices were common in the Hellenistic era but certainly not unique to it, and this further emphasises the continuity with the previous eras embodied in the figure of Nemesis.

In the context of this discussion of the Nemesis of man - and womankind and Nemesis and <u>hybris</u>, the circumstances surrounding the foundation of a shrine of Nemesis at Alexandria[147] at the very end of the Hellenistic period, shed a good deal of light on the way the goddess was perceived around this time. The Nemeseion in question was erected on the spot where Caesar allowed the head of Pompey to be interred following the treacherous murder of the latter as he walked ashore at Alexandria in 48 B.C.[148]. It seems likely that Caesar himself founded the shrine[149], and the career of Pompey forms a prime example of a man falling from a great pinnacle of power to a highly lamentable end which could easily be taken as a manifestation of Nemesis' power; the epigram <u>AP</u> 9.402 = FGE 2182 indeed shows that this was in fact how things were

seen: τῷ ναοῖς βρίθοντι πόση σπάνις ἔπλετο τύμβου [150].
M. Rostovtzeff argues that the significance of the shrine is that Pompey was crushed because of his hybris in starting the Civil War, and because of his demise war was tranformed into peace and Nemesis became the protecting goddess of peace, the Nemesis-Pax ((1926) 25); Perdrizet ((1912) 257) suggests the Alexandrians were flattering Caesar by making Pompey the type of the hybristes; it has also been surmised that the Nemeseion commemorates the vengeance exacted by Nemesis on the assassins[151], or alternatively that by his sudden death Pompey became one of the aoroi and biothanatoi who are considered victims of Nemesis and that, since Pompey was blameless when he met his fate, he had the right to the revenge which Nemesis would exact for him on his assassin[152]. Thus there appears to be no simple solution to this problem, if indeed there is one at all, for it may be that all these, and other, different aspects of Nemesis ran concurrently, and that individual worshippers would emphasise whatever aspect of Nemesis was important to them given their specific individual needs and beliefs.

So alongside the more ancient focal points of the cult of Nemesis at Smyrna and Rhamnus we can see a newer centre of worship developing at Alexandria in the later Hellenistic era, with the result that Egypt emerges as an important point from which the worship

of Nemesis was diffused. Evidence for this diffusion comes in the form of a group of three dedicatory inscriptions made to Isis-Nemesis on delos by Sosion, priest of Sarapis, in 110/9 B.C.[153]. The fact that Sosion was an Athenian, and that Delos was under Athenian control at the time, has led some scholars to view this syncretism as a fusion of the Attic cult of the Nemesis of Rhamnus with the Egyptian cult of Isis occurring in the second century B.C. specifically at Delos, with the Egyptian element being introduced by Alexandrian merchants[154]. However this hypothesis is not plausible, since the Isis-Nemesis syncretism was already established in Egypt before this time[155]; the goddess is more likely to have been introduced as a complete entity. Thus syncretism, which is a salient feature of Hellenistic religion and which is doubtless deeply affected by the historical events of the era, can be seen to be a further point to consider when looking at the way in which Nemesis developed. Although the Alexandrian cult appears to have taken over the forms of the Smyrnaean cult in the first instance[156], it did not remain unchanged, since elements of the ancient Egyptian religion penetrated the conceptual sphere of the Greek goddess[157]. This is a major factor in the development of Nemesis in the Hellenistic age: the atmosphere of the era, which was so receptive to the syncretism of Hellenistic Greek, Egyptian and Oriental deities, was very conducive to the establishment of new trends which resulted in

Nemesis gaining new functions and attributes. Nemesis is not the same at the end of the Hellenistic era as she was at its beginning, and this must surely be due largely to the social conditions of the times: Nemesis had to develop in order to survive.

c) Nemesis and Jealousy

Nemesis does not only punish hybris, however, and I shall now move on to discuss the question of jealousy, which is attributed to Nemesis as one of her personality traits. This characteristic comes into force at a stage when the concept of Nemesis is already well developed(158), but it is unclear when precisely this feature of her personality came into existence, except for the fact that she seems to be characterised by jealousy by the beginning of the Imperial period, whereas she was not in the Classical era. The obvious inference is, therefore, that the development took place during the course of the Hellenistic age, and I intend to argue precisely that. Furthermore, if my findings are correct, they will enable us to draw some interesting conclusions not just about Nemesis in particular, but about Hellenistic religion in general.

By the time we arrive at the start of the Imperial period the main motivating force behind the goddess' interference in the world was regarded not, as it had been in former times, necessarily as the process of

order, right and equilibrium, but as envy, spite and fickleness[159]. If we approach the matter from the psychological point of view we can account for the shift in emphasis in the conception of Nemesis' actions quite easily: suffering people can easily impute their punishment, be this deserved or otherwise in their eyes or anyone else's, merely to the moods of fate or, more specifically, to the envy of Nemesis. She picks on them because she is jealous. Thus we can detect a radical departure from the conception of Nemesis as a high ethical force, and the arrival of a newer, more mundane, factor in her motives. The shift is away from order and disorder, overstepping the mark, as a basis for Nemesis' operation, towards sheer jealousy. This should be qualifed slightly, however, for the notion of excess still applies: there is still a point which you have to exceed before you incur her displeasure, but now her displeasure is manifested in her jealousy as opposed to the more detached aspect of her reactions in previous times: unpleasant she may have been, but never jealous. As a result of this process, Nemesis became the capricious , jealous daimon whose delight in overthrow has by now become familiar from the literary and monumental evidence. This invites speculation as to whether this trait can be seen as an offshoot, or even as a direct result, of her relationship with Tyche, with whom we more usually associate such characteristics; as the two deities are increasingly assimilated to one another they begin to

share each other's functions and attributes, and Nemesis may well have picked up her capricious aspect, which is closely linked to her jealousy, from Tyche. We must still be careful to emphasise that, however erratically Nemesis is held to behave, she always remains essentially a force of order, since the process of excess leading to transgression leading to punishment which restores the original state of affairs remains the same, regardless of the motivating factors.

If we introduce a 'quasi-Hellenistic' note, we can say that, in the light of the evidence we have seen so far, it is understandable why Tibullus, described by F. Cairns (1979) as 'a Hellenistic poet at Rome', called his mistress Nemesis. She is presented as a 'dura puella', compared in harshness with the implacable goddess whose name she bears, described as driven by greed, frequently going back on her word and ready to let the poet feel the full force of her temper and moods(160).

Is, then, this shift in emphasis in Nemesis' personality a symptom of what Nietzsche regarded as the poisonous Alexandrian spirit, the corrupt Alexandrian theorizing, that destroyed myth by exegesis and believed 'that the world can be corrected through knowledge and that life should be guided by science', the perpetrator of which was 'Alexandrian

man, who is at bottom a librarian and a corrector of proofs'[161]? Certainly there must be a strong link between Hellenistic society and the way in which it chose to conceive the manner in which Nemesis operates, but the changes in Nemesis are surely the result of similar factors to those which brought Tyche and Kairos to the fore: in an era whose political and military history is characterized by the rise and fall of individuals on a fairly drastic scale, it is not surprising that people should seek to explain such events in terms of chance, the envy of the gods, or, more specifically, the jealousy of Nemesis. Moreover, the way in which, for example, Callimachus, in the Hymns, and Apollonius, in the Argonautica, depict the gods, bringing them into the realms of the everyday contemporary world and characterizing them as 'ordinary' human individuals, forms, at least at the intellectual end of society, part of the same process: if the Olympians can be thought of as being 'like us', it is not surprising that to a force such as Nemesis should be ascribed such a human attribute as jealousy. Also the link with Tyche may well be significant, since, given the close relationship of Nemesis and Tyche, which eventually grows to almost complete identification, it is reasonable to assume that the former may well have picked up her capricious aspect from the latter. Their spheres of operation overlap in as much as both can destroy prosperity, riches, happiness and so on; the process is the same, so it

seems reasonable that the motives ascribed can also be the same.

d) Nemesis and Eros

Another specifically Hellenistic aspect of Nemesis is her appearance in the sphere of love, since she is not fully felt as an erotic force until the Alexandrian era[162]. This adds a further factor to consider in our 'extension - newness' scale. 'Beauty and the bizarre', the erotic and the grotesque, are two distinctive features of Hellenistic art, and in the light of the penchant for the former it is unsurprising that Nemesis should enter the realms of Eros and Aphrodite. Lovers invoke her against the arrogance of the beloved ones in what is really a sub-group of the hybris category; often the plea is for 'like fate for like fate', whilst the other main theme is that of growing old before one's time.

Eros thus appears as a vehicle of Nemesis (as again in this sphere Nemesis does not do her own 'dirty work'). Through this association with the world of the erótic, Nemesis also moves into the sphere of superstition: by means of magic formulae the general Nemesis is reduced, in this particular context, to a specific Nemesis of love: unrequited passion hopes for consolation through vengeance and retribution, so again Nemesis' appearance in this area can be seen as symptomatic of the era.

Prior to the Hellenistic age, Nemesis does not seem to have been involved in the sphere of the erotic to the same extent, or in the same way. In numerous instances in Hellenistic literature the lover calls on the goddess against inflexible, shy or unyielding boys or girls, so that she might punish their arrogance in rejecting his or her advances. The unlucky lover especially seems to desire that the unmerciful beloved might soon be stricken with a similar fate, and in this respect Nemesis is often invoked in her capacity as the punisher of hybris generally. This is an interesting inversion, presumably governed by the genre, of the more familiar view, which found legal expression in Attic law in a specific offence called 'hybris', which regards the man who has strong sexual appetites and who is more persistent in his pursuit of satisfaction than society regarded as acceptable, as the hybristes, whilst his counterpart, who tends to stop and think before acting in accordance with his own short term desires, is regarded as sophron. Clearly it is a question of perspective, dictated by self-interest, as to whether the erastes or the eromenos is considered to be the hybristes. There is, however, a slight difference in emphasis between these two angles; the view which considers the erastes the hybristes includes a notion of transgression of norms and boundaries which the eromenos - as - erastes view appears to omit. Both include hybris, but only the former includes the notion of the right measure.

In the Hellenistic epigrams AP 12.160 = HE 3776ff and AP 16.251, unlucky lovers console themselves in their anguish with thoughts on the power of Nemesis which, by the agency of Eros, the standoffish beloved will soon experience. In the first of these the words κακῆς ἀντάξια βουλῆς τῖσαι καὶ μακάρων πικροτάτη Νέμεσις refer to the eromenos' refusal to gratify the author and a punishment presumably along the lines of the one usually threatened in such circumstances, namely that the boy in question should himself be the victim of unrequited love. Such must be the sentiment behind Theocritus Id. 7.118f, where the author asks the Erotes to βάλλετε μοι τόξοισι τὸν ἱμερόεντα Φιλῖνον, βάλλετ', ἐπεὶ τὸν ξεῖνον ὁ δύσμορος οὐκ ἐλεεῖ μευ. The meaning of this command must be, as Gow ad loc. points out, 'make Philinus himself the victim of unrequited passion', rather than 'make him love Aratus'. Theocritus himself says that in the Golden Age ἀντεφίλησ' ὁ φιληθείς, but the passion between Aratus and Philinus cannot be reciprocal in this instance. The notion of ὁ ἐρώμενος becoming ὁ ἐρῶν is a commonly occuring motif(163), and the interpretation is confirmed by the context in which Theocritus introduces it, since Byblis and Oecus, from which the Erotes are summoned, are connected only with an unhappy love-affair(164), so the choice of these places would not have been apt if the object were to unite Philinus and Aratus. AP 16.251 purports to describe a plastic work of art which depicts the

punishment of a weeping Eros by a second Eros and Nemesis. Here is a scene of reciprocal punishment dealt out in exactly identical fashion : Eros is tortured, at Nemesis' command, in the way in which he usually tortures others. We are immediately reminded of the scene on the wall painting from Pompeii in which Psyche is tortured by three Erotes as Nemesis looks on: the epigram almost entirely reverses that scene. A further connection between Eros and Nemesis is implied in a beautiful carnelian in the Lewis collection which Schweitzer ((1931) 201) identified as a love-gift and which dates from the Hellenistic period(165). On it is depicted the upper half of Nemesis' body, making her customary gesture towards her clothing with her right hand and holding a branch in her left; the meaning seems to be, then, that the recipient of the gift is expected to obtain the goodwill of the goddess by gratifying the desires of the donor.

The punishment which Nemesis inflicts, or is asked to inflict, on the hard-hearted beloved consists either in that a similar unrequited passion will befall the eromenos, just as earlier he or she disdained the love shown towards him or her, or that he or she will grow old before his or her time, thereby undergoing a corresponding loss in beauty. In AP 12.33 = HE 4480ff Meleager warns Polyxeinides that he ought to master his delight at the news that his rival Heraclitus has lost his

good looks, and a later anonymous epigram shows us how anyone who prides herself on reaching lovers will bring down Nemesis in the form of old age and misery: here a one-time demi-mondaine is reduced to the more mundane household tasks of weaving to earn her livelihood:

> Ἡ τὸ πρὶν αὐχήσασα πολυχρύσοις ἐπ' ἐρασταῖς,
> ἡ Νέμεσιν δεινὴν οὐχὶ κύσασα θεῶν
> μίσθια νῦν σπαθίοις πενιχροῖς πηνίσματα κρούει.
> ὀψὲ γ' Ἀθηναίη Κύπριν ἐληίσατο.
>
> (AP 6.283 = HE 3818ff.)

When the beauty of a boy or girl goes unacknowledged Nemesis can inflame the guilty party with desire for the aggrieved party, and Meleager's epigram AP 12.141 = HE 4510ff powerfully tells the person who disparaged Tharon's good looks 'you are in love with him; that's revenge for all your rash talk':

> τοιγάρ ἰδού, τὸν πρόσθε λάλον προὔθηκεν ἰδέσθαι
> δεῖγμα θρασυστομίης ἡ βαρύφρων Νέμεσις.
>
> (AP 12.141 5-6)

The attitude of denying someone's good qualities is here seen as an interference in the natural order of things and hence punishable by Nemesis or Adrasteia. Meleager's work is a variation of another Hellenistic epigram by an anonymous author writing in the style of Callimachus(166); here the writer, who has criticized Archestratus' beauty, is punished by Nemesis and falls passionately in love with him, and asks 'shall I ask

Archestratus for his favours, or Nemesis to release me from my passion?'

Τὸν καλὸν ὡς ἰδόμαν Ἀρχέστρατον, οὐ μὰ τὸν Ἑρμᾶν,
οὐ καλὸν αὐτὸν ἔφαν· οὐ γὰρ ἄγαν ἐδόκει.
εἶπα, καὶ ἁ Νεμεσίς με συνάρπασε, κεὐθὺς ἐκείμαν
ἐν πυρί, παῖς δ' ἐπ' ἐμοὶ Ζεὺς ἐκεραυνοβόλει.
τὸν παῖδ' ἰλασθόμεσθ', ἢ τὰν θεόν; ἀλλὰ θεοῦ μοι
ἐστιν ὁ παῖς κρέσσων· χαιρέτω ἁ Νέμεσις.

(AP 12.140 = HE 3712ff.[167])

Thus we have encountered another definitive aspect of Nemesis which is peculiar to the Hellenistic age. New literary themes dictate that even a figure with so well-defined a history as Nemesis should be adapted to serve the needs of the genre. We are not witnessing complete alteration or innovation, however, but rather the adaptation of Nemesis' existing aspects to fit new contexts; love poetry, in the Hellenistic period, provides an especially suitable theatre in which Nemesis can exhibit her powers of revenge, punishment of hybris, enforcement of the right measure, and poetic justice. Thoughtless pride in love-affairs brings vengeance on itself: Nemesis is the grey hair of premature ageing of arrogant beauties; she punishes Eros himself, and, since the punishment fits the crime, she is the instigator of the pangs of love. By the Hellenistic period Nemesis has well and truly entered the domain of Cypris and Eros and appears as a third deity of love.

e) Nemesis and Tyche

We have already seen numerous examples of the way in which Nemesis comes into operation when someone has too much (good) luck; an excess of tyche distorts the natural order of things which Nemesis acts to restore: moral considerations are not necessarily an essential factor. Tyche creates abrupt changes of circumstances which Nemesis finds unacceptable; the result is the paradox that agathe tyche can in fact be a bad thing. Accordingly people pray to Nemesis to appease her. We have also seen how Fortuna/Tyche and Nemesis can exhibit a direct equation between each other in their actions and iconographies, and I intend to show that this is a process which has its roots in the Hellenistic period since they are already linked in the thought of that era, especially in thought of Stoic persuasion. One reason for the process of assimilation of Nemesis and Tyche may be the attempts by philosophers of the Hellenistic age to bring Nemesis into the framework of a specific system. Such at any rate was the procedure of the Stoic Cornutus in his treatise entitled Summary of the Traditions Concerning Greek Mythology, in which, mainly following Chrysippus, he expounds the principles of Stoic criticism of the myths in terms of the allegorical method. In the thirteenth chapter of this work he includes Nemesis amongst the gods and goddesses of Fate, and groups Zeus, Aisa, Heimarmene, Ananke, and the three Morai with Tyche and Opis in such a way as

to place Nemesis between the Moirai and Tyche[168]. Thus their similarity as deities of Fate is explicitly acknowledged in Hellenistic philosophy.

Another aspect to consider when assessing the development and assimilation of Nemesis and Tyche in the Hellenistic period is that both goddesses can be tutelary deities of cities: city Tychai are a common phenomenon in the wake of Eutychides' influential Tyche of Antioch, while city Nemeseis have a longer history, at least at Smyrna, where they too acted as guardian deities of the city. This parallelism in their functions again illustrates just how closely their conceptual spheres can interact.

If we accept that philosophical thought of the Alexandrian era has some degree of influence on the way in which Nemesis and Tyche evolved, it is important to notice that the powers and functions of Nemesis were sufficiently adaptable to amalgamate with those of Tyche or Fortuna without the mediation of the philosophers. We have only to consider the enormous influence which we have seen that the belief in Nemesis had on people's activities at that time: at every juncture people are on their guard against this goddess who follows in their footsteps; their whole life and prosperity can be dependent on her activities; all bad luck can be seen as punishment meted out by her, and in view of this it is hardly

surprising to see her associated with Tyche. This mixing up of the two deities is given plastic expression in the attribute of the wheel, and although, as I have argued previously, this attribute has opposite symbolic meanings for the two goddesses, the 'Fate' idea is clear enough. As far as the iconography is concerned, the Smyrnaean statues seem to have been the model used most frequently, despite the fact that Agoracritus' Nemesis of Rhamnus was copied in Roman times and that Romans such as Varro travelled to Rhamnus to see it(169). Clearly the relationship between Nemesis' qualities and her attributes is a key factor in the way in which she develops and in her links with other deities: the attributes express and symbolize the qualities, and this makes the precedence of the Smyrnaean model over the Rhamnusian one in the sphere of art, and in literature purporting to describe Nemesis in a visual way, understandable.

f) Nemesis and the Agon

From her function as donor of victory, as implied by the Nike figures on the stephanos on the Rhamnus cult-statue, she gradually came to fulfil the role of patroness of competitions(170). The origin of her activity as a bringer of victory may lie at Rhamnus or at Smyrna(171), but there can be no doubt as to her significance to athletes, gladiators, beast fighters and in the circus generally, and in fact we have

already seen how closely she is linked with contests in the story of the origin of the Rhamnusian cult-statue. Nemesis, as Volkmann((1928)317) argues, is a goddess who both triumphs and punishes, and as such, although she brings victory, she is also feared in case she intervenes in negative fashion at the last minute, or even after the event; once again we are entering the realms of her jealousy. I will also attempt to show that the development of Nemesis as an 'agonal' figure takes place to a great extent in the Hellenistic period. Once again we are faced with the same methodological problems that were encountered when looking at her jealousy; the bulk of the evidence is post-Hellenistic, even though the overall picture is one of the characteristic being present in embryo from a very early date on reaching full fruition by the Roman period - all the signs of this development occurring in the Hellenistic era are present.

Volkmann((1928) 320f) holds the opinion that Nemesis initially became a 'Kampfgöttin' at Rhamnus and Smyrna, directing and ruling over her own agones there, before encroaching upon foreign agones in the same capacity at a later stage. This is unlikely; Herter ((1935) 2372f) cogently argues that, in cases where there was no special contest for Nemesis to make specifically her own, it is possible that such a punishing and equalizing deity would obtain some degree of significance in an area where individual

strength and skill are so dependent on a higher power for their success. Her first appearance as a goddess of the gymnasium dates from the early Hellenistic period where, in the third century B.C., she assumes this role at Miletus[172]. This is crucial: here are the first indications of the development of an aspect of the goddess which is not nearly so heavily emphasised in Classical times but which comes to full fruition in the early Roman Imperial period. Schweitzer ((1931) 212) believes that this process took place in the Hellenistic age and I concur[173]. I have endeavoured to show how the corresponding developments in her jealousy, in her erotic function, and in her connection with Tyche, illustrate that she was gradually moving away from Classical conceptions into a new sphere of influence more suited to the society of the day, although we must qualify this by observing that the roots of the development can be traced back to factors which were present before the Hellenistic period. Thus the aspects of equilibrium, and preservation and restoration of order, remain, whilst the motif of jealousy, either of Nemesis herself or of your rival or fellow competitors, creeps in and establishes itself in an area of life where her force was particularly felt by those who were closely involved with it. We might notice that Kairos and Tyche are also prominent in this sphere, so, in view of the close association between Nemesis and Tyche, which, as we have seen, gets closer as the period goes

on, it is perhaps not surprising that Nemesis should assume a new and powerful role in this domain. Competition is one area in which order can easily be distorted, say by excessive good fortune or by a long series of victories(174), and one which, by its very nature, invites arrogance in the victors and jealousy and desire for revenge in the losers. So it is clearly intelligible why Nemesis should be as important as Kairos (when applied to the seizing of opportunities) and Tyche (when applied to the vagaries of fortune) in this field. Their connection is in part attested by the fact that there was an altar of Kairos near to the krypte of the Stadium at Olympia(175), whilst two statues of Nemesis - Tyche, the σταδίοισιν ἐπίσκοπος (176), also stood before the krypte as a promise of good luck, as well as a warning against arrogance and wickedness(177). This association between Nemesis and Nike is therefore indicative of another shift in emphasis in Nemesis' functions as she is adapted to meet the needs and conditions of a changing world.

g) Summary

We have now traced the course of Nemesis' evolution through four main channels, namely her erotic aspect, her jealous personality, her association with Tyche, and her appearance in the world of competitions. The basic feature of all these lines of development is that Nemesis acquires aspects which are present in her

make-up right from the start, but which develop fully throughout the Hellenistic period, as a result of various social, philosophical, literary, artistic and religious factors, and reach full fruition in the Roman Imperial period. The feature which binds these disparate strands together seems to be that of the right measure, in as much as Nemesis begins to operate when the limits defining what is ordered and what is right are violated. Thus we are not witnessing wholesale innovation on the part of the people of the Hellenistic world, but more an extension of Nemesis' already existing aspects. Whether these transgressions are directed against gods, mortals or the dead, whether they come in the realms of love, politics, or contests, and whether or not there is a strong moral reason behind Nemesis' action, the process is always the same: she punishes excess, very often in a manner which fits the crime. We have seen that there is some degree of tension between her actions in literature and art, in that she tends to operate by means of some other agency in literature, whereas in art she can perform her deeds in person; this, I argued, was due to the differences of medium, in that it is problematical for visual artists to portray Nemesis working via some other means, and this is surely the reason behind the iconographical absence of Nemesis' jealousy. The establishment of a third influential cult-centre in Alexandria, from whose trade-routes her worship could diffuse, is also a crucial factor in

assessing her development, especially when we consider her association with Isis. The scope of this chapter has been to show how, why, and in what degree Nemesis has developed in the Hellenistic era, and thereby to allow the figures of Kairos and Tyche to appear in a more clearly defined context; in doing this I have endeavoured to point out the more-or-less parallel evolution of the goddess in her cult, her jealousy, her erotic aspect, her assimilation to Tyche, and her importance in the sphere of the contest, and to show that these seemingly unrelated areas are all tied to her function of restoring order. I have argued that the process was complete by the Roman Imperial period, but I would like to conclude this chapter with an example from the twentieth century A.D. of how Nemesis' influence can still persist:

There was a porter
who had ideas
high above his railway station
always causing righteous indignation

he wanted to be
giant amongst men
saviour come again tò earth
but his teachings only met with mirth

one bright winters morn
packed in his job
believed the world needed him
dedicated his life to fighting sin

the second day out
crossing the road
apparently in Stockport town
a diesel lorry swerved and knocked him down

back at the station
all the porters
wore mourning masks on their faces
and all agreed he should have stuck to cases
(Roger McGough, 'Kyrie' (1976)).

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

1. Hesiod and Aeschylus (New York 1949) 81 n 18.

2. Cf. J.-P. Vernant Myth and Society in Ancient Greece (Brighton 1980) 94, 104.

3. See G. Murray The Rise of the Greek Epic (Oxford 1924) 82ff; Wilamowitz (1931) I.365 n. I.

4. See O. Kern Die Religion der Griechen (Berlin 1926) 255f; cf. Hamdorf (1964) 35f, 96f.

5. With this passage cf. also Hom Il 11.649; Thgn. 1135ff. See also Aristotle, who regards Nemesis as the personification of a concept half-way between phthonos and epichairekakia, just as aidos, sophrosyne and dikaion are mid-points between polar opposites (EE 1221 a 1ff; EN 1108 b 1ff; MM 1192 b 18ff; Rh. 1386 b 9ff). This emphasises nemesis' connection with forces of order and the right measure, in that nemesis comes midway between envy and malice, and is the feeling of pain at undeserved adversities and prosperities, and of pleasure at those that are deserved: διὸ καὶ θεὸν οἴονται εἶναι τὴν νέμεσιν (EE 1233 b 27).

6. Cf. Phaedra's dilemma which we encountered when discussing Kairos.

7. See K. Kerenyi The Religion of the Greeks and Romans (London 1962) 118ff.

8. Plu. Aem. 34-36; cf. D.S. xxx.11.2. For Aemilius Paullus' triumph as part of a series of tragic reversals in the fortune of States and persons see Walbank (1979) ad xxix.21.1-9. cf. G.J.D. Aalders (1979).

9. Plu. Aem. 36.6.

10. Cf. Hdt. i.32.1; Arist. Mu. 400 b 27f; Versnel (1980) 164.

11. See L. Gernet 'Value in Greek myth' in R.L. Gordon (ed.) Myth, religion and society. Structuralist essays by M. Detienne, L. Gernet, J.-P. Vernant and P. Vidal-Naquet (Cambridge 1981) 111-146 at p. 123.

12. A Commentary on Herodotus with Introduction and Appendices (Oxford 1912) ad i.32.1.

13. See the discussions of Herter (1935) 2365; Volkmann (1928) 310-12; E. Rohde (1925) I.236 n. 1; Rossbach (1897-1902) 27-30.

14. It has been suggested that the Nemeseia was just a special Attic name for a more universal Nekusia, but this, as H. Posnansky (1890) 29 points out, is unlikely. Equally unlikely is August Mommsen's theory that the Nemeseia was 'without doubt' identical with the Geneseia (Heortologie. Antiquarische Untersuchungen über die städtischen Feste der Athener (Leipzig 1864) 109. Cf. L. Preller, C. Robert, Griechische Mythologie (Berlin 1894) I.438), and the solution of Rohde (1925) I. 136 n. 1, who argues that the name nemeseia characterizes it as a festival dedicated to the 'wrath' of the dead, seems more plausible. (See also H.W. Parke Festivals of the Athenians (London 1977) 53f; L. Deubner Attische Feste (Berlin 1932) 230). He is also probably right to argue that as the cult of the dead, like the cult of the underworld in general, is usually apotropaic in nature (placantur sacrificiis ne nocerent Serv. Aen. iii.663), then the Nemeseia must have been apotropaic also. This would certainly square with the instances of apotropaic customs used in connection with Nemesis which we will encounter below.

15. Cf. the Orphic Hymn to Nemesis line 9:
ἐν σοὶ δ' εἰσὶ δικαὶ θνητῶν, πανυπέρτατε δαῖμον.

16. See P.M. Fraser (1977) 35f, fig. 97, and the refs. at n. 197.

17. 'Relief von dem Grabmal eines Rhodischen Schulmeisters' Hermes xxxvii (1902) 121-43. Cf. Fraser (1977) 35f.

18. Schol. Lycophron 88; Schol. Call. Dian 232; Ausonius Epigr. 66.

19. Apollod. 3.10,7. Cf. J.D.Beazley (1947b) 39-42, 115f.

20. Cf. Posnansky (1890) 7ff.

21. Dating the play accurately is problematical (see F.R.B. Godolphin 'The Nemesis of Cratinus' CPh xxvi (1931) 423f) but Frs. 110K and 112K suggest that it was written in the first years of the Peloponnesian War. Cf. IG II/III² 2323,200 for evidence of a second century B.C. comedy also called Nemesis.

22. Eratosth. Cat. 25; CAF I frs 107-120. For the temple at Rhamnus see A.-C. Orlandos 'Note sur la sanctuaire de Némésis a Rhamnonte' BCH 48 (1924) 305-20.

23. E.g. fr. 111K.

24. Cf. fr. 107 which refers to an ὄρνιθα μέγαν.

25. Paus. i.33.2f.

26. Paus. i.32.2; Pliny HN 36.17; Zenobius V.82; Suda s.v. Ῥαμνουσία ; M. Robertson (1975) 351ff.

27. Pliny HN 36.17.

28. See n.26 above.

29. See e.g. Posnansky (1890) 95; Farnell (1896) 491; Robertson (1975) 351, who argues that the inconspicuous signature may be historical, since Zenobius claims the Hellenistic art - historian Antigonus of Carystus, who was probably one of Pliny's sources, as his authority.

30. For the phiale see e.g. F.M. Snowden Blacks in Antiquity: Ethiopians in the Greco-Roman Experience (Cambridge Mass. 1970) 148f; D.E. Strong Greek and Roman Gold and Silver Plate (London 1966) 97f; N.M. Kontoleon, 'The Gold Treasure of Panagurischte,' Balkan Studies III (1962) 185-200.

    For the widespread tradition of just, righteous and pious Aethiopians see e.g. Hom. Il. 1.423f; Hes. Fr. 40 A (Loeb 604,11.15-19); Hdt. 2.137; 2.139; D.S. 1.60.2-5; 1.65.1-8, and esp. 3.2.2 - 3.3.1; Heliodorus Aethiopica 9.26; Dionysius 'Periegetes' Orbis Descriptio 559-561 GCM III 139; Stob. 4.2.25; Lactantius Placidus Commentarii in Thebaida 5.427 (in R. Jahnke's ed. (Leipzig 1898) 284).

    Kontoleon op. cit. 200 also regards the Aethiopians, who inhabit both the East and West ends of the earth, as symbolic of Nemesis' pervasive influence over the entire world.

31. B.M. no. 460.

32. Cf. Schefold (1971).

33. E.g. Copenhagen Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek 304a; Athens Nat. Mus. 3949. For a full reconstruction see Despinis (1971) pl.I-IV; Schefold (1971) pl.I.

34. The framing of scenes with local personifications also occurs e.g. on the East Pediment of the temple of Zeus at Olympia and on the West pediment of the Parthenon. These personifications are local to the place where the works of art stood and also give a setting to the events depicted. The delivery of the egg of Leda, and its hatching out, would have taken place at Sparta, but the foster-mother's introduction of Helen to her real mother Nemesis may well have taken place at Rhamnus, at least in the Attic story of this time.

35. Athens Nat. Mus. 203 and 205-214. See B.G. Callipolitis (1980).

36. Stockholm Nationalmuseum 150. See Robertson (1975) 353 and pl.118 c; Callipolitis 76ff.

37. See Callipolitis (1980) pl.7. α and pl. 9. α - στ.

38. Cypr. fr. VII 5-6.

39. Rossbach (1897-1902) 119 is surely right in rejecting Wilamowitz's contention ('Die Beiden Elektren' Hermes xviii (1883) 261 n. 1) that the Cypria story had its origins at Rhamnus.

Eratosthenes Cat. 25 mentions Rhamnus but not the Cypria, which itself leaves it vague as to where the rape of Nemesis occurred. Neither does the fact that Cratinus follows the Cypria in his comedy Nemesis, which is set in Rhamnus, prove the connection between the Cypria and Rhamnus, since he clearly knew there was a well-established cult and temple of the goddess in his local area. It is equally unlikely that the cult statue of the temple was inspired by the Cypria, since references to the egg and the swan are lacking. Still, the scene of Leda bringing Helen to Nemesis on the base of the statue probably forms part of the same tradition which the author of the Cypria followed, and further emphasises Nemesis' firm basis within that tradition.

40. Paus. vii.5.1ff.

41. Hdt. i.16.

42. J.M. Cook 'Old Smyrna, 1949 - 1951' BSA 53-54 (1958-59) 25-27, though see Schweitzer (1931) 202.

43. Themis (Assen 1956) 70-71.

44. i.33.7.

45. BMC Coins Ionia pl. 26.17; 29.14. Posnansky (1890) figs. 7,8.

46. BMC Coins Ionia pl.29.9; Posnansky (1890) fig.2; Head (1911) 594.

47. BMC Coins Ionia pl.29.16; Posnansky (1890) fig.3; Head (1911) 594.

48. BMC Coins Ionia pl.39.2

49. BMC Coins Alexandria 120 pl.3.

50. La Collection Sabouroff, Monuments de l'art grec (Berlin 1881) Excurs. to pl.72 p. 16; Posnansky (1890) 64.

51. BMC Coins Ionia 249 pl.29.6.

52. See Rossbach (1897 - 1902) 145.

53. E.g. on the Neo-Attic Stele in the Palazzo Chigi, Rome, known as the Chigi Crater. This depicts a weeping Eros standing on an altar against which is leant a burning torch. Behind his back he holds a butterfly over the torch (a common motif for the sufferings of Psyche). On the left, behind Eros, in a long, sleeveless chiton with archaic side-folds, with her head tilted forward

slightly, stands Nemesis, holding the border of her dress to the height of her neck with her right hand; in her left is a branch with oblong shaped fruit. On the right stands Elpis holding a flower in her raised right hand and a small twig in her left. See C. Walz (1852) title page; Posnansky (1890) 122; Rossbach (1897-1902) 156 and fig.5. Cf. also a red jasper in the British Museum on which a winged Nemesis, holding her robe with her right hand and an apple branch in her left, stands on a vehicle drawn by a large snake (BMC Gems 138 no. 1141; Posnansky (1890) 166 and fig. 40). There is also a version of the Zeus and Nemesis story where Zeus woos her in the form of a snake (schol. Clem. Al. Protr. 2.37.2).

54. Fig. 22. Cf. BMC Coins Ionia pl.26.8

55. F.G. Welcker Griechische Götterlehre (Göttingen 1857-1863) iii.34; Posnansky (1890) 61-62; H. Usener 'Dreiheit' Rh.Mus. 58 (1903) 190; T.G. Rosenmeyer 'Eros-Erotes' Phoenix 5 (1951)11-22.

56. Cf. Shapiro (1977) 85.

57. Cf. also the female votary on an archaic marble relief, Berlin, Staatliche Museen inv. 731, who holds a lotus bud in her right hand, and the archaic bronze statuette from Sparta, Berlin, Staatliche Museen 7933, who also holds a lotus bud to her right shoulder. (G.M.A. Richter Korai Archaic Greek Maidens (London 1968) 59 no. 92, fig.288 and p.60 no. 100, figs. 306-308). Cf. the engraved gem in the Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge, dating from the fourth century B.C., signed by Dexamenos, which features a toilet scene depicting an Athenian lady who raises the corner of her veil with her left hand (J.H. Middleton The Engraved Gems of Classical Times with a Catalogue of the Gems in the Fitzwilliam Museum (Cambridge 1891) 28ff and appendix p.viif. with pl.1.H.). Cf. also Elpis on the Chigi Crater, Asia on the Apulian volute crater, Naples Nat. Mus. H 3252 (81947), and the warrior's wife on the red-figure stamnos by the Cleophon painter in the Staatliche Antikensammlungen, Munich (2415. Beazley (1963) p.1143 no. 2.).

58. A. Furtwängler La Collection Sabouroff, Monuments de l'art grec (Berlin 1882) Excurs. to pl.72, p.16; Posnansky (1890) 104f.

59. See e.g. Posnansky (1890) figs. 18,19,27,29f, where Nemesis is clearly not spitting. Rossbach's suggestion ((1897-1902) 146) that this is an inappropriate sculptural subject because it is tasteless can surely be discounted however.

60. See e.g. S. Thompson Motif-Index of Folk-Literature (Copenhagen 1955-1958) s.v. 'spitting' and 'spittle'. Cf. B. Sergent L'Homosexualité dans la mythologie grècque (Paris 1984) 219 and n.10.

61. Cf. Strato AP 12.193.1-2: Οὐδὲ Σμυρναῖαι Νεμέσεις ὅ τι σοὶ ἐπιλέγουσιν, Ἀρτεμίδωρε, νοεῖς· "Μηδὲν ὑπὲρ τὸ μέτρον". Cf. also Artem. 2.37.

62. For the griffin as an attribute of Nemesis and as Nemesis herself see Perdrizet (1898), (1912), (1914); F.H. Marshall 'Elpis-Nemesis' JHS xxxiii (1913) 84-86; J. Leibovitch 'Le Gryffon d'Erez et le sens mythologique de Némésis' IEJ 8 (1958) 141-148; J. Quaegebeur 'De l'origine égyptienne du griffon Némésis in Visages du Destin dans les Mythologies. Mélanges Jaqueline Duchemin. Actes du colloque de Chantilly 1er - 2 mai 1980 (Paris 1983) 41-54.

63. Wings are evident in the non-sculptural iconography of other Archaic divinities, as in the case of Artemis on the François Vase, and show that wings may be found in other media when they were still technically impossible in sculpture in the round.

64. This supported by the fact that Nemesis never has wings when she appears as a pair. See e.g. Posnansky (1890) figs. 11,14,17; BMC Coins Ionia pl. 26.3; 26.4; 27.3; 39.3. My figs. 25, 26 and 27.

65. E.g. the two statuettes found by German excavators at Olympia which originally stood at the entrance to the krypte of the stadium. Both figures wear long-sleeved chitons and an overgarment which falls in smooth vertical folds to their feet; on each figure the right arm rests on a steering oar which stands on a wheel; the left hand holds a measuring rod against the left shoulder. See G. Treu (1898) iii. Pl.59.2,3 and Text. iii. 237-39, who dates the statues to the second century A.D. Cf. the votive marble relief from the Piraeus now in the Louvre, also of Imperial date, where Nemesis has large wings, stands on the back of a naked prostrate man, holds a four-spoked wheel and puts the measuring stick to her shoulder with her left hand. See Perdrizet (1898). The two figures in the right-hand niche of a relief of Imperial date found in the western entrance to the theatre at Thasos are also of interest here. Both wear a long undergarment with sleeves and a mantle which leaves the upper body bare and hangs down in a long fold on the figures' left hand sides. The left hand holds a cubit measure, the right grasps

the drapery in the usual manner. See Posnansky (1890) 123; Rossbach (1897-1902) 157f and fig. 6. Another funerary relief, from Thessalonika, shows similarities to these figures. This work also of Imperial date, depicts a wingless Nemesis carrying the measure and making the customary gesture. She wears a sleeved chiton but no mantle. Treu (1897) Text. iii 237f and fig. 265 rightly remarks on the connection between the drapery of this figure and that of the figures on the Thasos relief and surmises that this correspondence, along with the evidence of the Smyrnaean coins we have already examined, allows us to recognise fairly faithful copies of the originals here.

66. See n. 53 above.

67. See Posnansky (1890) 129ff; Rossbach (1897-1902) 160 and fig. 7.

68. Rossbach ((1897-1902) 160) feels that this person is introduced to express the same idea as Elpis on the Chigi Crater on the grounds that the leafy fan is a closely related motif to Elpis' flower. However this is surely unacceptable, since an artist wanting to express the concept of Elpis in art already had a well-developed figure with an explicit iconography. Furthermore, although there is some degree of similarity between flowers and leaves, such a fluid transfer of attributes would be hard to explain in this case, and the identification of the figure must remain obscure.

69. See K. Jex-Blake, E. Sellers, The Elder Pliny's Chapters on the History of Art (London 1896) ad loc.

70. Cf., for instance, the Piraeus relief (n. 65 above), the Hymn to Nemesis of Mesomedes, and Nonn. D. 48. 375-388. In all these late examples Nemesis has numerous attributes.

71. i.33.3. Cf. vii.5.3. where he adds that the Athenians say that Oceanus is the father of the Nemesis at Rhamnus. See Allègre (1889) 154. Tyche is a daughter of Oceanus in Hes. Th. 360.

72. As e.g. on the Olympia statuettes mentioned in n. 65 above.

73. Posnansky (1890) 171 and fig.41. Cf. Amm. 14.11.26 where Nemesis bears all the features usually associated with Tyche or Fortuna.

74. When Allègre (1889) 226 interprets the wheel as a symbol of 'versatilité et volubilité' he is only correct on the first count: the wheel does not stand for speed, which, as in the case of Kairos,

is usually represented by winged or running figures.

75. T.E. Mionnet Description des médailles antiques, grecques et romaines: Bithynie (Paris 1806 - 1839) no. 481. Walz (1852) 21.

76. The links between these deities will be examined below in section (iii). For Isis-Nemesis see Posnansky (1890) 57, 123, 167; W. Drexler in Myth.Lex. II.i. 544f; Rossbach (1897-1902) 140f. For Isis-Tyche see R. Peter in Myth.Lex. I.ii. 1530ff; W. Drexler in Myth.Lex. I.ii. 1549ff; II.i. 545f. Cf. Perdrizet (1912) 256ff. For Nemesis in relation to Tyche or Fortuna see Posnansky (1890) 38 n. 1, 52ff, 166; Rossbach (1897-1902) 135ff.

77. App. Met.3.9; 10.10. cf. G. Lafaye in Dar-Sagl. s.v. 'Rota'. Also Anacr. fr. 388,7 Page; Ar. Pax452; Antiphon I.10.

78. A treatise on the symbolism of wheels was written by the Hellenistic teacher of grammar and literature Dionysius Thrax, circa 170-90 B.C. On fortune's volubility see also Pacuvius ap. ad Herennium ii.23.36. (second century B.C.) which describes her attributes, one of which is a rolling circular stone (not a wheel). The passage was clearly known to Shakespeare and appears in the mouth of Fluellen in Henry V:

> (PISTOL) ... cruel fate
> And giddy Fortune's furious fickle wheel,
> That goddess blind
> That stands upon the rolling restless stone -
> (FLUELLEN) By your patience, Ensign Pistol:
> Fortune is painted blind, with a muffler afore her eyes, to signify to you that Fortune is blind. And she is painted also with a wheel, to signify to you - which is the moral of it - that she is turning and inconstant and mutability and variation. And her foot, look you, is fixed upon a spherical stone, which rolls and rolls and rolls. In good truth, the poet makes a most excellent description of it. Fortune is an excellent moral.
>
> (Henry V. 3.6.26-37)

Cf. J.H. Betts 'Classical Allusions in Shakespeare's Henry V with Special Reference to Virgil' G & R N.S. 15 (1968) 147-163.

79. D. Chr. Or. 64.8. cf. Cornutus' treatise 'Summary of the Traditions concerning Greek Mythology 13. See p.4/73f below. Cf. Posnansky (1890) 52.

80. A.H. Smith A Catalogue of Sculpture in the Department of Greek and Roman Antiquities, British

Museum (London 1892-1904) I.794; Perdrizet (1898) pl.16.2.

81. See n.65 above.

82. See n.65 above.

83. This interpretation is supported by the epigram which accompanies the relief. This talks of Nemesis in general terms only and makes no allusion to any specific individual. See Perdrizet (1898) 600; Rossbach (1897-1902) 157.

84. See Perdrizet (1912) 250f; M. Rostovtzeff (1926) pl. X, 8; Volkmann (1928) 298; Schweitzer (1931) 210, 214. Cf. Herter (1935) 2374-76.

85. Perdrizet (1912) 250-255 and pls. I and II; Rostovtzeff (1926) pl.X,7. On the dating of these statues as Imperial rather than Hellenistic see the discussion of Perdrizet (1912) 268-274.

86. These problems are fully discussed by Perdrizet (1912) 263ff, with fig. 1.

87. Catalogue générale des antiquités égyptiennes du Musee du Caire (Nos. 7001-7394 et 8742-9200. Koptische Kunst) (Cairo 1901) 103 and fig. 159.

88. 'Le representazioni allegoriche della vita nell' arte bizantina' L'Arte vii (1904) 130-145.

89. See Perdrizet (1912) 263-67.

90. Posnansky (1890) 48ff; Rossbach (1897-1902) 135f.

91. Herter (1935) sect. I and sect. X.10.

92. Cercidas was a pro-Macedonian, anti-Spartan politician, who on behalf of the Achaean statesman Aratus, whose πατρικὸς ξένος he was, negotiated the Achaean betrayal to Macedon in 227/6 B.C. and later commanded his city's contingent against Cleomenes of Sparta at Sellasia. See Plb. ii.48.4-6; 50.3; 65.3 and see Walbank (1957) ad loc. Cf. Walbank (1943) 11; E.A. Barber (1921) 4.

93. As does E. Gabba (1957) 19.

94. Barber (1921) 3; Walbank (1943) 11 n. 3.

95. The 'God' of the first line of Dudley's translation.

96. Powell Coll.Alex. 174.

97. See Webster (1964) 223.

98. See L. Paquet (1975) 136 n. 38.

99. Antagonism to the current polytheism was a salient feature of Cynic philosophy, and the tone in which the deities of popular belief are attacked is essentially Cynic. See A.S. Hunt (1911) 21; Dudley (1937) 80.

100. For his use of Sophrosyne, Pothos and Peitho see his Fr. 5 Powell.

101. Phaenomena 96-136. Notice also the similarity between Aratus' sentiments and Cleanthes'. At the end of the latter's Hymn to Zeus he prays 'grant that they may have judgement, trusting in which you govern all things with Dike.' Cf. also Arat. Phaenomena 1-18; 408-429; 765-777.

102. See L.S.J. s.v.

103. Dudley (1937) 81. M.L. West (1978) ad loc. observes that Dos and Harpax 'are often printed lower case and explained as = δόσις or δωρέα and ἁρπαγή , but there is no obvious analogy for abstracts so formed. The forms are those of agent nouns ... Hesiod, or whoever first produced the saying, would surely have been most likely to light on such forms if he were coining names for a pair of personalised figures of the same order as Δίκη and Ὕβρις (whose fem. gender may have determined that of Δώς and Ἅρπαξ)'.

104. This invites speculation on whether the author himself is conscious of the distinction between personification and abstract noun, but the phrase θεὸς γὰρ αὕτα looks more like an elucidation of a striking use of Metados than a device to distinguish between Metados a goddess and metados an abstract noun. Cf. AP. X. 52.

105. See Hom. Il v. 401; 899. The Cynics also regarded themselves as the iatroi of people's souls.

106. See the discussions of Posnansky (1890) 30-45; Rossbach (1897-1902) 130-132; Herter (1935) 2366-68.

107. ἵνα ... τις ὑπερβασίας ἁλέηται, l. 22.

108. A.W. Bulloch (1977) 98 regards Callimachus' 'religious' material and 'traditional' forms as a mode of discourse rather than the essential point of his poetry; N. Hopkinson (1984) 12 interprets the work as a mixture of elements combining the literary and the 'religious' in equal measure. To

see the hymn as entirely comic, as K.J. McKay (1962 b.), or entirely tragic, as P.B. Falciai (1976) is surely to oversimplify and misread it : tragic and comic elements are certainly present, but so are mimetic and hymnic elements. See Hopkinson (1984) 11 n. 4.

109. Bulloch (1977) 98.

110. Bulloch (1977) 113f.

111. See M.L. West (1969) 8.

112. See Fraser (1972) II. 355-56 with bibliography. Callimachus' line resembles Hom. Il. 6.200 which says of Bellerophon ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ καὶ κεῖνος ἀπήχθετο πᾶσι θεοῖσιν, ἦτοι ..., and we may compare Call. Lav.Pall. 80-1 τίς σε, τὸν ὀφθαλμῶς οὐκέτ' ἀποισόμενον, ὦ Εὐηρείδα, χαλεπὰν ὁδὸν ἄγαγε δαίμων ; which is itself derived from Hom. Od. 17.446, where Antinous says to Odysseus the beggar, τίς δαίμων τόδε πῆμα προσήγαγε, δαιτὸς ἄνίην; McKay ((1962. b.) 89) is surely right in observing that the hostility does not come from Demeter since the daimon would have to be feminine (cf. Theoc. Id.7.34, where Demeter is referred to as ἁ δαίμων). Neither, for the same reason, can the hostility emanate from Nemesis who, however, is probably referred to as a daimon by Call. in Fr. 687: δαίμων, τῇ κόλποισιν ἐπιπτύουσι γυναῖκες. Cf. Strato AP 12. 229: θεὸς ... δι' ἣν ὑπὸ κόλπον ... πτύομεν ... Νέμεσιν, and Anon. AP 16. 251: ἃ Νέμεσις ... ἐς δὲ βαθὺν τρὶς κόλπον ἀπέπτυσεν , and also Schol. (K) Theoc. Id.4.39: ἔπτυσα κόλπον : τὸ νεμεσητὸν ἐκτρεπόμενοι ποιοῦσι τοῦτο, καὶ μάλιστα αἱ γυναῖκες. Καλλίμαχος· ' δαίμων - γυναῖκες.'

113. See e.g. McKay (1962 b.) 70-71; H. Gundert (1970) 121; Bulloch (1977) 113; Hopkinson (1984) 8.

114. 11.72-73. Cf. Phaedra's dilemma concerning the kairos of aidos, and her and Hippolytus' shortcomings in respect of aidos.

115. McKay (1962 b.) 72.

116. The arguments are summarized by Hopkinson (1984) ad loc.

117. The tone of the priestess' warning has proved problematical: some scholars see the use of pais as condescending, others as conciliatory.

118. Cf. Nonn. D. i.481 where Adrasteia does likewise. See also xxxvii.423. Hopkinson (1984) ad 1.56 observes that it was out of the idea of memory as a writing tablet that the idea arose of a register

in which unjust actions are recorded. However the book of Nemesis should not be confused with the Book of Fate in which the Moirai indelibly write people's futures, for although both ideas are dependent on a basic concept of writing as fixed and certain and a necessary prerequisite for the workings of destiny (see e.g. Ovid Met. 5.808-14), the Book of the Moirai refers to the future whilst the book of Nemesis refers to present and past actions.

119. See the artworks discussed in section (ii) above and cf. Nonn. D. xlviii.375ff where Nemesis tramples hybris in a literary context but one which appears to be influenced by a work of art:

> She betook herself to Nemesis, and found her on the heights of Tauros in the clouds, where beside neighbour Cydnos she had ended the proudnecked boasting of Typhon's threats. A wheel turned itself round before the queen's feet, signifying that she rolls all the proud from on high to the ground with the avenging wheel of justice, she the allvanquishing diety who turns the path of life. Round her throne flew a bird of vengeance, a griffin flying with wings, or balancing himself on four feet, to go unbidden before the flying goddess and show that she herself traverses the four separate quarters of the world: highcrested men she bridles with her bit which none can shake off, such is the meaning of the image, and she rolls a haughty fellow about as it were with the whip of misery, like a self-rolling wheel.
>
> (tr. W.H.D. Rouse).

120. SIG 997. See McKay (1962 b.) 102.

121. As is argued by J. Robert, L. Robert in REG 68 (1955) 197.

122. See e.g. Hom. Od. 5.216; Archil Fr.78. 4-5; J. BJ v.10.3.

123. These words are derived from Hom. Il. 24.532f. where Achilles, talking of the man whose fate comes from the unlucky jar, says καὶ ἐ κακὴ βούβρωστις ἐπὶ χθόνα δῖαν ἐλαύνει, φοιτᾷ δ' οὔτε θεοῖσι τετιμένος οὐτέ βροτοῖσιν.

124. Summarised by Hopkinson (1984) ad l. 102. See also L.J.D. Richardson (1961 a,b,c), who deals

with the cult of Boubrostis at Smyrna and its connection with Hybris. Cf. McKay (1962 b.) 120f.

125. McKay (1926 b.) and Hopkinson (1984) also share this view. A very similar ambiguity occurs at A.R. Arg. 3.92f: ἀναιδήτῳ περ ἐόντι...αἰδὼς ἔσσετ' ἐν ὄμμασιν· See G.W. Mooney (1912) ad loc.; M.M. Gillies (1928) ad loc.; F. Vian (1961) ad loc.; H. Fraenkel (1968) ad loc., and the Loeb translation by R.C. Seaton (1961). Cf. also A.A. 418 and E. Fraenkel (1950) ad loc.

126. Eros in the eyes: A.A. 743; Supp. 1004. See also W.S. Barrett (1964) ad E. Hipp. 525-26 and M.L. West (1966) ad Hes. Th. 910; Himeros in the eyes: Theoc. Id.18.37 and A.S.F. Gow ad loc.; Aidos in the eyes A.R. Arg 3.93 (see n.125 above). See also W. Deonna Le Symbolism de l'oeil (Paris 1963) 56; Peitho on the lips: Alciphron IV.11.7; Charis on the hair: Alcman P.Oxy. 2387.11-12; Chola on the nostrils: Theoc Id.1.18; Nemesis on the cheeks: Meleager AP 12.33 = HE 4480ff etc. etc..

127. McKay (1962 b.) 120.

128. As McKay (1962 b.) 119.

129. Hom Il. 1.587-88; 24.213; Od. 8. 459; A.R. Arg. 4. 1620. Cf. A. Fr.99.13; S. Ant. 763-64; Tr. 241; E. Fr.736; Call. AP 7.519.2 = HE 1242.

130. For other instances of diseases and plagues personified see e.g. K. Chrysanthis (1945) and M. Robertson (1952) 99-100.

131. Erysichthon came from the promontory of Triopium in Asia Minor. His daughter was Mestra, who received the power of metamorphosis from Poseidon. Erysichthon used to sell her every day and buy food with the proceeds and so ease his ravening hunger; she changed shape, escaped from the purchaser, and returned to him. (cf. Ovid. Met. 8.873f.)
Erysichthon is called Aithon because of his insatiable hunger, and by gatomountos Lycophron is referring to the literal meaning of his name 'tearer up of earth', 'plougher'. See G.W. Mooney (1921) ad loc.

132. See Hopkinson (1984) 19 and cf. McKay (1962 a.) 119; (1962 b) 105-6; H. Reinsch-Werner (1976) 221-30.

133. Ath. 452b.

134. West (1966) ad Hes. Th. 227 says 'the gender of the noun and the sex of the god are variable': we

have seen a similar phenomenon with Kairos/Occasio. Whatever the gender of the abstract noun, that is the sex of the personification. Here 'Hunger doesn't appear in the feminine because of the duality in Erysichthon's situation' (McKay (1962 a) 110).

135. Codinus De Signis Constantinop. p.60 Bekker. Demeter and Hunger are opposites at Hes. Op. 299-300 and Call. Fr. 267.

136. This view owes much to McKay (1962 a.) 119; (1962 b.) 123f and Reinsch-Werner (1976) 373.

137. For other instances of this in Callimachus and Theocritus see, e.g. F.T. Griffith Theocritus at Court (Leiden 1979) 63f. and n.35, and 75.

138. Cf. Il 5.9; 10.314; 13.663; 17,575; Od. 9.508; 15.417; 20.287.

139. See McKay (1962 b.) 122.

140. Cf. Hom. h.Ven. 264-72; Call. Del. 79-85; Wilamowitz (1931-32) I.184-5; Hopkinson (1984) ad 1.39.

141. Now in the Biblioteca Apostolica, Vatican. See e.g. M.H. Swindler Ancient Painting from the Earliest Times to the Period of Christian Art (New Haven 1929) 339 and fig. 542; J. Charbonneaux, R. Martin, F. Villard Hellenistic Art 330-50 B.C. (New York 1973) 170 and fig. 171. Cf. Vitr. De. Arch. 7.5.2.

142. As on the statue in the Bracchio Nuovo, Vatican, where the bearded river-god reclines on a sphinx and carries a cornucopia and sheaves of wheat or a papyrus branch as symbols of fertility. The sixteen cubits the Nile rises when it floods are represented by sixteen boys. See M. Bieber (1981) figs. 407-9.

143. Cf. Catullus 68.77f. where Nemesis is also called Ramnusia virgo.

144. Fr.266Kð. Cf. Pl.R. 451a : προσκυνῶ δ' 'Αδράστειαν ; Alciphron iv.6.5: προσκυνῶ δε τὴν Νέμεσιν. The practice goes back much earlier, however. See A. Pr. 936; S. El. 1467; E. Rh. 342f.

145. See W. Headlam, A.D. Knox Herodas The Mimes and Fragments (Cambridge 1922) ad l. 34 for extensive references.

146. Char. 16.15.

147. Evidence collected in the note to BGU VI, 1216, a document from 110 B.C. which mentions, at 11.49

and 161, a sanctuary of the two Nemeseis and Adrasteia (of Smyrna). Cf. P. Perdrizet (1912) 256ff; H. Volkman (1928) 297ff. Statues of a temple of the two Nemeseis and of Milesian Apollo are reproduced on Alexandrian coins of Antoninus Pius : BMC Coins Alexandria p.120 pl.III, Nos. 1028, 1031. See fig.23.

148. Coincidentally on the same day as on which thirteen years before, he had celebrated his triumph over Mithridates and the pirates. The precise location of the shrine is unknown: see Appian II.90, and Perdrizet (1912) 257; Herter (1935) 2354.

149. See Rostovtzeff (1926) 25; Schweitzer (1931) 176; Herter (1935) 2354.

150. Appian II.86 says that the line was inscribed on Pompey's tomb. More likely Dio Cassius' version, in which Hadrian spoke the line over the tomb, is correct (69.11).

151. G. Lumbroso L'Egitto dei Greci e dei Romani² (Rome 1897). Cf. Appian II.86 who says of Caesar ὁ δὲ αὐτοὺς ἠμύνατο ἀξίως τῆς ἀθεμίστιας.

152. Volkman (1928) 304.

153. A.-M. Hauvette-Besnault 'Fouilles de Délos' BCH 6 (1882) 336-38. For the date see T. Homolle 'Remarques sur la chronologie de quelques archontes Athéniens' BCH 17(1893) 158. See also M.-F. Baslez Recherches sur les Conditions de Pénétration et de Diffusion des Religions Orientales a Delos (II - ler s. avant notre ère) (Paris 1977) 59.

154. E.g. A. Rusch De Serapide et Iside in Graecia cultis (Berlin 1906) 44.

155. See Perdrizet (1912) 256; F. Dunand Le Culte d'Isis dans le bassin oriental de la Méditerranée (Leiden 1973) II. 112 and pl. xxxvi.1.

156. Volkman (1928) 304; Schweitzer (1931) 176. For traces of a cult image of the Smyrnaean type at Alexandria see Schweitzer (1931) 205.

157. Volkman (1928) 308.

158. Posnansky (1890) 48-52 has a good discussion of Nemesis' jealousy.

159. See e.g. Diodorus Siculus AP 9.409 = GP 2142ff (Drusus' virtues are so great that Nemesis may be compelled, out of jealousy, to intervene); Statius Silvae II. vi. 73-79 (Ursus' physique causes the

envy of the goddess); Appian Pun. 85 (she is called τὴν φοβερωτάτην τοῖς εὐτυχοῦσι Νέμεσιν) . Strato AP 12.229 (Nemesis begrudges the addressee's beauty); Agathias AP 5.273 (excessive beauty prompts Nemesis' intervention); Secundus of Tarentum AP 9.260 = GP 3386ff (Lais laments her fading beauty); Chariton Chaereas and Callirhoë III.8 (Dionysius fears the envy of Nemesis on account of his own great good luck); Aesopus AP 10.123 = FGE 432ff (regardless of ethical considerations, too much good can incur Nemesis); Anon. AP 9.146 (a facetious epigram connecting Elpis and Nemesis, the moral being that though one may hope, one will get nothing).

160. In 2.6.27. Spes and Nemesis are cleverly juxtaposed in a context which invites comparison with Anon. AP 9.146 (see previous note), and the overriding impression which we get of the woman is that, like the goddess, she earned her name from being πολλάκις δινουμένη καὶ μεταπίπτουσα (see Lucian Asin. 35). See M.J.C. Putnam Tibullus, a commentary (Norman 1973) ad loc.

161. F. Nietzsche The Birth of Tragedy tr. F. Golffing (New York 1956) 108.

162. For discussions of this aspect see Posnansky (1890) 34-40; Rossbach (1897-1902); Schweitzer (1931) 176-78; Herter (1935) 2370-71.

163. Theoc. Id. 23.33; AP 12.12 = GP 3843ff; 12.16; Meleager AP 12.109 = HE 4308ff (which varies the theme ἐρώμενος ἐρασθείς in which the captor of men is caught by a woman); AP 12.193.

164. Ovid Met. 9.664ff.

165. Furtwängler (1900) pl. 40.9 Cf. pl.39.28.

166. Cf. line 3 with Call. Cer. 56.

167. Cf. Meleager AP. 12.63 = HE 4484ff; 12.122 = HE 4454ff; 12.141 = HE 4510ff for the wording.

In later times Ovid uses Nemesis in this role. Met. 3. 460 has Echo, who has fallen in love with Narcissus, ask the gods to afflict her beloved with an unrequited love like hers; Nemesis hears the prayer and grants her request, making Narcissus see his own image in the pool and fall in love with it, and pine away with longing until he dies. In Met. 14.693f there is a similar motif in the myth of Pomona and Vertumnus, where the latter points out to the unyielding former the punishment of Nemesis and tells her the story of Anaxarete who was turned to stone for her intransigence: ultores - deos et pectora dura perosam Idalien memoremque time Rhamnusidis iram.

168. Cf. Dio Chrysostom Or.64.8 discussed above at p.4/32.

169. Pliny HN 36.17.

170. See e.g. A. von Premerstein (1894) 400f; Perdrizet (1898) 601; (1914) 94ff; P. Collart 'Le Théâtre de Philippes' BCH 52 (1928) 107-113; Volkmann (1928) 312ff; Herter (1935) 2372-73.

171. We might notice that at both Nemesis' main cult sites, Smyrna and Rhamnus, she had agones held in her honour. At Rhamnus there was a lampadephoria, gymnastic games and comedies in her honour (see Rossbach (1897-1902) 127) and at Smyrna there was an ἀγωνοθέτης Νεμέσεων (CIG 3148).

172. Volkmann (1934) 73.

173. Chapouthier (1924) 294 also believes that 'les rapports qui s'établirent ... entre les deux conceptions voisines de Némésis et de Niké' occurred mainly 'vers la fin de l'époque hellénistique'.

174. Cf. Pindar passim.

175. See Treu (1897) 212f and pl. lv 4-5.

176. Milet I.7.205a

177. See von Premerstein (1894) 404; Treu (1897) 237-39 and pl.lix. 2-3; Schweitzer (1931) 212.



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HEAD OF NEMESIS,
BY AGORACRITOS OF PAROS (?)
FROM THE TEMPLE OF
NEMESIS AT RHAMNUS.

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Personifications in the Hellenistic World

Chapter 5 Personifications in the Hellenistic World

The aim of this chapter is to synthesise and summarize the conclusions and comments made during the course of the examinations of Nemesis, Kairos and Tyche. The tripartite division into individual chapters for each personification is, to an extent, arbitrary, and the methodology should not be misconstrued. This thesis does not attempt to define them independently from one other, as if they are entirely separate and isolated figures, since that would be to overlook an essential point about them; the work of, for example, Dumézil and Vernant has shown that one cannot fully understand a religious system without studying how the various individual gods relate to one another. Hence an awareness of the structure of the pantheon is essential, provided we bear in mind Burkert's comments,((1985) 218), that the pantheon ought not to be regarded as a closed and harmonious system(1), and it is important to show how the various figures are associated, opposed and distinguished from each other. It is in this way that those features of each deity which are significant from the point of view of religious thought can emerge. Yet there is some degree of difference between the personifications which form the subject of this thesis and the Olympian pantheon on which Vernant's interest is mainly focussed, in that Nemesis, Kairos and Tyche all lie outside that

pantheon and, although the degrees vary, they have more closely circumscribed spheres of action, as befits their nature as personifications of particular abstract nouns. The relationship between Tyche and Nemesis, which shows the paradoxical process of a pair of polar opposites which eventually become assimilated, and also Nemesis' jealousy, her erotic function and so on, illustrate the validity of this approach. However, as a result of being the specific personifications of the Opportune Moment or of the Fortune of a given city, Kairos and the Tyche of Antioch are individuals with particular single characteristic forms, as are the other personifications created by artists to serve specific functions. Nemesis and Tyche, when the latter is considered in all her various facets besides her function as city Tyche, are more complex figures which lend weight to E. Rohde's observation that 'the Greek is incapable of imagining a god as a single deity but rather envisages a divine power which can be apprehended now in its unity, now in its diversity'[2], but does so only if we are aware that many personifications which receive divine cult are specific 'unities'. The differences between the Kairos of Lysippus and the Tyche of Antioch on the one hand, and Nemesis and, to a lesser extent, Tyche in all its wider ramifications on the other (the latter pair being more closely connected with a far-reaching religious tradition), underline and parallel the other

fundamental difference between the pre-Hellenistic figures which form a central part of that tradition, and the new creations of the Hellenistic period, which have no part in that tradition at all.

This study does not attempt to treat the religious data as if they are completely separate from the material and social life of the Hellenistic world; on the contrary, it attempts to gain an understanding of that religion by connecting it with the people who lived by it. It also seeks to achieve some degree of detachment from modern ideas about the role religion plays in people's lives, since it is not possible to know a priori whether Greek religion occupied the same place in relation to the people and society of the Hellenistic world as contemporary religions do in the modern world. Like other fundamental aspects of civilization, religious phenomena have their own history which reflects the developments and changes which took place in that civilization, and throughout this work an effort is made to put personification firmly within its historical, social and artistic, as well as its religious context.

This chapter falls into four main sections. The first of these is concerned with the ways in which Hellenistic civilization's uses of personification compare with what happened in previous eras, focussing mainly on the crucial notions of continuity and

change. The second section examines the case for believing that something dramatically new concerning the use of personification does occur in the Hellenistic period. In doing so it assesses the radically new and influential figures of the Kairos of Lysippus and the Tyche of Antioch, along with certain other artistic and literary creations of similar type, and also the vast increase in significance of tyche in all kinds of writing as well as in cult. This section also examines the so-called 'decline' of religion which is often alleged to have taken place in the Hellenistic period, and argues that the cult of Tyche, along with numerous other factors also used in evidence, are not so much indications of decline as indications of the changes which run concurrently with the various social, historical and religious developments, some of which were new, some merely continuations of long established trends, which were taking place. In this section and the succeeding one the value of including the firmly - established figure of Nemesis in this study becomes clear, since she provides a yardstick against which to measure the degree of newness and innovation embodied in Kairos and Tyche; without her inclusion those features would be far harder to assess accurately. Section (iii) examines why it is that these three personifications became important, and why they exhibit the extensions and innovations in the existing representations of concepts which they do in the ways they do. The first

part of the answer is concerned with iconography, centred around the context of the development of new iconographical attributes for a new kind of public, while the second part is concerned with the historical and political circumstances which were influential in making these three concepts particularly important. The final section is more general, and, under the heading 'personification as a concept', considers how and why in art we are faced with different problems to those we face in literature when assessing personification. This section also examines the fact that personifications can now be created out of nothing as artistic conceits and need not be rooted in a religious tradition; also included are some cautionary remarks on the care that must be exercised, when making generalisations about personification or Hellenistic religion as a whole, to be aware of precisely who is conceiving the personifications and of his or her intellectual status and personal prejudices; there is a great difference between attitudes in the library of Alexandria and attitudes in the streets outside. The overall purpose of the entire scheme is to attain a better degree of understanding of religion and art in the Hellenistic period; the case advanced here is that the study of Nemesis, Kairos and Tyche is an ideal means to achieve that end.

i) How does the use of personification in the Hellenistic era compare with what went before?

The notions of continuity and change, or extension and newness as they have previously been designated, are crucial to any study of Hellenistic society. In fact the term 'Hellenistic society' itself, though convenient, is, as J.K. Davies ((1984) 290) observes, an arbitrary label for a set of developing and ad hoc solutions to the very various immediate or longer-term needs and problems which had to be solved, or lived with, within certain boundary conditions by governments and individuals. Furthermore, modern scholarship in this field is becoming increasingly conscious of the need to avoid the misleading and facile concept of 'heyday and decline' which has frequently been (mis-)applied to the Hellenistic era, and the arguments which I shall make in parts (ii) and (iii) of this chapter fall in with that trend. We are dealing here with practices developed over a period of time within a definite framework of needs, ambitions and possibilities, not with an isolated, decadent unit of history; almost no aspect of the social life of the Hellenistic era developed without reference to the past(3), and if we accept the hypothesis of W. Burkert ((1985) 6) that 'religion is quintessentially tradition', then we must remain aware that any account of any aspect of the religion of the Hellenistic era cannot afford to lose sight of the earlier world.

Although the 'many broken lines of tradition and the innumerable catastrophes of (earlier) times cannot be lightly overlooked, forces of continuity have always reasserted themselves, and probably nowhere as much as in the sphere of religion' (Burkert (1985) 15). Thus the career of Alexander the Great merely hastened processes which were already in existence, and in this way the political consequences of his activities and those of his successors only removed the obstacles and created the conditions in which religious attitudes, artistic trends, and, within that framework, personification, could more easily expand and develop. Indeed as F.C. Grant ((1953) xiv) remarks, 'some of the major changes which were leading on to the Hellenistic age, including its syncretism, were already beginning to take place at the end of the fifth century, precipitated apparently by the social crisis and the political tragedy of the Peloponnesian War'. Thus the notion of continuity, of the extension of already existing conditions, is a vital one for any study related to the Hellenistic age.

However, we shall also examine the evidence which suggests that something radically new was happening in this period. The Tyche of cities and the Kairos of Lysippus are two instances of strikingly influential innovations; they do not have their roots in a specific religious tradition and are certainly not mythical in the same sense as Nemesis is, for, as we

saw in discussing Kairos, Lysippus was able to create the personification more or less out of nothing and was also able to manipulate the tradition by chosing the sense of the word in which he personified it(4). Thus within the framework of extension and continuity we have the capacity for newness and change. This is essential to our overview of Hellenistic religion and personification; side by side with the deep-rooted tradition, and even within it, stands the ability to accept the creation of new deified personifications out of nothing as a result of an individual artist's conceit and genius, as we have seen in the work of Lysippus, Eutychides, Callimachus, and Cercidas. This tension is informative in many ways, and Nemesis enshrines that tension in as much as she shows both the growth in significance, and also innovations, in what is already a firmly established figure; Nemesis differs at the end of the Hellenistic age from how she was at its beginning - she had to develop in order to survive. Hence we are dealing with the adaptation of Nemesis' existing aspects to fit new contexts such as love poetry, agons, jealousy, poetic justice and her connection with Tyche, rather than complete alteration or innovation. The increase in importance of the general concept of tyche, as opposed to the specific Tyche of cities - the two are very different - and its sphere of influence, is a natural culmination of events in the fourth century B.C.: Alexander's exploits and the events following his death were the

impetus to set in motion the process of tyche's increase in influence.

a) Continuity

The importance of precedent to Hellenistic art and literature cannot be overestimated. Artists and writers were steeped in the works of their predecessors, and the way in which any individual manipulated the tradition was considered to be more an index of his or her merit than originality in its pure sense. In view of this, if we are to assess how Hellenistic civilisation's use of personification compares with what went before, we must first examine the tradition in which works such as Nemesis, Kairos and Tyche lie.

As all the figures we are dealing with are, in a sense, allegorical, we shall begin our investigation in the fifth century B.C. with the work by Prodicus of Ceos, known as the 'Choice of Heracles'(5). Deliberately written allegories like this are rare at this time and never extensive(6). Prodicus himself, whose opposition to established religion was acute, is well known for his allegorical interpretation of myth, and, like Democritus and Critias, was enthusiastic in formulating questions and answers on the subject of why people had invented the notion that there were gods. In his opinion the things which people called gods and worshipped accordingly were those things

which they found particularly useful, such as the sun, moon, springs and rivers; then, in a secondary stage, itinerant teachers brought progress and introduced new cultivated plants, and were consequently revered as gods: thus Demeter brought corn, Dionysus wine[7]. The story of the Choice of Heracles is, however, a conscious use of the device of allegory to make a specific point. Here two different types of woman stand for two different ways of life[8]. The allegory is of a didactic nature and relates to mental processes in which the characteristic traits of the concepts Arete and Kakia are transferred to the personal figures of two women, who are neither humans nor gods, and used to represent the inner decision of Heracles in a type of psychomachia[9]. In order to elucidate his meaning, Prodicus used allegorical personification to express his account in detail. This was a process which was to become increasingly prominent; the personification of qualities, things, arts etc., which appeared in Prodicus and the sophists, and also in the graphic arts from this time onwards, was cultivated in continually more innovative and detailed ways.

The group of Eirene holding the child Ploutos in her arms, sculpted by Cephisodotus and probably erected in 372-368 B.C., the date given by Pliny as the sculptor's floruit, occupies a very important place in the development and growth of personification and

allegory[10]. (See Fig. 29.) The two figures are allegorized in terms of a mother and child relationship which expresses the idea that peace produces and encourages the growth of wealth. Such a causal and familial relationship is an important innovation since Eirene and Ploutos had for a long time been divine beings but had no connection in myth, so this new relationship implies a new acknowledgement of their abstract essence. Yet this group is still firmly tied to the religious past, in as much as it is undoubtedly a cult statue connected with the worship of Eirene which arose after the peace of Callias. Plutarch Cimon xiii.6. mentions the peace of Callias as the reason for the foundation of the altar, but gets this treaty confused with the battle of the Eurymedon which occurred much earlier[11]. Here an altar of Pheme was erected when news of the battle, fought in 465 B.C., arrived at Athens on the same day as the victory took place[12]. The evidence of Isocrates 15.109f on the issue of the cult of Eirene is unequivocal, however, for he was a very old man and witnessed the foundation of the cult in relation to the peace of Callias, and says that ἀπ' ἐκείνης τῆς ἡμέρας (i.e. 371 B.C.) θύειν αὐτῇ [13]. Yet whatever the facts are surrounding the foundation of the cult, this group occupies an important stage in the tradition in that it is a cult statue in the tradition of divine images but is also consciously

connected with the trend that reflects a growing interest in personifications and their relations.

Contemporary with the Eirene and Ploutos by Cephisodotus there is a well-documented trend in which art picks on personifications as its models more frequently than it had done in the past, and in which family relationships symbolic of causal connections show some prominence. Around this time an Athenian sculptor, Xenophon, created a Tyche holding Ploutos in her arms; significantly Pausanias compares her with the Eirene and Ploutos group(14). Scopas, c.370-330 B.C.,created statues of Eros, Himeros and Pothos for the Temple of Aphrodite Praxis in Megara, and his contemporary Praxiteles, the son and pupil of Cephisodotus, sculpted images of Peitho and Paregoros for the same temple(15), and thus 'the master of emotion very suitably chose the more violent, the master of grace the softer qualities connected with love - that is Aphrodite and Eros'(16). A fourth century B.C. relief in Copenhagen dedicated by an unknown Athenian to Zeus Epiteleios Philios and his mother Philia and wife Agathe Tyche, is another example: success is the result of friendship combined with good fortune(17). (Fig. 30.)

A painting by Aëtion, whose floruit Pliny dates to the 107th Olympiad (352 B.C.), of the marriage of Alexander and Roxane (and which therefore cannot have

been painted before 327 B.C. when the marriage took place), bears certain similarities to Prodicus' Choice of Heracles in that, although it uses a somewhat different imagery, it converts an incident in the life of Alexander into a similar allegory of choice. It is described by Lucian in Herod. 4ff. and exists in a renaissance reconstruction by Giovanni Antonio Bazzi ('Il Sodoma') on an early sixteenth century fresco showing Alexander and Roxane in their marriage chamber (Fig. 31). They are surrounded by Erotes who introduce her to him and play with his armour. Lucian's interpretation is that, rather than being meaningless ornamental trivia, the Erotes signify Alexander's passion for military activities and the fact that he remembers his armour despite his love for Roxanne; more likely the opposite is true and love has made Alexander remove his armour and forget it. However, that is not the point at this issue here: what matters is that the painting works on two levels, the descriptive and the allegorical. Allegoria, meaning 'saying something else', is a relatively recent addition to the Greek language, and only became current in the time of Plutarch, but it translates a more ancient idea which is expressed by the word hyponoia, whose principal meaning is 'suspicion' or 'conjecture', but which can also point to a deeper sense, to the meaning which lies at the bottom of something, especially a covert meaning as conveyed by myths and allegories[18]. The fact that allegoria

grows out of a significant tradition of Greek culture which flourished especially in the Hellenistic era, as this section examining that tradition is designed to illustrate, is crucial, for the ability of a work of art to carry an underlying message which 'says something other' than appears at first sight to be intended now becomes very important and comes to form a part of the tradition in which Nemesis, Kairos and Tyche lie. Standing as it does more or less on the threshold of the Hellenistic era, Aëtion's painting heralds the onset of one of the most characteristic trends of Hellenistic art and thought.

This allegorical representation of abstract concepts which we have been examining has analogies in the literary and rhetorical theory, and in the theology, of the Hellenistic age. The allegorical method of exposition which taught that the names of the gods should be understood on the one hand as natural and on the other hand as metaphysical entities, was taken up by both literature and philosophy[19]. Towards the end of the sixth century B.C. Xenophanes of Colophon had combined his own theology with vitriolic attacks against the immorality of Homer's and Hesiod's gods[20] and also with a penetrating refutation of anthropomorphism: if horses could paint, he argues, they 'would paint the forms of the gods like horses, and cattle like cattle,' for 'the Ethiopians say their gods are snub-nosed and black, the Thracians that they

have light blue eyes and red hair'[21], or, in other words, that man creates god in his own image. However, although his criticism of Homeric religion remained unsurpassed and unrefuted, Xenophanes attracted few adherents or disciples. Rather than attack Homer, people tended to quote him in support of their arguments, doing so by means of allegory[22]. The method used corresponds to that we have seen in Aëtion's painting: it is taken for granted that the myths as recounted by the poets are nonsense, but that beneath the surface of the text there is a hidden 'under thought', hyponoia[23], which eludes the superficial hearer but is accessible to the philosophically-minded listener. Theagenes of Rhegium, fl.525 B.C., was the first author to attempt this kind of interpretation of Homer by suggesting that the names of the gods represent natural elements[24]. Other interpretations appear in Metrodorus of Lampsacus[25] and in the Derveni Papyrus[26]. These methods were taken over by the Stoics, who used them to show that the Homeric poems supported many of their doctrines[27]. The relations which Homer described between the gods were thus seen as allegories of the relationships between the physical elements. This principle that language and literature and art had two distinct levels, one of which was understandable by anyone, the other which was only accessible to the wise, was thus firmly established in Hellenistic times.

These developments, then, prepare us for some of the new features of Hellenistic art, one of which is the new type of visual allegory which this thesis is very much concerned with. There is a degree of difference between the earlier theories of Metrodorus etc. and Hellenistic explanations of divine powers in as much as the emphasis tended to shift away from the use of etymology as an explanation of the form and significance of deities, towards interpreting that same form and significance in the light of their individual functions. A good example of this comes from early Stoicism: Cleanthes, in an instance which indicates his interest in the visual imagination as an excellent learning aid, used to describe Epicureanism in terms of a painting of Pleasure dressed in a rich garment and seated on a high throne with the Virtues as her servants at her feet(28). Cleanthes' use of personifications and his fondness for the allusive and allegorical approach is important, for his use of a painting here shows the rise in interest in visual communication; Plato would probably have used a myth to illustrate the same point. 'Images are the literature of the layman'(29). The way in which this principle of allegorical personification operates is described by Diogenes in Dio Chrysostom Or. IV 85ff:

> Therefore, come, let us imitate clever artists. They put the impress of their thought and art upon practically everything, representing not only the various gods in human forms but everything else as well. Sometimes they paint rivers in the likeness of men and springs in

> certain feminine shapes, yes, and islands and cities and well nigh everything else, like Homer, who boldy represented the Scamander as speaking beneath his flood, and though they cannot give speech to their figures, nevertheless do give them forms and symbols appropriate to their nature, as, for example, their river gods recline, usually naked, and wear long flowing beards and on their heads crowns of tamarisk or rushes. Let us then show ourselves to be no whit worse or less competent in the field of discourse than they in their several arts as we mould and depict the characters of the three spirits of the three lives.
>
> (Tr. J.H. Cohoon)

Clearly personification, which is separate from deification, matters a great deal here. It is used as an artistic device, and Dio justifies it on the grounds that it is the duty of popular philosophy to direct people to the Good. Dio here pronounces, through the mouthpiece of Diogenes, the principle embodied in the sort of allegories which represent, in art, a choice between two modes of life. A similar appraisal of the Goods occurs in the famous value-table of Crantor, an Academic and disciple of Xenocrates, who lived circa 300 B.C.. Wanting his listeners to have a clear image (emphasin) of the object under discussion, he is said to have 'made use of an extremely nice example' in which Ploutos, Hedone, Hygeia and Andria appear personified before a panhellenic theatron and let their respective merits come to light[30]. What also needs stressing is that, as we have seen, none of these elements or processes is completely new; the novelty lies in their particular growth in importance at this time.

In the light of this the painting known as the Calumny of Apelles is also significant (Fig. 32). Here is an independent composition consisting wholly of allegorical figures, without any mythological pretext; it is entirely allegorical[31]. Our only ancient evidence for this lost work occurs in the description of it in Lucian's essay on Calumny entitled On Not Believing Rashly in Slander, in which he relates how Apelles repudiated the calumny against himself. Lucian begins with a general description of his topic, namely that calumny is the product of ignorance and that it is a very serious problem which has harmed a considerable number of individuals. Accordingly he introduces the description of the allegory by Apelles, by which as he says, 'I wish to show in words as if in a painting, what sort of thing Calumny is, how it is born and how it works in the world'. This then, is to be a first outline of calumny drawn in words but seen as though it were a picture, and as such it reinforces the comments made above on the power of visual communication; indeed the circumstances surrounding the creation of the original strongly suggest that it too was intended as a substitute for verbal communication. Presumably words would be insufficient to convey the full force of Apelles' message. It is also interesting that Lucian should use the technique of ecphrasis, which is essentially a verbal medium: perhaps the written description of a work of art can be seen as lying half way between true visual and true

verbal communication. This also invites comparison with the example mentioned above wherein a similar type of painting could conceivably have been on Cleanthes' mind in his description of Epicureanism.

Before he introduces the allegory itself, Lucian describes the circumstances under which it was created. Whilst at the court of Ptolemy in Egypt Apelles was falsely accused by his rival and envious colleague, the painter Antiphilus of Alexandria, of being involved in a conspiracy against the king. Antiphilus' testimony prevailed, Apelles was found guilty, and, had it not been for an eleventh-hour reprieve, would have been executed. As it was Antiphilus was punished and Ptolemy offered compensation. Even so, the great artist created the allegory of Calumny so as to preserve forever what had happened to him.

Lucian describes the painting as follows:

> On the right of it sits a man with very large ears, almost like those of Midas, extending his hand to Diabole while she is still at some distance from him. Near him, on one side, stand two women - Agnoia, I think, and Hypolepsis. On the other side, Diabole is coming up, a woman beautiful beyond measure, but full of passion and excitement, evincing as she does fury and wrath by carrying in her left hand a blazing torch and with the other dragging by the hair a young man who stretches out his hands to heaven and calls the gods to witness his innocence. She is conducted by a pale ugly man who has a piercing eye and looks as if he had wasted away in long illness; he may be

> supposed to be Phthonos. Besides, there are two women in attendance on Diabole, egging her on, tiring her and tricking her out. According to the interpretation of them given me by the guide to the picture, one was Epiboule and the other Apate. They were followed by a woman dressed in deep mourning, with black clothes all in tatters - Metanoia, I think, her name was. At all events, she was turning back with tears in her eyes and casting a stealthy glance, full of shame, at Aletheia, who was approaching.
>
> That is the way in which Apelles represented in the painting his own hairbreadth escape.
>
> (Tr. A.M. Harmon).

Lucian's account presents one or two problems of chronology, however. The first is that it is odd that of all the ancient writers, only Lucian mentions this painting, which must have been one of Apelles' most celebrated works. Pliny omits it, and presumably so did the Greek authorities which he consulted; in the surviving fragments of Polybius' On Calumny there is no mention of it either. The second problem concerns the fact that the conspiracy in which Apelles was allegedly implicated involved Theodotus of Tyre, a general in the army of Ptolemy IV Philopator, and took place in 220 B.C.; Apelles and Antiphilus were active about a century earlier - Pliny says the former's period of activity was the 112th Olympiad, 332-329 B.C.. As far as the first difficulty is concerned, arguments ex silento carry little conviction on their own account, as R. Hinks ((1939) 116) rightly says, and it would be unwise to draw any major conclusions from this. The second problem offers more

alternatives, however, one of which is that Lucian was misled by his guide and omitted to verify his dates. This raises doubts as to whether the painting was by Apelles at all. Hinks ((1939) 117) and D. Cast ((1981) 10) believe that, as the conspiracy of Theodotus against Ptolemy IV has some basis in actual fact, what we have is a work of circa 220 B.C. attributed to Apelles by an enthusiastic cicerone or an unreliable local tradition. M.H. Swindler ((1929) 274), L. Petersen ((1939) 53), M. Robertson ((1975) 492) and J. Onians ((1979) 97) believe it was by Apelles, was directed against Antiphilus and was painted under Ptolemy I: by implication if the two artists were contemporaries and Antiphilus was Ptolemy's court painter, 'Antiphilus was the court painter and resented the intrusion of Apelles'[32]. If this is so Apelles could not have been involved with the plot of Theodotus. It is undoubtedly possible for Apelles to have painted a work of this type in view of the artistic milieu of his day, and although it is hard to account for its absence from the sources it could conceivably have been created by him: he had done a portrait of Alexander with Polemos in chains next to him, which suggests that an allegorical work such as the Calumny would not be out of the question at this early date. Hinks ((1939) 117) admits this, although he remains sceptical and prefers the later date, placing it nearer in time to Cleanthes[33]. The problem admits no clear-cut solution, and indeed the

picture may never have existed at all, the entire question having been created out of Lucian's imagination: the episode may be fiction.

However, whether one prefers a later or an earlier date, both options show the rise in importance of wholly allegorical works in the first one hundred years of the Hellenistic era and the importance of images as an alternative to verbal communication. Each figure represents the way of working of the pathos which it personifies: the individual pathe are made intelligible by means of their relation to one another in the picture. Thus the gestures and grouping of the figures, both male and female, as individuals working on the ruler's mind, identified by their appearance, are of great significance. Thus there are some important features which set the Calumny of Apelles apart from its fifth century B.C. precursors. Firstly Classical artists did not attempt compositions of this type without mythical content and with only personifications as actors; secondly Lucian tells us that Apelles attempted to convey the character of each concept by its physiognomy or attributes in a way which Classical artists did not. The latter tended to rely on labels for identification and rarely employed the deliberate and dramatic interaction of the figures which gives Apelles' allegory its special character. However, Lucian's account intimates that there were no inscriptions (the guide identifies the figures for

him) and, although some of the figures seem easier to recognise than others, an astute viewer would probably have been able to identify them.

The Kairos of Lysippus lies in the same tradition as the examples we have already discussed in that it is deliberately depicted in anthropomorphic guise in order to say something about the power and nature of Opportunity, whose character is summed up by a number of attributes in a self-contained image embodying the nature of the personification of the abstraction Kairos. The final couplet of Posidippus' epigram on Kairos, AP 16.275 = HE 3164f., which reads τοὔνεχ' ὁ τεχνίτης σε διέπλασεν; - Εἵνεκεν ὑμέων, ξεῖνε, καὶ ἐν προθύροις θῆκε διδασκαλίην , whose key word for this discussion is the last one, shows just how close to the Stoic methods the author of the epigram thought the statue was. Once again visual allegory replaces verbal communication; the statue expresses at a glance what Posidippus took twelve lines to explain. Thus in the Kairos by Lysippus, just as in Stoic ethics, we have a medium of tuition in which allegory was developed and understood both in speech and in plastic art. As we observed in concluding the chapter on Kairos, statues were becoming less important as icons or images of gods and heroes at this time, set as they were in an environment which was placing an increasing emphasis on gesture, attributes, expression, situation and so on as the 'clues' to an iconographic 'decipherment' of

the figure. The learned scholar is a notable distinguishing feature of the Hellenistic age, and the large number of allegorical works which we have encountered in this period provide firm evidence that the need to convey a given meaning in visual terms stimulated the development and use of gesture and attribute. The role which Kairos plays outside this tradition, as an embodiment of the innovative aspect of Hellenistic art, is discussed throughout the rest of this chapter, but it is still vital to remain aware that the figure occupies a specific place in a wider scheme of things and within a definite line of development.

It has been suggested[34] that the use of personifications and allegory in literature grew out of the attempts to interpret the ancient myths, especially by the application of etymology to the names of the Olympians. Our examination of the ways in which Hesiod handles personifications showed this is only partly true, but we do know that allegorical interpretation of Homer started as early as the sixth century B.C., and that some philosophers, as we have seen above, had a penchant for seeking hidden meanings, hyponoiai, in the poets. Yet allegorism as a method was seemingly only fully developed by Stoic philosophers not earlier than the third century B.C.. Cleanthes, a contemporary of Callimachus, was a leading light here, and allegorism reached its height

with Chrysippus towards the end of the third century B.C.. But the fragment 114 Pf. of Callimachus, to which we now turn, seems to occupy a special place, for it appears that no interpretation of a work of religious art that we could justifiably term allegorical exists which is as old as this. It is striking to have an example from the first half of the third century B.C., and it is conceivable that Callimachus may be drawing on even earlier sources, possibly Attic writers on Delos of circa 300 B.C. or earlier(35).

In this fragment we are provided with a visual equivalent of an etymology of a statue. If Pfeiffer is right the original statue of Apollo with the Graces, which is the subject of the fragment, was sculpted by Angelion and Tectaeus circa 600 B.C., and had the Graces standing on Apollo's right hand. Thus the cult image represented the god with a bow and with the Charites as they were worshipped by pilgrims coming from all over the Greek world. There was no metaphysical intention in the first instance, but what appears in Callimachus' Aetia is an allegorical interpretation separated by at least three hundred years from the time of the original artists. The form of the statue can be seen from Athenian Hellenistic coins cast in 166 B.C., and from a Roman Sardonyx(36). When Apollo is asked why he carries the bow in his left hand (the bad one, even though a right handed

person shoots with the bow in his or her left hand) and holds the Charites in his right, he replies that he is slow to punish but always disposed to give good things:-

> "Are you the Delian Apollo?" "Yes, I am the Delian." "Are you eighteen cubits high?" "That is right, by me (the god)." "Made of gold?" "Yes, made of gold." "And unclad?" "Yes only a belt goes round the middle of me." "For what reason in your left hand, Cynthian, do you hold the bow, and in your right hand your comely Graces?" "...To hold back the stupid from being insolent ... I offer to the good."
>
> (Tr. C.A. Trypanis).

This rationalization of the ancient image may be connected with the Stoic movement, and certainly Callimachus' interpretation with its Stoic overtones, is as gratuitous as the association of Hera with aer, and is rooted in a similar outlook. Yet, gratuitous or not, it is an important process, and furthermore if we invert the process we arrive at the normal way of constructing allegorical personifications, in which the nature of the concept is made visible and explicit by the attributes the figure displays: in this way an image can be explicated by means of attributes, and it is only a matter of personal taste as to how far a poet or artist wanted to go in piling up these specifications, of how many attributes he or she wanted to give a concept to match its definition. Moreover, this linking of poetry or art with personification is not just an intellectual exercise;

it is less concerned with the invention of suitable defining attributes than with the attractions of psychological or physiognomic characterization.

The relationships between the personifications we have been discussing have been of various types. In Cephisodotus' Eirene and Ploutos, and in Callimachus' interpretation of the Apollo statue, the relationship between the figures was seen to be causal; in the Tyche of Antioch the figures have a spatial relationship, and in another work, or perhaps more accurately, event, of this period, the Great Procession of Ptolemy II Philadelphus, the relations can be seen to be temporal. In the fifth book of Athenaeus' Deipnosophistai a detailed account of this procession is excerpted from a larger work by Callixinus of Rhodes called About Alexandria[37]. The quotation describes an enormous civic procession comprising several smaller processions in honour of gods, deified mortals and two personifications from nature. The sub-procession recorded in most detail is that of Dionysus, which takes up about three quarters of the text (197E - 202A). Athenaeus says that the procession happened in the reign, and on the initiative, of Ptolemy II Philadelphus, so Callixinus' description may well have a historical basis, and if it does it forms an important primary source for the cultural history of Alexandria in the early third century B.C., since it raises questions

concerning the date, context, occasion and purpose of the procession, as well as issues of economics, religion, politics and art[38]. It also provides a great deal of useful evidence about personification in the Hellenistic era.

We know at what time the procession began and at what time it ended. The first individual procession honoured Eosphoros, the Morning Star, since the Grand Procession began at dawn (197D 1.4), while the conclusion of the event was indicated by the procession of Hesperos, the Evening Star, since nightfall was the hour of the finale. Thus the sidereal limits of the procession are clear, though not its duration, which may have been several days[39]. However, the function of these two processions, as indicators of the time of the beginning and end of the entire procession, explains their inclusion and position in it. By the Ptolemaic period it was well known that the Morning and Evening Stars are identical, but in myth and literature they were still frequently depicted as two different stars, one bringing dawn, the other evening[40]. Here , however, the need to depict the beginning and end of the procession explains the division of one star into two. The personifications of these two stars have a tradition which reaches back to Homer[41], along with similar natural phenomena like Helios, Selene and Eos; in the fourth century and later, personifications of natural phenomena often

assumed functions additional to their primary representation of nature, like the star Arcturus which is the prologue figure of Plautus' Rudens. Indeed from the time of Plato and Aristotle the stars and their movements assumed an especial interest; the writer of the Platonic Epinomis made them 'recording angels'(42) like the Arcturus of Diphilus. Eosphoros and Hesperos belong to this tradition since, while they do represent particular stars, they also impart information about the duration of the procession. Scientific advances in the observation of the stars and their movements at the hands of people like Eudoxus of Cnidus, Callipus of Cyzicus, Heraclides Ponticus and Aristarchus of Samos may have been one factor in their renewed importance as personifications, but the extended use of these particular personifications from nature may equally be due to the increasing popularity and use of personifications in general in the Hellenistic period, which is well illustrated by the other types of personification which appear in the procession(43). Although we have little information about these two individual processions, we can speculate, as Rice ((1983) 37) does, that the statues of Eosphoros and Hesperos were probably drawn on carts as the central feature of their respective processions, probably as counterparts to one another. The earliest representations of stars were boys or youths as riders, but later Eosphoros and Hesperos were frequently

shown as winged youths, sometimes holding torches to symbolize their light[44]. Something along these lines may be imagined here. Thus the Grand Procession of Ptolemy II Philadelphus forms yet another element in the continuous tradition which we have been examining and adds to the number of media exploiting personification for various purposes: here they perform religious and political functions in the new context of a religious procession.

Let us now turn to some of the other personifications which appear in the procession. Towards the beginning of the Dionysiac procession came a

> 'man, six feet tall, in a tragic costume and mask, who carried the golden horn of Amaltheia. He was called Eniautos. A very beautiful woman of the same height followed him, adorned with much gold jewellery and a magnificent (costume); in one hand she carried a crown of persea, in the other a palm branch. She was called Penteteris. Four Horai followed her, elaborately dressed and each carrying her own fruits' (198A-B).

As far as the procession is concerned Eniautos, Penteteris and the Horai must have a temporal, chronological significance. Penteteris, the five-year cycle, seems to signify that the festival, of which the procession was a part, was a penteteric one, occurring every four years by our reckoning, and this is corroborated by Callixinus' statement at 197D that his sources were contained in the penteteric records. The notion of Penteteris as a recurring cycle of time

assists the decipherment of the other figures: the one representing the Year is called eniautos, a year-long span of time which can begin at any point and need not coincide with any given calendar year, rather than etos, a specific chronological period, be this civic, regnal or calendaric(45). Thus Eniautos is a twelve month period recurring four times to make up a Penteteris. The Horai, moreover, had been associated with Eniautos since the time of Pindar(46), and they may also be seen in this light as the recurring seasons which make up the Eniautos. Members of the 'Cambridge School' made much of the notion of the Eniautos-Daimon being connected to the cycles of nature as a symbol of the recurring fruitfulness of a new year, the harvest, the death and rebirth of nature and so on, and, although these theories no longer carry widespread conviction, we might observe here that all these personified figures carry symbols of nature: Eniautos the horn of plenty (= the year's fruitfulness); Penteteris a crown from the traditionally ever - fruitful Egyptian persea tree; the Horai fruit appropriate to each of them. In fact the very presence of the Horai may connect these cycles to natural cycles, even if this was not their primary connotation in the procession. It is also conceivable that the Horai, the Penteteris and the four Dionysiac scenes which followed them, are intended as allegories of the cycle of growth, maturity and decline which was essential to Dionysiac

cult. As our fig. 33, a Roman relief depicting Dionysus with Spring, Summer and Autumn, which is probably an adaptation of an original of around 200 B.C., shows, Dionysus and the seasons could certainly be shown together in cult.

There are hints of political propaganda in all this. The scenes from the life of Dionysus are followed immediately by Alexander and Ptolemy I wearing gold crowns of ivy leaves, and an assimilation of mythical and historical reality appears to be occurring; Alexander and Ptolemy I, had both assumed the Dionysiac role of Soter, so the religious and political message is that Ptolemy II is directly in line to the god himself. If this is the case we have an instance of the co-existence of the religious and political aspects of these figures which shows new ways in which personifications were used within the continuing tradition of which these allegorical figures form one element.

Such political statements are extremely recondite, but at other levels the procession communicates as explicitly as possible. The words ὃς προσηγορεύετο Ἐνιαυτός (198A) suggest that he was preceded by a labelled banner or that his name was announced as he passed by. We may therefore assume that his appearance may not have permitted immediate identification, although the horn of Amaltheia, which a description of

a cup elsewhere in Athenaeus (783C) suggests was a common attribute of Eniautos, is a well known symbol of the year's fulfilment. Penteteris carries a palm branch and a crown of persea which, besides their connotations of fruitfulness mentioned above, are symbols of victory, possibly an allusion to victory in the agones associated with the festival[47]. The Horai have been common in art from archaic vases and in literature from the time of Hesiod and probably appeared here as elaborately dressed beautiful young women, possibly carrying their appropriate fruits in kana, processional baskets[48].

These nature personifications are not the only ones to appear in the procession. Cities of the Hellenistic 'New World' were often represented by a Tyche figure, as Antioch was, or, in a closely related way, by an allegorical figure which personifies the locality. The era of Alexander's conquests, and that of the Successors, saw both the foundation of many new cities and the discovery of many new regions, all of which had their own distinctive features. There was as a result a proliferation of personifications of these places in the Hellenistic era, and it was a practice which also held propaganda value for rulers who wished to publicise their achievements. So in this procession we encounter Corinth, Nysa, the Greek cities of Ionia, Asia and the Islands under Ptolemaic control.

The representation of Nysa was an 'automaton', a 'self-moving' statue which stood up, sat down and poured a libation from her phiale. Again, some means of identification must have been provided to inform the spectators just who this statue was. It is hard for us to decide which of the numerous Nysas connected with the corpus of Dionysiac myth this was, but it seems likely that she was either the legendary woman Nysa, Dionysus' mortal nurse, or the location Nysa, where Dionysus was raised, or perhaps even a conflation of the two. However her interpretation as the personification of the geographical Nysa best fits the context of the procession[49]; the appearance of other female figures personifying the various cities of Greece, the Islands and Ionia (201 D-E) shows that the idea of Nysa as a personified locality, especially of the place where Dionysus was reared, would have been extremely apt, since it played a large part in the Indian campaign of Alexander which itself forms a central theme of the procession. The locality of Dionysus' birth and nurture is important as far as both Alexander and the procession are concerned, and this further underscores the politico-religious nature of the figures in the procession.

In addition to Nysa we also hear, at 201 D-E, of

> 'statues of Alexander and Ptolemy wreathed with ivy crowns of gold. The statue of Arete beside Ptolemy has a golden crown of olive. Priapus, having an ivy crown of gold, was also present with

> them. The City of Corinth standing by Ptolemy was crowned with a golden diadem'.

This group was followed by women who were called by the names of the cities of Ionia and the rest of the Greek cities which, situated in Asia and the Islands, had been subdued by the Persians. It should be observed that, since the figure which represents Corinth is female, she must be an allegorical one depicting Corinth the city, and not Corinthos the eponymous hero of the city. The gender of a personification is inextricably linked to the gender of the abstract noun which it personifies, and so Eros, Pothos and Kairos are masculine, Occasio, Tyche, Nemesis and the vast majority of abstract nouns in Greek, Latin and other Indo-European languages are feminine. It has been pointed out that the female form in this context does not refer to particular women, does not describe women as a group, and often entirely fails to evoke their natures[50]: for instance, Dike is not represented as woman because women were thought to be just any more than they were considered capable of dispensing justice; Liberty is not female because women were or are free - the opposite is often manifestly the case. The real force behind this 'gynaecomorphism' is nicely illustrated by an exchange in J. Addison's Dialogue upon the Usefulness of Ancient Medals (London 1726) 36, which proceeds as follows:

> 'It is a great compliment methinks to the sex, says Cynthio, that your Virtues are generally shown in petticoats. I can give no other reason for it, says Philander, but because they chanced to be of feminine gender in the learned languages.'

Thus the appearance of the city personifications is of allegorical, iconographic and historical importance[51]. As has already been remarked, such local personifications began in the Classical period and became increasingly popular in the Hellenistic and Roman periods, and were current at Alexandria[52]. Later parallels to these cities can be adduced from the Homereion built by Ptolemy IV Philopator, where there were personifications of the places which claimed to be Homer's birthplace[53], and also from the figure of Alexandria on the second century B.C. Sophilos mosaic, a work strongly influenced by Eutychides' Tyche of Antioch[54]. All these cities were undoubtedly idealized female figures symbolizing the cities which they represented by attributes and dress, and a rough idea of what they may have looked like can be gained from the frieze of the Temple of Hecate at Lagina, dating from circa 100 B.C. which shows personifications of Rome and various Carian cities (Fig. 34). The phrase προσηγορεύοντο δὲ πόλεις (201 E 1.206) suggests, however, that total explicitness was not achieved by attributes alone and that more obvious means of identification were necessary, just as in the case of Eniautos.

There are some scholars who believe that the figures on the first cart carry an allegorical significance closely linked to Prodicus' Choice of Heracles. In these interpretations the triangle is made up of Ptolemy (= Heracles) and Arete (= Virtue) and either Corinth (= Vice)[55] or Priapus (= Vice)[56]. Such hypotheses carry little conviction on iconographical grounds, as Rice (1983) rightly argues. There must surely have been an unequivocal indication that 'Corinth' was meant to represent Corinth the place, or Callixinus would not have called her that, and if the figure was labelled Corinth she could hardly stand for 'vice', which would have been personified like Arete was [57]. It is likely that Arete would have been labelled as such, and, although there is no way of knowing precisely how she appeared, it is probable that she exhibited those features which the spectators naturally associated with a mental picture of her. Prodicus' Choice of Heracles can reasonably be adduced as a parallel in this case; his allegorical Arete had a fair, noble figure with a pure complexion, respectful eye, and modest form, and was dressed all in white. Arete was also personified in art and literature of the fourth century B.C.: according to Pliny HN 34.78, Euphranor produced a statue of 'virtus' and one of Greece, and Aristolaus painted 'virtus'[58], possibly as part of a unified allegorical composition. We may also observe that Arete is often cited as an essential royal attribute

bestowed by the gods: Theocritus xvii, 135ff exhorts Philadelphus to seek arete from Zeus; Callimachus Hymn I Zeus 94-6 exhorts Zeus to grant arete as well as olbos. The concept of arete, and the appearance of its personification in the procession, must have held a special contemporary significance for the Ptolemaic dynasty, and Arete's position on the cart shows that she bestows special honour on Ptolemy Soter.This serves to illustrate that personifications need not necessarily carry religious significance or have their origins in a religious tradition; here personification is being used as a medium of expression which can be manipulated as an instrument for broadcasting political propaganda.

The Great Procession of Ptolemy II Philadelphus shows once again how far visual communication had developed and how art, if this is the right category in which to place the figures partaking in the procession, could compete with words as a vehicle of expression. The need to convey a given meaning by using personification stimulated developments in the way these figures were presented, and in this way the use of art as a visual equivalent of verbal language stimulates stylistic development and leads to a search for new poses and attributes, and to the study of new actions and new objects. This process has, of course, a kind of built-in obsolescence, since, once the essential character of a pose, gesture, expression or

attribute has been grasped for identification purposes, representations of it can be reduced to a summary. However that stage has not been reached yet, as the need for some of the figures to be labelled shows; allegorical personification is still in the developmental stage in the reign of Ptolemy II.

It is clear from the evidence that has been dealt with in this thesis that, as far as allegory is concerned, attention principally focussed on attributes, pose, gesture and expression, as opposed to form and technique. Furthermore, presumably because of the nature of the medium, visual art tends to predominate over literature; these elements are important as a medium of expression in the visual arts in a way that they are not in literature, and so anthropomorphic deified abstractions do not permeate literature to the same extent as they do art in the Hellenistic period[59]. The various relationships between personifications can also be just as central to their meaning as form, gesture and attribute; such is the case with Cephisodotus' Eirene and Ploutos, with Callimachus' Apollo with the Graces, with Hesperos and Eosphoros in Ptolemy's Procession, and with the Tyche of Antioch and the river Orontes in the group by Eutychides.

Thus it is possible for a general idea to be put into a relationship with other general ideas as, say,

child, parent or companion, in a kinship system of gods and personifications which allows the latter to be incorporated into a systematic network of relationships which help to define their functions more clearly. In this way personification can be a vehicle for thought, and from the fifth century B.C., when increasingly large numbers of abstract nouns came into use in various kinds of thinking, their significance and relationships were continually expressed by personification; in certain contexts personifications are extremely 'good to think with', and the Hellenistic era was quick to make extensive use of this facility.

The importance of attributes, pose and the relations between personifications has already been witnessed in Eutychides' Tyche of Antioch[60]. The innovation that this embodies will be discussed below, but what is of immediate interest is her place in the tradition. Here is an allegorical group embodying a situation, with the figures allegorized in a spatial relationship: the mural crown, the palm branch (or the cornucopia on other Tyche figures), the rocky throne and the river flowing from beneath her feet all define the seated woman as the state of Antioch itself. The poses and the relationship between the city and the swimmer indicate that the former was situated on the banks of the latter, and the spectator is surely expected to go through a similar mental process as Posidippus did in

his epigram on Kairos, initially identifying the personifications and then interpreting the allegory of their relationship. Thus the geographical position, and also the economic importance of the city, as represented by the fruits of the earth which the woman holds, are symbolized right from the start in a form whose success is attested by its continuance right through antiquity.

An important element of innovation which is worthy of note here is that, although writers like Polybius had an ambiguous attitude towards Tyche, which corresponds directly to the ambiguity inherent in the very nature of the concept of Tyche itself, the city Tychai, visualized as wearing a mural crown and carrying a cornucopia signifiying abundance, tried to deify tyche in a purely benevolent sense. Walbank ((1981) 200) observes that just how far people really personalized such an abstraction, and whether they had any consistent view about it, is a problem almost impossible to answer, but we should perhaps add that in formulating the problem in the first instance we are saying much about the various attitudes and viewpoints that were prevalent in the Hellenistic age; this in itself provides ample justification for examining personification in general, and Tyche in particular, as a means to a deeper understanding of Hellenistic culture.

A form of imagery very closely related to that of the Ptolemaic festival occurs in a relief found at Bovillae in Italy signed by Archelaus of Priene(61), dating from the second half of the second century B.C. (Fig.35). The scene is divided up into three zones, more or less related in subject, of which the bottom one is of particular interest here. In it Homer is seated on a throne at the side of which crouch figures representing the Iliad and the Odyssey. They are identified by inscriptions. At the footstool are a frog and a mouse who represent the Batrachomyomachia. Chronos and Oikoumene, again identified by words, crown the poet with a wreath, signifying that Homer's achievements are ubiquitously recognized across a large time-span. The faces of these two figures have also been recognized as bearing the features of Ptolemy IV Philopator and Arsinoe II his wife, presumably in a reference to the fact that Ptolemy IV instituted the official cult of Homer in Alexandria in about 210 B.C., dedicating a Homereion which contained a seated statue of the poet(62). The range of Homer's influence is indicated by the figures of Mythos and Historia who perform a sacrifice before him, and by those of Poiesis, Tragodia and Komoidia who greet him, suggesting the idea that all subsequent poetry derives from him(63). On the spectator's right is a group of figures comprising a boy, Physis, who hangs on to and looks back at four women who are Arete, Mneme, Pistis and Sophia. Onians ((1979) 103ff) interprets the group

as an allegory of the qualities of the Homeric poems, with the characters describing their conformity to nature, moral tone, memorability, credibility and technical excellence; Webster ((1964) 145f) believes they describe the virtues which a knowledge of Homer brings to the young, the four women being the elements of Homer's genius (physis). The latter interpretation is perhaps more likely, but whatever the meaning of this particular allegory, Archelaus has managed, by the careful deployment of the figures, to list Homer's major works and describe his position in literary history and criticism, with the grouping of the figures showing that Homer's influence spreads first to the poets, then to wider circles. The imagery of Archelaus is highly sophisticated; it uses labelling, gesture, attribute, grouping and the relationship between the groups, so when Mythos and Historia are separated from the other literary forms by their more active involvement in the sacrifice, this perhaps implies that they are the most essential elements in Homer's work. The political undercurrents further show how subtle this work is and how highly developed the visual language and the underlying thought is; thought and image are closely integrated here.

All the various works of art and literature which have been examined in this section fall into a continuous tradition of allegorical works which stretches back well before the Hellenistic era began and extends deep

into it. Throughout the next section we must remain aware that the figures of the Kairos of Lysippus, the Tyche of Antioch, and the Nemeseis of Smyrna are firmly established within this particular tradition. However, in certain respects Nemesis, Kairos and Tyche show important and quite striking innovations in the representations of concepts, and Kairos and Tyche in particular can be seen as radical departures from the tradition. This tension between tradition and innovation is a salient feature of Hellenistic culture and must be continually born in mind; whereas the Kairos and Tyche figures do lie within this developing artistic tradition they lie outside any religious tradition, and therefore they form a good eyepiece through which to analyse certain changes taking place in various aspects of social and religious life in the Hellenistic period. They tell us that there was room for innovation within the religious tradition, and that personifications can come into existence as a result of ad hoc creation by artists who need not rely on that religious tradition. Once the investigation of change and innovation is complete we shall examine Nemesis and see how she enshrines many of these conflicting factors at one and the same time.

b) Change

One would be hard put to describe figures such as the Kairos of Lysippus and the Tyche of Antioch, as we find them in the Hellenistic period, as mythical in

the same sense as the Olympian gods and heroes are. They represent something quite different from Eros, Eukleia, Nike or even Euripides' Lyssa, in that they are deliberately created abstract figures, self-conscious artistic inventions, products of artistic conceit. This facility to fabricate personifications outside the religious or mythological tradition, as we have seen in our examination of Hellenistic literature, art and indeed politics (as in the case of Metados, for example), is a characteristic feature of the age. The artist certainly seems to perceive a clear-cut distinction between the abstract notion and the human form in which he or she chose to place it, but the fact that these unashamedly imaginary figures seem to have been taken for granted by the public and became part of the repertory of official art, is indicative of how deeply ingrained mythopoeic thought was, even in the Hellenistic era. As Hinks ((1939) 17f) observes, even when the most rationalizing thought had managed to depersonalize the cosmos and represent its functions as the result of abstract forces, the popular imagination continued to people the hills and woods with nymphs and satyrs, to see the thunderbolt of Zeus in every stormcloud. This coexistence of philosophical speculation and religious imagination makes the personifications and allegories of the Hellenistic era plausible and preserves them from the sterility of many of their modern derivatives.

The Tyche of Antioch and the Kairos of Lysippus show a remarkable parallelism in that in each case the sculptor has homed in on one particular aspect of the concept which he wished to personify, and produced a sculpture that, for artistic and cultural reasons, has been responsible for a considerable shift in emphasis in the usage of that concept. In Lysippus' case the temporal semantic field came to predominate over the spatial meanings; in Eutychides' case the introduction of the city Tyche was instrumental in adding this particular aspect to the 'luck' meanings of the word - the Tyche of a city is highly specific in its frame of reference and forms a kind of sub-category of what we might call '<u>tyche</u> in general'; it represents the concept of <u>tyche</u> as applied to a city explicitly as its tutelary deity, and as such it is closely circumscribed, lying within the field of the wider connotations of the other diverse meanings of the word:



It is for this reason that the artistic and social sides of Tyche's meaning, with all their individual subtle nuances, can exist concurrently. Kairos on the

other hand shows the artistic side of the concept completely dominant. The reason for this is that the Kairos of Lysippus was able to exercise such a hold over the temporal meaning of kairos that this became the pre-eminent semantic field: here, instead of forming a sub-group of a larger category, the temporal kairos becomes the most important aspect of the word:



The processes are closely similar; the difference is more due to the degree of influence exercised than anything else:



It is partly for these reasons that the two figures have been described as the patron saints of the Hellenistic age.

The cult of Tyche is habitually cited by scholars as a characteristic of the (early) Hellenistic period[64]: indeed a cult of Agathe Tyche had been in existence at Athens since 335/4 B.C.[65]. It is undoubtedly true that the conquests of Alexander and the unstable political and military climate of the time had a strong influence on the feeling that there was a power at work greater than human volition. If Alexander and his successors had practised some severely orthodox Macedonian religion, as Murray ((1912) 112) points out, it would have been understandable if their subjects had assumed that the gods of Macedon were the rulers of the world. But this was manifestly not the case. The Hellenistic monarchs tolerated most of the religions that they encountered, and so, in default of any positive object (to use Dodds' words ((1951) 242) the sentiment of dependence attached itself to the idea of the unexplained and the unpredictable, which is Tyche. Furthermore, although the workings of tyche were held to be completely random, people still maintained the idea that the force which brings good or bad luck can be influenced and propitiated, and from this stage (indeed the process may happen simultaneously), it is easy to impute personality, thoughts, plans and emotions to Tyche.

This is clearly something very different from all that is associated with the Tyche of Antioch and the cult of city Tychai in general; the personified goddess

Tyche is a different concept from Agathe Tyche and the personal tyche of an individual. However it is an important and significant feature of Hellenistic thought and is, to a degree, governed by social, historical and political circumstances prevailing at the time. These will be discussed more fully in section iii(b) below, but for the moment we may observe the different emphases which exist in the artistic and non-artistic spheres; the Tyche of Antioch is one specific facet of a very broad field.

These differences are the same in the case of Kairos, only more pronounced. Here the greater emphasis which is placed on art directly reflects the nature of events in which one work of art plays a major part. Our examination of the spatial side of Kairos' meaning showed just how widespread that usage of the word was in the centuries prior to the Hellenistic age, and that the temporal meaning was just one amongst several. Lysippus thus created the personified Kairos more or less from nothing and was also able to dictate the sense in which he personified it; the personified Kairos is, then, a creation of the Hellenistic age, and the shift in its principal meaning from spatial to temporal goes hand in hand with it. As in the case of tyche, the social and historical climate of the times aided development. In such a volatile world it was especially important for individuals to take their chances, but the second factor, which to an extent

depended on the social milieu, was the sheer brilliance of Lysippus' work. Our examination of the tradition in i.(a) showed how receptive the Hellenistic age was to allegorical figures and representations, and here is an allegorical figure par excellence. This was an artistic masterpiece of such a magnitude that it exerted a powerful hold over its viewing public and so was able to dominate the meaning of the concept which forms its subject matter. In such a cultural environment a personification need not be mythical but can be created at whim.

The Kairos and Tyche show, in differing degrees which are in themselves interesting, a specific type of innovation in the ways the concepts are depicted, even though this type of innovation fits into a continuous tradition of allegorical works. Both go to show that the artistic side of the concept can come to occupy a special status within the complete spectrum of that concept's meanings, which varies according to the different artistic, historical, social, religious, political and other criteria which we have encountered. The two figures can, however, be shown in a sharper perspective by the addition of a third element which will in herself and by means of her association with them, show precisely how they stand in relation to the tradition and just how radical the innovations are. So far in this section we have discussed continuity and change in isolation; I now

wish to discuss continuity and change together as they are encapsulated in one personifiction which shows a growth of significance and innovations in a firmly established figure. She is Nemesis.

c) Continuity and Change

The figure of Nemesis in the Hellenistic period exhibits extension within a tradition, and as such embodies both continuity and change. It is essential to our assessment of the significance of Nemesis in this argument to realise that from the outset she has some fundamental characteristics which differ greatly from Tyche and Kairos. Uppermost among these is the fact that at the beginning of the Hellenistic period, when the Tyche of Antioch and the Kairos of Lysippus were being created, there was already a very strong literary, artistic and mythological tradition in which she played an important part. She also differs from them because the artistic representations of her lie in two different iconographic traditions. Thus there is less place for innovation, and the changes which do occur in her case take place more subtly and over a longer time-span; consequently they are harder to document and harder to pinpoint at any specific juncture.

On the other hand, Nemesis also exhibits parallel aspects with Kairos and Tyche, most notably in that, although the word itself has a vast number of nuances,

the artistic, or iconographical, dominance was related to one particular, although fundamental, aspect of the spectrum, that of the right measure as symbolised by the measuring-stick and the bridle. There is a close link between the fact that, despite the fame of her statue at Rhamnus, it was the Smyrnaean side of her iconography which dominated, and the iconographical power which Kairos and Tyche exerted. The reasons for this are surely artistic in the main and show just how powerful allegorical personification was as a vehicle of expression of abstract concepts, and how receptive the viewing public was to artworks of this sort. So the power of the visual image and the importance and influence of allegorical representation by means of attributes, which was so pronounced in Kairos and the Tyche of cities, is also visible in Nemesis, although, for the reasons we have given, not quite to the same extent.

During the Hellenistic period Nemesis acquired a significance in erotic contexts, the trait of jealousy, a role in competitive situations and a number of syncretisms, most notably with Tyche and Isis. These are important modifications, for there is a strong link between Hellenistic society and the way it chose to conceive of Nemesis and the ways in which she operates; similar influences are at work here to those which led to the popularity of Kairos and Tyche, for in an environment where world affairs were so

unstable it is quite understandable that people should seek to explain events in terms of chance, opportunity or the powers of Nemesis. Religious factors such as syncretism also play their part, for, in a social environment where Greek and non-Greek came into contact on an unprecedented scale, the amalgamation of deities from different cultures was only natural, even if the deities were superficially often quite dissimilar. Thus Nemesis, by her equation with Tyche, Isis and other deities, fell into this scheme in which the boundaries between deities became re-drawn to some degree.

All these extensions occur within a tradition, and, despite the developments which were taking place, Nemesis was still identifiable by means of most of the traits which she had in her original form. Here we are dealing with shifts in emphasis and shifts in perspective, the bringing forth and development of latent characteristics; change is taking place within a context of continuity.

ii) On the so-called 'decline' of religion in the Hellenistic period and the case for believing that something radically new does occur.

a) New developments

It has already been seen that the Kairos of Lysippus and the Tyche of Antioch are striking developments in the area of personification in art, and we have also witnessed parallel processes in fields such as politics, with, for instance Cercidas' creation of Metados and some of the figures in the Great Procession of Ptolemy Philadelphus. All these are conscious creations which lie outside the religious tradition, but we have also seen some more subtle developments in the handling of personification, as for example in Callimachus' Hymns, where by a kind of artistic 'sleight of hand' so typical of much Hellenistic writing, he is able to manipulate personification as a literary device to score 'points' in a literary environment which demanded precisely that kind of cleverness. We saw this process taking place in Hymn 6 Demeter in the blurring of the boundaries between Erysichthon and Aithon and between the nymph and her tree, and also in Hymn 4 Delos where the same conceit was applied to localities and nymphs. In discussing this we also adduced parallels from second century B.C. paintings where the personifications of pastures, mountains, winds and coast are depicted as small figures within the

elements they personify, such as Krene and Aktai, as well as figures like Nile and the Orontes. We have also commented on the influence of the artistic types of the Kairos of Lysippus and the Tyche of Antioch, as well as on the rather more subtle, though none the less instructive, re-definitions which Nemesis undergoes, and observed a vast increase in the significance of Tyche in all kinds of writing and in cult. Tyche becomes a vitally important factor in historical, dramatic and philosophical literature. Polybius' attitude to Tyche[66] is especially interesting because of the inconsistencies and self-contradictions which appear in his work; in Menander, Tyche speaks the prologue of the Aspis, and the whole corpus of evidence that New Comedy provides is very valuable for assessing how tyche was conceived at the outset of the Hellenistic age. Again there are contraditions: though the characters frequently decry tyche's fickleness and unfairness, tyche is still one of the prime movers of the dramatic action and is frequently responsible for the ultimately just and happy outcome of the drama. Epicurus also shows through his work that he felt it was of paramount important to free oneself from Tyche, for although the Greeks of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. had felt her force, and Athens in particular had undergone fearful disasters but always recovered, the world was now very different, and Athens was at the bottom of the heap and Tyche was dealing some devastating blows

to Greece. A fundamental precept of Hellenistic wisdom now became the ability to 'laugh at Tyche'[67].

b) The 'decline' of religion

H.I. Bell ((1953) 65) sees the heavy emphasis laid on Tyche in Hellenistic literature as a sign of 'the scepticism which had been common among the educated élite at the end of the classical period in Greece and at Rome in the later republic', The emphasis of Bell's argument is on the educated 'élite', but the broader idea of a decline in religion in the Hellenistic period has been posited unequivocally by many scholars at many times[68]. In their scheme of things Tyche becomes a barometer of the supposed decline. In the light of the findings made thoughout this thesis however, this view is surely untenable; Tyche is not an indicator of a decline but rather of the changes of emphasis which go hand in hand with social, political, historical and artistic developments in the Hellenistic world, some of which are completely new, others of which are continuations of a tradition. In Bell's words (loc. cit. supra) we are witnessing 'not a decay in religion but a new orientation of the religious consciousness'. This notion is crucial to this thesis, and in view of this I intend to examine the question of the alleged decline in depth, assessing Tyche's role in the overall scheme in the process. All the various aspects of this question have been encountered at some stage in the earlier

chapters: I now wish to bring them together as under one heading and discuss them as a unit.

Ancient religious behaviour is frequently interpreted along the lines that belief in one or more gods arises, reaches a zenith and then declines. Futhermore this assumption is often accompanied by the notion that a new belief only arises because an old one has become obsolete. The end result of this is that processes such as the importing of new gods from other cultures, the assimilation of foreign gods with one's own, and syncretism are believed to come about because people have 'lost faith' in their traditional cults. In addition to this, ruler cult is held to arise since the Olympians have become moribund, and the belief in Tyche is seen as equal and opposite to the withdrawal from belief in the traditional gods. According to this interpretation of the situation, new beliefs arise specifically to replace the old. Yet our findings related to Kairos, Nemesis and Tyche show that polytheism is a 'system' which can readily accept new beliefs and practices without necessarily rejecting traditional ones, and without the need for a complete readjustment[69]. It therefore seems preferable to interpret the phenomena in terms of a gradual and unsystematic transference, rather than an inexorable process of replacement, since this will enable us to reject the idea of a uniform decline in belief or in the ritual which accompanies it, secondly to free

ourselves from the prejudice that Hellenistic religion was unable to yield emotional satisfaction, with the result that people were forced to seek exotic gods or to turn to astrology and magic, and finally to rid ourselves of the supposition that philosophy killed the beliefs of ordinary people. Having done this we can then assess the importance of Tyche not against a background of a failure of nerve or the secularizing of religion, but as part of a reorientation of religious consciousness which is characterized by continual changes rather than by substitutions.

The import and assimilation of new gods, syncretism, ruler cult, and the cult of Tyche have all been regarded as more or less parallel developments which indicate the extent to which religion had declined in the Hellenistic age. It can be cogently argued that this is not the case, but it is necessary to assess the entire range of symptoms of this decline in order to refute the arguments in favour of it, since by sketching in the full background of the picture we shall be better placed to see in detail the exact function which Tyche has. This is why it is essential to discuss the factors in each of the sub-headings of this section: only with the insights afforded by them can we experience the full significance of Tyche and the part she plays in Hellenistic thought, writing, art and cult.

i) Import of new gods, syncretism, assimilation and the trend towards monotheism

In discussing Nemesis we remarked on the general acceptance that syncretism of deities whose spheres of operation were, in former times at any rate, rigorously separated, is an salient feature of Hellenistic religions[70]. Posnansky ((1890) 56) attributed this feature to a fading of the accustomed conceptions of the individual deities, Rossbach ((1897 - 1902) 145) to a trend which endeavoured to unite different gods with one another, and both scholars saw the process as part of a more widespread movement towards monotheism, in the words of the former to 'an unconscious striving after monotheism which had, in its turn, its origin in the general dissatisfaction with the existing deities and the disdain for the ancient mythological conceptions'. Wardman ((1982) 112) however warns against this temptation to over-emphasise those parts of cult which seem like anticipations of monotheistic religion in a simplistically neat transition from polytheism to henotheism to Christianity; such an interpretation is over-influenced by the hindsight imposed by the ultimate Christian triumph. Even so assessments like Posnansky's have persisted right through to the current generation of scholars; Walbank ((1981) 210), in observing that the Olympian religion had been 'under attack', speaks of how the sophistic movement had engendered an atmosphere of sceptism about most

accepted beliefs, how at the same time many foreign cults had found a home in Greek cities, and how the worship of the traditional gods had become associated with abstractions like Philia, Eirene, Ploutos and Demokratia. This leads him to assert that the old certainties had gone and though ancient rites were still zealously performed in the conviction that what was traditional should be preserved, many people were at bottom agnostics or even atheists, and also that observance of established rituals must have meant little to many worshippers. Yet despite this powerful lobby of first-rate scholars with a tradition spanning practically one hundred years[71], I do not feel the arguments in favour of the 'decline' are convincing, especially in the light of the findings made throughout this thesis. Let us now discuss the issue in detail.

The fusion of Greeks and Barbarians goes back at least to Alexander's act of the marriage ceremony at Opis in 324 B.C., but widespread integration of Greek with non-Greek, at least in Egypt, did not come until after the battle of Raphia, between Ptolemy IV and Antiochus III in 217 B.C., with the enrolment of 20,000 native troops in the phalanx[72]. This helped to bring about a greater increase in the intermingling and intermarriage of races, and although this happens less frequently as one gets higher up the social scale, Greeks and people of Greek background increasingly

took to the worship of Egyptian gods whom they often identified with Greek gods. This can be shown by a late second century B.C. dedication on behalf of Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II and Cleopatra and their children:

> to Cnoubis who is also Ammon, Satet who is also Hera, Anuket who is also Hestia, Petempamentes who is also Dionysus, Petensetis who is also Cronos, Petensenis who is also Hermes, the great gods and the other powers who look after the cataract (OGI. 130).

In addition to this it is also often said that Alexander's conquests ended the isolation of the Greek city state, with its civic cults and rites, and that into the space created by the Macedonian conquests were drawn all kinds of foreign cults, especially the Oriental mysteries. But, as Burkert ((1985) 178ff) rightly argues, polytheism is an open system and the Greek pantheon is not immutable. He cites the Adonis cult on Lesbos in c. 600 B.C.[73], the adoption of Cybele by the Greeks of Asia Minor in the seventh century B.C.[74], the fact that Pindar composed for the Meter cult at Thebes[75] and the Metroon at Athens which housed the state archives and a statue by Agoracritus showing Meter with a tympanon and a lion[76], the appearance of the Phrygian god Sabazios who is set side by side with Dionysus in fifth century Athens[77], the official cult of Thracian Bendis introduced during the Peloponnesian War[78], and the fourth century B.C. cult of Ammon in Athens[79] as

examples of the conscious adoption of foreign gods which occurred throughout Greece prior to the Hellenistic period. Such evidence clearly refutes assertions such as we find in Tarn and Griffith ((1952) 341) to the effect that, in the Hellenistic period, 'the common man .... must worship something[80], and, as the Olympians faded, a more real religious feeling began to develop, and the appeal of the intimate and confident oriental worships became irresistible'. Thus the increased variety of religious practices which undoubtedly arose from the expansion of the spatial and cultural horizons of the Greek world, cannot be made to indicate a decline in religion. To argue that imported ideas, or innovations like Tyche, were a destructive force in the Hellenistic age, and that intellectual developments had a far-reaching and negative 'knock-on' effect on everyday beliefs, and also to regard the practice of new cults (which supposedly therefore entails a neglect of 'true' or traditional religion) as synonymous with the 'decline' is surely erroneous. Throughout its history Greek polytheism shows respect for and neglect of its tradition, and also the acquisition of new gods and practices; what distinguishes these processes, and also syncretism, in the Hellenistic world was their vast extent and the origins of some of the cults and deities involved, but that should not entitle us to see as manifestations of 'disdain', 'dissatisfaction' or 'degeneration' what

would more properly be termed 'modifications' or 'shifts of emphasis'.

ii) Ruler cult[81]

In addition to the importation and assimilation of new gods, the advocates of the pro-decline case often adduce a further corpus of evidence in support of their arguments. This revolves mainly around the cult of the Hellenistic rulers. Using the Hymn to Demetrius Poliorcetes as a central text, and bringing in also the undoubted scepticism in Cercidas' Fr. 4 Powell, Callimachus' Hymns, the writings of Euhemerus and the work of Hecataeus of Abdera (who wrote under Ptolemy I arguing that the gods were former kings who were deified after their death, and to whom Euhemerus was deeply indebted) they conclude for example, that there was 'a very genuine despair of the times, when the normal gods had not only proved themselves ineffective but had their existence called into question by philosophers' (Webster (1964) 14), and speak of a weakening belief in traditional religion as evidenced by ruler cult, which is held to be indicative of a self-abasement of Hellenistic cities before their superiors in wealth and power. It is also argued that the protecting deities of the Greek cities lost their importance, and perhaps the most extreme statement of this view comes from Dodds ((1951) 242) who, in reference to the alleged decline of public religion at Athens, says 'when the old gods withdraw, the empty

thrones cry out for a successor, and with good management, or even without management, almost any perishable bag of bones may be hoisted into the vacant seat. So far as they have any religious meaning for the individual, ruler-cult and its analogues ... are primarily ... expressions of helpless dependence; he who treats another human being as divine thereby assigns to himself the relative status of a child or an animal'(82).

We must be careful, however, not to see this denigration of the gods which occurs in some, but not all(83), philosophical contexts, as an attitude pervading the whole of society. It is undoubtedly surprising to read the Hymn to Demetrius Poliorcetes and also to learn that later, in 304/3 B.C. on his visit to Athens, he established himself in the Parthenon as a living god and brother of Athena, but a close examination of the points at issue will reveal that this is not a mark of the depravity of the Hellenistic age or that politics had reduced religion to a pure matter of form. The Hymn is unusual in that denigration of the traditional cults was not the norm in ruler cults; rather, as Price ((1984) 38f) has shown, the honours were in fact based on the honours of the gods and carefully inserted into the body of traditional cults. It must also be noted that, although ruler cult was largely an innovation of the period, it was not disruptive or subversive; ruler

cult should be set against the background of polytheistic assimilation, for it was never intended to supplant the existing gods, but to co-exist. In fact Wardman ((1982) 90) practically argues for an increase in belief when he says that ruler cult did not displace the traditional cults but reinforced them by adding new deities. Furthermore, although we are told that the Hymn to Demetrius was popular[84] it must be emphasised that it had no tangible effect on civic cults at Athens.

We might also add that those who follow the conventional view of the decline of the traditional gods have argued that the temples of these gods were defunct and were taken over for imperial cult, citing, for example, the dedication to thea Livia on the epistyle of the Temple of Nemesis at Rhamnus[85]. Yet there is practically no evidence of this from Asia Minor and only two cases from mainland Greece. Admittedly some cults did die away in the course of antiquity, especially in areas which experienced economic difficulties, but they were replaced by new ones. However, as Price ((1984) 164) rightly says, takeovers of this sort were demonstrably rare and it is 'entirely wrong on the basis of them to sing a dirge over the old gods'.

iii) Tyche in cult

Dodds ((1951) 242) described the wide diffusion of the cult of Tyche in the early Hellenistic age as a related phenomenon to that of ruler cult and as a significant pointer to the decline of religion for which he argues. He also concurred in the description of Tyche as the last stage in the secularising of religion and he is not alone in this view. Cary ((1951) 366) believes that the more shallow intellects hovered in the borderland between religious faith and mere negation by paying homage to chance; Murray (1912) asks 'what was left when the conception of the Olympian religion proved inadequate?' (111) and comes up with the answer 'Fortune'. More recently Walbank ((1981) 218ff) has spoken of a decline in confidence in traditional cults and of divinity becoming depersonalized by the growth of abstractions which can be traced back to the fourth century B.C. In short, then, we have another well-established tradition of scholarship which upholds the view of a decline in religion in the Hellenistic era, though this time the cult of Tyche is cited as the main indicator.

This viewpoint does not square with the findings that have been made throughout this thesis. The innovations that Tyche represents have been discussed above, along with some of the particular reasons, iconographical and religious, for the importance and influence of Tyche of Antioch and related figures, but to these we

can add that even though, for example, the cult of Tyche had been in existence in Athens since 335/4 B.C., this did nothing to damage the cult of other deities who were important to the city: Greek polytheism is an accommodating system which can admit individual additions without the system itself going into decline, and, despite the fact that some gods were more important than others, the acknowledgement of a new deity did not cause any correlative indifferent to other cults. The system functions on an ever-shifting pattern, not by straightforward substitution. The rise in significance in Tyche comes from iconographic, historical and political forces, and her new found importance is not achieved at the expense of the traditional religion.

It is also important to bear in mind at what level the criticism of the established religion was pitched. It comes from the upper echelons of society, from the intellectual élite,and seems to have little influence on the general public and their activities. Even-hard line attitudes such as that expressed by Pliny HN 2.22 cannot be pressed to imply neglect of other deities. Furthermore, when we are told by Diogenes Laertius X. 134 that Epicurus 'does not hold chance to be a god, as the world in general does, for in the acts of a god there is no disorder', this does not indicate a religious decline, but rather shows us the gap which exists between the philosopher and the

person-in-the-street. Hence when Murray ((1912) 116) says 'so much for the result in superstitious minds of the denial, or rather removal, of the Olympian gods. It landed men in the worship of Fortune' he is both mistaken and unnecessarily condescending. The advent of the cult of Tyche on a wider scale caused a shift in emphasis within the system, not a wholesale degeneration of it.

iv) Temples, priesthoods and ritual

It cannot be doubted that the events leading up to the installation of Demetrius of Phalerum as epimeletes in Athens in 317 B.C. were far-reaching in their repercussions. The Hymn to Demetrius Poliorcetes shows one way in which its composer reacted to these influences, wondering what had become of the divine protectors of Athens; what they were doing and what they were caring for. Prior to this, in response to Alexander's demands for divine recognition, Demosthenes had advised the Athenian assembly 'to recognise the king as the son of Zeus, or even as Poseidon, if it gives him pleasure'. This has been taken as evidence that in the emancipated circles for which polytheism had lost its meaning such issues were regarded as inconsequential[87], but surely 'emancipated' is the key word here, and Demosthenes' words are clearly loaded with sarcasm. In fact none of these events seriously affected the actual ceremonies of worship, or the religion of the people; indeed, far from neglecting the old festivals, the Hellenistic age

created new ones such as the Soteria at Delphi, the Museia at Thespiae, the Asclepieia at Cos, the Didymeia at Miletus and the gatherings to Artemis Leukophryene at Magnesia-on-the-Maeander and to Athena at Priene. Our sources continually mention processions, sacrifices, temples and images, and these are, in Price's words ((1984) 11), 'the crucially important collective constructs to which the individual reacted. Ritual was what there was'.

Despite the fact that seer-craft was still held in common esteem, that oracles were still regularly consulted, that festivals increased in number and splendour, that priesthoods were objects of competition and were often bought and sold for high prices even though more heavy expenditure was imposed on the holders(88), that mystery religions like that of the 'Great Gods' on Samothrace were still very much in vogue, and that private religious societies underwent a considerable expansion(89), it is still argued that twilight was falling on the Olympians,that the new epiphanies, oracles and festivals, and the attempted religious revival in Greece after 146 B.C., are merely external show, that the great temples that were built and completed were generally to some alien deity, and that an index of what was occurring can be seen in the one great temple which a Greek city planned to a Greek god, the Temple of Apollo at Didyma, which was still unfinished four centuries

later, not through lack of funds but' for that lack of living faith which had formerly enabled cities to complete their temples in a generation' (Tarn and Griffith (1952) 336f.). It is also argued that, in accordance with the - supposedly - mainly secular character of Hellenistic art, temples occupied a less important place in the architectural scheme of things than in classical time although Didyma and Magnesia-on-the-Maeander are admitted as exceptions. But, as Burkert((1985) 88) remarks, from the point of view of Greek religion the temple had never been given as a matter of course; most sanctuaries were older than their temples, and a number of them never had a temple. Furthermore, even though the highest skill and craftsmanship was devoted to the building of Greek temples, the expenditure on them had never been totally excessive: for instance, the entire Periclean building programme on the Athenian Acropolis cost the city no more than around 7% of what the Peloponnesian War cost(90). Any assessment of the 'decline' in terms of temple construction must take these factors into account, especially given that most Hellenistic cities already possessed well-established temples to their major gods, whilst new cities were involved in building schemes and town-planning exercises which, while they included temples as significant features, also had to provide other public services out of the overall budget.

To interpret a lack of large-scale building of a sacred nature, which is in any case a highly debatable issue, as a feature of the 'decline' is to misinterpret the situation. Just as the whole polytheistic system accumulated gods and occasionally pushed some deities into the background, so a similar process happened with the temples which housed the gods. Temples which became less significant to the community in its changed circumstances were sometimes less well maintained, but this is surely a product of a shift in the orientation of the religious consciousness, not a product of decadence in religion.

It is frequently assumed, in reference to the festivals, which generally featured a procession, like that of Ptolemy II Philadelphus which may be part of a Ptolemaic festival[91], a sacrifice, a feast and games[92], that the importance of the god and the importance of the ruler operate on an inversely proportional relationship. Certainly some elements of Greek religion were transformed at the hands of the Macedonians under Alexander and carried the influence until the period of his successors and beyond[93]. In their isolated, foreign milieu the civic religious festivals underwent variation of their traditional aspects until ultimately religious celebrations could be divorced from any ritualized civic context tied to specific cult practices. Thus the content of the celebrations varied; for instance some of Alexander's

festivals honoured several gods at once rather than a single god upon the occasion of his or her annual festival(94). This enlargement of the festivals to include several gods meant that the originally close links between the procession and specific religious ritual were dissolved, since the procession no longer formed part of the larger ritual in the same way. Thus the procession became a method of worship in its own right, and ritual elements could be manipulated at the organiser's will. Proponents of the 'decline' argument assert that this shows that individuals had lost touch with their own religion, or had been influenced by scepticism, or that they treated religion merely in terms of its entertainment value. However, as Wardman ((1982) 25f.) points out, the religious sense was not wholly lost or reduced. Admittedly the rulers became more important, but they are still associates of the gods and the gods have not been supplanted. This illustrates the forces of continuity and change which are inherent in the polytheistic system and which should be interpreted as readjustment rather than decline.

The same argument holds good for sacrifices. To argue that sacrifices diminish in importance relative to feasts is surely to create a false problem(95) since it is wrong to divide a single Greek semantic field into two and to distinguish between the religious and secular aspects. The notion of decline in this context

is also invalid, for even as far back as Homer the emphasis could be put on the banquet. Changes in sacrifice which did take place show the way in which the institution reflected changes in society such as the widening definition of membership of the community and the increasing sphere of public action allowed to individuals vis-a-vis the city. Sacrifice, rather than becoming obsolete, was integrated into city life.

v) Emotion and frigidity

In answer to our arguments concerning the role of temples and ritual in the Hellenistic era the pro-decline advocates assert that, even if ritual was still flourishing, it was meaningless, frigid and devoid of emotion. Cary ((1951) 365), Tarn and Griffith ((1952) 337) and Festugière ((1955) 8,12) have all expressed views along these lines, but the assessment of Gilbert Murray is perhaps the most well-known and the most damning; on p.103 of Four Stages of Greek Religion he talks of a 'change in the whole relation of the writer to the world around him ... a rise of asceticism, of mysticism ... of pessimism; a loss of self-confidence, of hope in this life and of faith in human effort; a despair of patient enquiry, a cry for infallible revelation; an indifference to the welfare of the state, a conversion of the soul to God.... There is an intensifying of certain spiritual emotions; an increase in sensitiveness, a failure of nerve.' If the invention

of Kairos by Lysippus, the increase in importance of Tyche, and the developments undergone by Nemesis are not to be brought into this scheme of things, as, on the strength of the conclusions formulated throughout the previous chapters, I believe they must not, these points and assessments must be shown to be erroneous and outmoded.

Recent scholarship in this field has been concerned to show that modern regard for spirituality as a value is not relevant to Hellenistic religion. Price ((1984) 11) is surely right to observe that 'belief' as a religious term is profoundly Christian in its implications, and to note that the emphasis which 'belief' gives to spiritual commitment has no necessary place in the analysis of other cultures. In other words, the question about the 'real beliefs' of the Greeks is implicitly Christianizing and therefore anachronistic. The same can be said of emotion as the criterion of the significance of rituals. Apart from the fact that there is no real evidence, to use feelings and emotions as the measure of authenticity in ritual and religion is, as Price again points out, ((1984) 10), an appeal to the Christian virtue of religio animi, that is the interiorized beliefs and feelings of individuals. It is a mistake to impose one religion's values on the ritual on a different society without considering their relevance to that society. So although for instance established cults may have

provided a religious experience which was unlike those which had dealt principally with civic benefits, the latter should not be dismissed as frigid, since the two kinds were not necessarily mutually exclusive. As Wardman ((1982) 114) warns, we should not suppose that people took to oriental cults because they had been spiritually starved for centuries; the cults were complements rather than alternatives and it would be a 'vulgar modern error' (Wardman (1982) 171) to suppose that the great religious occasions of state were always unemotional. Such ideas about the decline in belief and the unemotional nature of civic polytheism are symptomatic of a particular type of contemporary religious outlook. Burkert ((1985) 275) enshrines the essence of this issue when he observes that it is our own Christian standpoint which makes us dismiss a piety without faith, hope and love as extrinsic, superficial and not obtaining the essence of religion, and that it would be a mistake to return a verdict of not genuine simply because Greek religion is turned towards outward realities: 'a creed or confession of faith is as foreign to Greeks as the Spanish inquisition'.

vi) <u>Scepticism: Philosophy and Euhemerus</u>

There remains one more area to analyse if we are to escape fully from the notion of a decline in Hellenistic religion and thereby acquit Tyche, Kairos and Nemesis of their alleged involvement in it.

Throughout the preceeding discussion we have come across the idea that belief was destroyed by philosophy. Yet criticism of anthopomorphism in particular, and of traditional religion in general, has a pedigree which goes back at least as far as Xenophanes. Much of Greek philosophy acknowledged the existence of the gods; Cleanthes in his famous Hymn to Zeus, identified the Stoic principle with Zeus[96] and Epicurus, though arguing that the gods have no concern with human affairs, is careful not to reject their existence or discourage the performance of rites due to them. Therefore the argument that religion declined because people were taught to lose it by philosophers surely cannot be allowed to stand. Wardman ((1982) 171) rightly observes that Stoic doubt was directed against philosophy which claimed too much or too little for the gods, not against the gods themselves, and that philosophy as a means of secularization is familiar to us from the modern world, but should not be exported to other cultures without modification.

Walbank ((1981) 219) sees two trends which sought to define the gods in terms acceptable to people who were basically sceptical about their existence. The first is the depersonalization of divinity by the growth of abstractions, as manifested in the widespread worship of Tyche. This we have already encountered. The second trend falls into the line of thought mainly associated with Euhemerus of Messene[97] who wrote under

Cassander between 311 and 298 B.C., taking up the work of Hecateus of Abdera who wrote under Ptolemy I in circa 315/4 B.C.[98]. He argued that the gods were former kings deified for their benefactions after death. His writings seem to have followed the earliest ruler cults, by which they may have been influenced, but there is no sign that they affected the further development of Ptolemaic ruler cult. Walbank's viewpoint goes back at least to Gilbert Murray, who parallels Alexander's journey to India where he was made a god with Dionysus' journey from India to Greece where he was made a god, and draws the conclusion ((1912) 140) that this threw a flood of light onto all the traditional mythology which, he argues, had always been a puzzle to thoughtful people and was impossible to believe as it stood, although a tension existed between this scepticism and the general reluctance to see the whole of myth as a mass of falsehood and Homer and Hesiod as liars. He goes on to assert that the generation which witnessed the deification of the various Seleucidai and Ptolemies 'suddenly seemed to see the light. Traditional gods... were simply old-world rulers and benefactors of mankind, who had, by their own insistence or the gratitude of their subjects, been transferred to the ranks of heaven'. This is, in fact, the doctrine of Euhemerus, who wrote a novel of travel in which he described an imaginary voyage to an island called Panchaea. Here was a monument, a golden pillar which gave the novel its

title Hiera Anagraphe, 'on which the deeds of Uranus and Zeus were inscribed, and after these an account of the deeds of Artemis and Apollo had been added by Hermes' (D.S. 5.45, cf. 6.2.4.-10). These people had been great rulers in their day and were now worshipped as gods by their grateful subjects. The connections with Hellenistic ruler cult are undeniable, and the novel has been interpreted, according to taste, as either supporting the traditional belief of Greek epic poetry which drew no clear line between gods and great men, or as advancing justification for contemporary ruler cult, or again as a work of rationalizing atheism. However there is no evidence to support Murray ((1912) 141) when he says that the work had 'instant and enormous success' or theories which assert that Euhemerus expresses the mood of the times by saying that the gods were originally only men who had been deified. In fact the theory which Euhemerus propounded made little impact on the Greeks, and although Diodorus, taking it, typically, as fact, embodied it in his sixth book, Euhemerism did not really become popular until it was introduced into the Roman world via Ennius' translation. It has been argued that the advisers of Antiochus I Theos Dikaios Epiphanes Philorhomaios Philhellen of Commagene (who dates from the second half of the first century B.C.), who allegedly dreamt up the royal cult, were deeply influenced by Euhemerus, but the parallels adduced are not sufficiently close or striking to support the

argument[99]. But, even allowing that Euhemerus' influence on the cult of Antiochus could be shown, it would not necessarily help the pro-decline case, for even if Euhemerus was a subversive figure who undermined the authority of the traditional gods, the Greek cities still celebrated their birthdays and even proclaimed that they were the place where the god was born. Furthermore, although he was sometimes attacked in antiquity as an atheist, it was only with the rise of the Christian apologists, who liked to use his work as evidence for the 'real' nature of the Greek gods, that he achieved true notoriety; there seems to be a hint of that process in the pro-decline case also.

Thus the influence of Euhemerus and philosophical scepticism as trends running parallel to the depersonalization of the gods through the use of abstractions in general and Tyche in particular, should not be overestimated or brought to bear on the arguments in favour of the decline. Again Burkert ((1985) 305) has pertinent comments to make. He says that the perspective, the verbalization and the type of questions asked did indeed change, but observes that in spite of the temptation to see an intellectual battle in which logos triumphs over myth, modern over archaic, we must remember that this 'victory' remains ineffectual in practice. In this he is surely correct.

vii) Summary

The contact of Greek with non-Greek populations who worshipped different gods, the deliberate encouragement of certain cults for political reasons, the adoption of ruler cult, the influence of philosophy, the response of individuals to the insecurities of a world in which rapid changes brought striking reversals of fortune, so that Tyche was often invoked as a powerful deity, all contribute to a rather confusing picture of change which is hard to focus sharply. Yet that difficulty is instructive. The Olympian 'system' had never been closely circumscribed, and as such remained in a constant state of flux. The key distinction here is not between doubt and belief, frigidity and emotion, but between preserving tradition and adopting new practices. We are dealing with a flexible religion, not a rigid system which declines as a whole when one element in it is afflicted; shifts in emphasis within polytheism are not synonymous with its overall decline.

Thus the breakthrough of the cults of personifications from the fourth century B.C. onwards[100] is not a sign of an undermining of the old religion, nor a feature which goes hand in hand with a decreasing 'faith' in the anthropomorphic gods, nor does Tyche represent the final stage of the secularizing of religion[101]. Religious belief was still more-or-less ubiquitous despite the scepticism evident among the

upper strata of society. Religion has not declined; religious consciousness has been re-organised in order to fulfil the needs of the people living in the changed world.

iii) <u>Nemesis, Kairos and Tyche show, in different degrees, an extension or innovation of existing representations of concepts; why these three in particular and why does it happen in these ways?</u>

The answer to these questions which is offered here comes under two main headings, both of which have been encountered frequently throughout the previous chapters. The first concerns iconography and relates to the development of symbolic attributes for a new kind of public (which include learned scholar-poets and their artistic equivalents, the libraries of especially Alexandria and Pergamum, and the influence of Stoic allegory) to whom attributes and their interrelations, be these spatial, causal, temporal or familial, became particularly important. Thus the Tyche of Antioch is placed in relation to a specific locality, and although Kairos and Nemesis are more self-contained, in the sense that they are defined by their personal attributes alone, this shows that, even if the relationships between personifications are important or essential in some contexts, a single figure can still perform an unmistakably allegorical function.

The second half of the answer concerns the historical and political circumstances in which these works of art were produced and in which the personifications functioned. It is no accident that Nemesis, Kairos and Tyche should be popular concepts: the general

political instability, the career of Alexander the Great, the rise of Macedon as commented upon by Demetrius of Phalerum, the importance of taking opportunities, the jealousy generated by much of this activity are all factors which influence the way in which these personifications were perceived and treated. We might also notice in passing that the figures also differ in content: Nemesis and Tyche are opposed as embodiments of order and disorder respectively, and yet whereas one might have expected them to have been rigorously separated, the Alexandrians were struck by the similarity of the two and ultimately assimilated them.

a) Iconography

In the course of each individual chapter we have witnessed the changes undergone by Kairos, Nemesis and Tyche within the Hellenistic period and have seen that these changes embody, in differing respects, extension and/or innovation and continuity and/or change. The special significance that iconography assumes in these processes is directly linked to the distinctive artistic and literary milieu so aptly represented by the scholar-poet. The libraries, as established centres of learning, engendered an artistic environment in which recondite allusion was highly valued and widely practised. This environment was highly conducive to the development and invention of allegorical abstractions like those under scrutiny;

personal, temporal, spatial and kinship relations, attributes, gesture, physiognomic features and so on assumed secondary meanings which provided the key to the decipherment of works of art. We are dealing with a public which was highly sensitive and which demanded of its allegorical figures attributes which were iconographically specific. Inevitably the process occurs also in literature, as can be seen clearly in the exploitation of the epigram as a commentary on, or even a translation of, a work of art. We have already encountered examples of this in Fr 114 Pf. of Callimachus on the Apollo from Delos (a completely gratuitous interpretation of the statue) and the epigram by Posidippus on the Kairos of Lysippus, which is a valid 'reading' of that statue. We also remarked that this rationalisation of the ancient Apollo figure may well have close connections with the Stoic movement(102).

It is interesting, and important in the light of the insights it affords, to compare the iconographic developments which we have encountered, with a very similar trend which can be observed in literature concerning tombstones, real or more often imaginary, which reinforces our findings and comments concerning the various artistic and literary fashions prevalent in the period, precisely because this form of epigram is both artistic and literary. Free-standing sculpture, reliefs, paintings and inscriptions had

long been used together in various combinations on graves, and when the verse epitaph as a literary form became au courrant it was natural that authors should refer to both the dead person and the figured decoration on his or her tomb.

An epigram, AP 7.422 = HE 2029ff by Leonidas of Tarentum, a contemporary of Posidippus, refers to a tombstone surmounted by a carving of a particular throw of the dice which was called 'Chian', the worst throw possible. This is the earliest example of what Gow, Page ad loc. call a 'somewhat far-fetched joke' and in which Leonidas considers, but rejects, the possibility that the deceased was a Chian or an unlucky gambler, and concludes that the real significance of the dice is that he drank himself to death on Chian wine(103). Thus, as in art, information can be conveyed in this context by the use of enigmatic images.

This trend persisted into the next century in the work of Alcaeus of Messene whose technique and outlook suggest the influence of Cercidas and whose concern with Philip V of Macedon show he was writing shortly after Cynoscephalae which was fought in 197 B.C. His poem AP 7. 429 = HE 96ff is an epitaph of a woman whose tomb has only two letter Φ's inscribed on it. After adding the numerical value of the letters (Φ = 500 therefore 2Φ = 1000) and getting the name Chilias, which he

rejects, he tries the phonetic values of the letters and gets Φ twice, φεῖ δίς, and smugly announces that he is the Oedipus who had found the solution to this riddle, which is that her name is Phidis; he then praises the designer's ingenuity.

Alcaeus' fine example of the Hellenistic fondness for mystery and compression is matched by five epigrams by Antipater of Sidon, floruit circa 150 B.C. In the first of these, AP 7. 423 = HE 362ff, Bittis, the dead woman herself, explains the five pictures on her tomb: the jay shows she was loquacious, the cup that she enjoyed drinking, the bow that she was a Cretan[104], the wool that she was a good worker, and the snood that she had grey hair.

In AP 7. 424 = HE 370ff, the reins, the muzzle and the bird from Tanagra, symbols which when unexplained seem only suitable for a man's grave, show that Lysidice was one who got up in the night to work, directed her house and was not fond of words.

In AP 7. 425 = HE 380ff, also by Antipater, we are told how Myro's tomb bears a whip, an owl, a bow, a grey goose and a swift bitch. These show, respectively, that she was a just chastiser of faults, a faithful servant of Athena, a strict 'well-strung directress' of her house, a careful guardian of that house and that she took good care of her children. The arbitrary nature

of these symbols, as Gow observes in his commentary, is shown by the fact that in AP 7. 423 = HE 362ff the bow was interpreted to mean Cretan and the dog in AP 7. 54 = HE 2671ff means a Cynic, but this is not the point at issue here: what matters is that Antipater himself unequivocally conceives of these images as functioning as a symbolic language; the word he uses to describe the relationship between the image and the concept it represents is symbolon. In AP 7. 426 = HE 390ff the lion on the tomb of Teleutias son of Theodorus is called an 'emblem of courage', σύμβολον ἀλκᾶς (1.5) and in AP 7. 427 = HE 396ff he also tells us that the images 'bear a message' (ἀγγέλουντι 1. 7). In the latter the epitaph is expressed merely by nine knuckle-bones used as dice. The first throw represented is that called Ἀλέξανδρος (1. 4), the second ἔφηβος (1. 5) and the last Χῖος (1. 6), and the whole is firmly interpreted as meaning that the dead man was from Chios, was called Alexander and died in his youth.

The word symbolon is also used to describe such images by Meleager who wrote two epigrams in this genre. One of these, AP 7. 421 = HE 4008ff is an epitaph on himself in the form of a riddle. The allusions here are extremely abstruse. The epitaph deals with a winged figure which carries a spear and a boar skin, and the reader has to extract Meleager's name and his attributes from the symbols. Their meaning is revealed in ll.7 ff:

> Then - yes , I think I am right - the man
> beneath the earth was a sophist, and you
> are the winged word for which he was

famous. You carry the double-edged attribute of Artemis in allusion to his laughter mixed with seriousness, and perhaps to the metre of his love verses. Yes, indeed, these symbols of boar-slaying point to his namesake, Meleager, son of Oeneus. Hail, even among the dead, you who fitted together into one work of wisdom Eros, the Muses and the Charites.

The discovery of the final solution to the problem by looking at the image as a whole after studying its details for clues can be compared with the rather more immediate recognition of the significance of the total shape of poems known as technopaegnia (105), which were also popular at this time.

The longest and most sophisticated of poems of the type which we have been discussing here is Meleager's Epitaph for Antipater of Sidon AP 7. 428 = HE 4660ff. On this imaginary tombstone is a figure of a cock carrying a sceptre under its wing and seizing a palm-branch in its claws; on the very edge of the base is a knuckle-bone. After the now familiar initially futile attempts to make sense of the picture (which of course are designed to show the author's ingenuity), Meleager discloses the correct answer: the palm signifies the city of Tyre (ματέρα φοινίκων - 1.14) where the deceased was born; the cock symbolises a man who made himself heard, was a great lover and an accomplished singer; the sceptre is a token of his eloquence (heralds carried them); the knucklebone means that he died of a fall when drunk. This final detail in

particular is not entirely self-evident and carries the allusion one stage further. The die signifies a fall when drunk because in the poem by Leonidas we saw that 'Chian' was the name of a good wine and a bad dice throw, so a die showing the 'Chian' throw might therefore signify a bad fall caused by good wine. Thus the whole work revolves around the word 'Chian' which is precisely the word which Meleager leaves out. This shows the nature of the literary environment in which the poets and artists we have been studying were operating, for here it is taken for granted by Meleager that his readers will supply the missing word from Leonidas AP 7. 422 = HE 2029ff and Antipater AP 7. 427 = HE 396ff with which they are assumed to be familiar.

The importance of the context in which our personifications existed cannot be overestimated, especially in considering their development. The attributes carried by the figures are emblems or symbols, replete with meaning, and this provides them with a great deal of utility which led Hellenistic artists to value an image's symbolic qualities as highly as its plastic qualities. It was conscious choice which led them to turn to complicated and often bizarre figures, in the genuine belief that they were the ones best suited to express all the nuances of their thought and the subtlety of their intentions. In many cases they failed to realise that an excess of meaningful content can be a hindrance to plastic

expression (as, for example, in the Nile figure which is literally crawling with cubits); once a given complexity of symbolism has been reached the balance between form and idea becomes distorted. However, it is significant that the same defects and excesses appear in both literature and art, where the obsession with learned allusion very often stifled aesthetic considerations, Lycophron's Alexandra being a prime example. The 'reading' of form now became an important factor, and it was accomplished by means of gesture and attribute. One notable feature of the Apotheosis of Homer relief is that many of the figures had inscribed names to identify them, but, significantly, only those whose identity was not clear from their forms and attributes, most especially the personifications on the lower band, rather than the traditional deities depicted on the upper two bands. But if these figures, many of whom had no firmly established iconography, require names to aid the process of identification, the same is not true of Kairos, Nemesis and the Tyche of Antioch. Kairos is shown running because he is hard to catch; Eutychides went to great lengths to make clear that Antioch was seated by a river, not only showing the figure at her feet swimming but also making the surrounding material as water-like as possible(106); Nemesis carries the cubit ruler because she presides over the right measure. Moreover, the multiplication of attributes which Nemesis experiences as she gains new functions

shows just how addicted to this mode of representation artists of this period were. In addition to this, the striking connection between the later literary descriptions of her and the works of art show that in her case the artistic side of the figure assumed such a distinctive and well-established form that it came to dictate the way in which she was portrayed in literature.

Thus iconography is a major force in the innovation and development of all three concepts. In short, Kairos, Nemesis and Tyche are especially suited to a type of expression which was very fashionable in the Hellenistic age. Hence their popularity in it.

b) <u>Historical and Political Circumstances</u>

The artistic environment in which the iconography of Nemesis, Kairos and Tyche developed is a crucial factor to take into account, but there is also a wider context into which these figures should be placed if we are to understand why, in particular, these three became popular; they must be located in their overall historical and political environment as well as in their artistic context if we are to approach a more complete understanding of their development and significance. Comments made in the previous chapters will here by synthesized and expanded in two main areas, namely Alexander's conquests and their immediate effects, and the political instability

thereafter and the role played by Nemesis, Tyche and Kairos in it. Given these factors I intend to argue that it is not by chance that these three concepts became popular to the degrees they did. In this area Tyche plays the greatest part and Nemesis the smallest; this is governed partly by social and political factors, partly by the fact that, as in her iconography, Nemesis is already a firmly established figure before these forces came into play and is thus less susceptible to the innovations which Tyche and Kairos underwent.

The conquests of Alexander had the effect of widening the spatial horizons of the Greek world. Dodds ((1951) 237) remarks that they also widened all the horizons of the mind, arguing that the new freedom of movement had an analogue in the 'levelling out of the temporal determinants'. This, he believes created a new freedom for the mind to travel backwards in time and chose at will from past experience those elements which it could best assimilate and exploit, and thus writers and artists,as we have already seen, began consciously to use the tradition instead of being used by it. The other corollary of the new spatial dimension was the expansion of the religious dimension(107). It is, of course, always difficult to assess the influence of political changes on the religious disposition of individuals, especially if there is no evidence or if what evidence is available comes merely from the upper

intellectual strata, but there can still be little doubt of their influence on the external and social aspects of religion: we encountered many of these 'currents of religious experience running in different directions' in discussing the 'decline' of religion, and widespread worship of Tyche is certainly one of these external factors. Syncretisms were especially successful in the Hellenistic world, as can, for example, be illustrated by the dedications to Nemesis - Isis - Tyche or Delos. Such cults often acquired important positions even amongst the official cults of various cities, and among the influential factors which made this possible are the various trends which were creating shifts of emphasis within the spectrum of religious experience and which had, as one of their offshoots, the result of the newly important significance of the universal power of Fate and capricious Tyche. Thus economic trends, the role of the kings, and the transformation of the polis as a focus of social life show the co-existence and interaction of a large number of layers or loci of action. This as Davies ((1984) 264) rightly says, yields a picture of incoherence and contradiction, but it accurately reflects the plural society in which the members of a single political unity show fundamental differences and discontinuities in institutions, culture, and social structure, lack a common social will and owe their political juxtaposition to the influence of external factors, most notably to power wielded from

the outside. It is in this environment that Tyche, Nemesis and Kairos developed in the ways in which we have seen.

There is ample evidence to show that the period following Alexander's conquests did much to foster a sense of instability in human affairs and thus, in particular, the rise in importance of Tyche. Political circumstances play a critical part here and, whilst there seems to be scant justification for describing the social conditions of the Hellenistic period in the apocalyptic terms which have been used by some scholars, it is nevertheless hard to find a more volatile period of history than the first centuries of the Hellenistic period; a secure life could only be found, it seems, by siding with the most powerful protagonists, flattering those in power, or placating Fate of Tyche. The latter was an option that was widely taken. Stoicism has been described by Grant ((1953) xxix) as 'a philosophy for an age of tyranny and suppression of individual rights', which, despite the power politics of the era could establish people within the fortress of their own minds and render them safe from all external circumstances or conditions. Yet even Stoicism was unable to assimilate Tyche fully: the first Peripatetics, Demetrius of Phalerum[108] and Theophrastus[109] had helped to shape her form , an anonymous poet, in a hymn to Tyche, compared her to Clotho, Ananke and Iris[110],

Polybius (1:11) and later Posidonius did not disdain the concession to popular belief implied in the use of her name, and we have also noticed the famous fragment of Demetrius of Phalerum on the rise of Macedon which Plutarch quoted with reference to the defeat of Perseus by Romans. Yet if these historical and political circumstances exerted a powerful influence over Tyche, the same can be said, although to a lesser degree, of Kairos and Nemesis. In the case of the former the importance of grasping opportunities is a prominent theme in Hellenistic historiography; in the case of Nemesis we have argued that chance, the envy of the gods, or the envy of Nemesis, were alternative ways of explaining many events taking place in the world.

Thus these three abstractions are ones that are readily called to mind by individuals or communities in the political and social world in which they were especially significant elements, and, in addition to their place in the artistic scheme of things we can confidently argue that historical and political circumstances are prominent forces in the development of Nemesis, Kairos, and especially Tyche, in the Hellenistic era.

iv) Personification as a Concept

The purpose of this final section is to tie together some of the general comments made throughout the main chapters of this thesis which have not already been dealt with in the previous sections of this chapter. Firstly it must be stressed that personification does not pose the same problems in art and in literature, since the inherent differences between the two media dictate that there are certain fundamental divergences between the ways in which personifications are presented in them. One of the reasons why Greek personifications remained alive and vivid is that artists and dramatists were compelled to personify wherever they wished to depict something immaterial; the option of showing its effects on visible things is not open to the visual arts as it is in literary works. This has been well illustrated by the example which we drew from Callimachus' Hymn 6 Demeter which highlights the difference in emphasis which exists in the case of Nemesis' function as the punisher of hybris. In art Nemesis takes on the role of executrix of the punishment and tramples the hybristes underfoot; in literature, as can be seen from the way in which she operates in Callimachus, her action is 'second hand', in that she is a force of Fate who instigates the punishment of Erysichthon but does not carry it out herself. The difference between the two modes of presentation surely underlies this, since the difficulties faced by visual artists in depicting

Nemesis acting by proxy are considerable. Hence we must introduce a qualification into our use of the 'sliding scale' or 'spectrum', since here the artist is forced into the anthropomorphic mode of representation in a clear cut choice where the gradations of the scale become imperceptible: as Beazley ((1947) 6f) accutely remarks in relation to an artistic representation of Athanasia(112), a poet may have used some vague expression on the boundary between a thing and a person, which might have been taken for a personification, but need not have been. However, as he rightly continues, the complete personification of Athanasia on the vase may be due to a painter, who from the nature of his art, 'had to choose and could not sit on the fence between person and thing'. This is a crucial point. There are contexts where the notion of a spectrum is unhelpful, as in the case of Athanasia and of hybris and Nemesis.

Secondly it is clear that personification in the Hellenistic era is not so closely associated with the religious tradition as an analysis of such authors as Hesiod, Aeschylus and Pindar would imply was the case earlier. This is instructive since it underlines a difference between Hellenistic and pre-Hellenistic times: in the later period personifications can be treated purely as artistic conceits without any reliance on a train of tradition. Kairos and the Tyche of Antioch clearly do not stand in the same tradition

as Nemesis, Peitho, Eukleia, Nike etc., and they obviously represent a marked difference in the way in which personifications can be treated; they do not require a far reaching religious background and indeed, as for example in the case of Callimachus' Erysichthon - Aithon and Cercidas' Metados, may be a conscious reaction against that background. Given the artistic and historical environment of the Hellenistic age, it now becomes possible for artists to detach themselves from the old traditions and to create personifications from nothing to serve their own immediate creative needs.

v) Epilogue

The picture which I have endeavoured to present through the examination of certain aspects of the Hellenistic world, is a highly complex one. That world was born out of an expansion which was at once geographical, social, religious, political and artistic, and the solutions which it found through its efforts to come to terms with the changes embodied in the 'New World' are the features which give Hellenistic culture its distinctive flavour. Contradiction and complexity permeate much of the evidence we have assessed: continuity runs alongside change; extension alongside newness; reliance on tradition alongside radical innovation; continuing and flourishing religious practice alongside religious scepticism. But the very difficulty and nature of the

problem provides the clue to its decipherment. We are not faced with a choice between options but with the task of reconciling the contraditions; here the interesting factors are that the contradictions all run concurrently and that the Hellenistic world took them for granted. If our vision of Hellenistic culture is complex and confusing, poikilos rather than haplous, that is surely a reflection of that culture itself. If the contradictions do not admit of reconciliation, this too is a reflection of that culture. In a sense the Hellenistic world was able to have its cake and eat it, if only because it had always got more than one cake.

NOTES ON CHAPTER 5

1. Cf. Wardman (1982) passim. Although his observations are made in relations to Roman religion, many of his arguments about civic polytheism can be applied *mutatis mutandis* to Hellenistic religion.

2. Quoted by Vernant in *Myth and Society in Ancient Greece* (Brighton 1980) 98.

3. See Davies (1984) 291.

4. Cf. Franz Marc's aphorism 'traditions are lovely things - to create traditions, that is, not live off them' quoted by H.B. Chipp *Theories of Modern Art* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London 1968) 180. Lysippus would doubtless have approved.

5. X. *Mem*. ii. 1.21-32.

6. Even Plato's parable of the Cave at R. 514A would more accurately be described as parabolic than allegorical in the sense of Prodicus' story.

7. See Burkert (1985) 313-14; J. Pépin (1976) 101-103.

8. Cf. Ath. XV 687c for a possible similarity in the Judgement of Paris. See K. Reinhardt *Das Parisurteil* (Frankfurt 1938) 79 n. 22.

9. See M. Lavarenne *La Psychomachie de Prudence* (Paris 1933) introduction; J. Seznec (1953) 109-10 and figs. 37-38; C.S. Lewis (1936) Chapter 2; R. Tuve (1963); (1964).

10. See Paus. 1.8.2.; 9.16.2.

11. See Aeschin.i.128; ii.145.

12. Note, however that Hesiod also calls Pheme a god at *Op*. 760ff., although his description is rather colourless: θεός νύ τίς ἐστι καὶ αὐτή.

13. The evidence of Ar. *Pax* 1017ff. must not be pressed to imply a cult of Eirene at that time. Cf. Cornelius Nepos *Timoth*. 2 who, speaking of the Peace of Callias says tum primum arae Paci publice sint factae.

14. Paus. 9.16.10.

15. Paus. 1.43.6.; Pliny *HN* 36.25. Both authors mention statues by Scopas of Venus/Aphrodite and Pothos on Samothrace. The authenticity of this is accepted by Bieber (1981) 28 and by A.F. Stewart *Skopas of Paros* (Park Ridge 1977) 109.

16. Bieber (1981)26.

17. Nilsson (1967) I. 809. pl. 28.2.

18. See Pépin (1976) 85-92 for fuller definitions and discussions.

19. This provided opportunities for reconciliation with Christian religion such as G.F. Creuzer's Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker, besonders der Griechen in Vorträgen und Entwürfen, I-IV, (Leipzig and Darmstadt 1810-1812) which Burkert ((1985) 1) describes as 'the last large-scale (and thoroughly unavailing) endeavour of this kind.' See also Pépin (1976) 45f. 50.

20. D-K. 21. B.11.

21. B.15-16.

22. F. Wehrli, Zur Geschichte der allegorischen Deutung Homers, (Diss. Basel 1928); F. Buffière, Les Mythes d'Homère et la pensée greque (Paris 1956); P. Lévêque, Aurea catena Homeri. Une étude sur l'allégorie grecque (Paris 1959); Pépin (1976).

23. See Plato R. 378D.

24. D-K. 8. R. Pfeiffer, History of Classical Scholarship from the beginnings to the end of the Hellenistic age. (Oxford 1968) 9-12.

25. D-K.25.

26. See Burkert (1985) 462 n. 2.

27. See Pépin (1976) 125ff.

28. SVF I. 553 = Cic. Fin. ii.69.

29. So says Adso in U. Eco's The Name of the Rose (London 1984) 41. That sentiment seems quite apt in this context also. Cf. Gregory the Great Epist. ix.9: 'quod legentibus scriptura, hoc idiotis praestat pictura.'

30. Crantor in Sextus Empiricus Against the Ethicists 51ff; Cic. Fin. 11.69.

31. The literature to which this painting has given rise is discussed by E. Pfuhl, Malerei und Zeichnung der Griechen (München 1923) I. 739, 743, 745.

32. Swindler (1929) 274.

33. See also Cic. Fin. 11.21, 69.

34. Onians (1979) 98.

35. See R. Pfeiffer (1952) 29f and 21 n 4.

36. See Pfeiffer (1952) pl.4a,b,d and e.

37. Ath. 197C-203B = FGrH 627 F2. See E.E. Rice (1983).

38. All these issues are well discussed by Rice (1983) passim.

39. Rice (1983) 36.

40. See F. Caspari (1933) 410.

41. Il. 22.317; 23.226.

42. The phrase is T.B.L. Webster's.

43. Thus Rice (1983) 37. Cf. Fraser (1972) i.396ff.

44. See A. Rehm in RE viii s.v. Hesperos, 1252-53; S. Karusu in Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae II.i. 904-927.

45. Rice (1983) 57; C.J. Emlyn-Jones 'ἔτος and ἐνιαυτός in Homeric Formulae', Glotta xlv (1967) 156ff; G. Murray 'Dis Geniti' JHS lxxi (1951) 120ff.

46. See e.g. Pi. Pae. 1.5ff.

47. A parallel to her can be adduced in the figure of Trieteris, who is portrayed on a Greek mirror dating from the first half of the third century B.C.. She is accompanied by Oine and Phallodia and acts as the nursemaid of Dionysus. This shows that the idea of personifying artificial times-spans was not unique to Ptolemy's Dionysiac precession. See W. Züchner Griechische Klappspiegel (Berlin 1942) 43.

48. See Harrison (1911) 186ff; Hinks (1939)43ff; Hamdorf (1964) 39f. 100f.

49. The issue is discussed by Rice (1983) 66f.

50. M. Warner (1985) 12.

51. The historical and political significance of the figures is discussed by Rice (1983) 102ff.

52. For a full account of pre-Hellenistic local personifications see Hamdorf (1964) 25ff., 90ff. For some fourth century B.C. and Hellenistic

personifications of cities see J.M.C. Toynbee The Hadrianic School (Cambridge 1934) 7 and n.7; P. Gardner 'Countries and Cities in Ancient Art' JHS xviii (1898) 47-81.

53. Ael. VH 13.22.

54. See B.R. Brown Ptolemaic Paintings and Mosaics and the Alexandrian Style (Cambridge Mass. 1957) 67 no. 48; M Robertson (1975) 470ff, 579ff.

55. G.W. Elderkin 'Arete and Corinth' Klio (NF xv) xxxiii (1940) 170-173.

56. C. Picard 'Représentations antiques de l'Apologue dit de Prodicos' CRAI (1951) 310-322.

57. Further objections of a historical and political nature are raised by Rice (1983) 104.

58. Pliny HN 35.137.

59. See Petersen (1939) 51.

60. See Dohrn (1960).

61. British Museum 2191. M.T.S., ESI; Bieber (1981) 127, fig. 497. On interpretation see Petersen (1939) 63ff; D. Pinkwart (1965).

62. Ael. VH 13.22.

63. Cf. Galaton's picture of Homer vomiting and other poets collecting the vomit in jugs: Ael. VH 13.22. cf. AP 7.6 = HE 224ff.

64. E.g. Murray (1912) 112; Dodds (1951) 242; Grant (1953) xviii.

65. IG II² 333c.

66. See Walbank (1957) ad Plb. 2.35.5ff.

67. Epicur. Ep. iii. 133.

68. This trend is beginning to be resisted, with scholars such as Price (1984) and Wardman (1982) in the forefront of the movement. Yet the pro-decline faction contains numerous famous scholars : Walbank (1981), Webster (1964), Festugière (1955), (1954), Tarn and Griffith (1952), Cary (1951), Dodds (1951), Nilsson (1948), Murray (1912), Rossbach (1897-1902) and Posnansky (1890) are all encountered in the following discussion.

69. This argument is a main tenet of Wardman (1982) and is primarily derived from him.

70. For instance, Grant (1953) entitles his book Hellenistic Religions. The Age of Syncretism.

71. See n. 68 above.

72. Full details are given e.g. at Walbank (1981)119.

73. Sappho Fr. 140; 168 L-P. cf. Hes. Fr. 139.

74. Burkert (1985) 178 and nn 15ff.

75. Aristomachus FGrH 383 F 13; Pi. Fr. 80,95; Dith. 2; P. 3.77f.

76. J. Travlos, Bildlexicon zur Topographie des antiken Athen (Tübingen 1971) 352-56; A. von Salis, 'Die Göttermutter des Agorakritos' JDAI xxviii (1913) 1-26.

77. Refs. at Burkert (1985) 420 n. 32.

78. Refs. at Burkert (1985) 420 n. 34.

79. Refs. at Burkert (1985) 420 n. 35.

80. That 'something' is, to many scholars, Tyche. Cf. Walbank's 'agnostics and atheists' above.

81. 'Die Entstehung des Herrscherkults ist das dunkelste und umstrittenste Problem der griechischen Religion in geschichtlicher Zeit' Nilsson (1967) i. 135. See Habicht (1956); Taeger (1957); Dörrie (1964); Pleket (1968).

82. He believes the cult of Tyche is a closely related sentiment to this, as we shall see below.

83. Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus and Aratus' Phaenomena are both 'pro-Zeus'.

84. See Dodds (1951) 242 n. 33 for references.

85. See W.B. Dinsmoor 'Rhamnountine Fantasies', Hesperia 30 (1961) 179-204, and esp. 186-194.

86. See Price (1984) 164 n. 70 for references.

87. Festugière (1955) 10.

88. Examples of such prices are given by Cary (1951) 364 n. 1.

89. SIG 1095-1120; Michel 961-1016.

90. See A.M. Burford 'The Economics of Greek Temple Building' PCPhS 191 (NS 11) (1965) 21-34, esp. 25.

91. See Rice (1983) 5 and n. 10.

92. See Parke (1977) 18 ff; Rice (1983) 26 n. 1.

93. The transformations with respect to processions are well discussed by Rice (1983) 26 f.

94. Arr. Ind. 36. 3.

95. See Rice (1984) 230 and n. 109.

96. Cf. Arat. Phaen. 1-18; cf.96-136; 408-29; 765-777.

97. See Fraser (1972) 289-98; Pépin (1976) 147-49.

98. See O. Murray 'Hecataeus of Abdera and the Pharaonic Kingship', JEA 56 (1970) 141-171; O. Murray, J. Stern 'Hecataeus of Abdera and Theophrastus on Jews and Egyptians' JEA 59 (1973) 159-168.

99. See H. Dörrie (1964) and the reviews by O. Murray CR 80 (1966) 105-108 and H. Pleket (1968). Dörrie thinks Antiochus' advisers were heavily indebted to Euhemerus in conceiving and elaborating the complex cult regulations; Pleket raises objections on p.446 and convincingly argues against Euhemerus being the auctor intellectualis behind Antiochus. He also objects to the theory of lack of religiosity in ruler cult (447). O. Murray (108) says 'few will follow (Dörrie) in thinking that Antiochus was influenced by Euhemerus' Panchaea'.

100. See Nilsson (1952) passim.

101. As Nilsson (1948), (1952) 39 believes to be the case.

102. See above p. 5/24 f; Pfeiffer (1952). The Stoics went a long way in their attempts to explain myths in allegorical terms: for instance Cleanthes explained triple-headed Cerberus as a symbol of the triple division of philosophy into logic, physics and ethics, Apollo ὡς ἀπ' ἄλλων καὶ ἄλλων τόπων τὰς ἀναστολὰς ποιούμενον (SVF I. 540),and Dionysus as a personification of the sun, on the grounds that it had received the surname Dionysus ἀπό τοῦ διάνυσαι, because in its daily course from the east to west from which day and night result, it traversed the entire circle of the sky (διανύω = finish a journey); Chrysippus who succeeded Cleanthes in 232 B.C., also explained numerous divine figures allegorically, as for example in his interpretation of the Charites as personifications of the threefold relationship of giving, receiving and paying back (SVF II.1082),

and his allegory of Dike (quoted by Aulus Gellius NA xiv. 4, cf SVF III, 197):

> She has the title of virgin as a symbol of her purity and an indication that she has never given way to evil-doers, that she has never yielded to soothing words, to prayers and entreaties, to flattery, nor to anything of that kind. Therefore she is properly presented too as stern and dignified, with a serious expression and a keen, steadfast glance, in order that she may inspire fear in the wicked and courage in the good; to the latter, as her friends, she presents a friendly aspect, to the former a stern face.
>
> (Tr. C.J. Rolfe).

103. Chian wine was famous in antiquity and is mentioned several times in Hellenistic epigrams: Dionysus AP 12.108 = HE 1453ff; Call. AP 13.9 = HE 1341ff Hedylus in Ath. 11.472F; Posidippus AP 5.183 = HE 3094ff.

104. Crete was famous for its bowmen: Pi. P. 5.41.

105. Eg. Simias' 'wings, 'axe' and 'egg' (Frs. 24, 25,26 Powell), Theocritus' 'Pipes', and Dosiadas' 'altar'. See Petersen (1939) 54f; Onians (1979) 108-110.

106. He was famed for making his personifications of river-gods embody the element they represented: fecit... Eurotam, in quo artem ipso amne liquidiorem plurimi dixere (Pliny HN 34 78).

107. See above section (ii)b.

108. Plb. 29.21. 1-9.

109. Cic. Tusc. iii. x. 21.

110. Powell Coll. Alex. 196 no. 34.

111. Loc. cit.

112. New York 12.229.4.


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

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

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Abstract

Abstract

In the Hellenistic era Tyche, Kairos and Nemesis all show extensions of,or innovations in, the existing ways in which personifications are conceived, represented and exploited. This thesis examines the developments undergone by these three personifications and the reason for those developments. This is done in two main areas : firstly iconography, which is related to specific artistic factors appertaining to the Hellenistic era; secondly, and more widely, the historical and political circumstances of the times. The case-studies, each of which comprises a study of precedent and a study of the particular personification in Hellenistic literature and art, are set against each other, and against a preliminary study of the ways in which pre-Hellenistic Greek culture deployed personification, with the aim of pinpointing where the main extensions and innovations in the use of personification in the Hellenistic world lie. These findings are then used to challenge the received view that the Hellenistic age was one of religious decline, and it is argued that the cult of Tyche, ruler-cult, philosophical scepticism,

syncretism, the general popularity of personifications, and various other developments relating to the external aspects of Hellenistic religion are not symptoms of a decline in religion but are responses to a changing environment. Care is also taken to distinguish between the views of an educated élite and (so far as they can be ascertained) the attitudes of other social groups. Thus what has previously been designated 'decadence' is re-interpreted as 'modification' or 'shifts of emphasis'. The resulting picture is complex and varied, but in so being it aims to be a more accurate reflection of a complex and varied culture.